The Other Side Of The Hill Liddell Hart

Barcode : 5990010109843
Title - The other side of the
Author - B. H. Liddell Hart
Language - english
Pages - 317
Publication Year - 1948
Barcode EAN.UCC-13

5 '99001 0"1 09843

THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN
COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE
AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS

THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE HILL

BBS— —

GERMANY'S GENERALS

THEIR RISE AND FALL, WITH THEIR OWN

ACCOUNT OF MILITARY EVENTS

1939 - 1945

B. H. LIDDELL HART

CASSELL

AND COMPANY LTD

LONDON • TORONTO • MELBOURNE • SYDNEY

WELLINGTON

To

MY SON, ADRIAN
and

to all who helped
in this effort to he of service to history

First Published 194S

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT FR1T4JN AT GREYCAINES
(TAYLOR G4.RNETT EVANS AND CO LTD ), WATFORD, HERTS

F248

CONTENTS

PAGE

Preface . . 7

FART I HITLER'S GENERALS

CHAPTER

I. The Suicidal Schism 9

II. The Mould of Seeckt . . . 17

III The Biomberg-Fritsch Era . . -27

IV. The Brauchitsch-Halder Era . . . 38

V. "Soldier in the Sun" — Rommel . . 52

VI. Soldiers in the Shadow 62

VII. "The Old Guard' 5 — Rundsted; . . 78

PART II — PRELIMINARIES TO WAS.

VIII. The Rise of Hitler .... 87
IX. The Rise of Arrnoui .... 96

PART III — THROUGH GERMAN EYES

X. How Hitler Bsat France — and Saved

Britain . . . . . .111

XI. The End in France and the First Frustra-
tion ....... 144

XII. Misfires in the Mediterranean . 162

XIII. Frustration at Moscow . . . 174

D

Contents

CHAPTER PAGB

XIV. Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalin-
grad ... 197

XV. After Stalingrad . . 219

XVI. The Red Army . . . 229

XVII. Paralysis in Normandy . . . .236

XVIII. The Anti-Hitler Plot— as seen from H.Q,.

in the West . . . . 269

XIX. Hitler's Last Gamble — The Second

Ardennes Stroke .... 283

XX. Hitler — as a Young General Saw Him 305

Conclusion . . . . .310

Table of the German High Command . 312

Index . t . . . . .31

MAPS

The Western Front, 1940 . . . . 145

The Mediterranean . . . . . .164

The Eastern Front . ... 181

The Western Front, 1944-45 . . . 256

PREFACE

The story is told in Croker's Correspondence and Diaries
how, on a journey with Wellington, he and the Duke passed
the time by guessing what kind of country they would find
on the other side of each hill on the way. When Groker
expressed surprise at Wellington's successes in forecasting
it, the latter replied: "Why, I have spent all my life in
trying to guess what was at the other side of the hill. 59

Wellington's remark was subsequently extended into a
definition of the imaginative requirement in generalship,
in the wider sense of guessing what was happening "at the
other side of the hill" — behind the opposing front and in
the opponent's mind. It has also served to epitomize the
functions of Intelligence.

When the late war ended, I was fortunate in having an
early opportunity of exploring the "other side of the hill".
Some work I was doing for P.I D. brought me in contact
with the German generals and admirals over a lengthy
period. In the course of many discussions with them I was
able to gather their evidence on the events of the war
before memories had begun to fade or become increasingly
coloured by after- thoughts.

Understanding of what happened was helped by
studying the German generals, as well as hearing their
accounts. Few of them resembled the typical picture of
an iron Prussian soldier. Rundstedt came nearest it, but
in his case the impression was offset by his natural courtesy
and light touch of humour. His quiet dignity in adversity,
and uncomplaining acceptance of hard conditions — that
were no credit to his captors — won the respect of most
British officers who encountered him. In contrast to him
were a number of aggressive young generals, blustering
and boorish, who owed their rise to Nazi favour. But the
majority were of a different type to both, and by no means a
dominating one. Many would have looked in their natural
place at any conference of bank managers, or civil engineers.

They were essentially technicians, intent on their
professional job, and with little idea of things outside it.

Preface

It is easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked aud handled them,
and found them good instruments up to a point

In sifting and piecing together their evidence it was
useful to have a background knowledge of the military
situation in the pre-war period. It was a guide, not only
in saving time, but in avoiding misconceptions that were
still widely prevalent at the end of the war. The idea that
the General Staff had played a dominant part in Ger-
many's aggressive course, as it did before 1918, still
coloured the prosecution proceedings at the Nuremberg
Trial. Earlier, that fixed idea had hindered the British
and American Governments from giving timely and
effective encouragement to the underground movement
in Germany which, with military backing, had long been
planning Hitler's overthrow. That the prevailing concep-
tion of the General Staff's influence was an out-of-date
notion had become clear to anyone who dispassionately
followed the trend of the German Army between the wars.
But legends are persistent, and delusions tenacious. They
had the unfortunate effect of postponing Hitler's downfall
and prolonging the war months, and probably years, after
it would otherwise have ended. The ill-consequences for
Europe are now beginning to be realized

I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the
help and historical sense of those who facilitated the
early exploration of events. Also, to Captain F. S. Kingston,
whose mastery of the German language and intuitive
teamwork were of great assistance in the discussions. At
the same time I would express my appreciation of the
ready help given by so many of those "on the other side
of the hill", in contributing to this piece of historical
research, and of the objective attitude most of them showed
in discussing events Finally, I wish to thank Major-
General Sir Percy Hobart, Chester Wilmot, G. R. Atkinson
and Desmond Flower for valuable comments and sugges-
tions while the book was in preparation.

Tilford House, Tilford B ' H * lidd ELL HART
January, 1948

PART I

HITLER'S GENERALS

CHAPTER I

THE SUICIDAL SCHISM

Everything in war looks different at the time from what
it looks in the clearer light that comes after the war.
Nothing looks so different as the form of the leaders.
The public picture of them at the time is not only an unreal
one, but changes with the tide of success

Before the war, and still more during the conquest of
the West, Hitler came to appear a gigantic figure, com-
bining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a
Machiavelh and the fanatical fervour of a Mahomet.
After his first check in Russia, his figure began to shrink,
and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering
amateur m the military field, whose crazy orders and
crass ignorance had been the Allies 5 greatest asset. All
the disasters of the German Army were attributed to
Hitler; all its successes were credited to the German
General Staff.

That picture is not true, though there is some truth
in it. Hitler was far from being a stupid strategist. Rather,
he was too brilliant — and suffered from the natural faults
that tend to accompany such brilliance.

He had a deeply subtle sense of surprise, and was a
master of the psychological side of strategy, which he
raised to a new pitch. Long before the war he had
described to his associates how the daring coup that
captured Norway might be carried out, and how the
French could be manoeuvred out of the Maginot Line.

The Suicidal Schism

conquering combination. Instead, they pix>duced a
suicidal schism that became the salvation of their
opponents.

The older school of generals, products of the Genera!
Staff system, had been the chief executants of German
strategy throughout the war, but in the days of success
their part had not received full recognition. After the
tide turned, they filled an increasing part in the public
picture, and came to be regarded by the Allied peoples
as the really formidable element on the opposing side.
During the last year the spotlight was largely focused on
Rundstedt, their leading representative. The constant
question became, not what Hitler would do, but what
Rundstedt would do — both in the military field and in a
political coup to wrest power from the Nazis.

The German generals have been regarded as such a
closely-knit body, and so much of one mind, as to be
capable of wielding tremendous political power. That
impression accounts for the persistent expectation, on the
Allies 5 side, that the generals would overthrow Hitler —
an expectation that was never fulfilled. It also accounts
for the popular conviction that they were as great a
menace as he was, and shared the responsibility for Gei-
many's aggressions. That picture was true of the last
war, but was now out of date. The German generals had
little effect on the start of the Second World War — except
as an ineffectual brake.

Once the war had started, their executive efficiency
contributed a lot to Hitler's success, but their achievement
was overshadowed by his triumph. When they came into
more prominence in the eyes of the outside world, as
Hitler's star waned, they had become more impotent
inside their own country.

That was due to a combination of factors. They stood
for a conservative order and tradition which had little
appeal to a generation brought up in the revolutionary
spirit and fanatical faith of National Socialism. They

12

The Other Side of the Hill

could not count on the loyalty of their own troops in any
move against the regime — and especially its faith-inspiring
Fuhrer. They were handicapped by the way they had
isolated themselves from public affairs, and by the way
Hitler cunningly isolated them from sources of knowledge.
Another factor was their ingrained discipline and profound
sense of the importance of the oath of loyalty which they
had sworn to the Head of the State. Ludicrous as this may
seem in regard to one who was himself so outstanding as
a promise-breaker, it was a genuine feeling on their part,
and the most honourable of the factors which hampered
them. But along with it often ran a sense of personal
interest which undercut their loyalty to their fellows, and
their country's best interests, in face of a common threat.
The play of individual ambitions and the cleavage of
personal interests constituted a fatal weakness in their
prolonged struggle to maintain their professional claim in
the military field, and to preserve it from outside inter-
ference. This stiuggle went on throughout the twelve
years from Hitler's rise to Germany's fall

The first phase ended m a definite advantage to the
professionals that was indirectly gamed when Himml^r
played on Hitlei's fears so effectively as to prompt I am to
carry out a murderous purge of Gap tain Roehni and
other Brownshirt leaders It is by no means clear whether
the latter designed to overthrow Hitler, but there is no
doubt that they were aspiring to fill a big place in the
military system. Once they were killed off, Hitler became
more dependent on the generab' support, and the latter
were able to le-eslablish their own supremacv in the
Army.

The second phase reached a climax in January, 1 938,
when the professionals themselves were caught 111 another
of Himmler's traps. In 1933 Hitler had chosen General
von Blomberg as his War Minister. His fellow-generals
became increasingly disturbed at his susceptibility to
Hitler's influence, and were then shocked to hear that he

The Suicidal Schism

*3

was marrying a typist in his office. That alienated their
sympathies still further. But Hitler gave this "democratic 59
marriage his blessing and graced the wedding. Soon after-
wards, Himmler produced a police dossier purporting to
show that the bride was a prostitute. Thereupon Hitler,
in real or simulated fury, dismissed Blomberg from
office. Himmler followed this up by producing another
dossier in which homosexual charges had been fabricated
against General von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army, whereupon he in turn was removed from his
post by Hitler — and never reinstated, though subsequently
vindicated after a court of inquiry. (A fuller account
of this crisis is given in Chapter III.)

Hitler exploited the moral shock that the officers' coips
had suffered by seizing the opportunity to assume supreme
command of the German armed forces. This paved the
way for his ultimate control of strategy, while enabling
Himmler to strengthen his own influence. General Keitel,
whose wire-pulling had weakened the united front of the
generals in their protest against Fritsch's treatment, was
appointed to succeed Blomberg, but with a lower status,
and henceforth only kept that place by subservience to
Hitler. A more reputable soldier, General von Brauchitsch,
who belonged neither to the reactionary nor the Nazi
school, was made head of the Army. By this shrewd step,
Hitler sought to placate the Army, while assuring himself
of an executive commander who would be easier to handle
than Fritsch.

Brauchitsch, however, made a stronger rally m defence
of the professional class than had been expected. He also
sought to slow down the pace of Nazi foreign policy by
a warning that the German Army was not ready for war
and that Hitler must not push his aggressive moves so far
as to produce a fight. He was stiffened in his protests
by the Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, who
came out with such open condemnation of Hitler's war-
like policy as to spur Hitler to dismiss him. Even then,

14

The Other Side of the Hill

Brauchitsch and Haider, Beck's successor, made a stand
when Hitler looked like proceeding to extremes against
Czecho-Slovakia, but the ground was cut away beneath
their feet when the French and British Governments bowed
to Hitler's threat of war.

With the added prestige of his bloodless conquest of
Czecho-Slovakia Hitler was able to force the pace over
Poland. The generals were little check on him here
beyond helping to convince him that no risk of war on
that issue must be taken unless he first secured Russia's
neutrality. On the other hand, once he had done that,
he was able to persuade most of them that Britain and
France would stand aside, and that a stroke against Poland
would carry no serious risk of involving Germany in a
major war.

A fresh strain developed between Hitler and his
generals when, after the conquest of Poland, they found
that he was intent on precipitating the wider conflict they
feared by taking the ofFensive in the west. Apart from
the long-term risks, they did not believe that it was even
possible to overcome France. But once again their pro-
tests were overruled, and their subsequent talk of a con-
certed move to overturn Hitler came to nothing. It
would be unjust to blame them for their ineffectiveness
at this stage, for it is clear that they had good reason to
doubt whether their troops would have followed them in
turning against Hitler, and they had a natural repug-
nance to appearing as traitors to their country when at
war.

The invasion of France was ordered by Hitler in
face of their doubts. Its success was due partly to new
tactics and weapons which he had fostered when the older
generals were still conservatively sceptical; partly to an
audacious new plan, suggested by a junior, which he had
pushed them into adopting; partly to blunders by their
fellow-professionals in France on which they had not
reckoned.

The Suicidal Schism 1 5

Nevertheless, their executive skill was an indispensable
factor in Hitler's conquest of France. Indeed, it was
through his sudden and strange hesitation, not through
theirs, that the full fruits of the swift cut through to the
Channel were not reaped. But their great contribution
to victory resulted, ironically, in a further weakening of
their own position. It was Hitler who filled the world's
eye after that triumph, and the laurels crowned his brow,
not theirs. He took care to crown himself. In his mind,
too, he now became convinced that he was the greatest
of all strategists, and henceforth interfered increasingly
in the generals' sphere of activity, while becoming even
less willing to listen to any arguments from them that ran
counter to his desires.

Most of them were fearful when they found that he
was intending to plunge into Russia But, like so many
specialists, they were rather naive outside their own sphere,
and Hitler was able to overcome their doubts about his
Russian adventure with the aid of political "information"
designed to convince them of its necessity, and that Russia's
internal weakness would affect her military strength.
When the invasion began to go wrong, Brauchitsch and
Haider wanted to pull back, but Hitler had come too
close to Moscow to resist its temptation. He insisted on
pressing the attack at all cost, though the chances were
fading. When his failure could no longer be concealed,
he cleverly shifted the blame by a public dismissal of
Brauchitsch, and himself assumed supreme command of
the army as well as of the forces as a whole.

For the rest of the war, he was able to brush aside the
generals' views on policy, and even to override their
judgment in their own field. If one of them made a
protest, he could always find another one ambitious to
fill the vacancy, and ready to express faith in continued
attack — as most soldiers are, by instinct, always inclined
to do. At the same time, the way was now open for ever
increasing infiltration of S.S. leaders into the Army, and

1 6 The Othe? Side of the Hill

of Nazi spies to keep watch on all suspected commanders.
The possibility of a successful icvolt of the generals pro-
gressively diminished. All the latter could do was to
make the best of their orders — or to make the woist of
them. For there is reason to suspect that some of the
generals became ready to carry out orders that they
considered hopelessly rash, simply as a way of sabotaging
Hitler's designs and hastening the end of the war.

CHAPTER II

THE MOULD OF SEEGKT

The German general who had the greatest influence on
the First World War died the year before it began — and
had retiied seven years before it. This was Alfred von
Schheffen, who came from Mecklenburg on the Baltic
coast. It was he who designed the master-plan for the
invasion of France, prepared the "tin-openers" to pierce
the foi tress barrier, and trained the staff to handle them.
That plan embraced the violation of Belgium's neutrality
— for the sake of outflanking France — and thus brought
Biitain into the war. Although its execution was bungled
by Schheffen's successor, it came dangerously close to
winning the war within a month

The Geiman general who had the greatest influence on
the Second World War died three years before the war —
and letired ten years eaiher still. This was Hans von
Seeckt, who came fiom Schleswig-Holstein, the land
between Mecklenburg and Denmark. He was the man
who contrived to rebuild an effective German Army after
the last war, and laid the foundations on which a much
greater structure could arise His plans had to be designed
and carried out under the extremely hampering conditions
of the victors 5 peace settlement — itself designed to frustrate
any serious rebuilding of the German Army, Those
restrictions make his performance the more significant.
Most of the achievements of the Wehrmacht, especially
in the victorious early phase of this war, were cast in
Seeckt's mould. Its later failuies were foreshadowed in
his warning words.

No attempt to assess Hitler's generals in the Second
World War can be of adequate value unless it first assesses

17

1 8 The Other Side of the Hill

the influence of Seeckt — so important for the future was
the reconstruction period of the German Army, Having
treated it at length, the individual treatment of the military
leaders who rose to fame in 1 939-45 can be correspondingly
condensed. For here we have a background common to
all, and can see the mould in which their doctrine was
cast. Naturally, there were differences of interpretation,
but these were less important than the broad foundation
that had been built up afresh in the days when the General
Staff, banned by the Versailles Treaty, was working
undei ground,

Seeckt, then a lieutenant-colonel, had begun the
1 9 14-18 war as chief of staff of a corps in Kluck's First
Army, and thus had a close view of the steps by which a
masterly design went wrong in the execution, and decisive
victory was forfeited just as it appeared within reach.
Seeckt made his own mark a year later, in 19 15, as the
cool bram that guided a dashing Hussar geneial, the
beau sabieur Field- Marshal von Mackensen, in the deadly
break-through at Gorlice in Poland, which split the Russian
armies — a stroke from which they never fully iccovered.
It was here that Seeckt introduced a method of attack
that contained the germ of modern infiltration tactics —
pushing in reserves at the soft spots, and thrusting on as
deep as possible, instead of the former method of trying
to advance uniformly and using the reserves to break
down the tough spots.

Seeckt not only made his mark but also his name. For
the concealed brain behind Mackensen became known
more and more widely, so that the saying spread thiougli
the German Army — "Where Mackensen is, Seeckt is;
where Seeckt is, victory is." He continued to play an
important part in the Eastern campaign, but it was his
misfortune to be outside of, and unpopular with, the Hind-
enburg-Ludendorff ring which acquired supreme control
of the Germany Army from 19 16 to the end of the war.
That, however, saved his reputation from being involved

The Mould of Seeckt

in the final collapse in the West, and he became adviser
to the German delegation at the Peace Conference. From
this it was a natural step for him to become Commander-
in-Chief of the Reichswehr, the small army of 100,000
officers and men to which Germany was restricted under
the terms of peace.

It was even more natural that he should have dedicated
himself to the task of stx etching these bonds and preparing
the way for Germany to regain her military strength — as
any soldier of any country would have done in similar
circumstances. As a guide, he had the example of how
Scharnhorst had managed to evade the disarmament of
the Prussian Army that France had imposed after 1806,
and had built up a camouflaged army that turned the
tables on Napoleon seven years later. But Seeckt and his
pupils in some ways improved on Scharnhorst's process,
under more difficult conditions.

The first obstacle that Seeckt had to overcome was the
natural mistrust of the leaders of the new Republic for the
military caste that had treated civilians with disdain, and
then led the nation to a crushing defeat. Here Seeckt
was helped by the impression that his polished manner,
diplomatic tact, and apparent understanding of their
problems made upon men who had been accustomed to
the domineering brusqueness of Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff. Seeckt was a pleasing contrast to the browbeating
Prussian general of whom they had bitter experience.
His elegance, artistic interests, and knowledge of the world
added a subtle flavour to the self-contained personality
that had gained him the nickname of the "Sphinx 53 .
While his somewhat cynical attitude and ironical com-
ments had been distasteful in higher military circles, they
appealed to the politicians as evidence of a lack of
fanaticism, and an assurance that he blended military
efficiency with moderation in militarism.

Seeckt kept the army as a whole out of politics, and by
his apparent loyalty to the new republican regime at an

20

The Other Side of the Hill

awkward time, he was the better able to cloak his military
development schemes, as well as the half-veiled political
activities in which numerous officers of the older school
indulged. So far as vested interests allowed, he ensured
that the cadres of the new Reichswehr should represent
the pick of the officers and N C O.s who had undergone
the test of war. He aimed to make this small force of
4,000 officers and 96,000 men a corps of qualified instructors
and leaders, capable of serving as the framework for
rapid expansion — when this might become possible. Their
training was developed to a high pitch and on new lines,
so that they should become more intensely professional in
spirit and skill than the unlimited army of the past had
been.

He supplemented this framework with a variety of
underground schemes by which officers could gain wider
experience than was practicable in an army compulsonly
deprived of the major modern weapons, and by which
ex-officers could be kept from getting rusty. Many staff
officers and technicians found temporary employment in
Japan, China, the South American countries, the Baltic
States and Soviet Russia — where they could have some
practical experience with tanks Other officers gained
flying experience with civil ah ways. A considerable pro-
portion of the demobilized army was able to get some
continued military practice m unofficial organizations that
were running inside Germany, and many subterfuges were
used to preserve extra weapons for their training.

These devices were testimony to the ingenuity of a
keen soldier and his assistants in evading a network of
restrictions. They were also a constant worry to the
Allied officers responsible for seeing that the Peace terms
weie fulfilled. But it is an historical mistake to overrate
their importance in making possible Germany's renewed
burst of aggression. The ictal effect was very slight,
compared with the weight that Germany had to regain
before she could again become a serious danger The

The Mould of Seecki

21

bulk of the material developments that really mattered
was only achieved after Hitler had come into power, in
1933, and launched the large-scale re-armament with
which the former Allies did not attempt to interfere.

Seeckt's more real achievement was in starting a train
of ideas which revitalized the German Army, turned it
into a new line of progress, and enabled it to add a quali-
tative superiority to the quantitative recovery that the
victors' inertia permitted it to carry out. He gave the
Reichswehr a gospel of mobility, based on the view that a
quick-moving, quick-hitting army of picked troops could,
under modern conditions, make rings round an old-
fashioned mass army. That view was m no small measure
due to his experience on the Eastern Front, where the
wide spaces had allowed far more room for manoeuvre
than had been possible on the Western Front. The first
post-war manuals of the Reichswehr laid down that
* 'every action ought to be based on surprise. Without
surprise it would be difficult to obtain great results 53 .
Flexibility was another keynote — "reserves should, above
all, be pushed in to exploit where a success is gamed, even
though it becomes necessary, by so doing, to shift the
original centre of gravity 53 . To promote such flexibility
the Reichswehr was quick to develop new means of inter-
communication, and devoted a larger proportion of its
limited strength to this service than any other post-war
army. It also insisted on commanders of all grades being
further forward than was then the custom, so that they
could keep their fingers on the pulse of battle and exert a
quicker influence.

In the exaltation of manoeuvre, these post-war German
manuals offered a striking contrast with those of the French
Army, which drew the conclusion that "of the two elements,
fire and movement, fire is preponderant 35 . The French
doctrine obviously visualized the repetition in any future
war of the slow-motion tactics of 191 8. That difference
was ominous. But the German view was not merely

22

The Other Side of the Hill

governed by the necessity of making the most of their
handicaps under the peace treaty. For Seeckt, in his
preface to the new manual, wrote with remarkable frank-
ness — "These regulations are based on the strength,
armament, and equipment of the army of a modern great
military power, and not only on the German Army of
100,000 men formed in accordance with the Peace Treaty/ 5

Seeckt's active work came to an end in 1926, when he
made a slip and was forced to resign following the political
storm that arose through his action in permitting the
eldest son of the German Grown Prince to take part in
the Army manoeuvres. The limitations of his outlook —
which had appeared broad by comparison with other
generals — were still more clearly brought out by his
subsequent venture into politics, as a spokesman of the
half-baked ideas of the German People's Party. But the
influence of his own military ideas continued to grow.

His vision of the future emerged clearly from the book
he wrote soon after he left office — Thoughts of a Soldier
(1928). He there questioned the value of the huge conscript
armies of the past, suggesting that the effort and sacrifice
was disproportionate to their effect, and merely led to a
slow-grinding war of exhaustion. "Mass becomes immo-
bile; it cannot manoeuvre and therefore cannot win
victories, it can only crush by sheer weight. 55 Moreover,
in peace-time, it was important "to limit as far as possible
the unproductive retention of male labour in military
service 55 ,. Technical science and tactical skill were the
keys to the future. "A conscript mass, whose training has
been brief and superficial, is 'cannon fodder 5 in the worst
sense of the word, if pitted against a small number of
practised technicians on the other side* 35 That prediction
was fulfilled in 1940 when a handful of panzer divisions,
striking in combination with dive-bombers, paralysed and
pulverized the ill-equipped conscript mass of the French
Army.

In Seeckt's view, "the operating army 55 should consist

The Mould of Seeckt

23

of "professional, long-term soldiers, volunteers as far as
possible". The bulk of the nation's manpower would be
better employed during peace-time in helping to expand
the industry required to provide the professional army
with an ample equipment of up-to-date weapons. The
type of weapons must be settled well in advance, and
arrangements for rapid mass production developed.

At the same time a brief period of compulsory military
training should be given to all fit young men in the country,
"preceded by a training of the young, which would lay less
emphasis on the military side than on a general physical
and mental discipline". Such a system would help to
link the army with the people, and ensure national unity.
"In this way a military mass is constituted which, though
unsuited to take part in a war of movement and seek a
decision in formal battle, is well able to fulfil the duty
of home defence, and at the same time to provide from
its best elements a continuous reinforcement of the regular,
combatant army m the field." It was a conscript levy of
this kind which filled the bulk of the German infantry
divisions in 1940. They merely followed up the decisive
armoured spearheads, and occupied the conquered regions.
Later, as their own training improved, they were available
to expand and replenish the striking forces in the way that
Seeckt had foreseen.

"In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to
lie in the employment of mobile armies, relatively small
but of high quality, and rendered distinctly more effective
by the addition of aircraft, and in the simultaneous
mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the attack
or for home defence."

Curiously, Seeckt's book scarcely touched on the subject
of tanks, but dwelt at length on the value of cavalry, as
well as of motor transport, in the mobile operations he
pictured. He even wrote lyrically that "the days of
cavalry, if trained, equipped and led on modern lines, are
not numbered", and that "its lances may still flaunt their

24

The Other Side of the Hill

pennants with confidence in the wind of the future".
It has been suggested in later years that Seeckt's neglect of
armoured warfare was prompted purely by political dis-
cretion, and that the word "tank" should be read into his
sentences wherever he used the word "cavalry". Such a
view is contradicted by the undisguised way in which he
advocated conscription and aircraft, both of which were
forbidden to Germany by the peace terms.

For all his dynamism, Seeckt was a man of his genera-
tion, rather than a forerunner of the next. His military
vision was clear enough to see the necessity of mobile
warfare for any offensive purpose, but did not reach far
enough to see that armoured mobility was the only way to
make it possible. It was left for others to develop that
possibility — and aggressive necessity.

The old military battle-picture also coloured Seeckt's
vision when he argued that the immediate object of the
air force's attack should be to destroy the opposing air
force. The Luftwaffe did that in Poland, and to a lesser
extent in Fiance. But when it tried that way of preparing
the invasion of Britain, it suffered crippling losses on
meeting, for the first time, a strong defending air force.

On the wider issues of war and life his outlook was
patchy. With some truth he contended that direct
experience of the horrors of war made soldiers more chary
than political leaders of becoming involved in a war, but
he went too far in trying to show they were really "paci-
fists" in the best sense of the word That characteristic
professional apologia, familiar in every country, does not
find much support in cases where the archives of a war-
making country have been opened to examination. High
soldiers have too often failed to show that "pacifism
established on knowledge and born of a sense of
responsibility" which Seeckt claimed for them.

He was rather weak in his argument that "militarism"
and "aggression" w r ere merely catchwords. At the same
time he was shrewdly prophetic in his remarks that when-

The Mould of Seeckt 25

ever policy aimed at the acquisition of power, "the states-
man will soon find himself thwarted in some way or other,
will deduce from this opposition a menace first to his
plans, then to national prestige, and finally to the existence
of the state itself— and so, regarding his country as the
party attacked, will engage in a war of defence 53 .

A sense of humanity, as well as of prophecy, gleamed
through his ironical comment on the modern psychological
tendency to reverse the moral judgments of the past — "I
find it very inconvenient that I may no longer regard
Nero simply as the imperial monster who used to go to
bed by the light of a burning Christian, but rather as a
wise if somewhat peculiar modern dictator. 5 5 Was he
hinting a doubt of the new morality that men like the
Nazis were starting to proclaim? Again, in emphasizing
the value of "action 5 *, there is a significant qualification
conveyed in his epigrammatic judgment — "Intellect with-
out will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous. 55
There was a wise warning, too, in another of his wider
reflections — "The statement that war is a continuation of
policy by other means has become a catch-phrase, and is
therefore dangerous. We can say with equal truth — war is
the bankruptcy of policy. 55

At the same time, Seeckt 5 s care to keep his army out
of politics carried a danger of its own. His attitude of
professional detachment, and the sharp dividing line he
drew between the military and political spheres, tended
towards a renunciation of the soldier 5 s potential restraining
influence on adventurous statesmen.

The Seeckt-pattern professional became a modern
Pontius Pilate, washing his hands of all responsibility for
the orders he executed. Pure military theory deals in
extremes that are hard to combine with wise policy.
When soldiers concentrate on the absolute military aim,
and do not learn to think of grand strategy, they are more
apt to accept political arguments that, while seeming
right in pure strategy, commit policy beyond the point

26

The Other Side of the Hill

where it can halt. Extreme military ends are difficult to
reconcile with moderation of policy.

That danger would grow because professional opinion,
as embodied in a General Staff, is never so united in
practice as it should be in principle. It is split by its own
c politics" and personal ambitions. Seeckt himself not
only recalled the past but foreshadowed the future when
he wrote — "A history of the General Staff . . . would
be a history of quiet positive work; it would tell of arro-
gance and haughty acquiescence, of vanity and envy, of
all human weaknesses, of the fight between genius and
bureaucracy, and of the hidden causes of victory and
defeat. It would take the radiance from many a halo,
and it would not be lacking in tragedy. 59

The General Staff was essentially intended to form a
collective substitute for genius, which no army can count
on producing at need. Of its very nature it tended to
cramp the growth of genius, being a bureaucracy as well
as a hierarchy, but in compensation it sought to raise the
general standard of competence to a high level The
unevenness of its performance was due less to differences
of individual talent than to the underlying differences of
personal interest, as well as to conflicting personal views.
The chance of promotion tended to make any general
swallow his doubts for the moment, long enough to enable
Hitler to split the solidity of professional opinion. That
applies to all armies, but is particularly marked under a
dictatorship. A newly-promoted general is always con-
fident that the situation is better than it appeared to his
predecessor, and that he can succeed where the latter
failed. Such a disposition is a powerful lever in the hands
of any ruler.

CHAPTER III

THE BLOMBERG-FRXTSCH ERA

Seeckt was succeeded by Heye, and the latter, in 1930,
by Hammerstem. Neither was quite of Seeckt's calibre,
but both on the whole continued to develop his policy.
Hammerstein was deeply perturbed by the growing
strength of the Nazi movement, finding both its creed and
its methods repugnant, and he was led to depart from
Seeckt's principle of political detachment to the extent of
considering the possibilities of taking forcible measures to
check Hitler's accession to power. The ground was cut
away beneath his feet, however, by the decision of the
senile President of the Republic, Field- Marshal von
Hindenburg, to appoint Hitler to be Chancellor — thus
making his position constitutionally valid. Moreover,
Hammerstein's apprehensions were not shared by other
leading generals who were soldiers "pure and simple".

The next important step came when Hitler, almost
immediately after entering office, appointed General von
Blomberg as War Minister. That choice was inspired
by the ambitious Colonel von Reichenau, who had been
Blomberg's Chief of Staff in East Prussia, and was in close
contact with Hitler. Blomberg himself did not know
Hitler, and his character was in many ways the antithesis
of Hitler's. His acceptance of the appointment, as well as
his performance in it, was an illustration of how simple
the pure soldier can be.

BLOMBERG

During the previous year, Blomberg had been chief
military adviser to the German delegation at the Disarma-
ment Conference. He was only just over fifty — young by

27

28

The Other Side of the Hill

comparison with the average age of the High Command
in the German and other armies. This fact in itself
naturally excited envy of his sudden elevation. That
hostile feeling was increased by the German generals'
attitude of disdain for the "Bohemian Corporal 39 . Many
of them had been ready to welcome Hitler's rise to power
in so far as it seemed likely to favour their own schemes of
military expansion, but they scoffed at the idea that an
ex-corporal could be credited with any military judgment,
and were thus the more quick to question any preference
he showed in making military appointments.

This attitude among the senior officers of the Reichswehr
prejudiced Blomberg's position from the outset. By
becoming suspect in the eyes of his fellows he was thrown
back on Hitler's support, and so was forced to follow
Hitler's line further than his own judgment would have
led him. Ironically, the natural pleasantness of his per-
sonality, refreshingly different from the "Prussian" type,
became a handicap in such circumstances of dependence.
This combination went far to account for the nick-name
of the "Rubber Lion" that was bestowed on him by other
soldiers.

For Werner von Blomberg was of a different type from
the violent and unscrupulous leaders of the new regime.
If he was more in sympathy with the Nazis than other
generals, it was partly because he was more idealistic —
while his romantic enthusiasm easily blinded him to aspects
he did not care to see. The Nazi movement for a time
attracted quite a number of such idealists, though most
of them were much younger than Blomberg. Soldiers,
however, are slow to grow up. Blomberg was a natural
enthusiast, and looked on the profession of arms in the
spirit of a knight-errant. This was evident to me when I
met him at Geneva in 1932. He showed an eager interest
in new military ideas, especially those that promised a
new artistry in tactics as a game of skill, but was still
more enthusiastic about the possibilities of resuscitating

The Blomberg-Fritsch Era 29

the code of chivalry. He became almost lyrical in dis-
coursing upon the appeal of "gentlemanliness" in war.
Close observation of the higher military levels over a
long period makes for scepticism, but Blomberg impressed
me as exceptionally genuine, if boyish, in his profession of
faith. Tall and broad physically, he was neither over-
bearing nor grim in his manner, but showed a natural
courtesy combined with a refreshingly frank way of
talking. It was his hard fate to be called on to deal with
two rival groups, and to become a buffer between them
In a better environment he might have proved a greater
figure.

Yet in one important respect his influence may have
been more effective than it seemed. One of the surprising
features of the Second World War was that the German
Army in the field on the whole observed the rules of war
better than it did in 1 914- 18 — at any rate in fighting its
western opponents — whereas it was reasonable to expect
that the addition of " Nazism 3 5 to "Prussianism" would
make its behaviour worse than before. The relative
improvement in behaviour, and the greater care shown to
avoid stains on its record, may be traced to the more
refined conception of soldierly conduct which Blomberg
and a number of others who shared lus views had striven
to instil m the Reichswehr. The restraint shown m 1940
by the troops that invaded Belgium and France, compared
with their predecessors of 19 14, was also a wise policy.
It went quite a long way to soften the sting of defeat and
conciliate the people of the conquered countries, and
might have had a more lasting effect but for the contrasting
behaviour of the Gestapo and the S.S. forces.

In the tactical sphere Blomberg helped to give an
important turn to the trend of development. Hammerstein
had perpetuated the German Army's old doctrine of the
offensive, without the material means to practise it or a
new technique to sharpen its edge. But, in East Prussia,
Blomberg had experimented with new forms of tactics

30

The Other Side of the Hill

which more realistically recognized the existing superiority
of modern defence, and sought to turn this to advantage
the other way, as an offensive aid. Instead of attacking
a strongly defended position, one might lure the enemy
out of position, draw him into making a rash advance or
hurried assault, catch him in a trap, and then exploit his
disorder by delivering one's own real stroke — in the more
deadly form of a riposte. The bait might be created by
luring withdrawal or by a sudden swoop that threatened
the enemy's communications. The potentialities of this
"baited move" combining offensive strategy with defensive
tactics — like sword and shield — had struck me in the
course of my study of Sherman's campaign in Georgia,
and in subsequent books I had elaborated its application
to modern warfare. It was Blomberg's particular interest
in this idea which first brought us into contact. 1

Blomberg also showed more appreciation than most
generals at that date of the new conception of mobile
warfare, with tanks fulfilling the historic role of cavalry — a
conception which had met with a half-hearted response in
the British Army, except in the circle of the Royal Tank
Corps. Reichenau was still keener, and had himself
translated some of my books, though even he did not
embrace the concept of armoured warfare quite so fully
as men like Guderian and Thoma who took a more direct
hand in creating Germany's armoured forces from 1934
onwards.

1 Sherman's methods also fired General Patton's imagination —
particularly with regard to the way that they exploited the indirect
approach and the value of cutting down impedimenta in order to
gain mobility. When I met Patton in 1 944, shortly before he took
his army across to Normandy, he told me how he had earlier spent a
long leave studying Sherman's campaigns on the ground with my book
in hand, and we discussed the possibilities of applying such methods
in modern warfare. They were demonstiated in his subsequent sweep
from Normandy to the Moselle. General Wood, who commanded his
spearhead, the 4th Armoured Division, was another enthusiast for these
ideas, and on reaching the Seme wrote to tell me how successful their
application had proved.

The Blomberg-Fritsch Era

3i

The triumphs of German tactics and of the German
armoured forces in the first two years of the war cast an
ironical reflection on the measures taken to disarm the
defeated country after the previous war. Materially, they
proved effective. For the numerous evasions that German
military chiefs practised were on a petty scale, and in
themselves amounted to no considerable recovery of
strength. Germany's actual progress in material re-
armament constituted no serious danger up to the time
when the Nazi Government openly threw off the restric-
tions of the peace treaty. It was the hesitancy of the
victors after that time which allowed Germany again to
become formidable. Moreover, an important result of
her enforced disarmament was to give her a clear start,
by freeing her army from such an accumulation of 1914-
191 8 weapons as the victorious nations had preserved — a
load of obsolescence that tended to bind them to old
methods, and led them to overrate their own strength.
When the German Army began large-scale re-armament,
it benefited by having more room for the development of
the newer weapons suggested by a fresher current of ideas.

The development of such fresh ideas was, in turn,
helped by another of the measures imposed by the victors
— the suppression of the General Staff. If it had been
left to carry on in its old form, and its old cumbersome
shell, it might have remained as routinely inert and over-
whelmed by its offices as other General Staffs. Driven
underground, its members were largely exempted from
administrative routine, and impelled to concentrate on
constructive thinking about the future — thus becoming
more efficient for war. Any such military organization
can be destroyed in so far as it is a physical substance, but
not in respect of its activities as a thinking organ — thought
cannot be suppressed.

Thus the net effect of the sweeping disarmament of
Germany after the First World War was to clear the path
for the more efficient modernization of her forces when a

3 2

The Other Side of the Hill

political opportunity for re-armament developed. Limi-
tations in the degree of modernization were due more to
internal conservatism and conflicting interests than to the
external restrictions that had been placed upon her.

FRXTSCH v

Blomberg's position as War Minister enabled him to
foster the growth of the new tactics he favoured, and to
overcome the resistance which the more orthodox generals
had shown — as in other countries, especially France.
But the weakness of his own position, as a "buffer-state 55 ,
handicapped him in hastening their spread and develop-
ment at the pace that might otherwise have been possible.
When he tried, at the end of 1933, to secure the appoint-
ment of Reichenau as Chief of the Army Command in
place of Hammerstein, he was foiled by the concerted
opposition of the senior generals. Acting on their advice,
Hindenbutg chose General von Fritsch, a soldier of great
all-round ability, who represented the more conservative
school, both politically and militarily. He had grasped
the value of tanks and aircraft up to a point, but regarded
the new arms as "upstarts 55 , and was intent to keep them
in their place — a subordinate place, in his view. More-
over, General Beck, who subsequently became Chief of
the General Staff, was almost as critical of the tank
"revolutionaries 55 as he was of the Nazi revolution. Thus
German military organization, though it forged ahead of
other countries in developing mechanized forces, remained
a compromise between the old and new patterns.

Werner von Fritsch, as a comparatively young staff
officer, had worked under General von Seeckt at the
Reichswehr Mmist i y from 1920 to 1922, m preparing the
new organization. Then he went to regimental duty in
command of a battery, and subsequently became chief of
staff in East Prussia. In 1927, he returned to the Reich-
swehr Ministry as assistant to Blomberg, who was head of
the operations branch. Here he was largely responsible

The Blombefg-Fritseh Era

33

for devising the plan, in case of war, for a swift offensive
against Poland combined with a defensive in the West to
hold France m check. It was the embryo of the plan
that was actually executed in 19395 although then amplified
in scale and resources.

During the pre-Nazi period Fritsch showed a diplo-
matic talent, unusual among German officers of the old
school, in dealing with democratic deputies who were
inclined to ask awkward questions regarding increases in
the military budget, and the reasons why an army limited
in size required such a disproportionately large framework
of staff and instructional cadres. _ Fritsch was adept in
explaining away such curious points, and in persuading
critics not to press their enquiries. He knew how to gag
them in subtle ways — by appealing to their patriotism,
playing on their weaknesses, or cultivating their friendship.
Normally he had an ice-cold manner, and nature, but he
could turn on a warm-tap of charm, when it served a
purpose.

When the Nazis arrived in power the generals realized
that they would need a chief who combined determination
with diplomacy in order to hold their own. It was Fritsch's
possession of these qualities, in addition to his reputation as
a strategist, that led to his appointment early in 1934.
His first moves were directed to curb the ambition of the
amateur soldiers of the Nazi party, headed by Captain
Roehm, and to counter the threat that their advancement
might carry to the authority and interests of the professional
army* He provided Hitler with evidence that their plans
for arming the storm troopers as a supplement to the army
were designed to pave the way for a coup d'etat, aimed at
Hitler himself. Himmler was working on the same line —
from a different motive. They succeeded in convincing
Hitler so well as to produce the bloody purge of June
30th, 1934.

This had the double effect of strengthening Fritsch's
position with Hitler and with all the elements in Germany

B

34

The Other Side of the Hill

that, for diverse reasons, feared the growth of the Nazi
influence. For a time, he established the supremacy of
the Army Command upon the internal balance of power,
and was able to outmanoeuvre Himmler. Over such
issues as the reintroduction of conscription and the re-
occupation of the Rhineland, Fritsch marched in step
with Hitler. But he insisted on testing the ground before
each step was taken, and was careful to restrain the pace
of developments, so that the German Army should not
be committed to a dangerous trial of strength while it was
still growing.

Emboldened by the submissive way in which these
defiant steps were taken by the French and Bi itish Govern-
ments, the Nazi leaders next made the more far-reaching
move of intervening in the Spanish Civil War — in order to
ensure the success of General Franco's revolt, and thus
establish a Fascist power athwart the sea-communications
of France and Britain. Fritsch was keen to use the Spanish
battlefield as an experimental practice-ground for the
German Army's new weapons and tactics, employed by
sample units sent out for the purpose, but he was shrewd
enough to see that Spain was an awkward place strategically
at which to risk an open challenge to Fiance and Btitain.
His caution was resented by the Nazi leaders, flushed with
their recent successes in defiance. At the same time his
diplomatic efforts to foster better relations with the Red
Army excited violent complaint on their part. Hitler's
anti-Bolshevist obsession provided Fritsch's enemies with
fruitful soil in which to sow suspicion. Friction was
increased by Fritsch's efforts to maintain the old spirit in
the new officer corps, and keep it free from permeation
by Nazi ideology.

Meanwhile the rift between Fritsch and Blomberg was
growing. Fritsch and his fellows felt that Blombeig was
hypnotized by Hitler, and was not standing up for the
Army's interests as he should have done It seemed to
them that Blomberg's spirit of subservience was symbolized

The Blomberg-Fritsch Era

35

in the way he wore Nazi emblems on his uniform, and they
nicknamed him Hitler- Youth-Quex, after an idealistic boy
portrayed in Nazi films,

"the double dismissal

A crisis came in Januaxy, 1938, arising out of an affair
that was very remote in appearance from its real causes.
Blomberg had fallen in love with a typist in his office,
and married her. Hitler expressed approval of Blomberg's
intention, as a public proof that the military leaders of
National-Socialist Germany were broadening their social
outlook and identifying themselves with the people, instead
of marrying only into their own caste. He graced the
wedding, as a witness. Blomberg's fellow-generals regarded
the marriage as unseemly, but — contrary to what was
widely reported at the time — it is not true that they made
a concerted protest and caused Blomberg's removal from
office. For any protest they might have made was
forestalled — by Himmler.

After Blomberg's marriage had taken place Himmler
presented to Hitler a police dossier purporting to show
that the bride was a prostitute. It has been suggested by
American investigations since the war, that Himmler had
planted her in Blomberg's office as part of a trap. Hitler's
reaction to the revelation was violent, for by his own
presence at this wedding of "a woman of the streets" he
had been made to look ridiculous. He dismissed Blomberg
from his post, and even crossed his name off the list of the
officers' corps.

That news did not disturb the other generals. But
they were shaken to their roots by a second stroke that
immediately followed. For now that the question of
appointing a new War Minister had to be considered
Himmler brought out a further dossier to show that Fritsch
was under police watch for homosexual offences. It was,
actually, a dossier about another bearer of the same name.
But when Hitler sent for the Commander-in-Chief,

36

The Other Side of the Hill

Himmler produced a witness who formally identified
him as the man in the case. Hitler thereupon removed
him from his post.

According to General Rohricht, the reason for this
move of Himmler's was to prevent Fritsch succeeding to
Blomberg's position and power, which carried with it
supreme command of the Wehrmacht — the armed forces
as a whole. * 'Anyone succeeding to that post would
become the superior of Goering who was now Commander-
in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. It would have been very
difficult to appoint any fresh soldier over his head. Fritsch
was the only possible one, because of his existing seniority
to Goermg as a Commander-m-Chief. Himmler' s inter-
vention was not for Goering's sake, but for his own ends.
All his moves had the aim of paving the way for his ambition
of replacing the army by the S.S., step by step. 55

Fritsch demanded a Court of Inquiry, but it was only
with much difficulty that he was granted one — after
energetic representations by Rundstedt, as repiesentativc
of the senior generals. When it was conceded, Himmler
wanted to preside over it himself, but the Minister of
Justice then came to Fritsch 5 s help by declaring that a
military court was necessary. Himmler next tried to get
at the witnesses for the defence. To ensure their attendance,
and their safety, the generals arranged for them to be
guarded by soldiers. At the inquiry Himmler 5 s chief
witness recanted his evidence — and paid for this with his
life. But Fritsch was completely acquitted.

Meanwhile, Hitler had taken the opportunity to assume
supreme command of the Wehrmacht himself, declaring
that he had lost confidence in the generals. Biomberg's
former post was reduced to a lower status, and filled by
General Keitel, who appeared to Hitler to have the quali-
ties of a good lackey. At the same time General von
Brauchitsch was appointed to command the Army in
place of Fritsch, so no room was left for the latter by the
time he was cleared of the charges that had been framed

The Blomba g-Fritsch Era

37

against him. Thus the outcome of the crisis that had been
so deliberately engineered was to pave the way for Hitler's
ultimate control of strategy, while strengthening Himmler's
influence.

By making himself actual Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht (the armed forces as a whole), Hitler naturally
increased the importance of its executive organ, the Ober-
kommando der Wehrmacht — a title commonly shortened
to O.K.W. In this were centralized the political and
administrative matters common to all three services. It
included a small "national defence" section (Landes-
verteMigung) which dealt with matters on the borderline
between policy and strategy, and with the co-ordination
of the three services. There was soon a move to develop
this into a Wehrmacht General Staff — a development
equally desired by Hitler and Keitel.

This project was strongly resisted by the Army High
Command (Oberkommando das Heeres — O K.H. for
short) 3 who were quick to see it as an attempt to displace
them as the heir of the old Great General Staff. They
argued that it was unsound to subordinate a long-
established organization such as theirs to a newly formed
body of an amateur nature, and that as Germany's military
problems were predominantly continental the Army High
Command ought to have the decisive influence. Their
opposition prevailed for the moment, helped by the Naval
High Command's inherent dislike of being directed by
land-lubbers, and the more personal objections that arose
from Goering's position as Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force So the issue remained in abeyance, and the
General Staff of the Army remained in control of strategy,
subject to Hitler's broad direction. He had still a long
way to go before he could fulfil his ambition of playing
the part of executive strategist — and actually handling the
pieces on the board.

CHAPTER IV

THE BR AU CHITS GH — H ALDER ERA

At first sight it may seem curious that such a man as
Walther von Brauchitsch was appointed to replace Fritsch,
and that he accepted the appointment. For he had
shown himself conspicuously loyal to the former repub-
lican regime, and inclined to take a liberal view of political
and economic issues, while outspokenly critical of Nazi
policies. Neither Junker narrowness nor Nazi fanaticism
appealed to him. At the same time he was generally
regarded as a man who had a keen sense of honour and
was by no means self-seeking. For these reasons, coupled
with his strong sense of justice and consideration for others,
he was trusted both by his fellows and his juniors to an
exceptional degree. Was his acceptance of Hitler's offer
in February, 1938, due to a sudden yielding to personal
ambition — when the prize was so big — or to a feeling that
he might be able to serve the Service by stepping into the
breach? The second, and better, explanation tends to be
supported by the fact that Brauchitsch continued on good
terms with Fritsch after the latter had been shelved, and
took more than one opportunity of paying tribute to him,
in a way distasteful to the Nazi leaders. Events soon
showed, however, that Brauchitsch had stepped on to a
slippery slope where he would find it hard to keep upright.

The reasons for his appointment are simpler to under-
stand. Hitler was shrewd enough to realize the importance
of making a choice that would inspire general confidence,
even though it meant taking a man who was not in sym-
pathy with the Nazi party. Brauchitsch was generally
regarded as a sound yet progressive soldier — although
primarily an "artillerist" he had a better appreciation of

38

The Brauchitsch-Halder Era

39

tank potentialities than most of the senior generals. In
other respects, too, he was less conservative than the
school that Fritsch had represented. His popularity with
all sections was an obvious asset, which would help to
offset suspicion of the political motives behind the changes
and of the internal struggle that had preceded them. His
unassuming manner fostered the hope that he would prove
easier to handle than Fritsch.

Hitler soon found, however, that Brauchitsch — though
more polite in his manner — was no more disposed than
Fritsch had been to allow a political infiltration in the
army. His first steps were to introduce a number of wel-
fare measures for improving the condition and post-service
prospects of the ordinary soldier, but he insisted on keeping
these clear of Nazi organization. At the same time, he
tightened discipline. He sought to quicken up the process
of equipping the forces, but also to put a brake on the
tendency of Nazi foreign policy to precipitate an early
conflict His stand was reinforced by General Beck, then
Chief of the General Staff Beck, though a soldier of
great ability and strong character, tended towards the
"anti-tank" school, so that in his opposition to Hitler's
aggressive policy he was inclined to underrate what Hitler
might achieve by the use of new instruments.

After Hitler, that summer, had made his designs clear,
Brauchitsch summoned all the senior generals to a con-
ference, and told them that Beck had drafted a memoran-
dum which, if they approved, he proposed sending to
Hitler. Beck then read the memorandum. It argued that
German policy ought to avoid the risk of war, especially
over such "a small issue as the Sudetenland". It pointed
out the weakness of the German forces, and their inferiority
to the combination that might be arrayed against them.
It emphasized that, even if the United States did not take
a direct part, she was likely to use her resources to supply
Germany's opponents with arms and equipment.

Rundstedt, giving me his account of the conference,

40

The Other Side of the Hill

said — "When Beck had finished reading the memorandum,
Brauchitsch got up and asked whether any of those present
had objections to raise before it was sent to Hitler. No one
objected, so the document was delivered. It provoked
Hitler to great wrath, and led to the dismissal of Beck —
who was replaced by Haider "

This momentarily damped opposition, but when the
Czecho-Slovakian crisis came to a head, in September,
Brauchitsch told Hitler that the German Army was not
prepared for war, and warned him against pressing his
demands so hard as to produce a fight Brauchitsch was
buttressed by Haider, who followed his predecessor's line
rather than Hitler's — showing the latter that it was still
difficult to drive a wedge into the close-knit German
military corporation. While Haider was more progressive
than Beck in his military views, he was also a man of long
views in the political field and not inclined to gamble
with Germany's future* A tougher personality than
Brauchitsch, he was more ready to be tough with Hitler.
When it became clear that Hitler was not to be checked
by counsels of caution, Haider became busy with plans
for a military revolt against Hitler's policy and regime

The French and British governments, however, were
even less prepared for war or willing to risk a fight on
behalf of Gz echo-Slovakia, so Hitler gained his claims for
the Sudetenland with little difficulty, at Munich.

In the flush of that triumph, Hitler became harder to
curb. Next spring he occupied the whole of the Czechs 5
territory by a sudden coup, breaking the Munich agree-
ment He then proceeded, without pause, to put pressure
on Poland for the return of Danzig to Germany and the
right to build an extra-territorial railway and road across
the Polish Corridor into East Prussia. Unable to see
anybody else's point of view, he could not understand
that these limited demands lost their appearance of
moderation in the circumstances of their proposal. When
the Poles, stiffened by the British Government's hurried

The Brauchitsch-Halder Era

41

offer of support, refused to consider such readjustments.
Hitler became so angry under his sense of injury as to
press matters further and quicker than he had intended.
While still hoping that- the Poles would climb down, and
save his face, he became more inclined to risk war —
provided that the risk in a war would not be too big.

When he consulted the military chiefs on this question,
Brauchitsch gave a more qualified reply than KeiteL
Brauchitsch considered that Germany could "probably"
reckon on a favourable result if the opposition were con-
fined to Poland, France and Britain. But he emphatically
declared that Germany would not have much chance of
winning if she had also to fight Russia. The French
Ambassador in Berlin, M. Goulondre, heard of the
arguments and reported them to his government early
in June.

Brauchitsch's doubts, coupled with his disparaging
comments on the value of Italy as an ally, annoyed the
more violent Nazis, who had already been complaining
of the way he had checked the Nazification of the Army.
They developed a campaign against him. This may-
explain why he was led at this time to make a public
declaration of confidence in the Fiihrer, and also to
express sentiments in a speech at Tannenberg which
sounded threatening towards Poland — though they could
be construed in a strictly defensive sense. But it is under-
standable that he should feel that there was little danger
in such language, since no one who weighed the situation
in military scales was likely to imagine that Britain and
France would actually carry their support of Poland to
the point of war in such a hopeless strategical position
as would result if Russia was induced to stand aside.
For Hitler was driven to meet Brauchitsch's stipulations
so far as Russia was concerned and to recast his whole
policy of the past in an effort to secure her neutrality.
Once he accepted the necessity of a political turn-about,
Hitler moved quickly to arrange a pact with Russia — in

42

The Other Side of the Hill

striking contrast to the hesitation and delay of the British
Government in their negotiations with Russia at the same
time.

Despite the announcement of the Russo-Gcrrnan pact,
the British Government defied logical military calculation
by deciding to fight, and pushed the French into the same
course. But the invasion of Poland had already been
launched, on Hitler's order, before the fallacy of that
calculation was apparent. For the moment, Brauchitsch
and Haider were fully occupied in conducting the cam-
paign — and could drown their anxieties by immersing
themselves in their professional task.

The plan was of their design, and the campaign was
swiftly successful. The executive commanders were
allowed a free hand 3 and demonstrated the value of it by
showing an initiative and flexibility that were in the best
vein of the old tradition. The main role was played by
Rundstedt's Army Group in the South which, after breaking
through the Polish front, sent Reichenau's mobile ioth
Army — this had the bulk of the mechanized divisions — on
a northward swerve to Warsaw, to cut astride the rear of
the main Polish armies in the centre. That stroke, which
decided the issue, was the more notable because O.K.W.
had ordered that the ioth Army should be sent straight
ahead over the Vistula, as the Poles were thought to be
already retreating to the south-east. But Rundstedt and
his Chief of Staff, Manstein, had gauged that the main
Polish armies were still west of Warsaw, and could thus
be trapped on the near side of the Vistula, On this occa-
sion the commander on the spot was allowed to act on
his own judgment, which the result vindicated — but when
a similar crucial turn came in the next campaign Hitler
imposed his own decision and thereby paid a heavy forfeit.

The effect of victory in Poland had an intoxicating
effect on Hitler. But with it was mingled a fear of what
might happen to him in the East if he did not soon secure
peace in the West. The intoxication and the feai , working

The Brauchitsch-Halder Era

43

on one another, impelled him to fresh action while making
him more reckless.

To Brauchilsch and Haider the victory in Poland had
brought no such intoxication. Once the dust of battle had
settled they perceived more clearly the awkward conse-
quences of that victory, and the dangers of becoming
embroiled more deeply. After the campaign was over
they recovered the long view so far as to oppose — even to
the point of contemplating a revolt — Hitler's idea that an
offensive in the West would make the Allies more inclined
towards peace. But something more than a few months'
inactivity would have been required to restore favourable
conditions for peace, and during the winter the Allies'
threats of c 'opening up the war", publicly voiced by
Winston Churchill in broadcasts, had a natural tendency
to spur Hitler into forestalling them. The dynamism of
war increasingly took charge of the train of events.

The invasion of Norway m April, 1 940, was the first
of Hitler's aggressive moves that was not premeditated.
As the evidence brought out at Nuremberg made clear,
he was led into it unwillingly, more by fear than by desire,
under the combined influence of persuasion and provo-
cation. Although he achieved this conquest with ease he
was no longer in control of his own course. The persuasion
started from the arguments of Vidkun Quisling, the Nor-
wegian pro-Nazi, about the likelihood of the British
occupying the coast of Norway, with or without the con-
nivance of the Norwegian Government. It was reinforced
by the anxiety of the Naval High Gommand about the
danger of such a development, both in tightening the grip of
the British blockade and hampering their own submarine
operations. These fears were increased, after the outbreak
of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of November, by
Franco-British offers of aid to Finland— which, as the Ger-
mans shrewdly suspected, concealed an aim of gaining
strategic control of the Scandinavian peninsula, Hitler,
however, still felt that Germany had more to gain by Nor-

44

The Other Side of the Hill

way's continued neutrality, and wanted to avoid an
enlargement of the war. After he had met Quisling in mid-
December, he decided to wait and see whether Quisling
could fulfil his hope of achieving a political coup in Norway.

In January, however, nervousness was accentuated
when Churchill made an emphatic broadcast appeal to
the neutrals to join in the fight against Hitler, while other
signs of an Allied move multiplied. On February 18th
the British destroyer Cossack pushed into Norwegian waters
and boarded the German supply ship Altmark to rescue
captured British seamen it was carrying. Tliis step was
taken on orders from the Admiralty, of which Churchill
was then head. It not only infuriated Hitler, but made
him think that if Churchill was ready to violate Norwegian
neutrality for the rescue of a handful of prisoners, he was
still more likely to do so in order to cut off the iron-ore
supplies from Narvik that were vital to Germany.

In this connection Rundstedt remarked to me in one
of our talks: "Churchill's broadcasts used to make Hitler
angry. They got under his skin — as did Roosevelt's
later. Hitler repeatedly argued to the Army High
Command, especially over Norway, that if he did not
move first, the British would — and establish themselves in
such neutral points 55 Admiral Voss, who was present,
confirmed this account from his experience m the Naval
High Command, and also said. "The British attack on
the Altmark proved decisive, in its effect on Hitler — it
was the 'fuse 5 that touched off the Norwegian offenshe.' 5

Immediately after this, Hitler appointed General von
Falkenhorst to prepare the forces for a coup to seize the
Norwegian ports. At a conference on February 23rd,
Admiral Raeder, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, em-
phasized that: "The best thing for maintaining this (ore)
traffic as well as for the situation in general is the main-
tenance of Norwegian neutrality. 55 But he went on to say:
"What must not be permitted, as stated earlier, is the occu-
pation of Norway by Britain. That could not be undone. 55

The Brauchiisch-Halder Era 45

By this time reports from Norway showed that Quisling's
party was losing ground, while reports from England
indicated that some action in the Norwegian area was
being planned, together with the assembly of troops and
transports. On March 1st Hitler issued his directive for
the expedition to Norway. On the 9th, the Naval High
Command presented their plan, and dw r elt on the urgency
of the operation in view of the reports that a British landing
was imminent. They were very worried, but their own
preparations would take some time to complete, and all
they could do was to send submarines to lie off the ports
in case the British transports appeared.

But the Allies 5 plans were upset for the moment by
Finland's capitulation on the 13th, which deprived them
of the pretext on which they were intending to land at
Narvik. When Admiral Raeder saw Hitler on the 26th,
he expressed the view that the danger of a British landing
in Norway was no longer acute for the moment, but
considered it certain that a fresh pretext would soon be
found and fresh attempts made to interrupt the iron-ore
traffic. "Sooner or later Germany will be faced with the
necessity of carrying out operation 'Weseruebung 5 JJ — the
code name for the expedition to occupy Norway. Thus
it was advisable to do this soon, rather than be too late.
Hitler agreed, and fixed the date. Now that preparations
had gone so far, there was an irresistible urge to put them
into operation At almost the same time the Allies decided
to put fresh pressure on the governments of Norway and
Sweden. A mine-belt was to be laid in Norwegian waters,
on April 5th, and the first convoy of troops was to sail
for Narvik on the 8th. But the mine-laying operation
was delayed until the night of the 7 th, and next afternoon
the German invading force sailed

Early on April 9th, small detachments of German troops,
carried mostly in warships, landed at the chief ports of
Norway, from Oslo to Narvik, and captured them with
little difficulty. The sequel showed that the Allies 5

46

The Other Side of the Hill

designs had outrun the efficiency of their preparations,
and the collapse of their counter-moves left Germany
in possession of the whole of Norway, together with
Denmark. This conquest was achieved without any
material subtraction from the forces on the Western front,
or interference with the preparations there. Moreover,
the operation was carried out under the direction of
O.K.W. and not of O.K.H.

The story of how the plan for the invasion of the West
took form is related m later chapters, and is too complex for
brief summary here. For the moment it is more useful to trace
the outline of the plan, and point out the basic factors that
governed its issue — as a background to the more detailed
record of personal influences and internal controversies.

While it appeared to the world as a supreme example
of the shock-offensive, it was really more remarkable for
its subtlety. The essential condition of its success was the
way that the Allied armies of the left wing, comprising
the pick of their mobile forces, were lured deep into Bel-
gium, and even into Holland. It was only through the left
wing being caught m this trap, and wrenched from its
socket, that the panzer stroke cut through the Allied left
centre deeply and quickly enough to have decisive effects.
Moreover, as fast as the German armoured divisions drove
towards the Channel coast, cutting a pocket in the Allied
front, the motorized divisions followed them up to form
a defensive lining along the whole length of the pocket.
These tactics extracted a maximum advantage fiom a
minimum use of shock, and exploited the power of tactical
defence as an aid to the offensive. For the burden of attack-
ing, at a disadvantage, was thereby thrown on the Allied
armies in any attempt to force open the trap and reunite
their severed parts. Such subtlety is the essence of strategy.

With the failure of the Allied left wing to break out,
its fate was sealed, save for the portion that managed to
escape by sea from Dunkirk, leaving all its equipment
behind. None at all might have escaped but for the fact

The Brauchitsch-Halder Era 47

that Hitler stopped the sweeping advance of the panzer
forces on the outskirts of Dunkirk — for reasons that are
discussed further on. But this forfeit did not affect the
immediate future. After the elimination of the left-wing
armies, the remainder were left too weak to hold the far-
stretching front in France against a powerful offensive, so
that their collapse in turn was mathematically probable
even before the next German stroke was delivered. In
1 914 the aim had been to wheel inwards and round up
the opposing armies in one vast encirclement, an effort
that proved too great for the Germans 5 capacity. In 1 940
the German Command concentrated on cutting off a
portion of the opposing armies by an outward sweep, with
the result that in this piecemeal process it eventually
succeeded in swallowing them completely.

But it was baffled, as Napoleon had been, when it came
to dealing with the problem that remained — the con-
tinued resistance of island Britain, and the prospect of her
continuous "thorn-in-the-flesh" effects unless and until
she was conquered. The Wehrmacht had been prepared
for continental warfare, and for a more gradual develop-
ment of events than had taken place. Having been led
on to attempt, and attain, much more than had been
foreseen, it was caught unprepared in shipping and equip-
ment for carrying out any such new technique as was
involved in a large-scale oversea invasion.

Placed in that dilemma, the sweeping success of the
earlier continental campaign encouraged the tendency,
inherent in the Nazi gospel, to follow in the footsteps of
Napoleon and repeat his invasion of Russia. Brauchitsch
and Haider tried to curb Hitler's ambition to succeed where
Napoleon had failed, but the immensity of their own suc-
cesses hitherto made it more difficult for them to impose
a policy of moderation. Moreover, while they were far
from agreeing with the Nazi view that the conquest of
Russia would be easy, the relatively high estimate that
they had formed of Russia's strength made them more

48

The Other Side of the Hill

inclined to accept the necessity of tackling Russia before
that strength had still further increased.

The plan they framed was designed on the same piin-
ciple as 1940 — that of piercing weak spots in the Red
Aimy's front, isolating huge fractions of it, and forcing
these 10 attack in reverse in the endeavour to get out of the
net woven round them. They aimed to destioy Russia's
aimed strength in battles near to their own frontier, and
wanted to avoid, above all, being drawn deep into Russia
in pursuit of a still unbioken army that letreatcd before
their advance. Conditions m Russia favoured this design
111 so far as the vast width of the front offei ed more 1 com
to manoeuvre for piercing thrusts than there had been in
the west, but were unfa vom able in the lack of natural
back-stops, comparable to the Channel, against which they
could hope to pin the enemy after breaking through.

The German plan achieved a scries of great piecemeal
victories which brought it ominously close to complete
success — helped by the initial over-confidence of the
Russian leaders. The armoured thiusts cut deep, and
successively cut off large portions of the Russian ai mies,
including a dangerously high proportion of thcii best-
trained and best-equipped tioops. But, on balance, the
advantage which the German offensive derived Irom the
breadth of space in Russia was outweighed by the dis-
advantage of the depth of space through which the Russians
could withdraw in evading annihilation. That balance
of disadvantage tended to increase as the campaign
continued.

Another handicap which emerged was the limited scale
of the armoured forces on which the success of the German
strokes mainly depended In 1940 the victory in the west
had been virtually decided by the thrusts of the 10 panzer
divisions used to open the way for the mass of 150 ordinary
divisions which the Germans deployed there. For the
invasion of Russia in 1941 the number of panzer divisions
was raised to 21 — but only by halving the number of

The Biauchiisch-Halder Era

49

tanks in each. The greater power of manoeuvre provided
by this increased scale of mobile divisions was valuable on
such a broad front, while the decreased punching power
did not matter much in the earlier phases of the invasion.
Indeed, the consequent rise in the proportion of infantry
in these divisions was welcomed by the orthodox, since it
provided a higher ratio of tioops to hold the ground gained.
But the limited punching power became a serious factor
as the campaign continued, especially when the Germans
met a more concentrated defence on approaching the great
ciiies.

It was on those "rocks 55 that the German prospect of
victory foundered. The nearer they came to such objec-
tives, the more obvious became the direction of their
attacks and the less room they had for deceptive manoeuvre.
Hitler's long-profitable instinct for the strategy of indirect
approach deserted him when such great prizes loomed
before his eyes. Moscow became as fatal a magnet for
him as it had been for Napoleon.

When the German armies failed to fulfil their aim of a
decisive victory west of the Dnieper — to destroy the
Russian armies before they could retreat beyond it —
Hitler wavered in a state of indecision, and then tem-
porarily flung his weight southward into the Ukraine.
But after a spectacular encirclement of the opposing forces
around Kiev, he reverted to the original axis. Although
autumn was now at hand, he decided to continue the
advance on Moscow — as well as the southern advance
through the Ukraine towards the Caucasus. Early in
October he staked his prestige on the gamble by the
announcement that the final stage of the offensive to
capture Moscow had begun.

The opening phase was brilliantly successful, and
600,000 Russians were caught by a great encircling move-
ment around Vyasma, carried out by the armies under
Bock's command. But it was the end of October before
they were rounded up, and by that time winter had set

50 The Other Side of the Hill

in, with the result that the exploitation of victory was
bogged in the mud on the way to Moscow.

When Hitler called for fresh efforts, Brauchitsch and
Haider advised that the armies should draw in their horns
and consolidate a safe defensive line for the winter, where
the troops could gain shelter from the weather as well as
from the enemy. But Hitler would not listen to such
cautious arguments. So another great effort was mounted
in November. But the obviousness of its aim and the
convergence of its thrusts simplified the Russians 5 problem
in concentrating reserves to check each dangerous develop-
ment. Brauchitsch ceased to be responsible except in a
nominal sense for this later stage of the offensive, carried
out under Hitler's orders. After its final failure early in
December, coupled with the German retreat from Rostov
in the south, it was officially announced that Brauchitsch
had been relieved of his post, and that Hitler had decided
to "follow his intuitions 55 and take over supreme command
of the German Army, in addition to the supreme command
of the forces as a whole, which he had assumed when he
had parted with Blomberg m February, 1938.

Brauchitsch was fortunate in the time of his departure.
For it left his military record distinguished by the most
striking series of victories in modern history, and blemished
merely by a check which he had not only foreseen but of
which he had forewarned his supeiior. But his dismissal
registered the final defeat of the soldiers' claim to decide
questions of strategy and military policy. Henceforth the
"Bohemian Corporal 5 ' would dictate to the generals in
their own sphere, and their power would be limited to
advice or protest. Unwilling executants do not make for
good execution.

The transition was traced by Dittmar in one of our
talks. "The Polish, Western and Balkan campaigns, and
the first stage of the Russian campaign, were conducted
by O K.H. — with comparatively little interference from
O.K.W. The battle of Kiev was the first occasion when

The Brauchitsck- Holder Era 51

Hitler attempted to take direct charge of operations. He
justified this on the ground that it was essential to finish
the Russian campaign before the winter. From then on,
O K H. was increasingly dominated by O.K W. — which
really spelt Hitler. 55

Dittmar went on to emphasize the effect of another
important development: "Hitler decided that O.K.H 5 s
sphere of responsibility should be confined to the Russian
front, and that O K.W. should assume the exclusive
direction of all other theatres of war. As a result, O.K.H.
could not keep a view of the war as a whole, and this
restriction of outlook progressively weakened its ability to
argue the case against errors of strategy. The division
of spheres, and interests, between O.K.W. and O.K.H.
w r as a grave weakness m the German planning.

"I heard much about the effects from Haider. He said
that Hitier was a mystic, who tended to discount, even
where he did not disregard, all the rules of strategy.

"Hitler taught and believed that reason and knowledge
are nothing, and that the unbending will to victory and
the relentless pursuit of the goal are everything. Mystical
speculation replaced considerations of time and space, and
the careful calculation of the strength of one's own forces
in relation to the enemy's. All freedom of action was
eliminated. Even the highest commanders were subjected
to an unbearable tutelage. 55

CHAPTER V

"SOLDIER IN THE^&UN 3 '— ROMMEL

From 1941 onwards the names of all other German generals
came to be overshadowed by that of Erwin Rommel. He
had the most startling rise of any — from colonel to field-
marshal. He was an outsider, in a double sense — as he
had not qualified for high position m the hierarchy of the
General Staff, while he long performed in a thealie
outside Europe.

His fame was deliberately fostered — not only by his
own efforts but by Hitler's calculated choice. For Hitler,
recognizing the public craving in wartime for glamorous
military figures, decided to pick two soldiers (and two only)
whom he could safely turn into popular heroes — "one in
the sun and one in the snow 55 . Rommel in Afiica was to
be the sun-hero and Dietl in Finland was to be the
snow-hero.

Both performed in the wings of the main stage, where
Hitler intended to keep the limelight for himself Both
were vigorous fighting soldiers whose qualities promised
well for local success, without being of the intellectual
calibre that might make them competitors for the higher
strategic direction. Both seemed certain to be loyal
instruments of Hitler, In the outcome, Rommel did more
of the two in performance to justify his selection, but
Hitler's confidence in his sustained loyalty was not so well
justified. When Rommel came to see that Hitler's survival
and Germany's survival were incompatible he put his
country first and turned against his patron.

While Rommel owed much to Hitler's favour, it was
testimony to his own dynamic personality that he first
impressed himself on Hitler's mind, and then impressed

52

"Soldier in the Sun" — Rommel

53

his British opponents so deeply as to magnify his fame
beyond Hitler's calculation.

As a junior officer in the previous war Rommel gained
exceptional distinction, receiving the highest German
decoration, Pour le Menie> after the Gaporetto offensive of
1 91 7 against the Italians* But his professional knowledge
was not regarded as equal to his fighting record, and he was
given only minor employment in the post-war army. He
was not considered suitable for the select circle of the future
General Staff The story that in the post-war years he
was a Nazi storm-troop leader is, however, a legend in-
vented by propagandists in the days when he became
famous, in oider to associate his reputation with that of
the party.

His opportunity came when, after the Nazis attained
power in 1933, he was appointed a military instructor to »
the S.A. He was a good lecturer, with a gift of vivid
exposition, and had widened his horizon by studying the
new 4 'science 5 5 of geo-politics — he was one of Professor
Haushofer's disciples. Subsequently he became instructor
at the Infantry School at Dresden, and was then appointed
to the new one at Wiener-Neustadt. Before this he had
come in contact with Hitler, who found him a refreshingly
unorthodox soldier with whom to discuss new military
ideas. On the outbreak of war he was appointed com-
mander of Hitler's personal headquarters, which naturally
increased both the contact and the opportunity. After the
Polish campaign he asked Hitler for command of a panzer
division, and got it. This was characteristic of Rommel's
keen sense of the right opening and his opportunism in
grasping it. For, prior to the war, he had been such a
keen infantryman that he had opposed the ideas of those
who preached the gospel of tank warfare. He saw the
light on the road to Warsaw, and lost no time in "following
the gleam 55 .

He was appointed to command the 7th Panzer Divi-
sion, and led it in the Western offensive. His division

54 The Other Side of the Hill

played a dashing part in the break-through over the Meuse
and on to the Channel coast. In the next stage, it broke
through the French front on the Somme between Abbe-
ville and Amiens, and led the drive to the Seine near
Rouen, Its brilliant performance was still further
enhanced by subsequent publicity, and it was retrospec-
tively christened "The Phantom Division".

Then, early in 1941, when Hitler decided to send an
armoured and motorized expeditionary force to help his
Italian allies in the invasion of Egypt, he appointed Rommel
to command this "Africa Corps 55 . By the time it arrived
in Tripoli the Italians had not only been thrown back over
the frontier, but their army had been destroyed in the
pursuit. Rommel was not daunted by the disastrous
situation which greeted him. Knowing that the victorious
British army was small, and guessing that it was probably
at the end of its tether, he promptly launched an offensive
with the first instalment of his corps. He had little under-
standing of tank technique, but he had a tremendous sense
of mobility and a flair for surprise. He caught the British
distributed piecemeal, and with most of their tanks in need
of repair. The speed of his onset and enveloping dust-clouds
magnified his strength. The British were swept headlong
out of Cyrenaica and back over the Egyptian frontier.

In the next eighteen months Rommel's fame continually
grew, owing to the way he baffled successive British
offensives, and, above all, through his startling ripostes
whenever his annihilation was prematurely announced.
In the process the troops of the British Eighth Army came
to think much more highly of him than they did of their
own commanders, and his Jack-in-the-box performance so
tickled their sense of humour that their admiration became
almost affectionate. He reached the peak of his career
in the summer of 1942 when he defeated the Eighth Army
piecemeal between Gazala and Tobruk, and then chased
the remainder of it back through the Western Desert to
the verges of the Nile Delta.

"Soldier in the Sun" — Rommel 55

General Auchmleck, the British Commander-in-Chief
in the Middle East, intervened at this crisis by taking over
personal charge of the battered Eighth Army and rallying
the disheartened troops for a definite stand on the El
Alamein position. Rommel's troops were tired and short
of supplies after their long pursuit. In two successive
efforts they were foiled and thrown back That check
proved fatal to the invader's prospects,

Rommel still appeared confident that he would succeed
at a third attempt, but his inward hopes were fading, while
time was slipping away in the process of accumulating
supplies. During the interval the British were reinforced
by fresh divisions from home. There was also a change of
commanders. Mr. Churchill wanted the British to take
the offensive as soon as the reinforcements arrived. Auchin-
leck, more wisely, insisted on waiting until they were
accustomed to desert conditions. In the sequel, Auchmleck
was replaced by Alexander as Commander-in-Chief, while
Montgomery took over the Eighth Army. But Rommel
struck first, at the end of August, and was again baffled
by the new defence plan. Then the initiative changed
sides. After a long pause for thorough preparation-
longer than Auchmleck had contemplated— Montgomery
launched an offensive in the last week of October that was
now backed by a tremendous superiority in air-power,
gun-power, and tank-power. Even then it was a tough
struggle for a whole week, as there was no wide outflanking
manoeuvre. But the enemy, besides being overstretched,
were vitally crippled by the submarine sinkings of their
petrol tankers crossing the Mediterranean. That decided
the issue, and once the enemy began to collapse at their
extreme forward point they were not capable of any
serious stand until they had reached the western end of
Libya, more than a thousand miles back.

For Rommel himself the decisive blow had been the
frustration of his August attack. Following that disap-
pointment, he was so badly shaken that his moral depression

5 6 The Other Side of the Hill

lowered his physical state, and he had to go sick, with
desert sores, for treatment in Vienna. On hearing of
Montgomery's offensive, he insisted on flying back to
Africa at once, regardless of the doctors' protests, but was
not fit enough to do himself justice in the months that
followed. Although he conducted the long retreat suffi-
ciently well to evade each of Montgomery's attempts to
encircle his forces, he lost opportunities to administer a
check, while his sickness may have accounted for his bad
slip in the Battle of Mareth that opened Montgomery's
path into Tunisia, and thus paved the way for the enemy's
final collapse m Africa, He himself left Africa, for further
treatment, in March — over a month before that occurred.
For Hitler it was as important to preserve Rommel's
prestige as to preserve his services for the future.

Since Alamein, there has been a tendency to talk of the
"Rommel legend", and to suggest that his reputation was
unduly inflated. Such disparagement is a common accom-
paniment of a change of fortune But there was a deeper
reason for it in the first place. He had become the hero
of the Eighth Army troops before Montgomery arrived
on the scene — the scale of their respect for him was shown
by the way they coined the term "a Rommel" as a synonym
for a good performance of any kind. This attitude of
admiration carried a subtle danger to morale, and when
Montgomery took over command special efforts were
made to damp the "Rommel legend" as well as to create
a counter-legend around "Monty".

This propaganda gradually spread the view that
Rommel was an overrated general. Montgomery's private
feelings, however, were shown m the way he collected
photographs of Rommel and pinned them up beside his
desk, though he later expressed the view that Rundstedt
was the more formidable opponent of the two. Here it
must be remembered that Montgomery never met Rommel
at his best, and that when they met in battle Rommel was
not only weakened by sickness but tactically crippled

"Soldier tn ike Sun 5 ' — Rommel 57

by a heavy inferiority of force and shortage of petrol
supplies.

The outstanding feature of Rommel's successes is that
they were achieved with an inferiority of force, and without
any command of the air. No other generals on either side
gained the victory under such conditions, except for the
early British leaders under Wavell, and their successes
were won against Italians. That Rommel made mistakes
is clear, but when fighting superior forces any slip may
result in defeat, whereas numerous mistakes can be
effectively covered up by the general who enjoys a big
advantage of strength.

More definite defects were his tendency to disregard
the administrative side of strategy and his lack of thorough-
ness over detail. At the same time he did not know how
to delegate authority, a defect that was very irritating to
his chief subordinates. He not only tried to do everything
himself but to be everywhere — so that he was often out of
touch with his headquarters, and apt to be riding round
the battlefield when he was wanted by his staff for some
important decision. On the other hand, he had a wonderful
knack of appearing at some vital spot and giving a decisive
impetus to the action at a crucial moment. He also gave
dynamic junior officers such opportunities to prove their
value as seniority-bound generals would never have
dreamt of allowing them. As a result he was worshipped
by the younger men. That feeling was shared by many of
the Italian soldiers who saw in him such a vital contrast
to their own senile and safety-first higher commanders.

In the field of tactics, Rommel was often brilliant in
ruse and bluff. In his first attack in Africa he pushed his
tanks so hard that many went astray in the desert, but
when he reached the main British position he cleverly
concealed the scanty number that were present by utilizing
trucks to raise a great cloud of dust, and create the
impression that tanks were converging from all sides.
This produced a collapse.

5»

The Other Side of the Hill

While extremely daring he was also subtle. A repeated
feature of his battles was the way he used his tanks as a
bait, to lure the British tanks with traps that were lined
with anti-tank guns — thus skilfully blending the defensive
with the offensive. These "Rommel tactics 5 * became
increasingly adopted by all armies as the war advanced.

When he left Africa his departure was almost regretted
by his opponents, so big was the place he had come to fill
m their lives, and in their imagination. That was partly
due to his remarkably good treatment of British prisoners ;
indeed, the number who managed to escape and return
to their own lines after a personal contact with him suggests
that his chivalry was blended with strategy. Much wider
still was the impression made by his swiftness of manoeuvre
and his startling come-backs after being apparently defeated.

As a strategist, his defects were apt to be a serious offset
to his subtlety and audacity. As a tactician, his qualities
tended to eclipse his defects. As a commander, his excep-
tional combination of leading power and driving power
was accompanied by a mercurial temperament, so that he
was apt to swing too violently between exaltation and
depression.

In 1944 Rommel reappeared as army group commander
on the Channel coast, to meet the Anglo- American invasion.
Here he was under Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, the
Commander-in-Chief in the West, Their views differed
as to the best way to meet the invasion and also as to the
place where it was to be expected. Rundstedt favoured
defence in depth, trusting to the effect of a powerful
counter-offensive when the invaders had fully committed
themselves. Rommel had a natural disposition to favour
such a form of strategy, which he had followed so often
in Africa, but experience there had modified his view of
its practicability against an invader superior in air-power.
He was now anxious to concentrate right forward with
the aim of checking the invasion before it became estab-
lished ashore. Rundstedt also held the view that the main

"Soldier in the Sun' 9 — Rommel 59

Allied offensive would come direct across the Channel at
its narrower part, between the Somme and Calais, whereas
Rommel became more concerned with the possibilities of
an invasion of Western Normandy, between Caen and
Cherbourg. Here he took the same view as Hitler.

On the latter issue Rommel's anticipation (and Hitler's)
was right. Moreover, there is evidence that he had striven
hard in the last four months to improve the coast defences
in Normandy, which had been neglected by comparison
with those in the Pas de Calais. His efforts, fortunately
for the Allies, were hampered by the shortage of resources
— so that both the under-water obstructions and the coast
fortifications were far from complete.

On the other issue, the general opinion on the Allied
side, especially among the generals, has been that Rund-
stedt's plan — of holding the reserves back and then
launching a massive stroke at a chosen moment — was a
good one, and that Rommel spoilt it by using up strength
in the effort to pen the Allied armies within their Nor-
mandy bridgehead. That was even more strongly the
opinion of most of the German generals-those who
belonged to the General Staff "caste" regarded Rommel
as only less of an amateur than Hitler. They argued, also,
that Rommel had had no war experience comparable to
that provided by the Russian campaign, which had
taught the importance of disposing forces in great depth.

Rundstedt's plan was certainly more in accord with
the basic theory of strategy. But when one takes account
of the size of the Allied forces, coupled with their domina-
tion of the air, and set against the wide space open for
manoeuvre, it looks very doubtful whether any deliberate
counter-offensive by the Germans could have stopped the
invading armies once they penetrated deep into France.
In such circumstances the only real hope may have lain
in preventing them from securing a bridgehead big enough

for building up their strength on that side of the Channel.

Rommel went close to depriving them of this opportunity

6o

The Other Side of the Hill

in the first few days, and his eventual failure to hold them
in check may be traced back, not to his mistakes, but to
delay in switching forces from the Pas de Calais. That
was due to the Higher Command's continued belief that
the Normandy landings were only a prelude to larger
landings between Le Havre and Calais. Beyond that there
was the lack of any adequate general reserve in the West.
Rundstedt had wished to create one by evacuating the
southern half of France, but Hitler would not sanction
such a step.

The effects were made fatal by Hitler's refusal to allow
a withdrawal in Normandy when it became clear to both
Rundstedt and Rommel that it was no longer possible to
hold the invading forces in check. A timely withdrawal
might have enabled the German forces to make a stand
on the Seine, and a much longer stand subsequently on
the German frontier. But Hitler insisted that there must
be no general withdrawal, and would not allow the
commanders in the West the freedom to carry out a local
withdrawal, even of a few miles, without his approval.
As a result divisions had to cling on until they were ham-
mered to bits — a rigidity which in the end resulted in much
longer retreats than Rundstedt and Rommel had proposed.

A common sense of the hopelessness of Hitler's policy
had brought these two into closer accord than ever before.
At the end of June Hitler came to France at their urgent
request — it was the only visit he paid to the West in 1944
— and they met him at Soissons. But he would not agree
to their very modest proposal to withdraw behind the
Orne, preparatory to an armoured counter-stioke. In
the following week the strain on the front grew worse.
Rundstedt now bluntly said that it was vain to continue
the struggle, and that the war ought to be ended. As that
solution did not appeal to Hitler, he decided to try a
change of commanders, and despatched his leading
general in the East, Field-Marshal von Kluge, to replace
Rundstedt.

"Soldier in the Sun" — Rommel

61

It was significant that Hitler passed over Rommel,
though he did not remove him. Rommel's attitude at
Soissons had not found favour with Hitler. But Rommel's
view of Hitler had changed even moie. He had remarked
to a number of his own subordinate commanders that
Germany's only hope now lay in doing away with Hitler
as quickly as possible, and then trying to negotiate peace.
It is certain that he was acquainted — at the least — with
the plot that culminated in the attempted assassination of
Hitler on July 20th.

Three days before that Rommel was driving along a
road near the front when low-flying 'planes attacked it.
His car capsized and he was thrown out, fracturing his
skull. The scene of this crash was the aptly-named village
of Sainte Foy de Montgommery He was taken to hospital
in Paris and when convalescent went to his home at Ulm.
By this time the Gestapo had investigated the plot against
Hitler. Two generals came to see Rommel at his home
and took him out for a drive. During it they gave him a
message from Hitler that he could choose between taking
poison and coming to Berlin for interrogation. He chose
the poison. It was then announced that he had died
from the result of his accident, and he was given a state
funeral.

Thus ended the career of a soldier who, though defective
both in his grasp of higher strategy and in administrative
detail, had a real touch of genius in the tactical field,
combined with dynamic executive power. He had a flair
for the vital spot and the critical moment. Exasperating
to his staff officers, he was worshipped by his fighting
troops.

CHAPTER VI

SOLDIERS IN THE SHADOW

In Chapter IV the pattern of the war on Germany's side
was traced as far as the end of 1941. The last chapter,
after following the divergent thread of Rommel's career
in the African field, came back along with him to the
decisive reopening of the Western field in the summer of
1944. But that has left a gap in the pattern; before
passing to the final stage it is desirable to pick up the
thread of events in Europe from the end of 1941, and
carry it through the interval. To avoid anticipating the
fuller picture that emerges from the accounts of the
generals, in Part III, this interim chapter will be confined
to a brief indication of the course of events, still in teims
of the chief military personalities concerned. They were
"soldiers in the shadow 55 , in a double sense — for the cloud
of Hitler's disapproval as well as the cloud of defeat
overhung their course.

halder's last lap

In 1942 the operations in Russia were conducted by
General Franz Haider, Chief of the General Staff, but sub-
ject to overriding directives from Hitler. Haider had a fine
strategical brain, and the actual design of the plans which
bad proved so successful earlier had been mainly his
own work, rather than the inspiration of brilliant assistants
in the background. But O.K.H,, over which he presided
after Brauchitsch's removal, was henceforth more definitely
under the control of O.K.W., which was scoffingly called
"the military bureau of Corporal Hitler 55 .

In this difficult situation Haider missed the support
that Brauchitsch, by virtue of his authority, had formerly

62

Soldiers in the Shadow 63

provided. It had been more possible to argue with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht when backed by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army than it now became
when the two were one — and when that one was a man of
Hitler's temperament. Between Brauchitsch and Haider
there was a harmony rare in high quarters, and differences
of view hardly ever arose. According to other generals who
knew them, the two had worked so closely together that
their respective functions and influence could hardly be
distinguished, though Haider tended to be the dominating
mind. "What Haider thought out, Brauchitsch presented
to Hitler. Haider never saw Hitler without Brauchitsch
being present to support him/ 5 But henceforth Haider
had to fight his battles alone.

The summer campaign of 1942 had brilliant initial
success and bore evidence of masterly planning by Haider,
An artful delay in opening the campaign on the main
front, coupled with a startling coup against the Crimean
peninsula, incited the Russians to take the initiative with
an offensive towards Kharkov. Having got the southern
Russian armies deeply embedded here, the main German
offensive was launched past their flank, and gained a clear
run down the corridor between the Don and the Donetz
rivers. But after crossing the Lower Don the German
drive split in divergent directions under Hitler's inter-
ference. The prospects of the main advance into the
Caucasus, and of securing the oilfields there, were sacri-
ficed to his desire to retrieve the check suffered by the
subsidiary advance on Stalingrad, the original object of
which had merely been to secure flank cover for the
avenue of advance into the Caucasus. Worse still, Hitler's
eyes became as narrowly focused on Stalingrad as they
had been on Moscow the previous year. The very name
of the city was a challenge to him. Once again, by the
directness of his aim he helped the Russians to concentrate
their reserves to frustrate him.

As soon as it became clear that the effort was losing

64

The Other Side of the Hill

momentum., Haider argued that it should be broken off.
Hitler had grown increasingly impatient of his objections,
and this time his unwelcome advice led to his dismissal,
at the end of September.

ZEITZLER

Haider was replaced by Kurt Zeitzler, who had recently
been Chief of Staff in the West. The fact that he had
thus been out of touch with the situation in the East
added to his handicap in taking over at such a critical
moment — and lessened his chance of disputing Hitler's
view of it.

Zeitzler, a much younger man, had been only a colonel
commanding an infantry regiment before the war, but
subsequently became chief of staff to Kleist's panzer army.
It was he who found a way to solve the problem of supply-
ing armoured forces during long-range advances and rapid
switches. Able and energetic, he was predominantly the
"man of action 55 type that appealed to the Nazi leaders,
in contrast to the "man of reflection 55 represented m
Haider, who was a mathematician and botanist as well as
a military writer of distinction.

Less of a strategist than his predecessor, Zeitzler was
an outstandingly resourceful organizer of strategic moves,
with an exceptional grasp of what could be done with
mechanized forces. His brilliant staffwork in organizing
and maintaining the panzer drive through the Ardennes
and on through France, in 1940, had been excelled in the
complex series of manoeuvres called for in 1941 — when
Kleist's panzer forces had first swerved down through the
Ukraine towards the Black Sea, to block Budenny's retreat
across the Bug and the Dnieper; then turned about and
dashed north to meet Guderian and complete the vast
encirclement round Kiev; then been switched south again,
onto the rear of the fresh Russian forces that were attacking
the German bridgehead over the Dnieper at Dnepro-
petrovsk; and, after producing a Russian collapse here, bad

Soldiers in the Shadow

6 5

driven down through the Bonetz Basin to cut off the
Russian forces near the Sea of Azov. As Kleist emphasized
to me, in paying unstinted tribute to his chief of staff, the
biggest problem in "throwing armies about in this way"
was that of maintaining supplies.

Zeitzler's performance attracted Hitler's attention, and
early in 1942 he summoned him for an interview. Hitler's
impression was deepened by what Zeitzler told him of the
emergency measures that had been improvised, in the
1st Panzer Army, to help the troops through the rigours
of the winter It impressed Hitler all the more because
he had a deep conviction that German professional soldiers
were too imbued with sealed-pattern methods, and could
not improvise Soon afterwards, Zeitzler was sent to be
Chief of Staff in the West, and reorganize the defences
there. In September, after the repulse of the Dieppe
landing, he was called back to the East, and told by
Hitler that he was to become Chief of the General Staff.
It was a dazzling jump for a young major-general.

Hitler's preference for younger men who understood
mechanized warfare, coupled with Zeitzler's practical
record in that field, might suffice to explain his selection —
but it was not the complete explanation. In placing such
a junior general at the head of O K.H., Hitler hoped he
would be so grateful to his patron as to sink his professional
loyalty and become Hitler's henchman as Keitel and Jodl
had done In ridding himself of Haider, Hitler counted
on relief from the constant objections he had endured
from that "turbulent priest" of the established military
order.

Momentarily, Zeitzler was dazzled. Thus he acquiesced
in the continuance of the assault on Stalingrad, as well
as the advance in the Caucasus, until the bulk of the German
reserves had been committed too far to be extricated — in
so far as they had not already been consumed in vain
efforts.

But his doubts soon began to grow, and he questioned
c

66

The Other Side of the Hill

the wisdom of Hitler's intention to hold on to an advanced
position at Stalingrad during the winter. When the
Russian counter-offensive began, he wanted to withdraw
Paulus's army immediately, but Hitler angrily refused.
After that, friction was frequent, for even wiien Paulus's
army was encircled Hitler would not agree that it should
be ordered to abandon its position and fight its way out
to the west. Zeitzler was driven to tender his resignation,
but Hitler brushed that aside.

After the army at Stalingrad had been forced to
surrender, Zeitzler managed to induce Hitler to sanction
withdrawals from two dangerous salients in the north,
facing Moscow and Leningrad respectively. This eased
the strain and helped to maintain that front intact in face
of subsequent assaults, besides releasing reserves for else-
where. But Hitler was galled by having to make such an
unconcealable step-back from Russia's two greatest cities,
and he would not consider any general strategic withdrawal
Zeitzler did not lack courage in standing up to Hitler, but
he had to fight his battles alone, for Keitel and Jodl always
backed Hitler. He was the more handicaped in combating
their influence because their offices were at Hitler's head-
quarters, while his was some distance away. But the
separation was more than a matter of mileage, for as
time went on and his protests multiplied, Hitler's
manner became distant when they met at the daily
conferences.

All this tended to augment the influence of General
Jodl, the chief of Hitler's personal staff, and thus of Hitler's
own control over operations. For Jodl, who kept his
place throughout the war, would never have lasted so long
if he had not been adept in "keeping his place 5 ' within the
limits assigned to him. He was a first-rate clerk. Zeitzler,
by contrast, was impulsive and far from subservient — he
frequently lost his temper in arguing with Hitler. But the
latter seems to have been reluctant to part with a man
who was such a master of mechanized logistics, with a

Soldiers in the Shadow

6 7

practical capacity to solve movement problems that neither
Keitel nor Jodl possessed

The end came early in July, 1944, soon after the
collapse of the armies on the Upper Dnieper. Zeitzler
went to see Hitler privately and urged him to sanction
the withdrawal of the Northern Army Group, in the Baltic
States, before it was encircled. Hitler refused, and then
both men flared up. Having had his resignation rejected
several times, Zeitzler went sick as the only way out of a
responsibility he was unwilling to share any longer. Hitler
took his revenge by depriving Zeitzler of various privileges
of his rank, and then by giving the humiliating order that
he was to be discharged from the Army without the normal
right to wear uniform.

GUDERIAN

To fill Zeitzler's place Hitler called on an earlier and
older tank expert — Guderian. That appointment shocked
many of the members of the General Staff, who regarded
Guderian as a one-sided enthusiast for his speciality and
a "bull" on the battlefield, lacking the strategical sense
and balanced view required in a Chief of the General
Staff. The choice demonstrated Hitler's instinctive pre-
ference for revolutionary ideas, and bis appreciation of what
he had owed to Guderian's past activities. 1 It appeared to
set the crown on the career of the man who had been the
pioneer in creating Germany's panzer forces, and then
the spearman of Germany's run of victories. But, in reality,
it proved more in the nature of window-dressing.

For Hitler had long since taken the direction of the
war completely into his own hands, and regarded O.K.H.
as little more than a means of transmitting his orders to,
and handling the executive details of, the Eastern Front.
Even if Guderian had been fitted by temperament and
experience to be Chief of the General Staff he would not
have been allowed to play the part. As things were, he

1 These are related in Chapter IX, "The Rise of Armour."

68

The Other Side of the Hill

was doubly checked — by an atmosphere of professional
mistrust around him, and by Hitler on top of him.

His subordinates on the General Staff patronizingly,
and rather resentfully, spoke of him as "a fighting soldier,
not a War- Academy soldier 55 . They were suspicious of any
sign of his unfamiliarity with their technique With
Hitler 5 s backing he might have overcome such resistance,
but he soon found himself clashing with Hitler as well.
It w T as difficult enough that his entry into office came when
Germany's strength was ebhmg, but more difficult still
that it came just after the plot of July 20th. Hitler was
now in such a mood of distrust that he was apt to take
any contrary opinion as a symptom of treason. Some of
the younger soldiers knew how to disarm his suspicions,
and could argue with him up to a point, but Guderian
lacked the knack,

Guderian himself had aged, and much of his original
vitality had been used up. He had partially burnt himself
out in fighting continued battles against disbelievers and*
doubters. In the process, determination had tended to
degenerate into obstinacy; and fiery energy, into irascibility
— as often happens to men of his kind The cramping
circumstances of his belated opportunity aggravated these
tendencies.

Nevertheless, this apostle of the new offensive gospel
seems to have shown more insight than his master into the
defensive requirements of the situation. Early in 1944,
when he was still Inspector-General of the Panzer Forces,
he had urged Hitler to carry out a strategic withdrawal
in the East, and for that purpose prepare a strong rear-
ward defensive line along the 1940 frontier. When he
became Chief of the General Staff, the front north of the
Pripet Marshes had just previously collapsed, but the
Russian flood was eventually checked on a line not far
behind what he had proposed. Some twenty divisions, how-
ever, had been lost or had sacrificed their equipment in
the hasty retreat that followed the collapse, and the breach

Soldiers in the Shadow 69

was only filled by rushing back panzer divisions £ro*n
Rumania. The weakened front in that quarter soon
collapsed, and the collapse was deepened by Rumania's
quick change of side. This opened the way for the Russians
to push up through the Carpathians into Central Europe
in a wide flank march.

Guderian's autumn efforts to consolidate the new line
covering East Prussia and Central Poland were hampered,
not only by the drain of reserves to bolster up the Hungarian
forces, but by Hitler's desire to attempt another offensive
in the West All possible reserves were collected for this
drearn-plan of "dunkirlring" the British again by another
flank thrust through the Ardennes. Yet even at this late
stage, Hitler would not listen to arguments for with-
drawing from the Baltic Stages, the Balkans and Italy
in order to provide reserves for the mam front in the
East.

When the Ardennes stroke had ended in failure, Hitler
still resisted Guderian's arguments. He allowed only a
paltry reinforcement to be sent eastward, although Guderian
v^/arned him that a fresh Russian offensive was imminent
there, and that the German front was not strong enough
to hold out. Worse still, that small addition was more
than cancelled out by Hitler's order that three of the best
armoured divisions in Poland were to be sent southward
in a vain offensive attempt to break the Russians 5 encircling
grip on Budapest.

When the Russian offensive was launched on January
1 2 th, Guderian had a mobile reserve of only twelve divisions
for a front of nearly 800 miles. Moreover, three days
earlier, Hitler had refused his appeal for permission to
forestall the Russians by withdrawing from the threatened
salients As a result the front in Poland collapsed quickly,
and the Russians 5 onrush could not be stemmed until
they had penetrated deep into Germany and reached the
Odor. Here there w r as a momentary chance for a riposte,
as they had outrun their supplies and their flanks were

7°

The Other Side of the Hill

exposed. Hitler had now agreed to release the 6th Panzer
Army from the West, but instead of allowing it to be used
for this counterstroke he sent it to Hungary for another
vain bid to relieve Budapest, He was living in a world
of dreams, remote from reality.

Reduced to desperation, Guderian now tackled some
of the other leading Nazis about the urgency of seeking
peace. His activities soon came to Hitler's ears, and he
was dismissed from his post, in March, barely a month
before the final collapse,

MANSTEIN

The ablest of all the German generals was probably
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein. That was the verdict
of most of those with whom I discussed the war, from
Rundstedt downwards. He had a superb strategic sense,
combined with a greater understanding of mechanized
weapons than any of the generals who did not belong to
the tank school itself. Yet in contrast to some of the
single-track enthusiasts he did not lose sight of the impor-
tance of improving alternative weapons, and defence.
He was responsible, shortly before the war, for developing
the armoured assault-gun, which proved invaluable later.

A Lewinski by birth, he had been adopted by the
Manstein family as a boy. He got an infantry commission
shortly before the 19 14 war, and, although too young to
qualify for the Staff College, he made his mark on the
staff of General von Lossberg, who in 191 7 produced the
new system of defence in depth. By 1935 Manstein had
become head of the operations section of the General Staff,
and next year was made Deputy Chief under Beck. But
in February, 1938, when Fritsch was ousted, Manstein
was also removed from O.K.H. — as another move in
eliminating opposition to O.K.W. and Nazi designs. He
was sent to command a division in Silesia. However, on
the eve of war in 1939 he was appointed Chief of Staff
to Rundstedt's Army Group, which played the decisive

Soldiers in the Shadow

7i

role in the Polish campaign. After that he accompanied
Rundstedt to the West,

Here he was the source of the brain-wave that produced
the defeat of France — the idea of the tank-thrust through
the Ardennes. But his arguments only prevailed after he
had paid personal forfeit. For the top military circles
felt that he was too pushing, and at the end of January, he
was pushed out of the way by sending him to command an
infantry corps, the 38th — his request for a panzer corps
being rejected on the ground that he lacked experience.
After his removal he was summoned to see Hitler and
seized the chance to explain his idea. Hitler agreed with
it; a week later O.K.H. issued the revised plan.

In the first stage of the campaign, Manstein had no
chance to show what he could do as a commander of
troops, for his corps was merely among the backers-up
of the panzer drive. But in the second stage, the attack
on the new French defence line along the Somme, his
corps was instrumental in achieving the first break-through,
east of Amiens. Rommel's tanks exploited the opening,
but Manstein raced them in the pursuit, handling his
infantry like mobile troops. His corps was the first to
reach and cross the Seine, on June 10th — marching over
forty miles that day. Then, by rapid strides, he pushed
on to the Loire. After that, when it came to a question
of invading England, he was allotted the formidable task
of making the initial landing across the Straits of Dover,
near Folkestone. But that plan was stillborn.

Before the invasion of Russia he was given command
of a new panzer corps — the 56th, in East Prussia. He
broke through the Russian front here, and raced on so
fast that he reached the Dvina (nearly 200 miles distant)
within four days — capturing the main bridges. But he
was not allowed to pursue his drive towards Leningrad,
as he wished, and had to wait for a week while the other
panzer corps and the 16th Army came up. He then
drove as far again to reach Lake Ilmen, by July 15th,

72

The Other Side of the Hill

but was there checked by Russian reserves that had now-
had time to gather. In September he was promoted to
command the nth Army, in the far south, and there
opened the gateway to tbe Crimea, by breaking through
the narrow and fortified Perekop Isthmus — a feat which
proved his mastery of the technique of siege warfare.

When the invasion of Russia became stuck in the mud
and snow before Moscow that winter, and Hitler sought a
scapegoat in sacking Brauchitsch, many of the younger
generals in the German Army hoped that Manstein would
be chosen to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief, But
Hitler wanted to assume the post himself. He thought of
making Manstein Chief of the General Staff, but felt he
might prove even more difficult than Haider.

In the summer of 1 942, Manstein was responsible for the
attack on the famous fortress of Sevastopol, which preceded
the main offensive. His success in that task deprived the
Russians of their chief naval base in the Black Sea, After
that, he was chosen to command the attack on Leningrad,
with forces transferred for the purpose from one extreme
flank to the other. It looked as though his scope was to
be continually limited by the skill he had shown in this
specialized role of siege tactics.

Manstein's mission went unfulfilled, however, for by
the time the forces were being moved to Leningrad, a
call came for them to go to Stalingrad, where Hitler's
advance had become stuck. Soon that impasse developed
into a crisis, and the army there was surrounded. In the
emergency Manstein was given an improvised force, called
Army Group "Don", and sent to the rescue.

It was too late and the effort failed — after some of the
most breathless cut-and-thrust in the war In the subse-
quent retreat he rallied the cracking line and prevented
the Russians crossing the Dnieper. A dazzling counter-
stroke threw them back a long way and recaptured
Kharkov, in March, 1943. Manstein now commanded
Army Group "South 55 . That summer, in combination

Soldiers in the Shadow 73

with Kluge (Army Group " Centre' '), he delivered
Germany's last offensive in the East.

He had proposed alternative courses. One was to
strike early in May before the Russians were ready, and
dislocate their preparations by a pincer-stroke agamst the
Kursk salient. The other — which he thought better —
was to wait for the Russians 9 offensive, recoil before it,
and then launch a flank stroke from the Kiev area to roll
up their line. Hitler rejected the latter, fearing to run
the risks involved in such a daring strategic gambit. But
after choosing the former he postponed the attack— just
as it was about to be launched — with the idea that by
waiting until his own strength had increased he would
re-insure his chances. In the end he waited until July
before striking — and the Russians profited more by the
delay. Although the southern pincer ( Manstein' s) pene-
trated fairly deep, the northern one was blunted by the
combined tenacity and elasticity of the Russian defence,
and then broken by a counter-stroke. This developed
into a general counter-offensive, which the Germans no
longer had the strength to resist.

Manstein showed great skill, against heavy odds, in
conducting the step-by-step retreat to the Polish frontier.
But Hitler would not listen to his arguments for shaking
off the Russian pressure by a long step-back. The vigour
with which he argued became an increasing annoyance to
Hitler, who finally shelved him in March, 1944 — saying
that stubborn resistance yard by yard was more needed
than skill in manoeuvre. An underlying factor in the change
was Hitler's and Himmler's political distrust of Manstein.
That ended the military career of the Allies' most for-
midable military opponent — a man who combined modern
ideas of mobility with a classical sense of manoeuvre, a
mastery of technical detail, and great driving power.

Dwelling regretfully on Manstein's disappearance from
the field, Blumentritt said to me: "He was not only the
most brilliant strategist of all our generals, but he had a

74

The Othei Side of the Hill

good political sense. A man of that quality was too difficult
for Hitler to swallow for long. At conferences Manstein
often differed from Hitler, in front of others, and would
go so far as to declare that some of the ideas which Hitler
put forward were nonsense 5 '.

KLUGE

Hitler had lost his other best-known commander in the
East a few months earlier, when Kluge was injured in an
air crash. But in the summer of 1 944, when he was fit again,
Hitler found fresh room for him — in the West, He was
sent to supersede Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief
there

Field- Marshal Guenther von Kluge was the only sur-
vivor of the original army commanders with whom Hitler
embarked on war in 1939. In the Polish campaign, the
French campaign, and the 1941 campaign in Russia he
commanded the Fourth Army. In the first and the third
he had been in Bock's Army Group, and had been entrusted
with the offensive against Moscow, even though he did not
share the optimism of Hitler and Bock. While he was a
strong personality, it was testimony to his forbearing temper-
ament that he endured Bock so long — for Bock was a very
difficult man to serve. In the same way Kluge had sufficient
moral courage to express his views frankly to Hitler, yet
he also refrained from pressing his views to the point of
being troublesome. After Bock was put on the shelf
early in 1942, Kluge succeeded him in command of the
Central Army Group. There he created a well-woven
defence that withstood successive Russian assaults during
the next two years.

His defensive successes, together with his temperament
and loyalty, naturally recommended him to Hitler when
Rundstedt and Rommel failed to give satisfaction by
achieving the impossible — and caused Hitler further
annoyance by pointing out the inevitable. By the time
Kluge took over, the Allies had poured such a volume of

Soldiers in the Shadow

75

force into their enlarged Normandy bridgehead that the
sheer weight of it was soon bound to burst the too extensive
dam with which the Germans were trying to contain it.
Three weeks later it collapsed at the western end under
the fresh impact of Patton's American Third Army. But
Hitler still forbade any withdrawal.

Kluge was too obedient to disregard such definite
instructions. One effect was seen in the attempted counter-
stroke on August 6th against the bottleneck at Avranches
through which Patton's forces had poured out. Shrewdly
aimed, this stroke could have been deadly if the panzer
divisions there employed had been strong in tanks; but
in their diminished state its chances were desperately
small, even before it was broken up by concentrated air
attack. Worse still, the German forces were not permitted
to break away from the clinch when this forlorn hope
miscarried. Although retreat was now inevitable, every
withdrawal was fatally late and short. In consequence,
the battle ended in a general collapse of the German armies
in France. When this developed, Hitler sacked Kluge
and appointed Field- Marshal Model to replace him.

Kluge took his dismissal with apparent calm, spent a
day and a half explaining the situation to his successor,
then quietly set off for home and swallowed a capsule of
poison on the way. That action was due, not to his
chagrin at the ending of his career, but to his anticipation
that he would be arrested on arriving home. For he had
been in close contact, and sympathy, as early as 1942
with the conspiracy that culminated on July 20th, 1944,
in the attempt to overthrow Hitler. Characteristically, he
had refrained from committing himself, but he knew that
his name had been found in the documents when the plot
was investigated after the attempt had failed.

MODEL

Walter Model was fifty-four, a decade younger than
most of the German higher commanders — whose average

76

The Other Side of the Hill

age had remained much higher than in the opposing armies.
Nor did he come from the same social level. In this as
in other respects he had many similarities to Rommel
though he had profited by a more thorough professional
grounding. When the big expansion of the army began,
with the Hitler regime, Model worked under Brauchitsch
in the training department of the War Ministry, and there
established close touch with the Nazi leaders. He made a
strong impression on Goebbels, who introduced him to
Hitler. Later he was put in charge of the inventions
department. His technical knowledge was scanty, but he
made up for it by imagination and energy, so that, although
his enthusiasm was apt to mislead him as to the practica-
bility of various ideas, he did a lot towards developing new
forms of equipment.

After being chief of staff of the 4th Corps in the Polish
campaign, and then of the 16th Army in the French
campaign, he was given command of the 3rd Panzer
Division. In the invasion of Russia he distinguished him-
self by his thrusting power, and led the way in the race
to the Dnieper. His extreme energy won quick promotion
— first to a panzer corps and then, m the winter, to
command of an army, the 9th. He showed much ability
here in a defensive role under difficult conditions.

In 1943 he was cast for a leading role in the summer
offensive — as the northern arm of the pincer-stroke against
the Kursk salient. Here he lost the best chance by per-
suading Hitler — contrary to the opinion of Kluge and
Manstein — to postpone the stroke so as to accumulate
more tanks and strengthen the punch. The delay gave
the Russians time to prepare, and Model's eventual
attack failed, at heavy cost, to break through their well-
knit elastic defence. But he did well m checking the
dangerous Russian offensive that followed, and in October
was promoted to command Army Group "North 53 . In
April, 1944, he was transferred to Army Group "South",
in place of Manstein, and parried the Russian thrust

Soldiers m the Shadow 77

towards the Carpathian passes In June the Russians'
summer offensive was launched against Army Group
"Centre 55 , which collapsed. Model was sent to take it
over. Just as he had checked the Russians on the Vistula,
he was despatched to deal with the crisis in the West.

After the failure of the July 20th attempt on Hitler's
life, Model had given a lead in reproclaiming his faith in
the Fuhrer, and had sent the first telegram of loyalty
received from the Eastern front. That assurance reinforced
Hitler's confidence in his military gifts. But Model was
also one of the few who ventured to disregard Hitler's
instructions and act on his own judgment.

In talking to a number of generals who had served
under him, I found that all paid tribute to his power of
command while emphasizing that he was difficult both
as a superior and subordinate. ManteufFel said of him:
"Model was a very good tactician, and better in defence
than in attack He had a knack of gauging what troops
could do, and what they could not do. His manner was
rough, and his methods were not always acceptable in the
higher quarters of the German Army, but they were both
to Hitler's liking. Model stood up to Hitler m a way
that hardly anyone else dared, and even refused to carry
out orders with which he did not agree."

in the West it was mainly owing to his efforts and his
extraordinary capacity for scraping up reserves, from an
almost bare cupboard, that the shattered German forces
succeeded in achieving their astonishing rally on the
German frontier and frustrating the Allies' expectation of
complete victory in the autumn of 1944. He also played
the principal executive part in checldng the Allies' later
offensives and in the Germans' Ardennes counter-offensive
of December — although the supreme direction of these
final operations in the "Battle for Germany" was in the
hands of Rundstedt. For Hitler had called back the
"Old Guard" at the moment when Germany seemed
about to fall.

CHAPTER VII

"THE OLD GUARD 5 ' — RUNDSTEDT

The wheel had come full circle. In the frantic effort to
restore the army's confidence Hitler was driven to put
back in the chief military place the man who, above all
others, represented the old Germany and the military
tradition — with its devotion to duty, political conservatism,
professional exclusiveness, and contempt for amateurs in
strategy as represented by Hitler. Moreover, Gerd von
Rundstedt was a gentleman to the core. His natural
dignity and good manners inspired the respect even of
those who differed widely from him in views. To such an
essential aristocrat the democracy of the Weimar Republic
had been unpalatable, but he had found the manners of
Nazism far more distasteful.

Now close on his seventieth year, he was almost the same
age as Hindenburg had been on attaining supreme com-
mand in the last war. Age and achievement had similarly
combined to make him a national idol on something
approaching the same scale. But he was a far abler soldier
than Hindenburg — abler even than the combination of
Hindenburg and Ludendorff— while his achievements were
intrinsically finer. That was symbolized in the contrast that
his face and figure presented to theirs. As forceful as they
had been, in a more refined way, he was lean, ascetic, and
thoughtful in appearance — though his thought was con-
fined to his profession. In his devotion to the army, and
to Germany, an overriding sense of duty had led him to
swallow much that he would have liked to spit out. Here
was the root of an inner conflict which revealed itself in
the career and in the countenance of this military priest.
He despised politics, but they kept on intruding into his
seclusion.

78

" The Old Guard"— Rundstedt

79

By 1932, after successive promotions, he became Chief
of the First Army Group Command, covering Berlin.
Almost at once he unwittingly acquired a political smell,
for it fell to him to carry out the orders of the new Chan-
cellor, Papen, to evict the Social Democratic Ministers of
Prussia when they refused to quit office. Then Papen
overreached himself and was succeeded as Chancellor by
General von Schleicher. But Schleicher could not gain
sufficient political support to maintain his position, and
thus the way was opened for Hitler to become Chancellor
and abolish all parties other than the Nazi. Rundstedt
did not like the way things had turned out, and he definitely
disliked both the social aims and the manners of the Nazi
leaders. But he found satisfaction in the vehement cam-
paign of the Nazis for military expansion, and was even
better content when the purge of June 30th, 1 934, curbed
the power of the storm-troopers. It seemed a healthy sign
to his simple soldierly mind that so many military pre-
tenders were wiped off the slate and the professional army
freed from the menace of such "brown dirt 55 , as he
described them.

He was now able to devote his attention mainly to the
development of the army. In the military sphere he was
mainly concerned to revive the power of the infantry, and
their confidence in themselves, by modernizing their
equipment as well as their training. For while he was
receptive to the new ideas of mechanized warfare, and
followed with keen interest the British theories and experi-
ments, he was not one of those who fervently embraced
them. Rather, he was one of the more progressive leaders
of the school that regarded tanks as useful servants, not
as the future masters, of the battlefield.

He believed that there was more value in motorization
and multiplied fire-power to improve the capacity of the
existing arms than in producing completely mechanized
forces. Besides his practical steps to overcome the
"machine-gun paralysis 35 that the infantry had suffered in

8o

The Other Side of the Hill

the last war, he initiated a propaganda campaign to cure
their inferiority complex. But he was too nearly a scientific
soldier to go so far as the British generals who in 1934
contrived that the big exercise of the season should show
that an infantry division could paralyze an armoured
division — and thereby helped to postpone the formation
of Britain's first armoured division for three years more.
Rundstedt favoured the creation of armoured divisions in
the German Army, provided that the proportion was not
unduly high and did not hinder the re-equipment of the
infantry mass. In sum, the extent of his vision and thai
of his school accounts for the superiority which the German
Army enjoyed against France in 1940, while the limitations
of their vision explain why it fell short of the technical
superiority that was needed for victory over Russia in 1941.

At the start of 1938 his concentration was disturbed by
another political shock, when Himmler's machinations
provided Hitler with an excuse to turn out Fritsch, the
head of the army, at the same time as Blombcrg, the head
of the whole armed forces, and himself assume the
supreme command. Rundstedt protested to Hitler against
Fritsch's treatment, but, although Fritsch was acquitted
of the moral charge framed against him, such acquittal
did not alter the fact that his post had already been filled.
A few months later Rundstedt endorsed the warning
memorandum drafted by Beck, the Chief of the General
Staff, in an attempt to put a brake on Hitler's war-risking
policy — but that protest merely led to Beck's removal
In the autumn, after the occupation of the Sudetenland,
Rundstedt asked and obtained permission to retire, on the
plea of age.

In August, 1939, he was called back to take command
of an army group on the Polish front. His obedience to
that summons may seem hard to explain, since he had
long insisted that a primary principle of German policy
must be to avoid another war with England. It was a
questionable conception of patriotism which required him

" The Old Guard"— Rundstedt 8 1

to take a leading part in the kind of war which he had
predicted as likely to prove fatal to Germany in the end.
To account for it, we need to understand the extremely
strait rule of soldierly duty and obedience in which he had
been brought up* Beyond that may have been the psycho-
logical factor that any ardent soldier finds it hard to
resist a professional opportunity.

That opportunity he certainly fulfilled, for it was the
army group he commanded which brilliantly carried out
the decisive moves in the conquest, first of Poland, and
then of France. Yet there were signs that the glory and
the pleasure were spoilt for Mm by an underlying dis-
quietude. In the Russian campaign of 1941 he again
proved the outstanding figure, by his direction of the
sweeping operations that overturned the Russian armies
m the south and gave Germany possession of the mineral
and agricultural riches of the Ukraine. But this time even
the victories fell short of being a complete success, and in
that falling short presaged ultimate disaster. Rundstedt
was quick to see confirmation of the apprehensions which
had impelled him, beforehand, to offer Hitler unwelcome
advice against attacking Russia. When the question of
continuing the advance on Moscow was discussed in the
autumn, Rundstedt argued in favour not merely of a halt
but of a withdrawal to the original starting-line. That
advice was still more unwelcome to the Fuhrer. At the
same time Rundstedt was growing more and more impatient
of "Corporal 55 Hitler's interference in operational details.
Eventually, at the end of November, Rundstedt replied to
one of Hitler's orders by telegraphing back that, if the
Fuhrer did not trust him to carry out the operation as he
judged best, the Fuhrer should find someone else to take
command. The offer of resignation was accepted by
Hitler with equal alacrity; Rundstedt 5 s doubts and
protests had been getting on his nerves, which were
already strained by the way that victory was eluding
his grasp.

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The Other Side of the Hill

But Rundstedt was not left long on the shelf. Early in
1942 Hitler asked him to take charge in the West, and
overcame his hesitation by emphasizing the note of national
duty. The entry of the United States into the war created
the possibility that American armies might eventually
jump off from Britain to invade the Continent, and
Rundstedt was very conscious of that risk. He spent the
next two years in preparation for the danger he feared, as
well as in wrestling with the civil problems arising out of
the German occupation of France and the Low Countries.
In June, 1944, the danger matured. That part of the story
has already been outlined.

Rundstedt was in retirement on the fatal July 20th, so
that he had no chance of giving the army a lead against
the Nazi regime when the first telegraphic message of the
conspirators — saying that Hitler had been killed — reached
the higher headquarters in the East and the West. It is
thus impossible to say whether he would have acted dif-
ferently from most of the other high commanders — who,
whatever their intentions, became paralyzed as soon as
second reports indicated that Hitler was still alive.
Rundstedt was not associated with the plot, and that is
significant.

While many soldiers, knowing his repugnance to
Nazism, had been looking to him to give them a lead
against Hitler, those who knew him best do not seem to
have had any such idea. In the first place, he was regarded
as a man so straightforward, so strict in his conception of
the soldierly code of honour, as to be unsuitable to parti-
cipate in a conspiracy which required subtlety. Secondly,
because of the symbolical value of his reputation, they
wanted to keep it clear of the inevitable taint that any plot
carries, even though its object may be good. Beyond that
he was more closely watched than others, because of his
eminence, by the network of Nazi spies in which all the
generals were enveloped.

At the same time a number of the generals had hoped

"The Old Gum d" —Rundstedt 83

that Rundstedt would bring about an armistice with the
British and Americans, or at least allow them an unopposed
entry into Germany, in order to check the Russians. That
hope was quenched by his removal early in July, though
it revived with his recall in September. In the meantime
Kluge had contemplated a similar step on July 20th, but
had hesitated to attempt it. The reasons for his hesita-
tion were, first, that it would be a breach of the oath of
loyalty to Hitler; second, that the German people had
been kept so much in the dark that they would not support
such an action; third, that the soldiers on the East front
would reproach the West front for betraying them; fourth,
the fear of going down to history as a traitor to his country.
It was natural that such restraining considerations should
have even more influence on a man like Rundstedt when
he was summoned back in the September crisis — apart
from the practical difficulties of taking such a step when
under close surveillance. As a result of that psychological
conflict between his judgment and his sense of duty, as
well as Hitler's continued interference at every turn, he
was virtually in a state of impotence during the autumn
months when the Allies imagined him to be conducting
the German defence in the West.

His connection with the so-called "Rundstedt offensive"
of December in the Ardennes was hardly more than that
of a distant and doubting observer. The project was
purely Hitler's in respect of aim, timing, and place —
though improved by the technical suggestions of Man-
teuffel, commanding the Fifth Panzer Army. The
execution was in the hands of Model and his two principal
subordinates, Manteuffel and Sepp Dietrich, commander of
the Sixth Panzer Army.

Late in October Hitler sent his plan to Rundstedt.
It had the same basic pattern as the 1940 masterpiece.
It was designed to profit by the way that the Allies had
committed their strength to the push through the Belgian
plain towards Aachen and Cologne, and were unlikely to

84

The Othei Side of the Hill

expect a German counter-offensive at this time, particu-
larly in the Ardennes — a psychological calculation that
again proved correct. The main effort was to be a double-
pronged thrust by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies,
with the aim of breaking through the weak American
front in the Ardennes, then wheeling north to cross the
Meuse and converge on Antwerp The Sixth Panzer
Army was to move on the inner arc of the wheel, past Liege,
and the Fifth Panzer on the outer arc, past Namur. The
Fifteenth Army was to help the Sixth Panzer Army by a
flank thrust noith of Liege, while the Seventh Army was
to provide flank cover for the Fifth Panzer Army as it
wheeled north.

By this scythe-like sweep Hitler hoped to cut off
Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group from its bases
and from its American allies, driving it to a Dutch "Dun-
kirk 55 even if he could not annihilate it. Britain was now
out of reach, but her armies were not — and they were the
chosen target of his final fling But Hitler's executive
commanders all regarded the aim as far too ambitious for
the resources

Realizing that a direct protest was hopeless, Rundsledt,
Model, and Manteuffcl agreed in proposing a more
modest alternative plan — to pinch off the American salient
east of the Meuse, around Aachen. But Hitler rejected
any such limitation of aim, though ManteufFel peisuaded
him to accept certain changes of timing and method — for
Hitler was always more receptive to the arguments of the
younger generals than to those of the older generals, and
ready to listen to original ideas when he was deaf to
counsels of caution. The changes increased the chances
of initial surpiise, but they could not increase the ultimate
chances.

The offensive was a gamble — at long odds. All the
higher executants realized that Germany was playing her
last trump, and that she had not the resources to provide
more than a slender chance of success — unless the offensive

" The Old Gum d"—Randstedt 85

was accompanied by extraordinary lock or the Allied
commanders were extraordinarily inept. That realization
was not a good foundation for an offensive. In the event,
the stroke threw the Allies off their balance sufficiently to
put them in serious difficulties and undue danger. But in
the diminished state of the German forces these could not
afford anything like the normal proportion of checks and
slips that occur in the run of any offensive. Manteuffel
almost reached the Meuse, but Sepp Dietrich, who had a
larger strength and a shorter distance to go, ran into
trouble sooner; and when the reserves were switched to
back up Manteuffel it was too late for any great results
in the face of the Allies 5 prompt counter-measures. The
offensive fell far short of its aims, and when it ended it had
fatally impoverished Germany's reserves, leaving her no
chance of long-continued defence.

PART II

PRELIMINARIES TO WAR

CHAPTER VIII

THE RISE OF HITLER

The story of Hitler's entry into power has been told from
many angles, but not from that of the Reichswehr. Its
chiefs have been charged with aiding and abetting his
entry, but remarkably little evidence has been produced
to support this accusation.

It is obvious that the officers of the Reichswehr were
beneficiaries, in their professional prospects, from the
expansion of the forces that followed Hitler's advent.
Moreover, Blomberg and other generals have admitted
that they originally welcomed his regime because it released
Germany and the Army from the shackles of the Versailles
Treaty. That was a very natural attitude on the part of
keen professional soldiers, though one that many of them
lived to regret. Others, with more foresight, were appre-
hensive from the start, for there was good reason to assume
that the amateur or "displaced" soldiers who led the S.A.
would not be content, once their Party was in power, to
see military office remain a privileged preserve of the
traditionally conservative Reichswehr.

But evidence that a considerable number of officers
were favourably disposed towards Hitler's rise is not
equivalent to evidence that they were instrumental in
aiding his arrival in power — and still less that the Army in
its corporate sense was instrumental. For that would
only have been practicable if those who were then in
control of the Army were favourably disposed. On this

87

88

The Other Side of the Hill

score the cardinal facts seem to point the other way.
The political head of the Army at this crucial period was
General von Schleicher, who had been made Reichswehr
Minister in Papen's Cabinet; under him on that side came
Colonel von Bredow, the Chief of the Ministerial Staff
(the Ministcramt, which was later developed mto the
High Gommand of the Wehrmacht). The military head
of the Army was General von Hammerstein {Chef der
Heeresleitung) .

Not long after Hitler came into power, Hammerstein
was removed from the command of the Aimy. Then, in
the bloody purge of June 30th, 1934, Schleicher and
Bredow were murdered. Such treatment is presumptive
evidence in support of what other soldiers say — that they
had tried to prevent the Nazis* rise to power.

General Rohricht, who was one of Schleicher's assistants
at the time, gave me an account of this critical phase, as
well as subsequent phases of the conflict between the
generals and Hitler. While it runs counter to outside
impressions it deserves consideration as the testimony of
one of the few surviving witnesses who were on the inside
of events during the decisive weeks.

In his preliminary remarks Rohricht sketched the
personalities of Schleicher and Hammerstein. This was
the description of Schleicher — "He was not so much a
soldier as an expert in home politics, though not tied to any
party. He was very sympathetic towards, and popular
with, the trade unions, while suspected by the Conserva-
tives on account of his tendency to social reforms He
was anything but a 'Junker*. A very skilful and astute
political tactician, but without the personality of a states-
man that was needed at this period." Speaking of
Hammerstein, Rohricht said — "He was gifted and ex-
tremely clever, politically level-headed, but a lazy soldier.
He was strongly opposed to National Socialism, and
followed Schleicher's political course."

Rohricht's narrative follows:

The Rise of Hitler

89

The Sequence of Events

In their struggle with the National Socialist Party the
Papen-Schleicher Government dissolved the Reichstag and
resigned — in October, 1932. The elections, in spite of an
obvious loss of votes for the National Socialists, resulted
in a Parliament without any clear basis of confidence and
definite majority either for Papen or for the Opposition —
which was split into Right and Left. At first the President
intended to charge Papen anew with forming the Govern-
ment. But there was high tension with all circles of revolu-
tionary opposition. During the Berlin transport workers 5
strike in November, 1932, co-operation between Com-
munists and National Socialists was apparent. This had
to be regarded as a critical symptom

Based on this alarming situation, a conference and
map exercise was held about the 20th November at the
Ministeramt of the Reichswehr Ministry, in conjunction
with the Ministry of the Interior, in order to examine the
question whether the armed forces of the State would be
sufficient to break a simultaneous revolutionary assault by
the extremists of both the Right and the Left. This situation
seemed likely to arise if a new Papen Government relied
exclusively on the Conservative Right (Deutsch-Nationale) 3
the Stahlhelm included.

The conclusion reached at this conference was that a
general transport workers 5 strike would paralyse the entire
structure and organization of the State and of the armed
forces. For the Reichswehr was only motorized to a slight
extent, and its emergency-units for technical work
(Technische Nothilfe) were not in an efficient state. In
Schleicher's opinion we ought to avoid a situation where
the troops had to fire on their own countrymen. He did
not want to "sit on bayonets 95 .

At this moment, very much against his will, Schleicher
was driven to take over the office of Chancellor himself,
with the idea that it would be for a limited time. Inasmuch

9°

The Other Side of the Hill

as he was not — like Papen — regarded as a representative
of conservative-reactionary circles, but as a neutral soldier,
he was accepted as a lesser evil by the Centre Party and
the Social democrats. The National Socialists also
acquiesced — regarding this stop-gap arrangement as a
possible stepping stone to their own coming into power.
Thus his appointment at the end of November had a
calming effect and provided a breathing space.

Schleicher planned to break the onslaught of the
National Socialists by splitting up their faction in the
Reichstag, The moment seemed favourable, as the Party
was badly disappointed by their electoral setback and
worried with financial difficulties. Negotiations started
with Strasser and about eighty other M.P.s. The opening
of the Reichstag was delayed.

The prospect looked better still when, at the beginning
of December, a success was gained in the sphere of foreign
affairs — the Disarmament Conference (presumably under
the pressure of the stormy domestic development in
Germany) conceding to Germany the right of military
equality on principle.

But from the start Schleicher met with violent opposi-
tion from the Conservatives (Deutsch-Nationale) because
his programme contained far-reaching social reforms.
Thereupon Schleicher threatened to disclose nepotism in
the use of the Eastern Relief funds (Osthilfc). The Presi-
dent — who, on account of his age, was no longer capable
of clear judgement — fell under the influence of his con-
temporary conservative friends, who accused Schleicher of
c 'Bolshevist 3 9 tendencies and spread the suspicion that he
wanted to pervert the Army for his own political aims.
At the same time Papen started an intrigue — negotiating
with Hitler — by which he hoped to come back into power
with the aid of the National Socialists, but in the end was
cheated himself.

The Hindenburg-Schleicher crisis reacted on
Schleicher's attempt to split the National Socialist Party

The Rise of Hitler 9 1

— by wrecking the discussions, which had opened with
good prospects.

Schleicher's situation, therefore, soon appeared hope-
less — no support by the President, no prospects of a
majority in Parliament. On January 26th or 27th General
von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army Command . . .
attempted once more for the last time to change the
President's mind. He was sharply rebuffed. Schleicher's
resignation on the 29th January was followed by Hitler's
appointment as Chancellor on January 30th.

With General von Schleicher the only Chancellor who
arose from the Wehrmacht was overthrown. Schleicher
was murdered at the first suitable moment (30th June,
1934) by agents of the Nazi Party, together with Colonel
von Bredow (apparently overrated as a politician) and
Strasser,

By Hitler's appointment the Reichswehr lost their
hitherto existing monopoly as the final and decisive instru-
ment of the Government. Their 100,000 men were
distributed in small units all over the Reich, whereas the
Party dominated the entire apparatus of the State, all
the means of transport, public communications and
utilities, the opinion of the man in the street, and a
large part of the working class. The Army had lost its
importance.

In view of these events and facts I venture to suggest
that it is historically false to charge the Wehrmacht with
having assisted Hitler in his coming into power. The facts
point to the contrary.

In this connection I would like to examine the question,
whether there was the possibility for the Reichswehrto
rise in open rebellion.

The circles around Schleicher and Hammerstein,
during the critical days and after the Nazi Party came into
power, considered the possibility of a coup d'itat by the
Reichswehr but rejected the idea as hopeless.

92

The Othe? Side of the Hill

These were the reasons. Hitler had been appointed
Chancellor by the President as leader of the strongest
party according to the constitution — therefore at first in a
wholly legal manner. A coup d*etat by the Reichswehr
ordered by Generals von Schleicher and von Hammerstein
— who were but little known by the rank and file — would
have appeared to be not only against the new Hitler-
Papen-Hugenberg Cabinet but also against the greatly
respected person of their universally venerated Commander-
in-Chief, the President. A political alliance with the
Communists was impossible; with the other republican
parties it was not prepared. The troops, bound by their
oath to Hindenburg, would have declined to follow such
an attempt. Besides, the disproportion of power was now
still more unfavourable than in November. Finally, the
unhappy consequences of a failure could not be overlooked.

THE PERIOD UP TO HINDENBURG 5 S DEATH
(JANUARY, I933— AUGUST, I934)

The Reichswehr stood aside from the political events
which changed Germany's features with sweeping revolu-
tionary measures. It was like an island — not commanded
by Hitler, but by Hindenburg, who, however, was very
old. Hammerstein was replaced by Fritsch on Hinden-
burg's order.

THE NEW MEN

Von Blomberg was appointed as War Minister
("Reichskriegsminister") in January, 1933. Until then
he had been German Representative with the Disarmament
Conference at Geneva — and had had no previous relations
with Hitler. He was a gifted soldier, a man of the world,
widely educated and with many interests, but not a
strong character, and was easily influenced.

Von Reichenau was Chief of the Wehrmachtamt, until
then the Ministeramt. He was a strong personality and
full of initiative, a man of action and instinct rather them

The Rise of Hitler 93

of intellect. Ambitious, clever, highly educated, even a
poet, he was nevertheless of a sturdy nature and a sports-
man. Well acquainted with Hitler for some years, he
felt himself bound to the person of Hitler, not to the
Party.

Freiherr von Fritsch (Chef der Heeresleitung, later
Commander-in-Chief of the Army) was an excellent and
distinguished soldier, but his ideas were limited to the
military sphere. He was a gentleman from top to toe,
and also very religious.

Blomberg and Reichenau had the task of assuiing the
position due to the Army within the new State — which they
had to accept as an established fact — and the task of
helping to recover normal public life by eliminating the
revolutionary elements of the Party.

The revolutionary S.A., dominating the masses and the
Party at that time, was opposed to the Army from the start.
The S. A claimed to form the Army of the new State out
of its own ranks. The Army prepared to fight for its
position within the new State. Hitler, like every dictator,
was forced to rid himself of his S.A. rebels — his Praetorian
Guard — who had raised him to power. He sided with the
Army and routed the S.A. (Roehm) on 30th June, 1934,
without calling in any troops.

The Reichswehr regarded that day as a success — not-
withstanding serious excesses (the murder of Schleicher
and others). However, it proved a Pyrrhic victory.
From that day, with the founding of the WafFen-S.S.,
dated the rise of an enemy much more dangerous to the
Army.

THE PERIOD FROM HXNDENBURG's DEATH TO I938

Following Hmdenburg's death, Hitler declared him-
self Head of the State — which made him at the same
time the titular Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht.

Re-armament, at first only aiming at equality with

94

The Other Side of the Hill

Germany's neighbours, began to absorb the entire atten-
tion and strength of the troops. Every new stage of
re-armament weakened the solid foundations of the hitherto
unanimous professional army. The 4,000 professional
officers had not only to form the nucleus for the officers
of the gradually expanding army, but also for the Luftwaffe.
To their numbers were added the newly-reinstated officers,
who came from the most various professions and circles.
These — especially the younger ones — brought along their
political ideas. The features of the officer-corps were
changing, and the Party began to gain ground within the
Army. Soon, one could not count any longer on unity
of mind.

With the reintroduction of conscription the whole
army lost its character as an instrument in domestic
struggles. It was further weakened by the formation of
the Luftwaffe — which was guided by National Socialist
principles from the outset. For the Luftwaffe, not without
purpose, embraced the Flak (A,A.) — a decision which
deprived the Army of every means of anti-aircraft defence.
The Army's scope of action for domestic struggle grew
ever more hopeless.

For all that, the leaders of the Army once more con-
sidered the question of a rebellion against Hitler, when,
with the fall of Blomberg, there arose a grave conflict over
the person of Colonel-General von Fritsch in January and
February, 1938. Hitler himself took over direct command
of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg, and retained
Keitel (Reichenau's successor), whose importance never
exceeded that of a pliant head-clerk.

The incredible injustice with which the distinguished
General von Fiitsch was treated, exasperated the generals
in positions of high command — no others were ever
informed — to great heat. 1 This boiling pot was stirred,
already, by a secret group of opposition (Goerdeler,

1 Civilian opponents of Hitler, however, complain that the fault
of the generals was that they simmered, but never came to the boil.

The Rise of Hitler 95

Schacht) which was inclined "to go all out 53 . For decisive
action, however, the generals lacked unity in the sense of
a solid acting corporation — which had not been attained
since the days of Seeckt. They lacked the instrument of
power — troops ready to go into action for such a purpose.
They lacked political leadership — that was ready for
action and ready to take over political power. Rebellion
remained untried. On the other hand, Hitler from the
outset used his "insertion 53 within the leaders of the
Wehrmacht in order to split up the body of military
leaders and to break their back-bone. Each commander
was reduced to his own counsel and guidance; it was no
longer possible to reckon on uniform and united political
action by the Army.

CHAPTER IX

THE RISE OF ARMOUR

While the rise of Hitler changed the map of Europe more
quickly than even Napoleon had done — though for a
shorter period — it was the rise of armoured forces in the
German Army that mainly enabled him to achieve his
run of conquests. Without them his dreams would never
have turned into realities. More even than the Luftwaffe,
and much more than the Quislings, they were his decisive
instrument. All his other means of softening opposition
would not have sufficed for the quick success he sought
without their unique capacity to penetrate and overrun a
country. He had had the foresight to back this new
development, though he ultimately paid forfeit for not
backing it more fully.

I was fortunate in getting a long account of the rise of
the "Panzers 55 from General von Thoma, the most famous
of the original German tank leaders next to Guderian.
A tough but likeable type, he is obviously a born enthusiast
who lives in a world of tanks, loves fighting for the zest
of it, but would fight without ill-feeling, respecting any
worthy opponent. In the Middle Ages he would have
been perfectly happy as a knight-errant, challenging all
comers at any cross-road for the honour of crossing spears
with them. The advent of the tank in warfare was a
godsend to such a man, giving him a chance to re-live the
part of the mail-clad knight.

He described the way it was developed in the German
Army after this was released by Hitler from the restrictions
of the Versailles Treaty. "It was wonderful to have real
tanks for the first time in 1934, after being confined to

96

The Rise of Armour

97

tactical experiments with dummies for so many years.
Until then our only practical experience was in an experi-
mental camp that we had m Russia, by arrangement with
the Soviet Government. This was near Kazan, and was
particularly for studying technical problems. But in 1934
our first tank battalion was formed, at Ohrdruf, under the
name 6 Motor-Instruction Commando', I was in charge of
it. It was the grandmother of all the others.

"It was subsequently expanded into a regiment of two
battalions, while two more were established at Zossen
They were equipped by degrees, rather slowly, according
to the production of the factories — at first with the air-
cooled Krupp tank, Mark I, with only two machine-guns ;
the next year with odd Maybach tanks, Mark II, that had
water cooling; in 1937-38 came the first Mark III and
Mark IV tanks, which were considerably better. Mean-
time our organization was gi^owing. In 1936 two tank
brigades were formed — one for each of the two armoured
divisions that were then created. The German tank
officers closely followed the British ideas on armoured
warfare, particularly your own; also General Fuller's.
They likewise followed with keen interest the pioneer
activities of the original British tank brigade. 3 9 (This was
formed in 1931 for experiment, under Colonel (now
General) Broad, and given permanent form in 1934 undei
Brigadier (now General) Hobart.)

I asked him whether the German tank methods had
also been influenced by General de Gaulle's well-known
book, as has been commonly reported. His answer was:
"No, that did not receive much attention then, as we
regarded it as rather 'fantastical'. It did not give much
tactical guidance, and was rather up in the clouds
Besides, it came much later than the British exposition
of the possibilities of tank warfare."

Thoma went on to say: "It may surprise you to hear
that the development of armoured forces met with much
resistance from the higher generals of the German Army,

D

98

The Other Side of the Hill

as it did in yours. The older ones were afraid of developing
such forces fast — because they themselves did not under-
stand the technique of armoured warfare, and were
uncomfortable with such new instruments. At the best
they were interested, but dubious and cautious. We
could have gone ahead much faster but for their attitude."

Thoma himself was sent to Spain in 1936 when the
Civil War broke out. "For it was seen that Spain would
serve as 'the European Aldershot\ I actually started on
the night that General Franco's revolt was due to begin,
and went via Marseilles and Lisbon — meeting him at
Merida, and arranging how we were to help him. I was
in command of all the German ground troops in Spain
during the war. Their numbers were greatly exaggerated
in newspaper reports — they were never more than 600 at
a time." (This excludes air and administrative personnel.)
"They were used to train Franco's tank force — and to get
battle experience themselves*

"Our main help to Franco was in machines, aircraft
and tanks. At the start he had nothing beyond a few
obsolete machines. The first batch of German tanks
arrived in September, followed by a larger batch in
October. They were the Krupp Mark I.

"Russian tanks began to arrive on the other side even
quicker — at the end of July. They were of a heavier type
than ours, which were armed only with machine-guns, and
I offered a reward of 500 pesetas for every one that was
captured, as I was only too glad to convert them to my
own use. The Moors bagged quite a lot. It may interest
you to hear that the present Marshal Koniev was my
'opposite number 5 on the other side.

"By a carefully organized dilution of the German
personnel I was soon able to train a large number of
Spanish tank-crews. I found the Spanish quick to learn
— though also quick to forget. By 1938 I had four tank
battalions under my command — each of three companies,
with fifteen tanks in a company. Four of the companies

The Rise of Armour

99

were equipped with Russian tanks. I also had thirty
anti-tank companies, with six 37 mm. guns apiece.

"General Franco wished to parcel out the tanks among
the infantry — in the usual way of generals who belong to
the old school. I had to fight this tendency constantly
in the endeavour to use the tanks in a concentrated way.
The Francoists* successes were largely due to this.

"I came back from Spain in June, 1939, after the end
of the war, and wrote out my experiences and the lessons
learned. I was then given command of a tank regiment
in Austria. I had been offered a tank brigade, but said
that I preferred to polish up my knowledge of recent
German practice by handling a regiment first, as I had
been out of touch so long with what was happening in
Germany. General von Brauchitsch agreed. But in
August I was given command of the tank brigade in the
2nd Panzer Division, for the Polish campaign.

"That division was in General von List's Army on the
extreme southern wing, beyond the Carpathians. I was
ordered to advance on the Jablunka Pass, but suggested
instead that the motorized brigade should be sent there,
while I carried out with my tank brigade a flanking move
— through thick woods and over the ridge. On descending
into the valley I arrived in a village to find the people all
going to church. How astonished they were to see my
tanks appearing! I had turned the enemy's defences
without losing a single tank — after a night approach
march of fifty miles.

"After the Polish campaign I was appointed to the
General Staff, as Chief of the Mobile Forces. This direc-
torate embraced the tank forces, the motorized forces, the
horsed cavalry — of which there was still one division — and
the cyclist units. In the Polish campaign we had six
armoured divisions and four light divisions. The armoured
divisions each had a tank brigade of two regiments with
two battalions apiece — the combat strength of a regiment
at the beginning was about 125 tanks. After an operation

100

The Other Side of the Hill

lasting several days, one must, in the light of experience,
deduct one quarter from the number of tanks — to allow
for those under repair — in reckoning the average combat
strength, 55

As combat strength, Thonia explained, he included
only the fighting tanks in the companies (or squadrons).
The total number in a regiment, including the light tanks
used for reconnaissance, was 160.

"The light divisions were an experiment, and the
strength of each of them varied. But the average was two
motorized nfle regiments (of three battalions each) and one
tank battalion. In addition they had an armoured recon-
naissance battalion and a motor-cyclist battalion, as well
as an artillery regiment — like the armoured divisions.

"We gave up this experiment after the Polish campaign,
and converted them into armoured divisions. For the
1 940 offensive in the West we had ten complete armoured
divisions, and the S.S. tank regiment 'Leibstandarte 5 — the
scale of which was considerably above a normal tank
regiment. The proportion of medium tanks in a division
was increased by that time. Even so, there were too many
light tanks. 5 *

Thoma then made the surprising revelation that, for
the invasion of France, the Germans had only 2,400 tanks
altogether — not 6,000 as French reports at the time stated.
He said that he did not count the light reconnaissance tanks,
which he called "sardine tins 35 . "The French tanks were
better than ours, and as numerous — but they were too slow.
It was by speed, in exploiting the surprise, that we beat
the French. 5 '

Discussing the different types of tank, and their respec-
tive qualities, Thoma remarked that if he had to choose
between "a thick skm" or "a fast runner 55 he would always
choose the latter. In other words, he preferred speed to
heavy armour, having come to the conclusion, from much
experience, that speed was a more desirable quality on
balance. He went on to say that, in his view, the ideal

The Rise of Amour

ioi

tank regiment would be made up of two-thirds large tanks 3
fairly fast, and one-third very fast tanks, lightly armoured.

Talking of the 1940 offensive, Thoraa said — "All the
tank officers wanted to see Guderian in charge of the
panzer army that carried out the thrust through the
Ardennes, Kleist had not the same understanding of
tanks — he had earlier been one of the chief opponents of
them. To put a sceptic, even a converted sceptic, in
supreme charge of the armoured forces was typical of
the way things were done in the German Army — as in
yours. But Guderian was regarded as a difficult sub-
ordinate. Hitler had the deciding voice in the issue, and
he approved Kleist's appointment. Nevertheless, Guderian
was called on to carry out the actual break-through,
which he did on the same lines that he had practised in
the 1937 Army Manoeuvres. After that, he continued to
lead the drive to the Channel He concentrated all his
thought on exploiting success, and took the attitude 'to
hell with what is happening behind 5 . That thrustfulness
was decisive, because it gave the French no time to rally.

"It was commonly said in the German Army that
Guderian was always seeing red, and was too inclined to
charge like a bull. 1 I don't agree with that opinion. I
had personal experience of serving under him on the
Stalingrad front in 1942, where opposition was very stiff,
and I found him a very fine commander under those
difficult circumstances. 55

I asked Thoma what he considered the principal ele-
ments in the success of the German armoured forces in
achieving such a series of breaks-through as they did in
the earlier part of the war. He gave five main reasons:

1 I have often noticed that when the senior German generals
wanted to convey criticism of some exceptionally vigorous commander
who did not conform to their own standards of methodxcal, and almost
chess-like operatxon, they habitually spoke of him as "a bull". Such
a term might be more suitably applied to those who butt at strongly
defended positions than to those who loosen opposition by audacity
and speed.

102

The Other Side of the Hill

"i. The concentration of all forces on the point of
penetration in co-operation with bombers.

"2. Exploiting the success of this movement on the
roads during the night — as a result, we often gained success
by surprise deep in, and behind, the enemy's front,

"3. Insufficient anti-tank defence on the enemy's part,
and our own superiority in the air,

"4, The fact that the armoured division itself carried
enough petrol for 150-200 kilometres — supplemented, if
necessary, with supply of petrol to the armoured spearheads
by air, dropped in containers by parachute.

"5, Carrying rations sufficient for three days in the
tanks, for three more days in the regimental supply column,
and three more days in the divisional supply column."

Thoma mentioned some of the examples of sustained
speed in long-range drives by the armoured forces. In the
Polish campaign, he said, the seven-day march from
Upper Silesia to Warsaw averaged about thirty miles a
day, fighting included. In the second stage of the French
campaign the advance from the Marne to Lyon averaged
the same. In the 1941 Russian campaign the advance from
Rosslawl to beyond Kiev averaged fifteen miles a day over
a period of twenty days, while the thrust from Glukov to
Orel covered forty miles a day for three days. The record
advance was up to sixty miles in the day.

Thoma stressed the importance of the commander of
an armoured force being well forward — "in the midst of
his tanks". He should give "saddle orders", like cavalry
leaders of old. "The tactical task for a commander is up
in front, and he must be on the spot. He should leave the
administrative side to his chief staff officer."

Thoma then talked of the reorganization of the German
armoured forces that was carried out before the Russian
campaign, and made it clear that he considered it a grave
mistake. "The armoured divisions each had one of their
two tank regiments taken away from them, in order to
form further armoured divisions — making twenty in all.

The Rise of Armour 103

I did not agree with this decision, and protested to Hitler
— for he always took a personal interest in technical
questions." Thoma argued that the net effect would be
disadvantageous on balance, since it meant doubling the
number of staffs and auxiliary troops without any effective
increase in the armoured punch. "But I could not persuade
Hitler — he was obsessed with the advantage of having an
increased number of divisions. Numbers always inflamed
his imagination.

"Hitler had not interfered in the Polish campaign, but
the immense public acclaim of 'his' strategy there, and
still more after the French campaign, had given him a
swelled head. He had a taste for strategy and tactics, but
he did not understand the executive details. He often
had good ideas, but he was stubborn as a rock — so that he
spoilt the fulfilment of his own conceptions.

"Twenty armoured divisions sounded a great increase,
but the actual number of tanks was no greater than before.
Our combat strength was only 2,434 tanks — not 12,000, as
the Russians stated. About two-thirds now were medium
tanks, instead of two-thirds being light tanks as in our first
campaign. 3 *

Discussing the Russian campaign, Thoma said that the
German armoured forces developed a new method which
they found very successful. "Armoured divisions would
break through the Russian front at night, and then go
into hiding in woods behind the front. The Russians
meantime would close the gap. In the morning the German
infantry would launch their attack on this partially
cemented sector — which was naturally somewhat dis-
organized — while the armoured divisions would emerge
from the place where they were lying up, and strike the
defenders in the rear."

For the 1942 campaign four new armoured divisions
were formed — this was achieved partly by breaking up the
existing horsed cavalry division, which had not proved
effective. Three more infantry divisions were also

104 The Other Side of the Hill

motorized — in addition to the ten which had been
motorized for the 1941 campaign, "But only ten out of
the twenty former armoured divisions were brought up
to strength again — because, under Hitler's orders, an
increase of tank production was neglected in favour of the
U-boat programme/ 5

Thoma strongly criticized the failure of the senior
generals, and of Hitler, to appreciate the vital importance
of the armoured forces, and to develop them in time to
the scale that was required, as well as in the form required .
"What we had was good enough to beat Poland and France,
but not good enough to conquer Russia. The space there
was so vast, and the going so difficult. We ought to
have had twice as many tanks in our armoured divisions,
and their motor-infantry regiments were not mobile enough.

"The original pattern of our armoured division was
ideal — with two tank regiments and two motor-infantry
regiments. But the latter should be carried in armoured
tracked vehicles, even though it entails more petrol. In
the earlier part of the Russian campaign it was possible to
bring them up in their lorries close to the scene of action
before they dismounted. They were often brought up as
close as a quarter of a mile from the fighting line. But that
ceased to be possible when the Russians had more aircraft.
The lorry-columns were too vulnerable, and the infantry
had to get out too far back. Only armoured infantry can
come into action quickly enough for the needs of a mobile
battle.

"Worse still, these clumsy lorries easily became bogged.
France had been ideal country for armoured forces, but
Russia was the worst — because of its immense tracts of
country that were either swamp or sand. In parts the
sand was two or three feet deep. When the rain came down
the sand turned into swamp."

Thoma added: "Africa was paradise in comparison.
Tank troops who had been in Russia found it easy to adapt
themselves to the African conditions. It is a mistake to

The Rue of Armour 105

draw lessons from the African campaign and apply them
to quite different conditions. For you in future it is only
Russia that matters — not the desert any more. 55 It was a
characteristic ending.

Thoma emphasized that another great mistake of the
Russian campaign was the lack of co-operation between
armoured forces and airborne forces. "This forfeited many
successes that we might have gained. The cause of it
was that the parachute troops formed part of the Luftwaffe,
and consequently there were conflicts of opinion in the
highest places about their employment. Goermg, in par-
ticular, was an obstacle. Another handicap was the
defectiveness of our self-propelled artillery. This weapon
is invaluable. But those we used were only makeshifts,
and the chassis was overloaded. 55

As Thoma was captured at Alamein in the autumn of
1942 he could contribute no evidence based on experience
in the last part of the war. But m that period Manteuffel
was the outstanding exponent of armoured warfare and
his conclusions bore out Thoma's earlier views, on the
whole, while supplementing them in certain respects.
Manteuffel gave me his views at too great length to set
forth here, for non-technical readers, but some of his main
points are worth citing — "Tanks must be fast. That, I
would say, is the most important lesson of the war in
regard to tank design. The Panther was on the right lines,
as a prototype. We used to call the Tiger a 'furniture van 5
— though it was a good machine in the initial break-
through. Its slowness was a worse handicap in Russia
than in France, because the distances were greater. 55

He considered that the Russian "Stalin 55 tank was the
finest in the world. It combined powerful armament,
thick armour, low build, with a speed superior to the
Tiger and not much less than that of the Panther, It had
more general mobility than any German tank.

Manteuffel then spoke of two avoidable handicaps that
the German armoured forces had suffered. "Every unit

106 The Other Side of the Hill

in the division should have its own Mobile Workshop,
which should accompany the tactical echelon. Our army
made a grave error in thinking that these Mobile Work-
shops should be kept in the rear. They ought to be well
forward,, under the command of a tactical leader who is
in wireless touch with them. This is essential so that
repairs can be done during the night, except in cases of
serious damage. Such a system saves many of the acci-
dental casualties that cause wastage. It would have
counteracted the pernicious effect that our actual system
had in leading the commanders to carry on with a dwind-
ling tank strength because they could not afford to wait
for tanks to be repaired. Too often they attempted tasks
that were beyond their real strength — because the task
was calculated on what a division should be able to achieve
on its nominal strength.

"It is essential, too, for an armoured division to have
its own air element — a reconnaissance squadron, a tactical
bombing squadron, and a liaison squadron of slow-flying
aircraft for the use of the commander and staff. The
commander of an armoured division ought always to
direct from the air. In the early part of the Russian
campaign, the armoured divisions had their own air
contingent. But the High Command took it away from
them in November, 1 941, in favour of centralized control.
That proved a grave mistake. I would also emphasize
that the air squadrons should be trained with the divisions
in peace time.

"Air transport is also essential — to carry supplies of
ammunition, fuel, food and men. For armoured divisions
will have to operate at much longer distances in future.
They must also be prepared to make advances of 200
kilometres a day. Having read so many of your trans-
lated writings in the years before the war, I know what
attention you gave to the development of this air side
of armoured warfare. This warfare is a different
language from infantry warfare — and infantrymen don't

The Rise of Armour 107

understand it. That was one of our great troubles in the
war."

Discussing tank design and tactics* Manteuffel spoke
of the value of designing tanks that were low in height,
and thus a less visible target. The difficulty was to combine
low build with the necessity that the underside of the tank
should be sufficiently clear of the ground to avoid becoming
* bellied' in crossing obstructions such as bumps in the
ground, rocks and tree stumps. "A slight handicap in
ground clearance, however, can be overcome by a good
eye for ground. That is the most vital quality in handling
tanks."

Giving an example, Manteuffel narrated the story of
a riposte he had delivered against the Russian break-
through near Jassy, inside the Rumanian frontier, early
in May 1944. "A tank battle developed in which a total
of some five hundred tanks were involved on the two sides.
The Russians were repulsed, and only 60 of their tanks
got away, most of them damaged. I lost only ir of mine.
It was here that I first met the Stalin tanks. It was a
shock to find that, although my Tigers began to hit them
at a range of 2,200 yards, our shells did not penetrate
them until we had closed to half that distance. But I
was able to counter their technical superiority by manoeuvre
and mobility, in making the best use of ground cover/'
Manteuffel concluded his account with the emphatic
remark: "In a tank battle, if you stand still you are lost."
Recalling the memory of that piece of tactics gave him
obvious professional satisfaction, and he added: "It would
have given you a lot of pleasure to see this fight."

He went on to speak of the importance of the careful
selection of tank crews, in order to ensure tactical aptitude
and gain the advantage which this offers in modern
battle. "With that condition fulfilled, tank design must
aim at a careful balance between armour, weapons and
speed, taking into account particularly the special risks
introduced by air attack, parachutists, and rocket weapons."

io8 The Other Side of the Hill

I asked him what he considered to be the ideal composi-
tion of an armoured division. His reply was: "In the first
place, a tank regiment of three battalions, each of 60 tanks
— so as to ensure that somewhere about 150 would be
available for action, allowing for mechanical troubles.
Secondly, two infantry regiments, each of two battalions
carried in armoured half-track vehicles. In one regiment
these should be well armoured — the 7 mm, of armour
which they had in the war was not enough when it came
to bringing them up close under fairly heavy fire. In the
other regiment the carriers should be of a more lightly
armoured type — so that they could move faster, and exploit
opportunities of pushing forward where opposition w r as
slight. Another essential element in the division is a
strong reconnaissance unit, carried in full-track vehicles.
In this war they had half-track vehicles, which were not
good enough for a reconnaissance role, under the conditions
met in Russia. There should also be a pioneer battalion —
what you call engineers. This need not be larger than
the present scale, because every unit in the division ought
to have its own section of pioneers, capable of laying and
lifting mines, and of building bridges. The other main
element is the artillery. I should like four battalions of
artillery, each of three batteries. Three of them should
be mixed battalions, each of two light field howitzer
batteries, and one heavy field howitzer battery. The fourth
battalion should consist of three heavy batteries, with
150 mm. pieces. Two of the three mixed battalions at
least should be self-propelled instead of tractor-drawn. 35
In another of our talks ManteufFel gave his views on
the question of how armies should be organized in the
future. "Modern conditions indicate that there should
be two classes of army within the Army. The best policy
would be to constitute an elite. A certain number of
divisions should be picked out for this purpose, and they
should be given the best possible equipment, ample money
for training, and the pick of the personnel. A large

The Rise of Armour 109

country might be able to create an army of up to thirty
divisions m this way. Of course, no country could equip
an army of millions on this scale. But it is better to have an
elite army for the main operational purposes than to have
a much bigger army that is mediocrely equipped and
trained throughout. That elite army would have an
increased proportion of air support, airborne forces and
rocket weapons. The present scale of artillery with
armoured forces is a handicap on mobility. It is required
by the need for plunging fire, such as only howitzers can
provide under existing conditions, but the development
of rocket weapons may provide an effective substitute. 59

ManteufFel went on to say that he agreed with the view
I had often expressed in my writings that the basic military
problem of the present time was to diminish the proportion
of auxiliary troops and vehicles m comparison with the
striking arms. "But for such progress to be attained the
High Command must learn the new language of
mechanized warfare.

"The new model army calls for the design of a new
kind of strategy. For these ideas to win acceptance, it is
important that all the new type of forces should be under
a single chief of adequate status. At the same time in
order to foster the esprit de corps of the troops composing
this elite army they should not only have the best of equip-
ment and training facilities but a distinctive uniform — the
smartest possible."

PART III

THROUGH GERMAN EYES

CHAPTER X

HOW HITLER BEAT FRANCE—
AND SAVED BRITAIN

The real story of any great event is apt to be very different
to what appears at the time. That is especially the case
in war. The fate of millions of people turns on decisions
that are taken by one man — who may be influenced by
the most curious of motives in reaching a decision that
changes the whole course of history. The way he makes
up his mind is known only by a few men behind the
scenes, who usually have good reason for keeping it quiet.
The truth sometimes leaks out later; sometimes never.

When it emerges it often bears out the saying that
"truth is stranger than fiction". A novelist has to appear
plausible, and would hesitate to make use of such astound-
ing contradictions as occur in history through some
extraordinary accident or twist of psychology.

Nothing could be more extraordinary than the way that
the decisive events of 1940 were shaped. France was
overcome by an offensive in which few of the higher
executants had any faith, and the invasion only succeeded
through a belated change of plan on the German side that
happened to fit the situation produced by rigidity of plan
combined with over-confidence on the French side.
Stranger still was the way that the British Army escaped,
and Britain herself was preserved from invasion. The
truth here runs quite contrary to the popular picture. It
would have seemed incredible to the British people at that

in

112

The Other Side of the Hill

times and equally incredible to most of Hitler's ardent
followers in Germany, Little indication of it emerged in
the revelations at Nuremberg. The bare facts were known
to a small circle at the top of the German Army, but the
essential clue was held only by a few, not the topmost,
who were present one day at Rundstedt's headquarters
when Hitler disclosed the way his thoughts were running.

The escape of the British Army from France has often
been called "the miracle of Dunkirk", For the German
armoured forces had reached the Channel coast behind
the back of the British Army while this was still deep in
the interior of Flanders Gut off from its own bases, and
from the bulk of the French Army, it seemed likely also to
be cut off from the sea. Those who got away have often
wondered how they managed to do so

The answer is that Hitler's intervention saved them —
when nothing else could have. A sudden order from him
over the telephone stopped the armoured forces just as
they were in sight of Dunkirk, and held them back until
the retreating British had reached the port and slipped
out of their clutches, Rundstedt and other generals con-
cerned, as executive commanders or on the higher staffs,
gave me accounts from their different angles of this
staggering order and its effects.

But although the British Army thus escaped from the
trap in France, it was in no state to defend England. It
had left most of its weapons behind, and the stores at home
were almost empty. In the following months Britain's
small and scantily-armed forces faced the magnificently-
equipped army that had conquered France — with only a
strip of water between them. Yet the invasion never
came.

At the time we believed that the repulse of the Luftwaffe
in the "Battle over Britain" had saved her. That is only
part of the explanation. The last part of it. The original
cause, which goes deeper, is that Hitler did not want to
conquer England. He took little interest in the invasion

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 113

preparations, did nothing to spur them on, and cancelled
them at the first plausible excuse.

Before relating in detail the inner story of these fateful
decisions, there is a previous one to reveal. For the real
character of earlier events is hardly less amazing than the
climax — or anti-climax. While Hitler saved England,
France was conquered in spite of his Generals

When France lay prostrate under the German heel,
the men of the victorious Army would have been astonished
had they known that their highest military chiefs had not
believed such a victory to be possible — and that the
victory had been gained by a plan which had been forced
on a doubting General Staff as the result of a backstairs
approach. Most of them would have been horrified to
hear that six months earlier they had nearly been ordered
to march on Berlin instead of on Paris. Yet those were
the facts hidden behind the triumphant fa9ade.

SCHISM IN THE BRAIN

The conquest of the West, although it appeared so
irresistible in retrospect, was conceived in an atmosphere
of fear and doubt. The preceding period of "the phoney
war 55 was so christened by American commentators in
derision of the Allies' inactivity. In that sense it was
hardly just, since the Allies lacked the equipment needed
to take the offensive — as later events showed. But there
were "phoney" factors on the German side.

After the conquest of Poland, and the division of the
spoils with Russia, Hitler made a bid for peace with the
Western Powers. When he was rebuffed he began to feel
afraid of what he had started — and of his temporary
partner. He expressed the view that a long-drawn-out
war of attrition with Britain and France would gradually
exhaust Germany's limited resources, and expose her to a
fatal attack from behind by Russia. "By no treaty or
pact can Russia's lasting neutrality be ensured," he told
his generals. His fear urged him to force peace on France

U4 Other Side of the Hill

by an offensive in the West. He hoped that if the French
were defeated, the British would see reason and come to
terms. He reckoned that time was working against him
on every count.

Hitler did not dare to risk playing a waiting game, to
see whether the French grew tired of war. He believed
that for the moment he had the strength and equipment
to beat France. "In certain arms, the decisive arms, Ger-
many to-day possesses clear, indisputable superiority of
weapons. 5 5 Hitler felt that he must strike as soon as
possible, before it was too late. His order was: "The
attack is to be launched, if conditions are at all possible,
this autumn. 9 '

Hitler's reckoning, and these instructions were set out
in a long memorandum of October 9th, 1939. His analysis
of the military factors in the situation was masterly, but he
left out of account a vital political factor — the "bull-
doggedness 55 of the British people when aroused.

His generals shared his long-term fears, but did not
share his short-term confidence. They did not think
that the German Army was strong enough to beat
France.

All the top ones to whom I talked, including Rundstedt
and his chief planner, Blumentritt, admitted that they
were full of doubt about taking the offensive in the West.
As Blumentritt remarked: "Hitler alone believed that a
decisive victory was possible. 55

General Siewert, who had been Brauchitsch's personal
assistant from 1939 to 1941, said that no plan for an
offensive in the West had even been considered until
after the Polish campaign, and that Brauchitsch was
dismayed when, early in October, he received Hitler's
directive to prepare such a plan. "Field-Marshal von
Brauchitsch was dead against it. All the documents
relating to this plan will be available in the archives
wherever they are, and they will show that he advised
the Fuhrer against invading the West. He went to see

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 1 15

the Fuhrer personally, to demonstrate the unwisdom of
such an attempt. When he found he could not convince
the Fuhrer, he began to think of resigning. 5 * I asked on
what grounds the objection was made. Siewert replied:
"Field- Marshal von Brauchitsch did not think that the
German forces were strong enough to conquer France,
and argued that if they invaded France they would
draw Britain's full weight into the war. The Fuhrer
discounted this, but the Field-Marshal warned him: c We
know the British from the last war — and how tough they

are. 3 "

Faced with such doubts on the part of the army chiefs,
Hitler summoned a conference in Berlin, on November 23,
with the aim of implanting his own conviction. I had
an account of it from General Rohricht, who was head of
the Training Department of the General Staff, and was
subsequently responsible for compiling the lessons of the
1940 campaign. Rohricht said: "The Fuhrer spent two
hours in a lengthy review of the situation aimed to convince
the Army Command that an offensive in the West was a
necessity. But Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch argued
against it, and drew upon himself a severe rebuke from
the Fuhrer. General Haider was equally dubious about
taking the offensive. Both of them argued that the German
Army was not strong enough — it was the only line of
argument that could have any chance of deterring the
Fuhrer. But he insisted that his will must prevail. After
this conference many new formations were raised, to
increase the Army's strength. That was as far as the
Fuhrer would meet the opposing views. 9 '

In Hitler's address to the higher commanders he
expressed his anxiety about ultimate danger from Russia,
and the consequent necessity of being free in the West.
But the Allies would not consider his peace offers, and lay
behind their fortifications — out of reach, yet able to
spring when they chose. How long could Germany
endure such a situation? While she had the advantage at

n6

The Other Side of the Hill

the moment, in six months it might no longer be so.
"Time is working for our adversary, 55 There was cause
for anxiety even in the West, "We have an Achilles 5 Heel
— the Ruhr ... If Britain and France push through
Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the
greatest danger. That could lead to a paralysis of German
resistance. 55 The menace must be removed by striking
first.

But even Hitler did not display much assurance of
success at this time. He described the offensive as "a
gamble 55 , and a choice "between victory and destruction 55 .
Moreover, he ended his exhortation on the gloomy, and
prophetic note — "I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I
shall never survive the defeat of my people. 55

A copy of this address was found in the archives of the
Supreme Command after Germany's collapse, and pro-
duced at Nuremberg. But there was no mention there of
the opposition that Hitler had met m the discussion, nor of
a sequel that might have cut short his career m the first
autumn of the war.

For the generals were driven by their forebodings to
consider desperate remedies. Rohricht told me: "It was
mooted in O.K.H., by Brauchitsch and Haider that — if
the Fuhrer would not moderate his policy, and insisted on
plans that would involve Germany in an all out struggle
against Britain and France — they should order the German
Army in the West to turn about, and march on Berlin to
overthrow Hitler and the Nazi regime.

"But the one man who was really vital to the success
of this counter-plan declined to co-operate. This was
General Fromm, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home
Forces, in Germany. He argued that if the troops were
ordered to turn agamst the regime most of them would
not obey — because they had too much trust in Hitler.
Fromm was only too right on this score. His refusal to
co-operate was not due to any love of Hitler. He disliked
the regime just as much as the others did, and in the end

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 117
became one of Hitler's victims — though not until March,

Rohricht went on to say: "Apart from Fromm's
hesitation, I think that the plan would have failed. The
Luftwaffe, which was enthusiastically pro-Nazi, could
have broken any revolt which the Army attempted, since
it had the flak under its control. The original step of
making Goering and the Luftwaffe responsible for the
anti-aircraft defence of the Army was a very shrewd move
in weakening the power of the Army."

Fromm's calculation about the troops' reaction was
probably correct. That is admitted by the generals who
were upset at the time by his refusal to co-operate, and it
tends to be confirmed by our knowledge of how hard it
was to loosen the people's faith in Hitler even in the later
days of devastation and disaster. But although this 1 939
plot might not have succeeded in its immediate object of
overthrowing Hitler, the attempt would have been worth-
while. For at the least it would have so shaken Germany
as to nullify Hitler's plans for the conquest of France.
In that case all the European peoples would have been
spared the misery that befell them as a consequence of
that illusory triumph. Even the German people would
not have suffered anything like what they did after a
long-drawn war, accompanied by ever-multiplying
devastation from the air.

Although the generals' plot was still-born, Hitler did
not succeed in delivering his offensive in 1939 as he wished.
Rundstedt explained — "The weather intervened to frus-
trate him, more than anything else. The postponements
continued throughout the winter."

Blumentritt revealed that on eleven occasions between
November and April the armies received the order to
"fail in" — to be ready to attack in forty-eight hours
"Each time it was cancelled before the time expired.
These repeated cancellations led us to think that Hitler
was merely bluffing, and was only using the threat of

1 1 8 The Other Side of the Hill

attack as a means of prompting the Allies to consider his
peace offer/ 5 But when the twelfth order came, in the
month of May, events took their fatal course,

THE VITAL CHANGE OF PLAN

The original plan, worked out by the General Staff
under Haider, was on broadly similar lines to that of 19 14,
though its aim was less far-reaching. The main weight
was to be concentrated on the right wing, for a drive
through the plains of Belgium, carried out by Army
Group "B" under Bock. Army Group CC A" under Rund-
stedt, in the centre facing the Ardennes, was to play a
secondary part. Army Group "C" under Leeb, on the
left, facing the frontier of France itself, was simply to
threaten and pin down the French armies that were
holding the Maginot Line. Bock had the 18th, 6th, and
4th Armies — listing them from right to left ; Rundstedt had
the 1 2th and 16th Armies; Leeb had the 1st and 7th
Armies. What was more important, the bulk of the tank
forces was to be concentrated for Bock's blow. None were
allotted to Rundstedt, whose task was merely to advance
to the Meuse, and there cover Bock's left flank.

In January, Rundstedt's strength was increased by
providing him with one panzer corps, and his part in the
plan enlarged to some extent — he was to push across the
Meuse and establish a wide bridgehead beyond, linking up
with Bock's flank and covering it better. But that was
only a modification, rather than a radical change. The
plan still placed the main weight on the right wing.

It is clear now that if that plan had been carried out
it would have failed to be decisive. For the British Army
and the best equipped part of the French Army stood in
the path. The German attack would have met these
forces head on. Even if it had broken their front in
Belgium it would merely have pushed them back on their
fortified line in Northern France, and closer to their bases
of supply.

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 119

The inner story of how the plan was changed is an
extraordinary one. It was only by degrees that I got on
the track of it. From the outset the German generals
were very forthcoming in telling me about the military
operations — such professional objectivity is a characteristic
of theirs. Most of them, I found, were old students of
my military writings, so that they were all the more ready
to talk, and exchange views. They were equally frank in
discussing most of the Nazi leaders, whose influence they
heartily detested. In regard to Hitler they were more
reserved at first. It was obvious that many of them had
been so hypnotized by him or so fearful of him that they
hesitated to mention his name. As they gradually became
convinced that he was dead, this inhibition subsided, and
they criticized his actions more freely — Rundstedt was
always critical. But they still had a tendency, a very
natural one, to cover up cleavages in their own ranks.
So it was only after many discussions that I learnt the
real truth about the brain-wave that beat France.

The new plan was inspired by General von Manstein,
who was Rundstedt's chief of staff at the time. He thought
that the existing plan was too obvious, and too much a
repetition of the past — so that it was just the kind of move
the Allied High Command would anticipate.

If the Allied forces advanced into Belgium, as was
expected, there would be a frontal clash. That would not
promise decisive results. Another drawback was that the
decisive battle would be fought out with the British Army,
which, Manstein argued, was likely to be a tougher
opponent than the French. Moreover, the German tank
forces, on whom the chances of victory depended, would
have to make their drive through country which, though
flat, was filled with rivers and canals. That was a serious
handicap, since the whole issue turned on speed.

So Manstein conceived the bold idea of shifting the
main stroke to the Ardennes. He argued that the enemy
would never expect a mass of tanks to be used in such

120

The Other Side of the Hill

difficult country. Yet it should be practicable for the
German tank forces, since opposition was likely to be
slight during the crucial stage of the advance Once they
had emerged from the Ardennes, and crossed the Meuse,
the rolling plains of Northern France would provide ideal
country for tank manoeuvre and for a rapid sweep to the
sea.

This idea was too bold for his able but more con-
ventional superiors to swallow easily. He found difficulty
in persuading them until he took an opportunity of
expounding his idea to Huler, whose imagination was
fired by it. That led to the adoption of Manstein's plan.

The man whose brain-wave produced the defeat of
France had to pay forfeit for his audacity. He was not
allowed any part in directing the execution of hi own plan.
The vigour with which he had pressed his ideas had
been resented by his military superiors, and they suspected
him of trying a backstairs approach to Hitler. Their
sore feelings were aggravated when it came to their ears
that many of the younger members of the General Staff
were saying that "Manstein ought to be made Commander-
in-Chief". Three months before the offensive was launched
he was appointed to command an army corps, and replaced
by General von Sodenstern. That promotion was a con-
venient means of moving him out of the way, to the relief
of his superiors yet with honour to both parties. Never-
theless, it was ironical that the man who had shown the
most imagination in grasping the potentialities of highly
mobile armoured warfare — though not himself a tank
specialist — should have been sent to take charge of an
infantry formation (which merely played a walkmg-on part
in the offensive) just as the new type of mobility was to
achieve its supreme fulfilment.

SHORT VIEWS

In discussing the campaign with the various generals
concerned I found that almost every one of them admitted

How Hitler Beat Frame — and Saved Britain 121

that he had not anticipated such a decisive victory as was
actually gained. The general run of opinion was repre-
sented by Rohricht, who remarked — "We hoped to succeed
far enough to reach the line of the Somtne, separate the
British from the main French armies, and occupy Belgium
together with Northern France/ 5 Blumentritt was more
explicit — "We were sure that the Allied left wing would
advance into Belgium, to Brussels at least, and thus
reckoned on cutting it off. Beyond that, we did not look.
The completeness of our victory was a surprise. 55

Most of the generals said that they had feared a delay
in crossing the Meuse. But they did not seem to have
considered the problem of what might have happened if
the break-through had failed, and they had been definitely
checked. Underlying Brauchitsch's and Halder 5 s objec-
tions to Hitler's plans there may have been such a thought;
if so it was exceptional Yet had the invasion failed to
produce the collapse of France, but merely taken a bite of
her soil, it would have made any settlement more difficult —
by arousing and stiffening the spirit of France. Thus, for
the Germans an indecisive offensive might have been worse
than none, and much less wise than a policy of remaining
quiet in the West, improving their defence, until the
French became weary of a deadlock war. This point did
not seem to have occurred to the German generals.
Blumentritt said he had no recollection of it being dis-
cussed either in conference or in conversation among
themselves. The reply that most of them made to me was
that questions of this sort belonged to the political side of
war, and were outside their ken.

The neglect to consider such obvious contingencies,
and the vital questions involved, sheds a particularly
revealing light on the limitations of their professional out-
look. It shows how lacking they were in a sense of grand
strategy, or in due regard for the objects of war, as distinct
from its military objectives. Such pure strategists were
bound to be ineffective in dealing with Hitler, who had a

122

The Other Side of the Hill

grasp of both aim and method, of politics and strategy —
from the mating of which grand strategy proceeds. Since
they could not argue on the same plane they were impotent
to correct the mistakes of his grand strategy, or curb his
increasingly excessive ambitions. Their professional skill
on the lower planes — of strategy and tactics — only served
to carry him, and them, deeper into a pit from which there
was no way of extrication.

By an irony of history, however, the greatest contri-
bution of all to the success which paved Hitler's path to
the pit came from his opponents.

THE FRENCH PLAN

The shattering effect of the Ardennes stroke owed
much to the design of the French plan — which fitted per-
fectly, from the Germans' point of view, into their own
remodelled plan. What proved fatal to the French was
not, as is commonly imagined, their defensive attitude or
"Maginot Line complex", but the more offensive side of
their plan. By pushing into Belgium with their left
shoulder forward they played into the hands of their
enemy, and wedged themselves in a trap — just as had
happened with their near-fatal Plan XVII of 1 914. It
was the more perilous this time because the opponent
was more mobile, manoeuvring at motor-pace instead of
at foot-pace. The penalty, too, was the greater because
the left shoulder push — made by the 1st, 7th, and 9th
French armies and the British Expeditionary Force —
comprised the most modernly equipped and mobile part
of the Allied forces, so that once these were deeply com-
mitted the French High Command lost most of its
manoeuvring power.

The supreme advantage of the new German plan was
that every step forward that the Allies took made them
more susceptible to Rundstedt's flanking drive through
the Ardennes, That had been foreseen when the scheme
was drafted. Rundstedt himself told me: "We expected

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 123

that the Allies would try to advance through Belgium and
Southern Holland against the Ruhr — and our offensive
would thus have the effect of a counter-stroke, with the
natural advantages this carries." Such an expectation
went beyond the Allies' intentions, but that did not matter.
For the opening of the German right wing assault on the
frontiers of Belgium and Holland acted like a pistol in
starting the Allies 5 dash forward into those countries, in
fulfilment of Plan D — which they had framed in the
autumn. Bock's direct thrust drew them out of their
defences, and far forward into the open, leaving their
flank and rear exposed to Rundstedt's indirect thrust.

While it was not difficult to foresee the Allies 9 reaction,
the ultimate decision in favour of Manstein's scheme was
guided by something more than intelligent anticipation.
Blumentritt made a significant disclosure in giving me his
account of events — "The opposition was finally overcome
and the plan changed owing to definite news, emanating
from Brussels, of the Allied plans."

THE MATADOR'S CLOAK

Hitler's invasion of the West opened with startling
successes on the seaward flank. These focused attention to
such an extent as to serve, like a matador's cloak, to
distract attention from the thrust that was being delivered
through the Ardennes — towards the heart of France.

The capital of Holland and the hub of its communica-
tions, at Rotterdam, were attacked in the early hours of
May 10th, by airborne forces, simultaneously with the
assault on its frontier defences a hundred miles to the east.
The confusion and alarm created by this double blow, in
front and rear, were increased by the widespread menace
of the Luftwaffe. Exploiting the disorder, German
armoured forces raced through a gap in the southern
flank and joined up with the airborne forces at Rotterdam
on the third day. They cut through to their objective
under the nose of the 7th French Army which was just

124

The Othet Side of the Hill

arriving to the aid of the Dutch. On the fifth day the
Dutch capitulated.

The main gateway into Belgium was also forced by a
dramatic opening coup. Airborne troops picked the lock
— by seizing the bridges over the Albert Canal near
Maastricht. By the second day, armoured forces pushed
through into the open, outflanking the fortified bridgehead
of Li6ge. That evening the Belgian Army was driven to
abandon its fortified frontier line, and fall back westward
as its Allies were rushing up to the line of the Dyle as
planned.

At the time these direct assaults, on Holland and
Belgium, earned the impression of tremendous strength.
It is remarkable to find how light was the weight put
into these strokes, especially in the case of Holland. The
German 18th Army under General von Kuchler, which
dealt with the Dutch, was considerably smaller than the
forces opposing it, and the path of its advance was inter-
sected by a network of canals and rivers that should have
been easy to defend. Its chances turned, primarily, on
the effect of the aii borne coup. But this new aim was
astonishingly small.

General Student, its Commander-in-Chief, gave me the
details. "Altogether, we had 4,500 trained parachute
troops in the spring of 1940. To give the offensive against
Holland a fair chance it was necessary to use the bulk of
them there. So we allotted five battalions, some 4,000
men, to that task, supplemented by an air-transported
division, the 22nd, which comprised 12,000 men.

"The limitations of our strength compelled us to con-
centrate on two objectives — the points which seemed the
most essential to the success of the invasion. The main
effort, under my own control, was directed against the
bridges at Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and Moerdijk by which
the main route from the south was carried across the
mouths of the Rhine. Our task was to capture the bridges
before the Dutch could blow them up, and keep them open

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 125

until the anival of our mobile ground forces. My force
comprised four parachute battalions and one air-trans-
ported regiment (of three battalions). We achieved com-
plete success, at a cost of only 180 casualties. We dared
not fail, for if we did the whole invasion would have
failed. 55 Student himself was one of the casualties, being
wounded in the head by a sniper's bullet, and he was out
of action for eight months.

"The secondary attack was made against The Hague.
Its aim was to get a hold upon the Dutch capital, and m
particular to capture the Government offices and the
Service headquarters. The force employed here was com-
manded by General Graf Sponeck; it consisted of one
parachute battalion and two air-transported regiments.
This attack did not succeed Several hundred men were
killed and wounded, while as many were taken prisoner. 55

After meeting the paramount needs of the coup m
Holland, only 500 airborne troops were left to help the
invasion of Belgium, Student told me. They were used to
capture the two bridges over the Albert Ganal and the
Fort of Eben Emael, Belgium's most modern fort, which
flanked this water line-frontier. That tiny detachment,
however, made all the difference to the issue. For the
approach to the Belgian frontier here lay across the
southerly projection of Dutch territory know as the
"Maastricht Appendix 55 , and once the German Army
crossed the Dutch frontier the Belgian frontier guardb on
the Albert Canal would have had ample warning to blow
the bridges before any invading ground forces could cross
that fifteen-mile strip. Airborne troops dropping silently
out of the night sky offered a new way, and the only way,
of securing the key-bridges intact.

The very limited scale of airborne forces used in
Belgium gives a fantastic air to the reports at the time that

126

The Other Side of the Hill

German parachutists were dropping at scores of places, in
numbers that cumulatively ran into thousands. Student
provided the explanation. He said that to compensate
the scantiness of the actual resources, and create as much
confusion as possible, dummy parachutists were scattered
widely over the country. This ruse certainly proved most
effective, helped by the natural tendency of heated
imaginations to multiply all figures.

The course of the invasion was described to me by
General von Bechtolsheim, then iA (operations chief) to
Reichenau's 6th Army, which carried out this frontal
offensive. He was an old acquaintance, having been the
German Military Attachi in London before the war.

"The axis of the 6th Army ran through Maastricht to
Brussels, its right wmg being directed from Roermond past
Turnhout to Malines, and its left wing from Aachen past
Liege to Namur. Maastricht was the vital point in the
first phase — or, to be exact, the two bridges over the Albert
Canal west of Maastricht. These were captured, before
they could be blown up, by glider-landings on the west
bank. Fort Eben Emael was captured in the same way,
though not so quickly. The great disappointment of the
first day was that the bridges over the Meuse in Maastricht
were blown up by the Dutch, thus delaying the advance to
support the glider-parties on the Albert Canal

"However, Hoeppner's i6th Panzer Corps was pushed
through as soon as the Meuse had been bridged, although
it was strung out in excessive depth, as it had to use a
single bridge, and thus had to be passed through a bottle-
neck. Once through, it drove towards Nivelles. Progress
now became quick.

"Under the original plan there was no intention of
attacking Liege. That fortified city was to be by-passed,
while screened on the north by our left wing and on the
south by the 4th Army's right wing. But our left wing,
pushing down towards Liege, succeeded in driving into it
from the rear without any serious opposition.

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 127

"Our main forces pushed on westward, and made
contact with the British Army on the Dyle line. We then
staged a turning movement from the north, but before it
developed the British had fallen back to the Scheldt, so
we halted for a short time on the Dyle to enable our
divisions to close up.

"Throughout our advance to Brussels we were con-
tinually expecting an Allied counter-attack from Antwerp
against our right flank

"Meanwhile, the 16th Panzer Corps had driven ahead,
on our southern flank, and fought battles near Hannut and
Gembloux with the French mechanized Cavalry Corps.
At first our tanks were outnumbered, but the French
tanks fought in a static way that forfeited their advantage,
and their lack of enterprise allowed time for the rest of
Hoeppner's corps to arrive on the scene. That decided
the Gembloux battle in our favour on the 14th. But we
were deprived of the chance to exploit our success, for
Hoeppner's corps was now taken away to back up the
break-through which had been achieved south of the
Meuse, in the Ardennes. This decision of the Supreme
Command left the 6th Army without any armoured forces, 3 *

This order caused much heartburning, and a heated
protest from Reichenau. But he was overruled in the
higher interests of the general offensive plan. The 6th
Army had well performed its r61e of attracting the attention
of the French High Command, and distracting their
attention from the greater threat that was developing in
the Ardennes. It had also pinned down the mobile forces
of the Allied left wing during the crucial days. For on the
13th Rundstedt's armoured spearheads crossed the Meuse
around Sedan and burst into the rolling plains of north-
eastern France. When Gamelin, the French Commander-
in-Chief, thought of switching his mechanized cavalry
from the left wing to stem the flood at Sedan he was told
that they were too fully engaged at Gembloux.

Once that object had been fulfilled there was good

128

The Other Side of the Hill

reason for reducing Reichenau's punching power, since it
was not desirable to hustle the Allied left wing into too
rapid a retreat before Poindstedt's net had been stretched
across its rear.

Reichenau's air support had been reduced even before
his armour was switched away, Bechtolsheim said. "In
the first phase of the offensive the 6th Army was given very
powerful support by the Luftwaffe, for the crossings of the
Meuse and the Albert Canal near Maastricht, but the
corps of dive-bombers were then concentrated southward
against the crossings of the Meuse near Sedan. 55 I asked
Bechtolsheim whether the freedom from bombing which
the B.E F. had enjoyed during its advance to the Dyle
was deliberately intended to entice it forward. He replied :
"Not so far as we were concerned at 6th Army H.Q,., but
it may have been planned on a higher level. 55

Before passing to the story of Rundstedt's break-through
from the Ardennes to the Channel coast, which trapped the
whole Allied left wing, it is worth giving some of the main
points from Bechtolsheim's account of the 6th Army's later
advance in following up the belated Allied retreat from
the Dyle line

"The axis of our advance was now directed on Lille,
with our right flank moving on Ghent, and our left on
Mons and Conde. The first serious contact with the
British was on the Scheldt. General von Reichenau
wanted to envelop Lille by a turning movement round
the north, but O.K. H. ordered the main effort to be made
on the other flank — in order to assist General von Kluge 5 s
4th Army (on the right wing of General von Rundstedt's
Army Group), which was heavily engaged in the area
Roubaix-Cambrai. In this advance our 4th Corps had a
tough fight at Tournai, where it did not succeed in
penetrating the British defence.

How Hitlet Beat France — and Saved Britain 129

"Belter reports then came from the Gambrai area, and
General von Reichenau persuaded O.K.H. to approve his
plan of swinging round north of Lille towards Ypres. A
powerful attack by the nth Coips broke through the
Belgian front here on the Lys near Courtrai. Following
this success, we concentrated all possible strength towards
Roulers and Ypres. The final overthrow of the Belgian
Army was now achieved by the 6th Aimy.

"On the evening of May 27th word came from the
1 nh Corps that a Belgian general had arrived at its H.£h
and asked for the conditions of an armistice. This request
was referred back to O.K.W., which sent back orders that
unconditional surrender must be demanded." This was
accepted, and the Belgians laid down their arms early next
morning. "I called on King Leopold at Bruges the day
after. He did not like the idea of going to the castle ot
Laeken for internment, and asked if he might go to his
country house I passed on his request, but it was not
granted. 3 '

I asked Bechtolsheim whether he considered that the
Belgian Army could have held out longer. He replied:
"I think it could, for its losses were not severe. But when
I drove thiough the lines of Belgian troops most of them
seemed to be very relieved that the straggle had ended.' 5

Another question I put was whether he had any news
at this time of preparations to evacuate the B.E.F. He
said : "We had repoits that a large concentration of shipping
had been seen at Dunkirk. This led us to suspect that an
evacuation was contemplated. Previously, we had expected
the British to withdraw southward."

Summing up the brief campaign, he remarked: "The
only real difficulty we met was the crossing of rivers and
canals, not from opposition. When the 16th Panzer Corps
had been taken away, most of our bridging units went with
it, and this became a handicap on our subsequent progress."

He also enumerated what he regarded as the four main
lessons of the campaign :

E

1 3 o

The Othe? Side of the Hill

"First. The outstanding lesson was the necessity of
air-ground liaison in actual battle. This was good in the
main efforts, at Maastricht and Sedan, but not in general.
At Maastricht the 6th Army had excellent support from
and co-operation with Richthofen's Stukas, but these were
then subsequently sent to support Kleist's thrust through
Sedan. The Air Force should always know when to
switch from attacking communications to close co-opera-
tion in the battle. There is need for great flexibility.

"Second. Even after the Panzer Group had been taken
away, events proved that infantry attack was still possible
without tank support — thanks to the way that the infantry
had been trained; to well-controlled supporting fire; and
to infiltration tactics Widely dispersed threats create
openings.

" "Third. When armoured forces are fairly equal, a kind
of standing battle develops — where space is lacking for
manoeuvre.

"Fourth. The need of flexibility in switching forces
when they are checked in battle along any particular line
of advance. 55

THE MATADOR'S THRUST

Befoie dawn of May ioth the greatest concentration of
tanks yet seen in war was massed opposite the frontier of
Luxembourg. It was poised for a dash through that state
and then through Belgian Luxembourg to the French
frontier near Sedan, seventy miles distant Made up of
three Panzer corps, these were arrayed in three blocks, or
layers, with armoureci divisions in the first two, and
motorized infantry divisions in the third The van was
led by General Gudenan, Germany's chief tank expert,
and the whole was commanded by General von Kleist.

"Like a great phalanx, the three blocks stood densely
closed up one behind the other 55 — that was Blumentritt's
description. Even so, this armoured array was more than
a hundred miles deep from head to tail — which lay nearly

How Hide) Beat France — and Saoed Britain 1 3 1

fifty miles east of the Rhine, A vivid impression of its scale
was conveyed in a remark which Kleist made to me: "If
this Panzer Group had advanced on a single road its tail
would have stretched right back to Koenigsberg in East
Prussia, when its head was at Trier."

To the right of Kleist's group lay a separate panzer
corps under Hoth, which was to dash through the northern
part of the Ardennes, to the Meusc between Givet and
Dinant.

These armouied phalanxes, however, formed only a
fraction of the armed mass that was drawn up along the
German frontier ready to plunge into the Ardennes.
According to Blumentritf "Army Group A had alto-
gether 86 divisions of all kinds closely packed on a narrow
but very deep front' 5 He went on: "This advance
through the Ardennes was not really an operation, in the
tactical sense, but an approach march. In making the
plan we had reckoned it unlikely that we should meet any
serious resistance before reaching the Meuse. That calcu-
lation proved correct. We met no resistance in Luxem-
bourg, and only slight resistance in Belgian Luxembourg —
from the Chasseurs Ardennais and some French cavalry.
It was weak opposition, and easily biushed aside,

"The mam problem was not tactical but administrative
— the complicated movement and supply arrangements.
It was essential to utilize all roads and tracks that were to
any degree practicable. The greatest possible precision
was required in plotting the route on the map; m the
regulation of traffic; and in the arrangements for protecting
the movement against both ground and air interference.
The many infantry divisions had to march on field paths
and across country, interspersed among the armoured
divisions that were using the roads. The most intricate
staff work was demanded in laying down start-lines for the
successive panzer blocks, while the beginning and end of
each division's passage was precisely regulated by the
clock. The terrain was difficult — mountainous and

The Other Side of the Hill

heads over the Meuse. The leading infantry corps only
began to arrive on the 14th."

I asked Kleist about the state of the French defences.
He replied: cc Along the Meuse there was a moderate
amount of fortification, in the way of pillboxes, but these
were not pioperly armed. If the French troops here had
been adequately equipped with anti-tank guns we should
certainly have noticed it, as the majority of our tanks were
of the early Mark I type, and thus very vulnerable ! The
French divisions in the sector were poorly armed, and of
low quality. Their troops, as we repeatedly found, gave
up the fight very soon after being subjected to air bombing
or gunfire. 55

On the French side, four 2nd Reserve divisions, of
oldish men, were holding a front of over forty miles.
Besides being thinly stretched, they were not even pro-
vided with the meagre normal scale of anti-tank guns,
while lacking anti-aircraft guns. Assailed by swarms of
dive-bombers while the Germans were bridging the river
and then by masses of tanks, it is not surprising these
low-grade French infantry quickly collapsed,

A FIRST PAUSE

The German commanders, however, could hardly
believe their luck. They were still more surprised that no
counter-offensive developed. Rundstedt had feared the
delivery of a heavy stroke against his left flank while he
was pushing through the Ardennes. "I knew Gameiin
before the war, and, trying to read his mmd, had antici-
pated that he would make a flank move from the Verdun
direction with his reserves. We estimated that he had
thirty to forty divisions which could be used for the purpose.
But nothing of the sort developed. 59

Hitler shared these apprehensions. In consequence he
put a curb on the advance — it was the first of two inter-
ventions on his part, the second of which had greater
consequences. Telling of this first case, Siewert said:

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 1 35

"After we had crossed the Meuse, the Commander-in-
Chief wanted to make a quick dash for Abbeville and
Boulogne. But the Fuhrer was nervous about the risk
that the main French armies might strike westward, and
wanted to wait until a large number of infantry divisions
had been brought up to provide flank cover along the
Aisne." R6hricht, then acting as chief liaison officer
between CXK.H. and 12th Army H.Q., was more explicit:
"The 1 2th Army, which was following Kleist's panzer
group, was ordered to wheel south to the Aisne, when he
wheeled west after crossing the Meuse and headed for the
Channel coast* Weichs's 2nd Army was brought up from
the rear to provide the infantry backing for this seaward
drive. In my opinion this decision was a bad mistake. I
reckon it cost us two days. It would have been better if
the 2nd Army had carried out the wheel south to the
Aisne, while the 1 2th Army marched straight on to support
the armoured forces.'*

Kleist himself, however, qualified these opinions. "My
forces were actually halted only for one day. The order
came when my leading elements had reached the Oise,
between Guise and La F&re. I was told that it was a direct
order from the Fuhrer. But I don't think it was the
direct consequence of the decision to replace the 12th
Army by the 2nd as our backer-up. It was due to the
Fiihrer's anxiety about the danger of a counter-stroke
against our left flank; he did not care to let us push too
deeply until the situation there was clearer."

THE DRIVE TO THE SEA

Such uneasiness is understandable, especially on the
part of Hitler, who was far in rear. For the quickness of
the French collapse on the Meuse, and the absence of any
strong counter-offensive reaction, naturally seemed too
good to be true. But events in the battle-zone soon dis-
pelled these apprehensions. The shock of the mechanized
blitzkrieg had paralysed the French Army, which was

136 The Other Side of the Hill

mentally and materially unfitted to cope with it, In that
state of paralysis it was incapable of profiting by the brief
relaxation of pressure which Hitler's first intervention
provided.

After crossing the Meuse and turning westwaid,
Kleist's drive met little resistance. His tanks rolled along
what was virtually an open corridor, behind the back of
the Allied left wing in Belgium. There was no "Battle of
the Bulge 95 such as the official commentators described so
graphically at the time. It was a smooth run. The few
counter-attacks against its flank were spasmodic and unco-
ordinated. The first had been at Stonne, just south of
Sedan, where the French 3rd Armoured Division caused
a momentary jolt before it was itself taken in flank and
swept back. The next was near Laon, by the newly-
formed 4th Armoured Division, under General de Gaulle.
In regard to this Kleist remarked: "It did not put us in
any such danger as later accounts have suggested.
Guderian dealt with it himself without troubling me, and
I only heard of it the day after. 5 ' Of the two other
armoured divisions which the French possessed, the 1st
ran out of petrol and was encixcled while helpless, while
the 2nd was frittered away in packets by the higher
command to guard bridges.

The German armoured forces, apait from their brief
pauses at the Oise, raced westward so fast that their
opponents were utterly confused. As an example, Kleist
related — ' ' I was half-way to the sea when one of my staff
brought me an extract from the French radio which said
that the commander of their 6th Army on the Meuse had
been sacked, and General Giraud appointed to take charge
of the situation. Just as I was reading it, the door opened
and a handsome French general was ushered in. He intro-
duced himself with the words, C I am General Giraud*. He
told me how he had set out in an armoured car to look for
his Army, and had found himself in the midst of my forces
far ahead of where he had expected them to be. My first

How Hidei Beat France — and Saved Biitain 137

encounter with the British was when my tanks came upon,
and overran, an infantry battalion whose men were
equipped with dummy cartridges, for field exercises. This
was a sidelight on the apparent unexpectedness of our
arrival.'* The Germans poured like a flood across the
back areas of the B E.F. while the bulk of it was still deep
in Belgium.

Kleist continued: k€ In sum, our advance met no
serious opposition after the break-through. Reinhardt's
Panzer Corps had some fighting near Le Gateau, but that
was the only noteworthy incident. Guderian's Panzer
Gorps, sweeping farther south, reached Abbeville on the
20 th, thus splitting the Allied armies. Wietersheim, with
the motorized divisions, was close on its heels, and promptly
took over the defence of the sector along the Somme from
Peronne to Abbeville, while Guderian turned north next
day," He had already cut the B.E.F.'s communications
with its bases ; he was now aiming to cut it off from retreat
to the sea.

The German higher command had a bad shock that
day, however, although it did not affect Kleist — who was
unaware of it at the time, as he had gone forward to
Abbeville on the 20th immediately after the place was
occupied. As he had driven deeper into France his flank
guards had been 1 elieved in turn by a system of relays — as
part of the process of maintaining the momentum of the
advance. The infantry corps were backing up his panzer
corps, and they came under his orders for a day or two at
each stage while they took up defensive positions on the
flanks* But, in the later stages, the pace of the panzers
became so fast as to leave a dangerous interval behind
them. A small British counter-attack force suddenly
inserted a wedge into the gap.

Rundstedt told me: "A critical moment in the drive
came just as my forces had reached the Channel. It was
caused by a British counter-stroke southward from Arras
towards Cambrai, on May 21. For a short time it was

1 38 The Other Side of the Hill

feared that our armoured divisions would be cut off before
the infantry divisions could come up to support them.
None of the French counter-attacks carried any seiious
threat as this one did." (It is remarkable to learn what a,
jar this gave the Germans and how it nearly upset their
drive, for it was delivered by a very small force, part of
General MarteFs 50th Northumbrian Division with the
4th and 7th Battalions Royal Tank Regiment It is cleai
that if there had been two British armoured divisions,
instead of battalions, the whole German plan might have
been paralysed.)

That proved to be the last effort to cut the net which
the Germans had cast across the rear of the Allied armies
in Belgium — a net which was soon drawn tighter. Hitler
was justified by the issue, against all the judgment of his
generals. Yet they were justified in their doubts on any
basis of probability. No reasonable estimate of the prospect
could have reckoned that the French Commander-in-Chief,
General Gamelin, would have made such an elementary
blunder as to leave the hinge of his advance almost un-
covered when he rushed the whole of his left wing armies
into the central plains of Belgium to meet the threat there*
But for that extraordinary oversight, it is almost certain
that Hitler's attack would have had only a limited success.
If it had penetrated only a short distance over the French
frontier, and stuck there, the whole course of the war,
and of the world in our time, would have been very
different,

Blumentritt said (and others endorsed this) : "The fact
that Hitler's 'judgment 5 had been justified in face of his
generals intoxicated him, and made it much more difficult
for them ever to argue with, or restrain him, again/ 5 Thus,
in the end, the 13th May proved even more unlucky for
them — and for Germany — than it did for France.

The turn of fortune began barely a week later.
Ironically, it started from a strange instance of restraint
on Hitler's part, not from his generals 5 caution.

How Hitler Beat Fiance — and Saved Britain 139

hitler's "halt" order

On wheeling north, Guderian's Panzer Corps headed
for Calais while Reinhardt's swept west of Arras towards
St. Omer and Dunkirk. On the 22nd, Boulogne was
isolated by Guderian's advance, and next day Calais.
That same day Reinhardt reached the Aire-St Omer
Canal, less than twenty miles from Dunkirk — the only
escape port left to the B.E.F. The German armoured
forces were much nearer to it than the bulk of the B.E.F.

"At that moment/ 5 Rundstedt told me, €C a sudden
telephone call came from Colonel von Grieffenberg at
O.K.H., saying that Kleist's forces were to halt on the
line of the canal. It was the Fuhrer's direct order — and
contrary to General Haider's view. I questioned it in a
message of protest, but received a curt telegram in reply,
saying : 'The armoured divisions are to remain at medium
artillery range from Dunkirk' (a distance of eight or nine
miles). 'Permission is only granted for reconnaissance and
protective movements 5 ."

Kleist said that when he got the order it seemed to
make no sense to him. "I decided to ignore it, and to
push on across the Canal. My armoured cars actually
entered Hazebrouck, and cut across the British lines of
retreat. I heard later that the British Commander-in-
Chief, Lord Gort, had been in Hazebrouck at the time*
But then came a more emphatic order that I was to
withdraw behind the canal. My tanks were kept halted
there for three days."

Thoma, who was chief of the tank side of the General
Staff, told me that he was right up forward with the leading
tanks, near Bergues, where he could look into the town of
Dunkirk itself. He sent back wireless messages direct to
O.K.H., begging for permission to let the tanks push on.
But his appeal had no effect. Referring to Hitler's attitude,
he bitingly remarked: "You can never talk to a fool.
Hitler spoilt the chance of victory "

140

The Other Side of the Hill

Meanwhile the British forces streamed back towards
Dunkirk, and cemented a defensive position to cover their
re-embarkation. The German tank commanders had to
sit and watch the British slipping away under their very
nose.

"After three days the ban was lifted, 59 Kleist said, "and
the advance was resumed — against stiffening opposition.
It had just begun to make headway when it was inter-
rupted by a fresh order from Hitler — that my forces were
to be withdrawn, and sent southw ard for the attack on the
line that the remainder of the French Army had impro-
vised along the Somme. It was left to the infantry forces
which had come down from Belgium to complete the
occupation of Dunkirk — after the British had gone/ 3

hitler's reasons

A few days later Kleist met Hitler on the airfield at
Gambrai, and ventured to remark that a great opportunity
had been lost of reaching Dunkiik before the British
escaped. Hitler replied- ''That may be so. But I did not
want to send the tanks into the Flanders marshes — and the
British won't come back in this war 55

To others Hitler gave a somewhat different excuse —
that so many of the tanks had fallen out from mechanical
breakdowns that he wanted to build up his strength and
reconnoitre the position before pushing on. He also
explained that he wanted to be sure of having sufficient
tanks in hand for the subsequent offensive against the rest
of the French Army.

I found that most of the generals, including Kleist,,
had accepted these explanations with little question,
though they were sore about the decision that had deprived
them of complete victory. They felt that Hitler's anxietv
about the marshy ground was exaggerated, and were
convinced that they could have easily avoided it. They
knew that lots of fresh tanks had been arriving daily to
replace wastage* Nevertheless, Hitler's decision was

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain 141

KB n i

assumed to be purely an error of judgment or excess of
caution.

But certain members of Rundstedt's staff regarded the
excuses as thin, and believed that Hitler had a deeper
motive for his halt order. They connected it with the
surprising way he had talked when visiting their head-
quarters at Gharleville on May 24th, the day after the
armoured forces had been halted in their stride.

Hitler was accompanied by only one of his staff, and
talked in private to Rundstedt and the two key men of
his staff — Sodenstern and Blumentntt Here is what
the latter told me — "Hitler was in very good humour, he
admitted that the course of the campaign had been 'a
decided miracle 9 , and gave us his opinion that the war
would be finished in six weeks. After that he wished to
conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the
way would be free for an agreement with Britain.

"He then astonished us by speaking with admiration
of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and
of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world.
He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the
creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that
were often harsh, but 'where there is planing, there are
shavings flying 5 . He compared the British Empire with
the Catholic Church — saying they were both essential
elements of stability in the world. He said that all he
wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge
Germany's position on the Continent, The return of
Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not
essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with
troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.
He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter
of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few
Germans could settle in the tropics,

"He concluded by saying that his aim was to make
peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as
compatible with her honour to accept.

142

The Othei Side of the Hill

"Field- Marshal von Rundstedt, who was always for
agreement with France and Britain, expressed his satis-
faction, and later, after Hitler's departure, remarked with
a sigh of relief— c Well if he wants nothing else, then we
shall have peace at last/ 35

When Hitler continued to keep on the brake, Blumen-
tritt's thoughts ran back to this conversation. He felt
that the "halt 53 had been called for more than military
reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make
peace easier to reach. If the British Army had been cap-
tured at Dunkirk, the British people might have felt that
their honour had suffered a stain which they must wipe
out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate
them.

This conviction of Hitler's deeper motive was con-
firmed by his strangely dilatory attitude over the subsequent
plans for the invasion of England. "He showed little
interest in the plans, 55 Blumentritt said, "and made no
effort to speed up the preparations. That was utterly
different to his usual behaviour 55 Before the invasion of
Poland, of France, and later of Russia, he repeatedly
spurred them on. But on this occasion he sat back.

Since the account of his conversation at Charleville
and subsequent holding back comes from a section of the
generals who had long distrusted Hitler's policy and
became more hostile to him as the war continued, that
makes their testimony on this point more notable. They
have criticized Hitler on almost every score. It would be
natural to expect, that, in the present circumstances, they
would portray him as intent on the capture of the British
Army, and themselves as holding him back. Their
evidence has the opposite effect. They very honestly admit
that, as soldiers, they wanted to finish off their victory,
and were upset at the way they were checked from doing
so. Significantly, their account of Hitler's thoughts about
England at the decisive hour before Dunkirk fits in with
much that he himself wrote earlier in Mein Kampf—axid it is

How Hitler Beat France — and Saved Britain i 43

remarkable how closely he followed his own bible in other
respects.

Was this attitude of his towaids England prompted
only by the political idea, which he had long entertained,
of securing an alliance with her? Or was it inspired by a
deeper feeling which reasserted itself at this crucial moment?
There were some complex elements in his make-up which
suggest that he had a mixed love-hate feeling towards
England similar to the Kaiser's-

Whatever be the true explanation, we can at least be
content with the result. For his hesitations came to
Britain's rescue at the most critical moment of her history.

CHAPTER XI

THE END IN FRANCE AND THE
FIRST FRUSTRATION

The second and final phase of the campaign in France
opened on June 5th, when the new German offensive was
launched southward over the Somme That was barely a
week after the bulk evacuation of the B E.F. from Dunkirk
had begun, and the day after the last ship had sailed from
there.

In their severed left wing the French had lost 30
divisions 3 nearly a third of their total forces, including
the best part of their scanty number of mechanized divi-
sions. They had also lost the help of 12 British divisions,
for all that remained in France were two that had not
been with the main body of the B.E.F when the blow fell.
Weygand, who had now replaced Gamelm, was left with
66 divisions, mostly depleted or of inferior quality, to hold
a stretch that was longer than the oiiginal front. The
Germans, on the other hand, had now had time to bring
up the mass of their marching divisions, which had taken
liftle part in the first offensive.

The most striking feature of the new offensive was in
its prelude — the fact that the German armoured divisions,
all of which had been engaged in the westward drive to
the Channel, could be switched southwards or eastwards
in so short a time ready for the next stroke. Such rapidity
of reconcentration in a fresh direction was proof that
mechanized mobility had transformed strategy.

In the new offensive Rundstedt's Army Group once
again played the decisive role. It was not definitely cast
for that in the plan. While Rundstedt had the larger
front and forces, six of the ten German armoured divisions

144

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146

The Other Side of the Hdl

were allotted to Bock's Army Group at the outset* But
the planning was flexible and the pattern developed from
the course of the battle. The change of pattern was another
proof of the power conferred by mechanized mobility.

Nothing could have been more concise than the way
Rundstedt summed up the battle in our first talk — "There
was tough going for a few days but the issue was hardly in
doubt. The offensive was opened by Bock's Army Group,
on the right wing. I waited until his attack had made
headway, across the Somme, before joining in the offensive
My armies met with strong resistance in crossing the Aisne,
but after that it was easy. The vital thrust was that made
over the Plateau de Langres towards Besan§on and the
Swiss frontier, behind the back of the French right wing
in the Maginot Line."

The opening of the offensive, by the German right wing,
had not fulfilled expectations where success was most
desired, though it had surpassed expectations on a secondary
sector where the obstacles had appeared greater.

On the extreme right, between Amiens and the sea, the
attack was delivered by Kluge's 4th Army, as the 18th
Army, originally the right of the line, had been left behind
to clear up the position at Dunkirk. Kluge was given one
panzer corps, and owing to a speedy cut through by
RommePs 7th Armoured Division, his advance soon reached
the Seine at and around Rouen. The French troops here
were thrown into confusion and made little attempt to
defend the crossings, so that the Germans got over the
liver on the heels of the French.

But it was not here that the decisive stroke had been
contemplated — for no reasonable plan could have reckoned
on such a smooth passage of a broad river-line that was
easy to defend. The main weight of the attack by Bock's
Aimy Group had been placed with Reichenau's 6th Army,
on the sector east of Amiens, where more decisive results
were anticipated.

What happened here was related by Bechtolsheim,

The End in France and the First Frustration 147

Reichenau's Chief of Staff, "General von Kleist's Panzer
Group was placed under the 6th Army for this attack.
Its composition differed from that in the first offensive, for
Guderian had been transferred to Aimy Group "A" in
Champagne, and his corps had been replaced by
Hoeppner's 16th Panzer Corps. We made a two-pronged
thrust. Wietersheim's 14th Panzer Corps attacked from
the bridgehead over the Somme that we had gained at
Amiens, and Hoeppner's from the bridgehead at Peronne.
The idea was that they should converge to join hands on
the Oise beyond St. Just-en-Chaussee. After that, the
decision was to be taken whether the advance should be
pursued east or west of Paris.

"In planning the attack there were some arguments
about this method. Personally, I should have preferred
to concentrate the two panzer corps in a single punch,
but in the end General von Reichenau decided in favour
of the pincer stroke from the two bridgeheads. The
drive might have gone quicker if the weight had been
concentrated.

"When the attack was launched it met stiff opposition
in the 'Weygand Line 5 for the Gist three or four days. As
a result, contrary to anticipation, the decisive break-
through was not made on our sector, but on the Aisne
east of Soissons. Thereupon O.K.H. decided to withdraw
General von Kleist's Panzer Group from us, and move it
east to exploit this breach. Naturally we were disappointed,
for it was a repetition of what had happened to us in
Belgium.*'

Kleist continued the story. "Wietersheim's Corps had
actually gained a bridgehead over the Oise at Pont Sainte
Maxence, but Hoeppner's advance was delayed by heavy
fighting west of Noyon. By this time a break-through had
been achieved in Champagne. Although the attack there
did not start until the gth, the passage of the Aisne was
quickly forced and Guderian's Panzer Group pushed
through the gap made by the 12th Army east of Reims.

The Other Side of the Hill

The 9th and 2nd Armies had also broken through west of
Reims, and I now received orders to pull out of the battle
I was fighting, and bring my forces back and round to
exploit this opening- We made a long circuit behind the
front, north of Gompiegne, then crossed the Aisne at
Soissons, and next the Marne at CMteau Thierry, after
which we headed for Troyes. By this time the French were
collapsing in confusion, so we drove on past Dijon down
the Rhone valley to Lyons without check. Another big
switch took place before this drive finished, for Wieter-
sheim's Corps was bi ought back and round for a south-
westerly drive to Bordeaux, and then to the Spanish
frontier beyond Biarritz. 55

What had happened m the course of the break-through
on the Aisne was told by Blumentritt. "There was only
one big strategic decision taken during this offensive.
When Guderian's Panzer Group was light through the
French fiont and leached the area between St. Dizier and
Ghaumont, on ihe upper Marne, the question arose which
of thiee couises it should take. Should it turn east, over
the Plateau de Langres, towards the Swiss frontier, m
order to cut off the French armies in Alsace? Should it
advance south-east over the plateau to Dijon and Lyon,
in order to reach the Mediterranean and to help the
Italians over the Alps ? Should it turn south-west towards
Bordeaux, in order to cut off the French armies retreating
from the Pans aiea to the Loire and beyond? Three short
wireless cues were prepared beforehand for this purpose. 55

In the event, Guderian was directed to follow the first
course, while Kleist's Panzer Group, racing up on its
right after passing through the gap on the Aisne, carried
out both the second and third. For by that time the
French armies were breaking up into incoherent fragments,
and the Germans could safely take the risk of splitting
their own forces.

Guderian was already sweeping across the rear of the
Maginot Line when, on June 14th, Leeb's Army Group

The End in France and the First Frush ation i 49

"C" joined in the battle by striking at that famous barrier.
Significantly, the Germans had not ventured to attack it
direct until it was undercut; and even then their efforts
were in the nature of probing. The main one was a narrow-
fronted assault by Heinrici's 12 th Corps (of the 1st Army)
near Puttlingen, south of Saarbrucken, while a secondary
effort was made a hundred miles to the south, on the 7th
Army front, where the Rhine was crossed near Golmar.

Heinrici told me that he broke through the Line in
twelve hours. But in further discussion he admitted that
this break-through only took place after the defence had
been weakened and the French were in process of with-
drawing. "On the 14th my troops penetrated at two
points, after stiff fighting. I had ordered a continuance of
the attack for the 15th when at midnight an intercepted
French order was brought to me, showing that the defenders
of the Maginot Line had been ordered to withdraw. So our
operation next day became a pursuit rather than an assault, 53

What had been happening meanwhile on the other
flank, where the German offensive had started, was
described by Bechtolsheim — resuming his account from
the point where one of Kleist's panzer corps had gained a
bridgehead over the Oise at Pont Sainte Maxence, before
being pulled out and switched to the Aisne. "When our
infantry relieved the tanks and pushed on beyond the
Oise, an awkward problem was presented by the outer Hue
of fortifications covering the approach to Paris that the
French had built near Senlis, General von Reichenau
was doubtful about the best way of tackling this obstacle,
but then decided to turn it by moving round the eastern
flank. However, the French retreat saved us trouble
When they abandoned Paris, our right corps was trans-
ferred to the 1 8th Army, which had now arrived from the
north, for the move into the capital, while we continued
our advance southward. After crossing the Seine at
Gorbeil and Montereau, we pushed on to the Loire. We
found the bridges at Sully and Gien had been blown up,

1 50 The Othei Side of the Hill

but we captured those at Orleans intact by a coup de main.
The advance was essentially a pursuit all the way from
the Marne to the Cher, where it ended. There was not
much fighting/ 5

Summing up the general course of the offensive,
Blumentritt said: i 'Only the crossing of the Aisne, which
was strongly defended by the French, involved a serious
engagement. Here, the armoured divisions were not
launched until the infantry had forced the passage; even
so, they had some stiff opposition beyond the river before
they broke through. After that, the fighting became less
and less strenuous. The armoured divisions pushed on
without stopping, or without bothering about their exposed
flanks, and flooded the south of France The German
infantry followed them up in forced marches of forty to
sixty kilometres a day, liquidating such fractions of the
French Army as were still holding out after the tanks had
driven on. On many of the main roads our armoured
forces advanced without opposition past French columns
that were marching back in the same direction.

"During this stage the Luftwaffe woiked in close co-
operation with the armoured divisions, in a new form of
'street tactics 5 . When a place was defended, the bombers
were called up to attack it, and then the advanced detach-
ment of the division took it; meanwhile the bulk of the
division, without leaving the road, usually waited in a
long column (nearly a hundred miles in length) until the
road ahead was clear. This was possible only because we
had air superiority, because the enemy's anti-tank defence
was inadequate, and mines were as yet little used.

"In the 1940 campaign the French fought bravely, but
they were no longer the French of 191 4-1 8 — of Verdun
and the Somme. The British fought much more stub-
bornly, as they did in 1914-18. The Belgians in part
, fought gallantly; the Dutch, only a few days. We had
* superiority in the air combined with more up-to-date
4 tanks than the French. Above all, the German tank troops

The End in France and the First Frustration 1 5 1

were more mobile, quicker and better at in-fighting, and
able while in movement to turn wherever required by
their leader. This, the French at that time were unable
to do. They still thought and fought more in the tradition
of the First World War. They were not up to date either
in leadership or m wireless control. When they wanted
to change direction on the move, they had to halt first, give
fresh orders, and only then were they able to start again.
Their tank tactics were out of date — but they were brave !"

This authoritative German verdict should correct the
hasty judgments that the world passed on the defenders
of France. While the final collapse was accelerated by a
rapidly spreading breakdown of morale, it is clear that the
issue of the second ""offensive was a foregone conclusion.
Defeat was inevitable from its outset, though it might have
been delayed a little longer.

On an elementary calculation of forces in relation to
space — the space that had to be covered between the
Somme and the Swiss frontier — Weygand had an insoluble
problem to meet. A calculation in terms of quantity
multiplied by technical quality only makes the situation
look more hopeless. It is more surprising that the British
Government, and even part of the French, continued to
cherish illusions after Dunkirk, than that soldiers like
Weygand and Petain abandoned hope as soon as the
Somme-Aisne line began to crack. But the strangest
feature of the whole period is that the German generals
should have counted on cutting off the Allied left wing in
Belgium, yet not expected a general collapse of French
resistance — its almost mathematically calculable conse-
quence. When that collapse came, it was soon clear that
they had failed to reckon with such a probability, and were
unprepared to follow it up.

RECUMBENT "SEA-LION 9 *

After the collapse of France the German Army relaxed
with a happy feeling that the war was over and that the

15a The Other Side of the Hill

fruits of victoiy could be enjoyed at leisure. Blumentritt's
account of the sequel conveys a vivid impression of the
prevailing attitude. "Immediately following the armistice
with France, oiders came from OIH, to form the staff
for the victory parade in Paris, and to despatch the troops
that were assigned to take part in the parade. We spent
a fortnight working on the organization of this parade.
Spirits were high, as everyone counted on a general peace.
Preparations for demobilization had already begun, and
we had received a list of the divisions that were to be sent
home for disbanding. 55

After a few weeks, however, the victory mood began to
subside, and a feeling of uneasiness grew m the absence of
any sign that Britain was disposed to make peace. Hopeful
rumours filled the void. "There was talk of negotiations
with Biitain being conducted through Sweden; then,
through the Duke of Alba 55 But nothing definite came
in the way of confirmation.

The first indication that Hitler was considering an
invasion of England came on July 2nd, when he directed
the heads of the three Services to study the problem, and
called for intelligence appreciations from them. But he
ended by emphasizing that "the plan is in its infancy",
and added: "So far it is only a question of preparing for a
possible event " Two weeks passed before the next
development

On July 1 Gui, nearly a month after the collapse of
France, Hitler issued a directive saying: "Since England,
in spite Qi her militarily hopeless situation, shows no sign of
coming to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing
operation against England and, if necessary, to carry it
out. ... The preparations for the entire operation must
be completed by mid-August. 55 The order, however,
sounded very "iffy 55 .

Hitler's disinclination to invade England had been
manifest at a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy, Admiral Raeder, on July nth. The record of

The End in France and the First Frustration 153

this conference was in the archives captured after the war.
Proceedings began with a long discussion, not of the
problem of invading England, but of the development of
Norway — a matter in which Hitler showed more interest.
He expressed his intention of building "a beautiful German
city" in the fiord near Trondheim, and ordered plans to
be submitted. Later, the question of invading England was
discussed Raeder considered that "an invasion should be
used only as a last resort to force Britain to sue for peace"
He dwelt on the many difficulties of the venture, and the
lengthy transport preparations required, as well as the
need for air superiority. When he had finished Hitler
expressed his views, which are thus summarized in the
record: "The Fuhrer also views invasion as a last resort,
and also considers air superiority a prerequisite."

Although the operational directive was issued on the
1 6th, its tentativeness was emphasized by Hitler's step three
days later in making a peace appeal to Britain in his speech
to the Reichstag on the victory in France. He struck a
remarkably moderate note, deploring the possibility of a
w T ar to the bitter end, and dwelling on the sacrifices it
would entail for both sides. Even the cynical Italian
Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, was impressed and noted
in his diary: "I believe that his desire for peace is sincere.
In fact, late in the evening, when the first cold British
reactions to the speech arrive, a sense of ill-concealed
disappointment spreads among the Germans . . . they
are hoping and praying that this appeal will not be
rejected."

Next morning he called on Hitler, and noted in his
diary: "He confirms my impressions of yesterday. He
would like an understanding with Great Britain. He
knows that war with the British will be hard and bloody,
and knows also that people everywhere to-day are averse
to bloodshed." On returning to Rome, however, Ciano
found that Mussolini was upset by the speech, fearing that
the English would respond to Hitler's appeal and consider

1 54 The Other Side of the Hill

a negotiated peace. "That would be sad for Mussolini,
because now more than ever he wants war. 5 *

On the 2 1 st Hitler held a conference of his higher
commanders His opening remarks showed that he was
puzzled as to the grounds for Britain's persistence in carry-
ing on the war. He could only imagine that she was
hoping that America or Russia would enter the war, but
it did not seem likely that either would, though Russia's
entry "would be unpleasant for Germany especially on
account of the threat from the air 55 . Then he came to the
question of invading England, and began by pointing out
that it would be "an exceptionally hazardous undertaking,
because even if the way is short, this is not just a river
crossing, but the crossing of a sea which is dominated by
the enemy. Operational surprise cannot be expected; a
defensively prepared and utterly determined enemy faces
us 95 . He went on to emphasize the difficulties of reinforce-
ment and supply after a landing. He insisted that "com-
plete mastery of the air 55 was essential before starting, and
that as the venture depended on sustained air support,
which in turn depended on the weather — which was
usually bad during the second half of September — the
main operation must be completed by the 15th. The
survey ended with the declaration* "If it is not certain
that preparations can be completed by the beginning oi
September, other plans must be considered. 55 The whole
address breathed doubt, and the final note implied that
his mind was turning elsewhere

It is interesting to look up one's notes of the situation
in England at that time. The Navy's dispositions did not
promise a very prompt intervention in the Channel, for
the British admirals were almost as anxious about the
menace of the German Air Force as the German admirals
were about the interference of the British Navy. But on the
same day that Hitler's directive was issued, I heard authori-
tatively that Britain's fighter strength, gravely depleted in
covering the evacuation from Dunkirk, had been built up

The End in France and the Fast Frustration 155

again to its former level — its fifty-seven squadrons now
comprised over a thousand machines, with reserves*

During the six weeks since Dunkirk the land forces
available to meet an invasion had been so scanty that even
a few enemy divisions might have brushed them aside.
But although the reorganization and re-equipment of the
land forces evacuated from France was still a slow process,
one felt that with the restoration of our fighter strength in
the air the primary assurance against invasion had been
achieved, and that the danger of this succeeding was on
the wane. Nevertheless, a glimpse of "the other side of
the hill 35 , as an unseen onlooker at Hitler's conferences,
would have been still more cheering. So would a glimpse
into the reports of the German Intelligence service. For
they grossly over-estimated even the strength of our land
forces. It is not surprising that Hitler and his generals
had growing doubts as they studied the problem

Only the air marshals, headed by Goenng, showed
confidence in fulfilling their part — the double role of
dominating the Royal Air Force and checking the Royal
Navy's intervention. It may have been only their
assurance which kept the plan alive.

The German generals and admirals had a common
mistrust of Goering's promises, but they did not agree
among themselves. A landing force of 40 cjivisions was
originally proposed, but had to be scaled down to 13
divisions because the Naval High Command declared that
it was impossible to transport more. The remainder were
to be sent over at intervals, in three more waves, if con-
ditions allowed. The panzer menace would not have been
as great as the British expected, for only small elements
were included in the landing force, and the bulk were held
back until a later stage. The Army High Command
insisted that the landings should be made on the widest
possible front — from Ramsgate to Lyme Bay at least — in
order to distract and stretch the British reserves. But the
Naval High Command insisted that they could only protect

156

The Other Side of the Hill

a passage and landing on a narrow front, no farther west
than Eastbourne. The argument raged for two or three
weeks. Haider declared that the Navy's proposal spelt
"complete suicide 35 for the Army — "I might just as well
put the troops that have been landed straight through a
mincing machine/' The Naval Chief of Staff retorted that
it would be equally suicidal to cross the Channel on a wider
front.

Eventually the controversy ended in a compromise,
ordained by Hitler, that satisfied neither service. By that
time it was the middle of August, and the completion of
the preparations had been deferred until the middle of
September. As Goering had begun his preliminary air
offensive on the 13th, both the generals and the admirals
felt the more inclined to wait and see whether the Luftwaffe
mastered the R.A.F., or whether by failing it conclusively
settled the issue against attempting invasion.

Discussing the invasion plans with Rundstedt, I asked
him about the timing and the reasons for cancelling the
invasion. He replied: u As the first steps to prepare for an
invasion were only taken after the French capitulation, no
definite date could be fixed when the plan was drafted.
It depended on the time required to provide the shipping,
to alter them so they could carry tanks, and to train the
troops in embarking and disembarking. The invasion was
to be made in August if possible, and September at the
latest. The military reasons for its cancellation were
various. The German Navy would have had to control
the North Sea as well as the Channel, and was not strong
enough to do so. The German Air Force was not sufficient
to protect the sea crossing on its own. While the leading
part of the forces might have landed, there was the danger
that they might be cut off from supplies and reinforce-
ments. 33 I asked Rundstedt whether it might not have
been possible to keep the invasion forces supplied by air for
a time — as was done on a very large scale in Russia during
the winter of 194 1. He said the system of air supply was

The End in France and the First Frustration 157

x not sufficiently developed in 1 940 for this possibility to be
considered.

Rundstedt then outlined the military side of the plan.
"The responsibility of commanding the invasion fell to me,
as the task was assigned to my Army Group. The 16th
Army under General von Busch was on the right, and the
9th Army under General Strauss was on the lelt. They
were to sail from ports stretching from Holland to Le
Havre. The 16th Army was to use ports from Antwerp
to Boulogne, while the 9th Army was to use the ports
between the Sorrrme and the Seine. No landing was to
be made north of the Thames. 55 Rundstedt indicated on
the map the sector over which the landings were to be
made, stretching from Dover to near Portsmouth. "We
were then to push forward and establish a much larger
bridgehead along an arc south of London. It ran up
the south shore of the Thames to the outskirts of London,
and then south-westwards to Southampton Water. 33 In
answer to a further question, he said the original idea
was that part of Reichenau 3 s 6th Army — from Bock's
Army Group — was to land on the coast west of the Isle
of Wight, on both sides of Weymouth, to cut off the
Devon-Cornwall peninsula, and drive north to Bristol.
But that was dropped, except as a possible later
development.

In further discussion he conveyed that he never had
much confidence in the prospects of successful invasion,
and that he was often thinking of how Napoleon had been
baffled. In that sense the German generals seem to have
been hampered by being historically minded — as they were
once again in Russia the following autumn.

Brauchitsch seems to have been rather more hopeful
than Rundstedt. That is the impression I gathered from
General Siewert, who was wit& him at the time. When
I asked him about Brauchitsch's views as to the practi-
cability of the plan, he replied: "If the weather was
favourable, and given time to prepare, and considering

The Other Side of the Hill

Britain's great losses at Dunkirk, Field- Marshal von
Brauchitsch thought it a possibility." But I gathered that
the thought was prompted by the wish, because he could
see no other way of gaining peace in face of Mr. Churchill's
refusal to consider any proposals for peace. "Our idea
was to finish the war as soon as possible, and we had to
get across the water to do that. 95 "Then why wasn't it
carried out," I asked. "There were many preparations
in progress, but the weather outlook was not too good.
The attempt was supposed to be carried out in September
but Hider cancelled all the preparations because he thought
it impracticable. The Navy's heart was not in it, and it
was not strong enough to protect the flanks. Neither was
the German Air Force strong enough to stop the British
Navy."

What the soldiers told me about the Navy's attitude
was amply borne out by the views gathered from a number
of admirals, among them Voss, Brinkmann, Breuning, and
Engel. One very significant comment seemed to express
the common view: "The German Navy was utterly
unprepared to hold off the British Navy, even for a short
time. Moreover, the accumulation of barges brought from
the Rhine, the Elbe and the Dutch canals were quite
unsuitable." In discussion some said that they did not
believe these barges were massed with the idea ol using
them, and doubted whether an invasion of England was
really intended There was a sense of play-acting — as if
most of the higher people concerned were pretending to
be more serious about the project than they were. "From
what we learnt later about Britain's situation, it would
seem that the war might have been won in July, 1940,
if the German Intelligence service had been better; but
most senior naval officers considered it lost on September
3rd, 1939." In other words, from the day Britain entered
the war.

General Student gave me details of the part that
the airborne forces were to have played in the invasion

The End in France and the First F? usti ation 1 59

plan, as well as some more interesting comments on the
way he would have wished them to be used. As Student
himself was then in hospital, recovering from the head
wound he had suffered at Rotterdam, the airborne forces
were commanded by General Putzier: ''Two divisions 1
were to be employed, as well as 300 gliders — each of these
carried a pilot and nine other men, three thousand in all.
The intention was to use the airborne force for securing a
bridge-head near Folkstone, about twenty miles wide and
twelve miles deep. The intended dropping zone was kept
closely under air observation. It was seen that obstacles
were being quickly prepared — that the suitable landing
fields were being filled with upright stakes — and it was
assumed that minefields were also being laid there.
For these reasons Putzier reported, at the end of
August, that an airborne invasion was now out of the
question

"If I had been still on the scene I should have urged
the use of the parachute forces against England while your
evacuation from Dunkirk was still in progress, to seize the
ports where your troops were landing It was known
that most of them had left Dunkirk without any of their
heavier weapons.

"Even if this project had been vetoed, my plans for the
airborne part of the invasion would have been different to
what was actually decided. I should have used my force
to capture airfields considerably deeper inland than the
intended bridge-head. Having captured these, I should
have transported infantry divisions over by air, without
tanks or heavy artillery — some to turn outwards and attack
the coast defences from the rear, and some to move on
London. I reckoned that one infantry division could be
brought over by air in a day and a half to two days, and
that this rate of reinforcement could be kept up" It
seemed to me that Student's plan was optimistic, taking

1 The Parachute Division and the 22nd Air-Landing Division,
forming the XI Air Corps.

160 The Other Side of the Hill

account of the small force that could be carried in this way,
and the time it would take to increase.

"But the best time/ 5 Student again emphasized, "was
immediately after Dunkirk — before your defensive measures
were developed. We heard later that the people in Britain
had a parachute psychology. That amused us, but theie
is no doubt it was the best defensive precaution, properly
directed/ 5

The attitude shown in the decision that the airborne
operation should be abandoned was symptomatic
Although the preparations continued, the nearer they
came to completion the further the will to invade receded
The progress of the air offensive was not very encouraging,
and all the doubters m the other services were prompt to
stress that Goering's expectations were not being fulfilled
as quickly as promised The strain that this "battle over
Britain 55 was imposing on the defenders was unduly dis-
counted. At the same time, the Intelligence reports
emphasized, and exaggerated, the growth of the British
defences on land — there is reason to suspect that this was,
in part, deliberate. Hitler himself tended to emphasize
not only the difficulties, but the ill-effects of failing in an
invasion attempt. The "wait and see" note became louder
as the pro-visional date approached. Hitlei kept on
putting off the crucial decision about fixing a definite
■ date, and on September 1 7th decided "to postpone 'Sea-
Lion' indefinitely."

Throughout the whole period the minutes of his con-
ferences reek, not only of doubt, but of a deeper disinclina-
tion. They tend to bear out the account that Blumentritt
gave me. "Although 'Operation Sea-Lion 5 was ordered,
and preparations made, the affair was not pushed forward.
Hitler scarcely seemed to bother about it at all — contrary
to his usual way— -and the staffs went on with their planning
without any inclination. It was all regarded as a 'war
game'. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt did not take the
affair seriously, and busied himself little with the work.

The End in France and the First Frustration 161

His Chief of Staff, General von Sodenstern, frequently went
on leave After about the middle of August no one
believed in its execution any longer, and from mid-
September the means of transport — which were quite
insufficient — were already being silently dispersed. By
the end of September it was quite clear that the plan was
not intended seriously, and it was dropped completely.
Among ourselv es we talked of it as bluff, and looked forward
to news that an understanding with Britain had been
reached. 55

It seems evident that the generals had no heart in the
attempted invasion, and that the admirals were even
more disinclined to make the venture. They took the
gloomiest view of what the British Navy might do, Goering
and the heads of the air force were the only people who
were keen on the plan. They were allowed to test the
Biitish strength in the air, but w r hen they failed to drive
the R.A.F. out of the sky the generals and the admirals
were quick to renew their objections to the venture — and
Hitler was surprisingly ready to accept their excuses for a
postponement. It was a permanent postponement. For
his mind was already turning eastward.

CHAPTER XII

MISFIRES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Discussion with the German generals brought fresh light
on many facets of the campaign in North Africa and the
war in the Mediterranean as a whole. Here are some of
the chief points that came out.

Egypt and the Suez Canal were saved, at the time the
Biitish forces were weakest, by the Italians 5 jealousy of
the Germans coupled with Hitler's indifference to the
opportunity of capturing these keys to the Middle East.

Cyprus was saved by the price the British made the
Germans pay for the capture of Crete.

Gibraltar was saved by Franco's reluctance to let the
Germans into Spain.

Malta was saved by Hitler's distrust of the Italian
Navy.

All that happened during 1941, when Britain's fortunes
were at their lowest. In 1 942 the tide began to turn, with
Russia's sustained resistance to Hitler's invasion, with the
entry of America into the war following Japan's assault,
and with the growth of Britain's own strength. But there
was a long road to travel. It might have been longer but
for Hitler's help.

It was Hitler who ensured the British the chance to
win such a victory at El Alamein as to decide the war in
North Africa. For he forbade his generals to forestall
Montgomery's attack by a timely step back that would
have preserved them from crushing defeat,

I gathered these revelations from various generals, but
most of all from General von Thoma, the famous tank
commander who was finally captured at Alamein, and
from General Student, the Commander-in-Chief of
Germany's airborne forces.

162

Misfit in the Mediten anean 163

Thoma related the origins of Germany's entry into the
Mediterranean field. "I was sent to North Africa in
October, 1 940, to report on the question whether German
forces should be sent there, to help the Italians turn the
British out of Egypt. After seeing Marshal Graziani, and
studying the situation, I made my report. It emphasized
that the supply problem was the decisive factor — not only
because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the
British Navy's command of the Mediterranean. I said it
would not be possible to maintain a large German Army
there as well as the Italian Army.

"My conclusion was that, if a force was sent by us, it
should be an armoured force. Nothing less than four
armoured divisions would suffice to ensure success — and
this, I calculated, was also the maximum that could be
effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across
the desert to the Nile valley. At the same time, I said it
could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with
German. Large numbers could not be supplied, and the
vital thing was that every man in the invading force
should be of the best possible quality

"But Badoglio and Graziani opposed the substitution
of Germans for Italians. Indeed, at that time they were
against having any German troops sent there. They
wanted to keep the glory of conquering Egypt for them-
selves. Mussolini backed their objections. While, unlike
them, he wanted some German help, he did not want a
predominantly German force."

The importance of this revelation can be better realized
if we remember that Thoma's mission to Africa was made
two months before O'Connor's brilliant riposte, under
WavelFs direction, broke up Graziani's attempted invasion
of Egypt. The small and scantily-equipped British forces
were capable of smashing the larger but worse equipped
Italian Army. But the prospects would have been very
dim if a German armoured force had been on the scene.

It is all too likely that a picked force of four armoured

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Misfires in the Mediterranean 165

divisions, such as Thoma suggested, would have swept
into Egypt — any time that winter. For O'Connor's force
then consisted of only one armoured and one infantry
division, both incompletely equipped.

Now comes another remarkable disclosure. Mussolini
got his own way — to defeat — partly because Hitler was not
fired by the idea of throwing the British out of Egypt.
That was very different to what the British imagined at
the time. Yet it may be compared with his equally sur-
prising attitude to the invasion of England, Thoma was
struck by Hitler's indifference, though he is not the sort
of man to speculate about the underlying motives.

"When I rendered my report, Hitler said he could not
spare more than one armoured division. At that, I told
him that it would be better to give up the idea of sending
any force at all. My remark made him angry. His idea
in offering to send a German force to Africa was political.
He feared Mussolini might change sides unless he had a
German stiffening. But he wanted to send as small a force
as possible." (It is to be noted, here, that Hitler had
already suspended the plans for the invasion of England,
and was considering plans for the invasion of Russia.)

Thoma went on to say: "Hitler thought that the Italians
were capable of holding their own in Africa, with a little
German help. He expected too much of them. I had
seen them in Spain, 'fighting 3 on the same side as we
were. Hitler seemed to form his idea of their value from
the way their commanders talked when he met them at the
dinner-table. When he asked me what I thought of them,
I retorted: Tve seen them on the battlefield, not merely
in the Officers 9 Mess.' " (If Thoma spoke to Hitler like
that, it is not surprising that he was out of favour after
this talk.) "I told Hitler: c One British soldier is better
than twelve Italians/ I added: c The Italians are good
workers, but they are not fighters. They don't like
noise.

The German General Staff was also against sending

1 66 The Other Side of the Hill

German forces to Africa, either on a big scale or a small
scale. According to Thoma, Brauchitsch and Haider did
not want to get involved m the Mediterranean at all.
"Haider told me that he had tried to impress on Hitler
the dangers of extending too far, and had pointedly
remarked — c Our danger is that we win all the battles
except the last one. 5 5 5

But Hitler would not refrain from interfering in the
Mediterranean, though he hesitated to go all out there.
After Graziani's defeat, he sent a picked detachment
there, under Rommel, to restore the situation. It was
strong enough to frustrate British plans for the conquest
of Libya — and to go on frustrating them for more than
two years — but not strong enough to be decisive. The
battle swayed to and fro, from the spring of 1941 to the
autumn of 1942.

Meanwhile, Britain's position in the Mediterranean
was subject to serious threats elsewhere, though they never
matured. That has tended to conceal how deadly they
might have been. I gathered details of them from General
Student, the Commander-in-Chief of Germany's airborne
forces.

The most serious was the projected attack on Gibraltar —
which could have barred the Western Mediterranean. He
told me that in January, 1941, he was instructed to draft
a plan for capturing Gibraltar by a parachute descent.
He came to the conclusion that it was too big a job to be
done by the parachute forces alone. His summing up
was — "Gibraltar cannot be taken if the neutrality of Spain
is observed by us.

'After my report, 59 Student went on, "the plan was
changed into the bigger one of capturing Gibraltar by an
attack from the mainland. Eight divisions from France
were to race through Spain. But this depended on the
Spanish agreeing to let us through. Hitler did not want
to take the risk of having to fight a way through Spain,
He tried to persuade Franco, but Franco would not agree.

Misfires in the Mediterranean 167

The discussions went on for some time, but they proved
fruitless. So the Gibraltar plan had to be dropped. 55

Student then made the surprising disclosure that
Hitler was not at all keen about the stroke that captured
Crete — and gave the British such a shock in the Eastern
Mediterranean. "He wanted to break off the Balkan
campaign after reaching the south of Greece. When I
heard this, I flew to see Goering and proposed the plan
of capturing Crete by airborne forces alone Goering —
who was always easy to enthuse — was quick to see the
possibilities of the idea, and sent me on to Hitler. I saw
him on April 21st. When I first explained the project
Hitler said: c It sounds all right, but I don't think it's
practicable.' But I managed to convince him in the end.

"In the operation we used our one Parachute Division,
our one Glider Regiment and the 5th Mountain Division,
which had no previous experience of being transported by
air. The 22nd Air-landing Division, which had the
experience of the Dutch campaign, had been flown to
Ploesti in March, to protect the Rumanian oilfields, as
the Fiihrer was afraid of sabotage there. He was so
concerned with this danger that he refused to release the
division for the Crete operation."

The air support was provided by the dive-bombers
and fighters of Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, which had
played such a vital part in forcing the entry into Belgium
and France in turn. Student said: "I asked that this
should be placed under my command, as well as the air-
borne forces, but my request was refused. Then the higher
direction of the whole operation was entrusted to General
Lohr, who had been in command of all the air forces
taking part in the Balkan campaign. However, I worked
out all the plans for the operation — and was allowed a
free hand in this respect. The 8th Air Corps was excellent,
but its action would have been more effective if it had been
placed under my direct control.

"No troops came by sea. Such a reinforcement had

The Other Side of the Hill

been intended originally, but the only sea transport
available was a number of Greek caiques. It was then
arranged thai a convoy of these small vessels was to carry
the heavier arms for the expedition — anti-aircraft and anti-
tank guns, the artillery and some tanks — together with
two battalions of the 5th Mountain Division. Escorted by
Italian torpedo-boats, they were to sail to Melos, and wait
there until we had discovered the whereabouts of the
British fleet. When they reached Melos, they were told
that the British fleet was still at Alexandria — whereas it
was actually on the way to Crete. The convoy sailed for
Crete, ran into the fleet, and was scattered. The Luft-
waffe avenged this setback by 'pulling a lot of hairs 5 out
of the British Navy's scalp. But our operations on land,
in Crete, were much handicapped by the absence of the
heavier weapons on which we had reckoned.

"Although we succeeded in capturing the island, our
casualties were heavy. We lost 4,000 killed and missing,
apart from wounded, out of 22,000 men we dropped on
the island — 14,000 of these wcie parachute troops and the
rest belonged to the Mountain division Much of the loss
was due to bad landings — there were very few suitable
spots in Crete, and the prevailing wind blew from the
inteiior towards the sea. For fear of dropping the troops
in the sea, the pilots tended to drop them too far inland —
some of them actually in the British lines. The weapon-
containers often fell wide of the troops, which was another
handicap that contributed to our excessive casualties. The
few British tanks that were there shook us badly at the
start — it was lucky there were not more than two dozen.
The infantry, mostly New Zealanders, put up a stiff
fight, though taken by surprise.

"The Fuhrer was very upset by the heavy losses suf-
fered by the parachute units, and came to the conclusion
that their surprise value had passed. After that, he often
said to me: 'The day of parachute troops is over.'

"He would not believe reports that the British an. I

Misfit es in the Mediterranean

169

Americans were developing airborne forces. The face
that none were used in the St. Nazaire and Dieppe raids
confirmed his opinion. He said to me: 'There, you see!
They are not raising such forces. I was right.' He only
changed his mind after the Allied conquest of Sicily in
1943. Impressed by the way the Allies had used them
there, he ordered an expansion of our own airborne
forces. But that change of mind came too laie — because
by then you had command of the air, and airborne troops
could not be effectively used in face of a superior air
force."

Returning to the events of 1941, Student said: "When
I got Hitler to accepc the Crete plan, I also proposed that
we should follow it up by capturing Cyprus from the air,
and then a further jump from Cyprus to capture the Suez
Canal. Hitler did not seem averse to the idea, but would
not commit himself definitely to the project — his mind
was so occupied with the coming invasion of Russia.
After the shock of the heavy losses in Crete, he refused to
attempt another big airborne effort, I pressed the idea
on him repeatedly, but without avail.

"A year later, however, he was persuaded to adopt a
plan for capturing Malta. This was m April, 1942. The
attack was to be carried out in conjunction with the Italians,
My airborne forces, together with the Italian ones, were
to be dropped on the island and capture a bridgehead,
which would then be reinforced by a large Italian sea-
borne force — of six to eight divisions. My force comprised
our one existing Parachute division, three additional
regiments that had not yet been organized as a division,
and an Italian parachute division.

"I hoped to carry out the plan not later than August —
it depended on suitable weather — and spent some months
in Rome preparing it. In June I was summoned to
Hitler's headquarters for the final conference on the
operation. Unfortunately, the day before I got there,
Hitler had seen General Cruwell, who was just back from

1 70 The Other Side of the Hill

North Africa, and had been given a very unfavourable
account of the state of the Italian forces and their morale.

6 'Hitler at once took alarm. He felt that if the British
Fleet appeared on the scene, all the Italian ships would
bolt for their home ports — and leave the German airborne
forces stranded. He decided to abandon the plan of
attacking Malta."

That decision was the more significant because Rommel
had just won a striking victory over the British in North
Africa, turning the Eighth Army out of the Gazala position
and capturing Tobruk. Exploiting its confusion Rommel
pursued it helter-skelter through the Western Desert. He
came within reach of the Nile valley before he was checked
on the Alamein line, at the beginning of July.

That was the worst crisis which the British passed
through in the Middle East. The situation was made all
the more grave by the simultaneous collapse of Russia's
southern armies in face of Hitler's new drive to the
Caucasus. At Alamein, Rommel was hammering on the
front door to the Middle East; in the Caucasus, Kleist was
threatening the back door,

Thoma declared, however, that the threat was accidental
rather than intended. "The great pincer movement
against the Middle East, which your people imagined to be
in progress, was never a serious plan. It was vaguely
discussed in Hitler's entourage, but our General Staff
never agreed with it, nor regarded it as practicable."

Even the threat to Egypt only developed haphazardly
— out of the unexpected collapse of the Eighth Army in the
Gazala-Tobruk battle. Rommel's forces were nothing like
strong enough to attempt the conquest of Egypt. But he
could not resist the temptation to push on in the flush of
victory. That was his undoing.

I asked Thoma whether it was true that Rommel was
so confident of reaching the Suez Canal as appeared in
some of the remarks he made to his officers. Thoma
replied: "I'm sure he was not! He only expressed such

Misfires in the Mediterranean 171

confidence to encourage his troops, especially the Italians.
He soon cooled down when he was checked by the British
on the Alamein position. He knew that he needed sur-
prise in order to throw the British off their balance, and
he didn't see how he could possibly achieve a fresh surprise
in face of the Alamein defences. Moreover, he knew that
British reinforcements were continuously arriving,

"Rommel realized that he had gone too far — with his
limited forces and difficult supply line — but his success had
caused such a sensation that he could not draw back.
Hitler would not let him. The result was that he had to
stay there until the British had gathered overwhelming
forces to smash him. 53

Thoma said that he had learnt most of this from
Rommel and Rommel's chief subordinates. He himself
had only gone to Africa, from Russia, in September.
"When I received orders to relieve Rommel, who was
sick with jaundice, I telephoned back that I did not want
to take the job, saying: 'See what I wrote two years ago, 5
But back came a message that the Fiihrer insisted on my
going, as a personal order, so nothing more could be done,
I arrived in Africa about September 20th, and spent a
few days discussing the situation with Rommel — who then
went for treatment to Wiener Neustadt, near Vienna. A
fortnight later General Stumme arrived on the scene,
having been appointed to take charge of the African
theatre as a whole. This meant that I only had command
of our troops at the front, facing the El Alamein position,
which limited my capacity to improve the administrative
organization. Soon afterwards Stumme had a stroke, and
died. All this complicated our preparations to meet the
coming British offensive.

"I did what I could to improve our dispositions, under
difficult conditions, as any idea of withdrawing before the
British offensive opened was vetoed. But we would have
had to retreat in spite of Hitler's order but for the fact
that we were able to feed our troops with the supplies

172

The Other Side of the HUl

which we had captured from your stores at Tobruk. They
kept us going, 55

On hearing this, I remarked that it looked as if our
own loss of Tobruk — disastrous as it seemed at the time —
had really helped to win us the war in North Africa. For
if the German forces had retreated from Alamein before
Montgomery struck, it was unlikely that they would have
been so decisively smashed as they were. This point did
not seem to have occurred to Thoma.

Thoma then gave me his impressions of the battle,
which opened on October 23, 1942. He said that the
Eighth Army's immense superiority of strength in all the
decisive weapons made its victory almost a certainty
before the battle opened. "I reckoned that you had 1,200
aircraft available at a time when I was reduced to barely
a dozen. Rommel arrived back from Vienna a week
after the offensive had begun. It was too late for him to
change any of the dispositions. He was in a nervy state,
being still ill, and was very api to change his mind. After
he arrived I had command of only part of the front, but
then he suddenly wanted me to take chaige of the whole
once more, under his general direction. The British
pressure grew heavier, straining us to the limiL

"When it was clear that we could not hope to check
the British breakthrough, we decided to carry out a with-
drawal, in two stages, to a line near Daba, 50 miles to
the west* That might have saved us. The first stage of
the withdrawal was to be made on the night of November 3.
It had already begun when a wireless order came from
Hitler forbidding any such withdrawal, and insisting that
we must hold our old positions at all costs- This meant
that our troops had actually to go forward again — to
fight a hopeless battle that could only prove fatal. 95

Thoma then related to me how he himself came to be
captured. He had been racing in a tank from one critical
point to another during the battle, being hit several times,
and in the end was trapped when his tank caught fire and

Misfius in the Mediterranean 1 73

he was pitched out, "I felt it was a fitting finish." He
showed me his cap, which had several holes in it — symbols
of lucky escapes. With a note of regret he said he had
only been able to take part m 24 tank fights during the
war — in Poland, France, Russia and Africa. "X managed
to fight in 192 tank actions during the Spanish Civil War,"

After Thorn a 5 s capture he was taken to see Mont-
gomery, and with him discussed the battle over the dinner-
table. "Instead of asking me for information, he said he
would tell me the state of our forces, their supplies and
their dispositions. I was staggered at the exactness of his
knowledge, particularly of our deficiencies and shipping
losses. He seemed to know as much about our position as
I did myself. 55

Then, speaking of the victor's handling of the battle, he
said: "I thought he was very cautious, considering his
immensely superior strength, but 55 — Thoma paused, then
added with emphasis — "hejte the only Field-Marshal in
this war who won all his battles,

**In ~ modern mobile warfare, 5 ' he concluded, **the
tactics are not the main thing. The decisive factor is
the organisation of one's resouices — to maintain the
momentum 55

CHAPTER XIII

FRUSTRATION AT MOSCOW

Hitler's gamble m Russia failed because he was not bold
enough. He wobbled for weeks at the critical moment,
losing time he could never regain. After that he ruined
himself, and Germany, because he could not bring himself
to cut his losses. There, in a nutshell, is the sum of the
evidence I gathered from his generals.

It is the story of Napoleon over again — but with
important differences. While Hitler missed the chance of
capturing Moscow, he came nearer decisive victory, con-
quered far more of Russia, and maintained his army there
much longer, only to reach an even more catastrophic end.

Hitler had counted on destroying the bulk of the Red
Army before reaching the Dnieper. When he missed his
mark — by a hair's breadth — he could not make up his
mind what to do. When at last he decided to dnve for
Moscow it was too late to win before the winter.

But that was not the only cause of failure revealed m
what the German generals told me. Sometimes they
themselves did not perceive the conclusions, having been
too deep "in the trees to see the wood 55 . But they did
provide the facts from which conclusions could be drawn

Here is the most startling of all. What saved Russia
above all was, not her modern progress, but her back-
wardness. If the Soviet regime had given her a road system
comparable to that of western countries, she would probably
have been overrun in quick time. The German mechanized
forces were baulked by the badness of her roads.

But this conclusion has a converse. The Germans lost
the chance of victory because they had based their mobility
on wheels instead of on tracks. On these mud-roads the

*74

Frustration at Moscow

wheeled transport was bogged when the tanks could move
on.

Panzer forces with tracked transport might have overrun
Russia's vital centres long before the autumn, despite the
bad roads World War I had shown this need to anyone
who used his eyes and his imagination. Britain was the
birthplace of the tank, and those of us here who preached
the idea of mobile mechanized warfare after 1914*1918
had urged that the new model forces should have cross-
country vehicles throughout. The German Army went
further than our own army, or any other, in adopting the
idea. But it fell short in the vital respect of neglecting to
develop such cross-country transport. In brief, the German
Army was more modern than any other in 1940-41, but
missed its goal because it had not yet caught up with ideas
that were twenty years' old.

The German generals had studied their profession with
the greatest thoroughness, devoting themselves from youth
on to the mastery of its technique, with little regard to
politics and still less to the world outside. Men of that
type are apt to be extremely competent, but not imagina-
tive. It was only late in the war that the bolder minds
of the tank school of thought were allowed free rein, and
then it was too late — fortunately for other countries.

Now for the main points of their evidence on the war in
Russia.

THE EFFECT OF THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN

Preliminary to the issues of the Russian campaign
itself is the question whether the Greek campaign caused a
vital delay in its launching. British Government spokes-
men have claimed that the despatch of General Wilson's
force to Greece, though it ended in a hurried evacuation,
was justified because it produced six weeks' postponement
of the invasion of Russia. This claim has been challenged,
and the venture condemned as a political gamble, by a
number of soldiers who were well acquainted with the

176

The Other Side of the Hill

Mediterranean situation — notably General de Guingand,
later Montgomery's Chief of Staff, who was on the Joint
Planning Staff in Gairo.

They argued at the time, and argue still more strongly
now, that a golden opportunity of exploiting the defeat
of the Italians in Cyrenaica, and capturing Tripoli before
German help arrived, was sacrificed in order to switch
inadequate forces to Greece that had no real chance of
saving her from a German invasion. They emphasize that
the Greek leaders were very dubious about accepting the
British Government's offer to intervene, and were jockeyed
into acceptance by Mr. Eden's persuasiveness, supported by
an inflated impression of the extent of help that Britain
could provide.

The historian must recognize that this military view
was confirmed by events. In three weeks, Greece was
overrun and the British thrown out of the Balkans, while
the reduced British force in Gyrenaica was also driven
out by the German Africa Corps under Rommel, which
had been enabled to land at Ti ipoli. These defeats spelt
a damaging loss of prestige and prospect for Britain, while
bringing misery on the Gicek people. Even if the Gieck
campaign was found to have retarded the invasion of
Russia that fact would not justify the British Government's
decision, for such an object was not in their minds at the
time.

It is of historical interest, however, to discover whethei
the campaign actually had such an indirect and unfore-
seen effect. The most definite piece of evidence in support
of this lies in the fact that Hitler had originally ordered
preparations for the attack on Russia to be completed by
May 15th, whereas at the end of March the tentative date
was deferred about a month, and then fixed for June 22nd.
Field-Marshal von Rundstedt told me how the prepara-
tions of his Army Group had been hampered by the
late arrival of the armoured divisions that had been
employed in the Balkan campaign, and that this was

Frustration at Moscow iyy

the key-factor in the delay, in combination with the
weather.

Field-Marshal von Kleist, who commanded the
armoured forces under Rundstedi, was still more explicit,
"It is true, 55 he said, "that the forces employed in the
Balkans were not large compared with our total strength,
but the proportion of tanks employed xhere was high. The
bulk of the tanks that came under me for the offensive
against the Russian front in Southern Poland had taken
part in the Balkan offensive, and needed overhaul, while
their crews needed a rest, A large number of them had
driven as far south as the Peloponnese, and had to be
brought back all that way."

The views of Field- Marshals von Rundstedt and von
Kleist were nam: ally conditioned by the extent to which
the offensive on their front was dependent on the return
of these armoured divisions. I found that other generals
attached less impoitance to the effect of the Balkan
campaign. They emphasized that the mam r61e in the
offensive against Russia was allotted to Field- Marshal von
Bock's Central Army Group, in Northern Poland, and
that the chances of victory puncipally turned on its
progress* A diminution of Rundstedt's forces, for the
secondary role of his Army Group, might not have affected
the decisive issue, as the Russian forces could not be
easily switched. It might even have checked Hitler's
inclination to switch his effort southward in the second
stage of the invasion — an inclination that, as we shall see,
had a fatally retarding effect on the prospects of reaching
Moscow before the winter. The invasion, at a pinch, could
have been launched without awaiting the reinforcement
of Rundstedt's Army Group by the arrival of the divisions
from the Balkans. But, in the event, that argument for
delay was reinforced by doubts whether the ground was
dry enough to attempt an earlier start. General Haider
said thai the weather conditions were not suitable before
the time when the invasion was actually launched.

178

The Other Side of the Hill

The retrospective views of generals axe not, however, a
sure guide as to what might have been decided if the
situation had been devoid of Balkan complications Once
the tentative date had been postponed on that account the
scales were weighted against any idea of striking befoie
the extra divisions had returned from that quarter.

But it was not the Greek campaign that caused the
postponement. Hitler had already reckoned with that
commitment when the invasion of Greece was inserted in
the 1 94 1 programme, as a preliminary to the invasion of
Russia. The decisive factor in the change of timing was
the unexpected coup d'etat in Yugo-Slavia that took place
on March 27th, when General Simovich and his con-
federates overthrew the Government that had just pre-
viously committed Yugo-Slavia to a pact with the Axis.
Hitler was so incensed by the upsetting news as to decide,
that same day, to stage an overwhelming offensive against
Yugo-Slavia. The additional forces, land and air, required
for such a stroke involved a greater commitment than the
Greek campaign alone would have done, and thus impelled
Hitler to take his fuller and more fateful decision to put
off the intended start of the attack on Russia.

It was the fear, not the fact, of a British landing that
had prompted Hitler to move into Greece, and the out-
come set his mind at rest. The landing did not even check
the existing Government of Yugo-Slavia from making
terms with Hitler. On the other hand, it may have
encouraged Simovich in making his successful bid to over-
throw the government and defy Hitler — less successfully.

THE IMPULSE TO INVADE RUSSIA

As a next stage in my enquiry I sought such light as
the generals could shed on the question why Hitler invaded
Russia* It was a dim light. Although the project had
been incubating in his mind since July, 1940, and had
taken definite form before the end of that year, it was
remarkable how hazy most of his generals were about the

Frustration at Moscow

*79

reasons for a step that had decided their fate. Most of
them had been apprehensive when they were told of the
decision, but they were told very little, and told very late.
Hitler was clever m the way he kept his commanders in
separate "water-tight compartments' ' — each was told only
what Hitler considered necessary for him to know in
carrying out his own localized task. They were almost
like prisoners on piecework in a row of cells.

As I heard from all of them that Rundstedt had been
the strongest opponent of the invasion — and the first
to urge its abandonment — I was anxious to get his views
on the question. He told me: "Hitler insisted we must
strike before Russia became too strong, and that she was
much nearer striking than we imagined. He provided
us with information that she was planning to launch an
offensive herself that same summer, of 1941* For my part,
I was very doubtful about this — and I found little sign of
it when we crossed the frontier. Many of us who had
feared such a stroke had been reassured by the way the
Russians had remained quiet during our battles in the
West, in 1940, when we had our hands full. I felt that our
best way of guarding against the danger was simply to
strengthen our frontier defence, leaving the Russians to
take the offensive if they chose. That would be the best
test of their intentions, and less risk than launching into
Russia. 5 '

I asked him further about the reasons that had led him
to discredit Hitler's belief in an imminent Russian offensive.
He replied: "In the first place, the Russians appeared to
be taken by surprise when we crossed the frontier. On my
front we found no signs of offensive preparations in the
forward zone, though there were some farther back.
They had twenty-five divisions in the Carpathian sector,
facing the Hungarian frontier, and I had expected that
they would swing round and strike at my right flank as it
advanced. Instead, they retreated. I deduced from this
that they were not in a state of readiness for offensive

i8o The Other Side of the Hill

operations, and hence that the Russian Command had
not been intending to launch an offensive at an early date."

I next questioned General Blumentritt, who at the
time was Chief of Staff to Kluge's 4th Army on the mam
line of attack, and who at the end of the year became
Deputy Chief of the General Staff at O.K.H. — where he
was in close touch with the records, and the "post-mortems' 5
into the course of the invasion.

Blumentritt told me that the Commander-in-Chief,
Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the General Staff, Haider,
as well as Rundstedt, were opposed to the attempt to
invade Russia. "All three realized the difficulties pre-
sented by the nature of the country from their experiences
in the 19 14-18 war — above all, the difficulties of move-
ment, reinforcement, and supply. Field- Marshal von
Rundstedt asked Hitler bluntly: 'Have you weighed up
what you are undertaking m an attack on Russia?'

Hitler was not moved fiom his decision. But he was
brought to declare that the Russian campaign must be
decided west of the Dnieper. He admitted beforehand
the difficulties of bringing up, and maintaining, sufficient
reinforcements if the advance extended beyond that line
When he found that the Russian Armies had not been
decisively beaten in the battles west of the Dnieper, he
was led, like Napoleon, to order a continuance of the
offensive beyond this river line. That was the most
fateful decision of the whole campaign. It was made
fatal by Hitler's own indecision as to the best direction to
take then.

Further sidelights came in discussion with Field- Marshal
von Kleist, who remarked that he was only told of Hitler's
intention to invade Russia a short time before the attack
was launched. "It was the same with the other high
commanders. We were told the Russian armies were about
to take the offensive, and it was essential for Germany to
remove the menace. It was explained to us that the
Fiihrer could not proceed with other plans while this threat

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1 82 The Other Side of the Hill

loomed close, as too large a part of the German forces
would be pinned down in the east keeping guard. It was
argued that attack was the only way for us to remove the
risks of a Russian attack.

"I believe that Jodl was opposed to Hitlei's con-
clusion, as well as Brauchitsch and Haider. Keitel, too,
was doubtful about it, but he was more hesitant to make
his doubts clear to Hitler. 35

Kleist went on: "We did not underrate the Red
Army, as is commonly imagined. The last German
military attach^ in Moscow, General Kostring — a very
able man — had kept us well informed about the state of
the Russian Army. But Hitler refused to credit his
information.

"Hopes of victory were largely built on the prospect
that the invasion would produce a political upheaval in
Russia. Most of us generals realized beforehand that, if
the Russians chose to fall back there was very little chance
of achieving a final victory without the help of such an
upheaval. Too high hopes were built on the belief that
Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suf-
fered heavy defeats. The belief was fostered by the
Fiihrer's political advisers, and we, as soldiers, didn't
know enough about the political side to dispute it.

"There were no preparations for a prolonged struggle.
Everything was based on the idea of a decisive result
before the autumn/ 5 The Germans paid a terrific price
for that short view, when winter came.

An even more astonishing fact is that Hitler embaiked
on the invasion of Russia in face of the knowledge that his
forces would be fewer than those opposing him at the
outset, and were bound to be increasingly outnumbered
if the campaign were prolonged. That alone made the
invasion an offensive gamble without precedent in modern
history. When Hitler's plan had been unfolded to the
generals in February, they had been peiturbed by Keitel's
estimate of the comparative strengths on either side. For,

Frustration at Moscow

even on his figures, the Red Army had the equivalent of
155 divisions available in Western Russia, whereas the
invading forces could muster only 1 a 1 . (Actually KeiteFs
estimate was a little under the mark.) The assurance
that the German forces were "far superior in quality" did
not suffice to allay their qualms.

The advantage of the initiative enabled the Germans
to produce a moderate superiority of strength on the
sector, north of the Pripet Marshes, where Field- Marshal
von Bock's Central Army Group advanced astride the
Minsk-Moscow highway. But Leeb's Northern Army
Group near the Baltic had bare equality to the opposition
and Rundstedt's Southern Army Group had to perform
its part with the handicap of a marked inferiority of
strength, especially in armour — the most essential element.
Kleist told me that his Panzer Army, which formed
Rundstedt's spearhead, comprised only 600 tanks. "That
will probably seem incredible to you, but it was all we
could assemble after the return of the divisions from
Greece. Budenny's Army Group, facing us in the South,
had some 2,400 tanks. Apart from surprise, we depended
for success simply on the superior training and skill of the
troops. These were decisive assets until the Russians gained
experience. '*

In the light of events it becomes clear that Hitler's
belief in the power of technical quality to discount superior
numbers had more justification than appeared in the final
issue of the war. The test of battlefield results for long
bore out his assurance of the decisive advantage of quality
over quantity. It brought his gamble dangerously near
fulfilment.

THE MISCARRIAGE OF THE INVASION

The next question I explored was how the plan went
wrong. Kleist's answer was: "The main cause of our
failure was that winter came early that year, coupled with
the way the Russians repeatedly gave ground rather than

1 84 The Other Side of the Hill

let themselves be drawn into a decisive battle such as we
were seeking, 55

Rundstedt agreed that this was 5 'the most decisive 95
cause. "But long before winter came the chances had
been diminished owing to the repeated delays in the
advance that were caused by bad roads, and mud. The
'black earth 5 of the Ukraine could be turned into mud by
ten minutes 5 rain — stopping all movement until it dried.
That was a heavy handicap in a race with time. It was
increased by the lack of railways in Russia — for bringing
up supplies to our advancing troops. Another adverse
factor was the way the Russians received continual rein-
forcements xrom their back areas, as they fell back. It
seemed to us ihat as soon as one force was wiped out, the
« path was blocked by the arrival of a fresh force. 55

Blumentntt endorsed these verdicts except for the point
about the Russians yielding ground. On the Moscow
route, the principal line of advance, they repeatedly held
on long enough to be encircled. But the invaders repeatedly
Tailed to reap the opportunity through becoming immobi-
lized themselves. "The badness of the roads was the worst
handicap, but next to that was the inadequacy of the
railways, even when repaired. Our Intelligence was faulty
on both scores, and had underestimated their effect.
Moreover the restoration of railway traffic was delayed by
the change of gauge beyond the Russian frontier. The
supply problem in the Russian campaign was a very
serious one, complicated by local conditions. 95 Neverthe-
less, Blumentritt considered that Moscow could have been
captured if Guderian 5 s unorthodox plan had been adopted,
or if Hitler had not wasted vital time through his own
indecision. Blumentritt's evidence on these issues will be
given later.

Another factor, emphasized by Kleist, was that the
Germans had no such definite advantage in the air as they
had enjoyed in their 1940 invasion of the West. Although
they took such a heavy toll of the Russian Air Force as to

Frustration at Moscow

turn the numerical balance in their favour, the diminished
opposition in the air was offset by the stretching of their
own air cover as they pushed deeper. The faster they
advanced on the ground, the longer the stretch became.
Talking of this, Kleist said: "At several stages in the
advance my panzer forces were handicapped through lack
of cover overhead, due to the fighter airfields being too
far back. Moreover, such air superiority as we enjoyed
during the opening months was local rather than general.
We owed it to the superior skill of our airmen, not to a
superiority in numbers." That advantage disappeared as
tl e Russians gained experience, while being able to renew
their strength.

Besides these basic factors there was, in Rundstedt's
opinion, a fault in the original German dispositions that
had a delayed ill-effect on the course of operations subse-
quent to the initial break-through. Under the plan of the
Supreme Command a wide gap was left between his left
flank and Bock's right flank, opposite the western end
of the Pripet Marshes — the idea being this area could
be safely neglected because of its nature, and the maxi-
mum effort put into the two rapid drives, north and
south of the marsh-belt. Rundstedt doubted the wisdom
of this assumption when the plan was under discussion.
"Frorn my own experience on the Eastern Front in 1914-18
I anticipated that the Russian cavalry would be able
to operate in the Pripet Marshes, and thus felt anxious
about the gap in our advancing front, since it left the
Russians free to develop flank threats from that area/'

In the first stage of the invasion no such risk
materialized. After Reichenau's 6th Army had forced
the crossings of the Bug, south of the Marshes, Kleist's
armoured forces passed through and swept rapidly forward,
capturing Luck and Rovno. But after crossing the old
Russian frontier, and heading for Kiev, the invaders
were heavily counter-attacked in flank by Russian cavalry
corps that suddenly emerged from the Pripet Marshes*

1 86

The Other Side of the Hill

This produced a dangerous situation, and although the
threat was eventually curbed after tough fighting, it
delayed the advance, and spoilt the chance of an early
arrival on the Dnieper,

While it is not difficult to see how this interruption
weighed on Rundstedt's mind, it is not so clear that
the general prospects of the invasion suffered in conse-
quence. For no similar interference played any con-
siderable part in checking Bock's advance north of the
Pripet Marshes, where the centre of gravity of the whole
offensive lay.

It was here, along the direct route to Moscow, that
Hitler had concentrated his strongest forces, and had
planned to bring off the decisive battle. While the course
of events on that front brought out with even greater
emphasis the difficulties that Rundstedt and Kleist had
encountered on the southern front, it also turned on more
personal factors — of human misjudgment.

A clear picture of the offensive design was given me by
General Heinrici, who traced the moves on the map. He
is a small, precise man with a parsonical manner — he
talks as if he were saying grace, Although he hardly looks
like a soldier, proof of his military ability is provided by the
fact that, starting as a corps commander, he finished as
Army Group Commander conducting the final battle of
the Oder in defence of Berlin. His outline of the pattern
of the operation was filled in with fuller details and back-
ground disclosures by General Blumentritt, who was Chief
of Staff to Kluge's Army throughout the advance from
Brest-Litovsk to Moscow.

The plan, in brief, was to trap the bulk of the Russian
forces by a vast encircling manoeuvre — with the infantry
corps moving on an inner circle, and two great groups of
tanks on an outer circle. The pincers nearly closed round
the Russians near Slonim, but most of them managed to
slip out. Then the pincers opened out again, and a still
bigger encirclement was attempted around Minsk — it was

Frustration at Moscow

187

hoped to make this the decisive battle. But it fell short
of full success, though masses of Russians were captured.
The pincers failed to close in time — "owing to sudden
heavy rain". These moves had been executed at great
speed, and Minsk was captured on the ninth day. But
the Germans were now two hundred miles deep in Russia
—and had missed their real aim.

Beyond Minsk the country became worse, and the
weather no better. Blumentritt vividly described the
conditions. "It was appallingly difficult country for tank
movement — great virgin forests, widespread swamps,
terrible roads, and bridges not strong enough to bear the
weight of tanks. The resistance also became stiffer, and
the Russians began to cover their front with minefields,
It was easier for them to block the way because there were
so few roads.

"The great motor highway leading from the frontier to
Moscow was unfinished — the one road a Westerner would
call a c road\ We were not prepared for what we found
because our maps in no way corresponded to reality. On
those maps all supposed main roads were marked in red,
and there seemed to be many, but they often proved to be
merely sandy tracks. The German intelligence service
was fairly accurate about conditions in Russian-occupied
Poland, but badly at fault about those beyond the original
Russian frontier.

"Such country was bad enough for the tanks, but worse
still for the transport accompanying them — carrying their
fuel, their supplies, and all the auxiliary troops they
needed. Nearly all this transport consisted of wheeled
vehicles, which could not move off the roads, nor move on
it if the sand turned into mud An hour or two's rain
reduced the panzer forces to stagnation. It was an extra-
ordinary sight, with groups of tanks and transport strung
out over a hundred miles stretch, all stuck — until the sun
came out and the ground dried/'

Despite such repeated delays the German forces pushed

The Other Side of the Hill

on to the Dnieper. Near the end of July, a month from
the start, a third encirclement was attempted around
Smolensk, on a larger scale than ever. "Half a million
Russians seemed to be trapped. The trap was almost
closed — within about six miles — but the Russians once
again succeeded in extricating a large part of their forces.
That narrow failure brought Hitler right up against the
question whether to stop or not. We were now over four
hundred miles deep into Russia. Moscow lay two hundred
miles farther ahead/ 5

Blumentritt revealed that, from the start, there was a
vital conflict of ideas about the method of operations.
"Hitler always wanted to carry out encirclements — accord-
ing to the principles of orthodox strategy — and Bock
agreed with him. So did most of the senior generals on
this issue. But Guderian and the new school of tank
experts had a different idea — to drive deep, as fast as
possible, and leave the enchclmg of the enemy to be
completed by the infantry forces that were following up.
Guderian urged the importance of keeping the Russians
on the run, and allowing them no time to rally. He
wanted to drive straight on to Moscow, and was convinced
he could get there if no time was wasted. Russia's resis-
tance might be paralysed by that thrust at the heart of
Stalin's power. But Hitler insisted on having the plan
carried out in his own way, and kept a curb on the advance
of the armoured forces.

"Guderian's plan was a very bold one — and meant big
risks in maintaining reinforcements and supplies. But it
might have been the lesser of two risks. By making the
armoured forces turn in each time, and forge a ring round
the enemy forces they had by-passed, a lot of time was
lost,

" After we had reached Smolensk there was a stand-still
for several weeks on the Desna. This was due partly to
the need of bringing up supplies and reinforcements, but
even more to a fresh conflict of views within the German

Frustration at Moscow 189

command — about the future course of the campaign .
There were endless arguments."

Bock wanted to push on to Moscow. Hitler, after
three failures to trap the Russian armies on that front, was
inclined to turn south. There, Rundstedt had broken
through south of Kiev, on a slant to the Black Sea. It
suggested to Hitler the idea of a bigger encirclement on a
fresh line. Eventually he decided on this course. From
Rundstedt's front, Kleist's tank army was to swing up-
ward; from Bock's front, Guderian's tank army was to
swing downward; and between them trap the massed
Russian forces around Kiev. Hider halted the march
on Moscow in favour of this southerly pincer-manceuvre.

A significent point about this crucial decision was
mentioned by Blumentritt: "Although Field- Marshal von
Bock desired to continue the advance on Moscow, von
Kluge did not share his view and was strongly in favour of
the alternative plan of encircling the Russian forces around
Kiev. It was his idea, and desire, that his own 4th Army
should swing south to carry out this pincer-movement
along with Guderian's panzer forces. When setting forth
the arguments for this plan, he said to me, with emphasis :
'It would also mean that we should be under Field- Marshal
von Rundstedt, instead of Field- Marshal von Bock. 5 Von
Bock was a very difficult man to serve, and von Kluge
would have been glad to get out of his sphere. This was
an interesting example of the influence of the personal
factor in strategy."

The Kiev encirclement succeeded, and over 600,000
prisoners were bagged. But it was late in September
before the battle was completed. Winter was drawing near.

Now Hitler had to face the question whether to be
content with what he had gained, or to make another bid
for final victory in 1941. Rundstedt was quite definite;
telling me of his view, he said: "We ought to have stopped
on the Dnieper after taking Kiev. I argued this strongly,
and Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch agreed with me. But

190 The Other Side of the Hill

Hitler, elated by the victory at Kiev, now wanted to push
on, and felt sure he could capture Moscow, Field-Marshal
von Bock naturally tended to concur, for his nose was
pointing towards Moscow. 55

So Hitler gave the order for the advance, which began
on October 2. "But," as Biumentritt remarked, "its
chances were shortened because Hitler had given the
Russians two months' grace on the Moscow front. We had
been halted during August and September — the best two
months of the year. That proved fatal/'

But this decision was accompanied by another, which
involved him in further complications and in a loss of
concentration. For Hitler could not resist the temptation
to exploit the success in the South at the same time as he
pursued the aim of capturing Moscow.

FRUSTRATION AT THE 6 * GATE TO THE CAUCASUS* '

When Hitler made up his mind to push on, he assigned
Rundstedt the extremely ambitious fresh task of clearing
the Black Sea coast and reaching the Caucasus. The
objectives, as Rundstedt traced them for me on the map,
were to gain the line of the Don from Voronezh eastward
to its mouth near Rostov, and drive far enough beyond it
to secure the Maikop oilfields with his right wing and
Stalingrad on the Volga with his left wing. When
Rundstedt pointed out the difficulties and risks of advancing
a further 400 miles beyond the Dnieper, with his left
exposed over such a long stretch, Hitler confidently
asserted that the Russians were incapable of offering
serious opposition and that the frozen roads would enable
a quick advance to the objective.

Describing what happened, Rundstedt said: "The
plan was handicapped from the start by the diversion of
forces to the Moscow front. A number of my mobile
divisions were drawn off for a north-easterly advance past
Orel towards the southern flank of Moscow. That achieved
little, and lost an opportunity. I had wanted von Bock's

Frustration at Moscow

right wing to turn south-eastward, and strike across the
rear of the Russian armies that were opposing me near
Kursk, thus cutting them off. It seemed to me a great
mistake to swing the offensive centre of gravity north-
eastward, as the Russians were much better placed, with
the help of the railways radiating from Moscow, to counter
a move in that direction.

"As it was, my 6th Army on the left wing was blocked
beyond Kursk, and fell short of its objective, Voronezh,
on the Don. This check reacted on the progress of its
neighbour, the 17th Army, and constricted the width of
the advance towards the Caucasus. The 17th Army met
stiff resistance along the Donetz. It could not push far
enough forward to protect the flank of von Kleist's 1st
Panzer Army. In consequence, von Kleist's flank was
endangered by the strong counter-attacks which the
Russians developed in a southerly direction, towards the
Black Sea.

"On the other flank, von Manstein's nth Army
pierced the defences of the Perekop Isthmus and broke
into the Crimea, quickly overrunning most of that penin-
sula except for the fortress of Sevastopol and the eastern
tip at Kerch. But this divergent move, ordered by Hitler,
reduced the strength I had available on the mainland.' 9

The story of what happened to the Caucasus drive is
best given in Kleist's own words. "Before we reached
the Lower Don it became clear that there was no longer
time or opportunity to reach the Caucasus. Although we
had trapped most of the enemy forces west of the Dnieper,
and thus gained an apparently open path, the Russians
were bringing up many fresh divisions by rail and road
from the east. Bad weather intervened and our advance
was bogged down at a crucial time, while my leading
troops ran short of petrol.

"My idea now was merely to enter Rostov and destroy
the Don bridges there, not to hold that advanced line.
I had reconnoitred a good defensive position on the Mius

92

The Other Side of the Hill

River, and taken steps to organize it as a winter line. But
Goebbels's propaganda made so much of our arrival at
Rostov — it was hailed as having 'opened the gateway to
the Caucasus' — that we were prevented from carrying out
this plan. My troops were forced to hang on at Rostov
longer than I had intended, and as a result sufFeied a bad
knock from the Russian counter-offensive that was launched
in the last week of November. However, they succeeded
in checking the Russian pursuit as soon as they had fallen
back to the Mius River line, and although the enemy
pushed on far beyond tbeir inland flank they managed to
maintain their position here, only 50 miles west 01 Rostov,
throughout the winter. It was the most advanced sector
of the whole German front m the East. 35

Kleist added: "The German armies were in grave
danger during that first winter. They were virtually frozen
in, and unable to move. That was a great handicap m
meeting and checking the Russian encircling movements 55

Rundstedt's account confirmed Kleist's, and also
brought out the story of his own first removal fiom com-
mand. "When I wanted to break off tie battle and
withdraw to the Mius River, Field- Marshal vonBiaudutsdh
agreed, but tiien an overriding order came from the Fuhi er,
which forbade any such withdrawal. I wired back that it
was nonsense to hold on where we were, and added: 6 If you
do not accept my view you must find someone else to
command. 5 That same night a icply came from the
Fuhrer that my resignation was accepted — I left the
Eastern Front on December 1st, and never returned there.
Almost immediately afterwards the Fuhrer flew down to
that sectoi ; after seeing the situation, he changed his
mind and sanctioned the step-back. Significantly, the
Mius River line was the only sector of the front that was
not shaken during the winter of 1941-42."

Nevertheless, Rundstedt made it clear to me that he
considered the deep advance of his Army Group had been
a fundamental mistake in strategy. In contrast to most

Frustration at Moscow

*93

generals, of any nationality, he did not blame the mis"
carriage of the plan on the failure to provide his particular
effort with sufficient resources, but rather suggested that
the error lay in developing it at all. For in further dis-
cussion he said: "The 1941 operations m Russia should,
in my opinion, have had their main effort directed, not
at first towards Moscow, but towards Leningrad. That
would have linked up with Ihe Finns. Then, in the next
stage, should have come an attack on Moscow from the
north, in co-operation with the advance of Field-Marsha?
von Bock's Army Group from the west."

FRUSTRATION AT MOSCOW

The offensive aimed at Moscow, starting on October
2nd, was carried out by three armies — the 2nd on the
right, the 4th in the centre, and the 9th on the left — with
the two panzer groups of Hoth and Hoeppner. The latter
had replaced Gudenan's, which had been sent southward
for the Kiev encircling manoeuvre.

The course of the offensive was vividly described by
Blumentritt: "The first phase was the battle of encircle-
ment around Vyasma. This time, the encirclement was
perfectly completed, and 600,000 Russians were captured.
It was a modern Cannae — on a greater scale. The
panzer groups played a big part in this victory. The
Russians were caught napping, as they did not expect a
big drive for Moscow to be launched at such a late date.
But it was too late in the year for us to harvest its fruits —
for the operation was not completed until the end of
October.

"After the Russian forces had been rounded up, we
pushed on towards Moscow. There was little opposition
for the moment, but the advance was slow — for the mud
was awful, and the troops were tired. Moreover, they
met a well-prepared defensive position on the Nara River,
where they were held up by the arrival of fresh Russian
forces.

G

1 94 The Other Side of the Hill

"All the commanders were now asking: 'When are we
going to stop? 5 They remembered what had happened to
Napoleon's army. Many of them began to re-read Caulain-
court's grim account of 1812. That book had a weighty
influence at this critical time in x 941. I can still see von
Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters
to his office, and there standing before the map with
Caulaincourt's book in his hand. That went on day after
day. 5 '

This point was of particular interest to me as in August,
1 94 1 — when the German tide of invasion seemed to be
flowing irresistibly — I had written an article for the
October Strand on the relation of Napoleon's campaign to
Hitler's, basing it on extensive quotations from Caulain-
court, to bring out my implied conclusion. I remarked
that we had evidently been thinking on the same lines,
though the German generals had begun to remember
Caulaincourt a bit late! Blumentritt agreed, with a wry
grin.

Resuming his account, he said; "The troops themselves
were less depressed than their generals. They could see
the flashes of the A.A. guns over Moscow at night, and it
fired their imagination — the city seemed so near. They
also felt that they would find shelter there from the bitter
weather. But the commanders felt that they were not
strong enough to push those last forty miles.

"The generals expressed their doubts in conference,
but Hitler overruled them, and Bock tended to agree with
him. Hitler said he had good reason to believe that
Russian resistance was on the verge of collapse. He gave
the order for a final attempt to take Moscow. The order
said that the Kremlin was to be blown up, to signalize
the overthrow of Bolshevism."

The dispositions were reshuffled before the offensive
was launched. On the southern wing it was to be carried
out by Kluge's 4th Army, with the 1st Panzer Corps; and
on the northern wing by Hoeppner's Panzer Group, with

Frustration at Moscow

*95

some infantry divisions of the 9th Army. The whole
attack was placed under Kluge's direction. This was
ironical in view of his disbelief in the possibility of achieving
what he must undertake.

Blumentritt continued: "The offensive was opened by
Hoeppner's Panzer Group on the left. Its progress was
slow, in face of mud and strong Russian counter-attacks.
Our losses were heavy. The weather then turned adverse,
with snow falling on the swampy ground. The Russians
made repeated counter-attacks from the flank across the
frozen Moskwa, and Hoeppner had to divert more and
more of his strength to check these thrusts. The 2nd Panzer
Division succeeded in penetrating far enough to get a sight
of the Kremlin, but that was the nearest it came.

"These unpromising conditions raised the question
whether the 4th Army should join in the offensive or not.
Night after night Hoeppner came through on the tele-
phone, to urge this course; night after night von Kluge
and I sat up late discussing whether it would be wise or
not to agree to his insistence. Von Kluge decided that
he would gain the opinion of the front-line troops themselves
— he was a very energetic and active commander who
liked to be up among the fighting troops — so he visited the
forward posts, and consulted the junior officers and
N.C.O.s. The troop leaders believed they could reach
Moscow and were eager to try. So after five or six days of
discussion and investigation, von Kluge decided to make a
final effort with the 4th Army. The snow was thick on
the ground, and the earth was frozen to a depth of several
inches. The hardness of the ground was more favourable
for artillery movement than if it had been otherwise.

"The attack was launched on December 2nd, but by
afternoon reports were coming back that it was held up
by strong Russian defences in the forests around Moscow.
The Russians were artists in forest fighting, and their *
defence was helped by the fact that darkness came as
early as 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

1 96 The Other Side of the Hill

"A few parties of our troops, from the 258th Infantry
Division, actually got into the suburbs of Moscow. But
the Russian workers poured out of the factories and fought
with their hammers and other tools m defence oi their city.

"During the night the Russians stiongly counter-
attacked the isolated elements that had penetrated their
defences. Next day our corps commanders reported that
they thought it was no longer possible to break through.
Von Kluge and I had a long discussion that evening, and
at the end he decided to withdraw these advanced troops.
Fortunately the Russians did not discover that they were
moving back, so that we succeeded in extricating them
and bringing them back to their original position in fairly-
good order. But there had been very heavy casualties
in those two days' fighting.

"The decision was just in time to avert the worst
consequences of the general counter-offensive that the
Russians now unleashed, into which Marshal Zhukov
threw a hundred divisions. Under their converging
pressure our position became daily moi e dangerous Hitler
was at last brought to realize that wc could not check
them, and gave reluctant permission for a short with-
drawal to a line in rear. We had been badly misled about
the quantity of reinforcements that the Russians could
produce. They had hidden their resouices all too well."

That was the end of Hitler's bid for Moscow — and it
proved his last bid on that capital front. Never again
would any German soldiers catch sight of the Kremlin
except as prisoners.

CHAPTER XIV

FRUSTRATION IN THE CAUCASUS
AND AT STALINGRAD

When Moscow remained out of reach, and winter set in
at its worst, fear spread among the German troops. With
it grew the danger of a collapse as terrible as befell
Napoleon's Grande Armie.

It was Hitler's decision for "no withdrawal" that
averted a panic in that black hour. It appeared a display
of iron nerve — though it may only have been due to sheer
mulish obstinacy. For it was against his generals 5 advice.

But his success in surviving that crisis was his undoing
in the end. First, it led him to plunge deeper into Russia
the next summer, 1942. He started well but soon went
astray. He missed taking Stalingrad because his eyes were
fixed on the Caucasus, and then forfeited the Caucasus in
belated efforts to capture Stalingrad.

When winter came he was led to gamble again on his
"Moscow" inspiration. This time it produced a disaster
from which he never recovered. Even then, he might
have spun out the war until Russia was exhausted, by
practising elastic defence in the vast buffer-space he had
gained. But he stuck rigidly to his rule of "no withdrawal",
and so hastened Germany's fall.

THE WINTER CRISIS

It is clear from all the generals told me that the German
armies were placed in the gravest danger after being
repulsed before Moscow in December, 1941. The generals
urged Hitler to make a long step back to a secure winter
line. They pointed out that the troops were not equipped
for the rigours of a winter campagn. But Hitler refused to

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The Other Side of the Hill

listen. He gave the order: "The Army is not to retire a
single step. Every man must fight where he stands."

His decision seemed to invite disaster. Yet the event
justified him — once again. The basic reason was brought
out by General von Tippelskirch, lean and professorial, a
corps and later an army commander there. "Frontal
defence was much stronger in this war even than in
1914-18. The Russians always failed to break our front,
and although they pushed far round our flanks, they had
not yet the skill nor sufficient supplies to drive home their
advantage. We concentrated on holding the towns that
were rail and road centres, rolling up round them like
'hedgehogs 5 — that was Hitler's idea — and succeeded in
holding them firmly. The situation was saved."

Many of the generals think now that Hitler's decision
was the best in the circumstances, though they did not
agree with it at the time. "It was his one great achieve-
ment," said Tippelskirch. "At that critical moment
the troops were remembering what they had heard about
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, and living under the
shadow of it. If they had once begun a retreat, it might
have turned into a panic flight. 3 '

Other generals endorsed this. Rundstedt, however,
caustically remarked: "It was Hider's decision for rigid
resistance that caused the danger in the first place. It
would not have arisen if he had permitted a timely
withdrawal."

Indirect support for that view was provided by
the account Blumentritt gave me of what happened on the
Moscow front during December. It brought out the need-
less perils that resulted from Hitler's excessive insistence
on rigid defence combined with his unstable way of revok-
ing any concessions he had granted.

"Following the final check before Moscow, General
von Kluge advised the Supreme Command that it would
be wise to make a general withdrawal to the Ugra, between
Kaluga and Vyasma, a line which had already been

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 199

partially prepared. There was prolonged deliberation at
the Fuhrer's Headquarters over this proposal before
reluctant permission was granted. Meanwhile the Russian
counter-offensive developed in a menacing way, especially
on the flanks. The withdrawal was just beginning when a
fresh order came from the Fiihrer, saying: 'The 4th Army
is not to retire a single step.'

"Our position became all the worse because Guderian's
Panzer Group was lying out beyond our right wing, near
Tula, and this much depleted force had to be extricated
before the main part of the 4th Army could withdraw.
The delay quickly produced a fresh complication, for the
Russians attacked Guderian's thin line and rolled it back
precipitately over the Oka River. At the same time
Hoeppner's Panzer Group on our left was being very hard
pressed by the Russians, who threatened to outflank it,

"In consequence the 4th Army became isolated in its
foiward position, and in imminent danger of encirclement.
The rivers were all frozen, so that they provided an
inadequate barrier against the Russian thrusts. Soon the
danger became acute, for a Russian cavalry corps pressed
round our right flank well to the rear of it* This corps was
composed of horsed cavalry and sledge-borne infantry,
while roping in all the men from the recaptured villages
who were capable of canying a rifle.

"Such was the grim situation of the 4th Army on
December 24th — and it had arisen from Hitler's refusal to
permit a timely step back. My chief, von Kluge, had gone
on the 15th to replace von Bock, who was sick, and I was
left in charge of the army. I and my staff spent Christmas
Day in a small hut — our headquarters in Malo Yaroslavits
— with tommy guns on the table and sounds of shooting
all round us. Just as it seemed that nothing could save
us from being cut off, we found that the Russians were
moving on westward, instead of turning up north astride
our rear. They certainly missed their opportunity.

"The situation remained very precarious, for Hitler

2 GO

The Other Side of the Hill

still delayed a decision, and it was not until January 4th
that he at last sanctioned the general withdrawal to the
Ugra. I had left just before — to become Deputy Chief of
the General Staff— and General Kuebler had arrived to
take command. But he soon found that he could not
stand the strain and was replaced by General Heinrici,
who managed to maintain the new position until spring
came, and longer, though it was deeply enveloped on both
flanks, 5 5

Talking of the conditions under which the forces had
to be extricated, Blumentritt said: "The roads were so
deep in snow thai the horses were up to their bellies.
When the divisions withdrew, part of the troops had to
shovel a path by day along the route their transport was
to move by night. You may understand what their trials
were when I mention that the temperature was twenty-
eight degrees below freezing 5 Fahrenheit."

Even though Hitler's decision may have saved a col-
lapse on the Moscow front, a terrible price was paid for
it. "Our losses had not been heavy until the final attack
for Moscow, 55 Blumentritt told me, "but they became very
serious during the winter — both in men and material.
Vast numbers perished from the cold." More specific
details came out in discussion with Tippelskirch, who
spent the winter as a divisional commander in the Second
Corps among the Valdai Hills, between Leningrad and
Moscow, and told me that his strength was reduced to
one third of its establishment. "Divisions were down to
5,000 men before the end of the winter, and companies
to barely 50 men/ 3

He also threw light on a more far-reaching effect of
Hitler 's "no withdrawal" policy. "That winter ruined
the Luftwaffe — because it had to be used for flying supplies
to the garrisons of the 'hedgehogs', the forward positions
that were isolated by the Russian flanking advances. The
Second Corps required 200 tons of supplies a day, which
called for a daily average of 100 transport aircraft. But

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 201

as bad weather often intervened, the actual number had
had to be considerably larger, so as to make full use of an
interval of passable weather — on one day as many as 350
aircraft were used to reprovision this single corps. Many
aircraft crashed as flying conditions were bad. The overall
strain of keeping up supplies by air to all the isolated
positions on such a vast front was fatal to the future
development of the Luftwaffe. 59

I questioned the generals about the course and effect
of the Russian winter offensive of 1941-42. All testified
to the nerve strain caused by the deep flanking threats of
the Russian forces, which lapped round their positions and
communications, but the general verdict was epitomized
in Blumenoitt's comment that the indirect results were
greater than the direct danger. "The principal effect of
that winter offensive was in upsetting the German plans
for 1942. The weather was a more damaging and
dangerous factor than the Russian offensive operations.
Besides lowering morale, the weather accounted for the
greater part of the German casualties — which were at
least as heavy as the Russians 9 during that winter. 9 '

He went on to say that the strain was increased by the
way that the German forces were stretched. "The average
extent of a divisional frontage was 20 to 25 miles, and
even on crucial sectors, such as those near Moscow, they
were 10 to 15 miles. That thinness of the front was made
more precarious because of the difficulty of bringing up
and distributing supplies, which in turn was aggravated
by the difficulty of building roads and railways."

I asked him how he accounted for the fact that such
thin fronts had, in general, been able to withstand attack,
since they were far more widely stretched than what had
been regarded in World War I as the limit that a division
could hold in defence. He replied: "In that war, the
fronts were narrowed by the great depth in which divisions
were distributed. New weapons and the improvement of
automatic small arms partly accounted for the possibility

1202

4

The Other Side of the Hill

of holding wider fronts than we could then. The greater
mobility of defensive means was the other main reason.
If the attackers broke through the front, small detachments
of tanks and motorized troops often checked them by
mobile counter-moves before they could expand the
penetration into a wide breach."

But the way that the disaster was repeatedly averted
by this underlying increase of defensive advantage had the
ironical effect of encouraging Hitler to gamble more
heavily on the offensive. The fact that the crisis was
survived exalted Hitler's faith in himself; he felt that his
judgment had been justified, against that of his generals.
From now on he was less inclined than ever to tolerate
their advice.

After the final repulse at Moscow he had got rid of
Brauchitsch, and himself taken over the Supreme Com-
mand of the Army ("O.K.H.") in addition to his existing
position as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht,
the forces as a whole ("O.K.W.") The announcement
that Brauchitsch had been removed naturally suggested
to the credulous public that the faults of the military
chiefs had been the cause of the failure. By that adroit
step Hitler shifted the blame on to their shoulders while
adding to his own power. An apt comment was provided
by Blumentritt: "Only the admirals had a happy time in
this war — as Hitler knew nothing about the sea, whereas
he felt he knew all about land warfare. 35

Even the admirals, however, had their troubles. Like
Napoleon's admirals, they had to deal with a leader who
was too continental-minded to take full account of the
obstacles created by British seapower, and its indirect
effect on his continental designs. They had not succeeded
in making Hitler realize the primary importance of cutting
away the bases of that seapower — where these were within
reach of landpower — before tackling further objectives.

The generals, on the other hand, were the less able to
put a brake on Hitler because their outlook was too

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 203

exclusively military, besides being continental. That
narrowing of vision tended to offset the effect of their
greater caution. In this connection, Kleist contributed
some significant reflections in the course of one of our
talks: " Clause witz's teachings had- fallen into neglect in
this generation — even at the time when I was at the War
Academy and on the General Staff. His phrases were
quoted, but his books were not closely studied. He was
regarded as a military philosopher, rather than as a
practical teacher. The writings of Schlieffen received
much greater attention. They seemed more practical
because they were directed to the problem of how an army
inferior in strength — which was always Germany's position
in relation to the whole — could overcome enemies on
both sides who, in combination, were superior in strength.
But Clausewitz's reflections were fundamentally sound —
especially his dictum that war was a continuation of policy
by other means. It implied that the political factors were
more important than the military ones. The German
mistake was to think that a military success would solve
political problems. Indeed, under the Nazis we tended to
reverse Clausewitz's dictum, and to regard peace as a
continuation of war. Clausewitz, also, was prophetically
right about the difficulties of conquering Russia. 35

plans for 1942

The question of what should be done in the spring
had been debated throughout the winter. The discussion
had begun even before the final assault on Moscow.
Relating what happened, Blumentritt told me: 6C A number
of the generals declared that a resumption of the offensive
in 1942 was impossible, and that it was wiser to make
sure of holding what had been gained. Haider was very
dubious about the continuance of the offensive* Von
Rundstedt was still more emphatic and even urged that
the German Army should withdraw to their original front
in Poland. Von Leeb agreed with him. While other

204

The Other Side of the Hill

generals did not go so far as this, most of them were very
worried as to where the campaign would lead. With
the departure of von Rundstedt as well as von Brauchitsch,
the resistance to Hitler's pleasure was weakening and that
pressure was all for resuming the offensive."

As Blumentritt had become Deputy Chief of the General
Staff early in January, under Haider, no one was better
placed to know the motives and ideas behind Hitler's
decision* He summed them up as follows :

First, Hitler's hope of obtaining m 1942 what he
had failed to obtain in 1941. He did not believe that
the Russians could increase their strength, and would
not listen to evidence on this score . There was a
"battle of opinion 3 ' between Haider and him. The
Intelligence had information that 600 to 700 tanks a
month were coming out of the Russian factories, in
the Ural Mountains and elsewhere- When Haider
told him of this, Hulcr slammed the tabic and said it
was impossible. He would not believe what he did
not want to believe.

Secondly, he did not know what else to do — as he
would not listen to any idea of a withdrawal. He felt
that he must do something and that something could
only be offensive.

Thirdly, there was much pressure from economic
authorities in Germany. They urged that it was
essential to continue the advance, telling Hitler that
they could not continue the war without oil from the
Caucasus and wheat from the Ukraine.

I asked Blumentritt whether the General Staff had
examined the grounds for these assertions, and also whether
it was true, as reported at the time, that the manganese
ore round Nikopol in the Dnieper Bend was vital to the
German steel industry. Replying to the latter question
first, he said he did not know about this, as he was not

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingmd 203

acquainted with the economic side of the war. It seemed
to me a significant revelation of the way that the German
strategists had been divorced from the study of factors that
were vital to their planning. He went on to say that it
was more difficult to question such assertions by the
economic experts as the General Staff was not represented
at conferences on these issues — evidence of Hitler's desire
to keep them in the dark.

While taking the fateful decision to plunge deeper still
into the depths of Russia, Hitler found he no longer had
enough strength left for an offensive on the whole front,
such as he had carried out the year before. Forced to
choose, and hesitating to make another attack towards
Moscow, he decided to strike south for the Caucasus oil-
fields, though it meant extending his flank, like a telescope,
past the main body of the Red Army. When his forces
reached the Caucasus, they would be exposed to a counter-
stroke at any point for nearly a thousand miles back.

The only other sector on which offensive opeiations
were to be undertaken was on the Baltic flank. The 1942
plan originally included an attempt to take Leningrad in
the course of the summer, in order to secure safe com-
munications with Finland and bring relief to her semi-
isolated situation. With this exception, the Northern and
Central Army Groups were to remain on the defensive,
merely improving their positions.

A special Army Group "A 55 was created for the advance
to the Caucasus and placed under Field- Marshal von List,
while the reduced Army Group South operated on its left
flank. Reichenau had replaced Rundstedt in command
of the latter, but he died suddenly from a heart attack in
January, and Bock was brought back to command it,
only to be shelved finally before the offensive was launched.
Kluge remained in command of the Central Army Group
and Busch replaced Leeb in command of the Northern
Army Group. Explaining this, Blumentritt said: u Field-
Marshal von Leeb was so dissatisfied with the decision

2o6 The Other Side of the Hill

to resume the offensive that he asked to be allowed to
give up his command. His heart was not in it. Apart
from regarding it as a hopeless venture on military
grounds, he was also opposed to the Nazi xegime, and thus
glad of a pretext on which he could ask to resign. Resigna-
tion would not have been possible without a reason that
satisfied Hitler. 55

In further discussion of the way that the plans for 1 942
came to be formulated, Blumentritt made some general
observations that are worth inclusion as a sidelight. "My
experience on the higher staffs showed me that the vital
issues of war tended to be decided by political rather than
by strategical factors, and by mental tussles in the rear
rather than by the fighting on the battlefield. Moreover,
those tussles are not reflected in the operation orders.
Documents are no safe guide for history — the men who
sign orders often think quite differently from what they put
on paper. It would be foolish to take documents that
historians find in the archives as a reliable indication of
what particular officers really thought.

"I began to perceive that truth long ago when I was
working on the history of the 191 4-18 war, under General
von Haeften, a very conscientious historian who taught me
both the technique and the difficulties of historical research.
But I came to see it much clearer from my own close
observation of high headquarters in this war — under the
Nazi system

"That system had some strange by-products. While
the German, with his liking for organization and order,
has a tendency to put more down in writing than others
do, a lot more 'paper 5 than ever before was produced in
this war. The old army were trained to write brief orders,
that allowed freedom to the executants. In this last war
the practice was changed, because mental freedom was
more and more chained. Every step, and all conceivable
cases had to be regulated in order to protect ourselves from
penalization. Hence the abundance and length of the

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 207

orders — the very contrary to our training. Their often
bombastic language and use of superlatives was against
all the rules of the old style — with its pregnant shortness
and concise words. But our orders now had to be 'stimu-
lating 5 , in the style of propaganda. Many of the orders
of the Fiihrer and O.K.W. were reproduced word for
word in subordinate orders, so as to ensure that, if things
went wrong, the latter could not be charged with having
failed to convey the Fuhrer's intention.

"The conditions of compulsion in Germany under the
Nazi system were almost as bad as in Russia. I often had
evidence of what they were like there. For example, quite
early in the campaign, I was present at the interrogation
of two high Russian officers who were captured at Smolensk.
They made it clear that they were entirely in disagreement
with the plans they had executed, but said they had either
to carry them out to the letter or lose their heads. It was
only in such circumstances that men were able to talk
freely — while in the grip of the regime they were forced
to echo it and suppress their own thoughts.

"The systems of National Socialism and Bolshevism
were similar in many ways. Talking in his own circle one
day, when General Haider was present, the Fuhrer said
how much he envied Stalin, who could deal in a more
radical way with the obstinate generals than he could
himself. He went on to speak about the pre-war purge
of the Red Army Command and how he envied the
Bolshevists who had. an army and generals completely
impregnated with their own ideology and thus acting
unconditionally as one man — whereas the German generals
and the General Staff had no similar fanatical belief in the
National Socialist idea. 'They have scruples, make
objections, and are not sufficiently with me. 9

"As the war went on Hitler indulged more and more
in tirades of this kind. He still needed the class that he
personally despised, as he could not carry out his opera-
tional functions without them, but he controlled their

2o8

The Other Side of the Hill

functions more and more closely. Many of the orders
and reports thus bear two faces. Often what was signed
did not represent the mind of the man concerned, but he
had to sign it unless the too familiar consequences were
to follow. Future psychologists, as well as historians,
should pay attention to these phenomena. 55

THE DRIVE FOR THE CAUCASUS

The 1942 offensive had a ciuious shape, even m its
original design. It was to be launched from the backward-
slancing line Taganrog-Kursk — the right flank of which,
on the sea of Azov, was already close to the Don at Rostov,
while the left flank at Kursk lay more than 100 miles
behind, to the west. The offensive was to start with a
powerful thrust from this reatward flank. The objectives
were dual, the Caucasus and Stalingrad, but the lattei
had only a protective purpose — to safeguard the flank of
the advance to the Caucasus. Ai Stalingrad it was intended
only to go far enough beyond the city to ensure the tactical
security of that strategical point.

The fact that Stalingrad was not a main objective will
surprise most people* For in that crucial summer of the
war the fight for Stalingrad filled the minds of the Allied
public. They felt that their own fate was bound up with
it, as much as Russia's.

Further light on this point was provided by Kleist,
who explained: "The capture of Staling! ad was subsidiary
to the main aim. It was only of importance as a convenient
place, in the bottleneck between the Don and the Volga,
where we could block an attack on our flank by Russian
forces coming from the East. At the start Stalingrad was
no more than a name on the map to us." Blumentritt,
however, told me that: "Hitler originally had the idea of
wheeling north from Stalingrad with the aim of getting
astride the rear of the Russian armies at Moscow, but he
was persuaded, after considerable argument, that this was
an impossibly ambitious plan. Some of his entourage

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingra 209

had even been talking about an advance to the Urals,
but that was still more a fantasy. 55

Even as it was, the plan was a hazardous one, and
became more hazardous from the way it worked out in
practice.

Kleist, who commanded the armoured drivre to the
Caucasus, was sent for by Hitler on April 1 — an ominous
date. "Hitler said we must capture the oilfields by the
autumn because Germany could not continue the war
without them. When I pointed out the risks of leaving
such a long flank exposed, he said he was going to draw
on Rumania, Hungary, and Italy for troops to cover it.
I warned him, and so did others, that it was rash to rely
on such troops, but he would not listen. He told me that
these Allied troops would only be used to hold the flank
along the Don from Voronezh to its southerly bend, and
beyond Stalingrad to the Caspian, which, he said, M r ere
the easiest sectors to hold. 35

The warnings, and forebodings, of Hitler's military
executants were justified by the ultimate course of events.
Nevertheless, it has to be recognized that his second-year
gamble did not fall far short of success. The summer of
1942 saw Russia's tide at its lowest ebb. It was fortunate
for her that so much of Germany's initial strength had
evaporated. A little greater impetus might have spread
the many local collapses into a general collapse.

The summer offensive opened with brilliant success.
For the Russians were suffering from their huge losses of
men and equipment in 1941, and their newly-raised armies
had not yet appeared on the scene. The German left wing
made a rapid advance from Kursk to Voronezh, Its
progress was helped because the Russian reserves were
scanty — they mostly lay farther north in the Moscow
sector. Another helpful factor was the Russian offensive
towards Kharkov that had been carried out, with great
persistence, during the month of May. Referring to this,
Blumentritt said: "It used up much of the strength that

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The Other Side of the Hill

might otherwise have been available to meet our offensive. 5 '
He went on: "The 4th Panzer Army was the spearhead of
this advance from Kursk to the Don and Voronezh, The
2nd Hungarian Army then took over that sector, while our
armoured forces swerved south-eastward along the right
bank of the Don. 55

Remembering the stirring reports at the time about the
Russians 5 stubborn defence at Voronezh and the way it
had blocked the German efforts to continue their drive in
that sector, I questioned him further on this score. He
replied: "There was never any intention of pushing beyond
Voronezh and continuing this direct easterly drive. The
orders were to halt on the Don near Voronezh and assume
the defensive there, as flank cover to the south-eastward
advance — which was carried out by the 4th Panzer Army,
backed up by the 6th Army under Paulus."

This slanting drive down the corridor between the
Don and the Donetz helped in turn to screen, and ease
the way for, the thrust of Kleist 5 s 1st Panzer Army,
which was entrusted with the principal r61e* Starting
near Kharkov, it made a rapid advance past Chertkovo
and Millerovo towards Rostov. The 1 7th Army, south of
the Donetz, only joined in the offensive when Kleist
approached Rostov. Relating the story of that lightning
stroke, Kleist told me that his army crossed the Lower
Don above Rostov and then pushed eastward along the valley
of the Manych river. The Russians blew up the dam there
and the consequent floods threatened to upset the German
plans. But his armoured forces succeeded in getting across
the river after two days 5 delay and then swung southward,
in three columns. Kleist himself accompanied the right
column, which reached Maikop as early as the 9th of
August. At the same time his centre and left columns were
approaching the foothills of the Caucasus mountains, 150
miles farther to the south-east. This fan-shaped armoured
drive was backed up by the 1 7th Army, which was pushing
forward on foot.

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 211

Thus in six weeks from the outset the Germans had
reached and captured the more westerly oilfields, but they
never succeeded in reaching the main sources — which lay
beyond the mountains. "The primary cause of our
failure/ 5 Kleist said, "was shortage of petrol. The bulk of
our supplies had to come by rail from the Rostov bottle-
neck, as the Black Sea route was considered unsafe. A
certain amount of oil was delivered by air, but the total
which came through was insufficient to maintain the
momentum of the advance, which came to a halt just
when our chances looked best.

"But that was not the ultimate cause of the failure.
We could still have reached our goal if my forces had not
been drawn away bit by bit to help the attack at Stalingrad.
Besides part of my motorized troops, I had to give up the
whole of my flak corps and all my air force except the
reconnaissance squadrons.

"That subtraction contributed to what, in my opinion,
was a further cause of the failure. The Russians suddenly
concentrated a force of 800 bombers on my front, operating
from airfields near Grozny. Although only about a third
of these bombers were serviceable, they sufficed to put a
brake on my resumed advance, and it was all the more
effective because of my lack of fighters and of flak,"

Paying tribute to the stubbornness of the Russian
defence here, Kleist made an interesting psychological
point. "In the earlier stages of my advance I met little
organized resistance. As soon as the Russian forces were
by-passed, most of the troops seemed more intent to find
the way back to their homes than to continue fighting.
That was quite different to what had happened in 1941
But when we advanced into the Caucasus, the forces we
met there were local troops, who fought more stubbornly
because they were fighting to defend their homes. Their
obstinate resistance was all the more effective because the
country was so difficult for the advance."

Dealing in more detail with the course of operations in

212

The Other Side of the Hill

the later bound — after the capture of Maikop — he went on
to say that the first objective assigned to him was to secure
the whole length of the great highway from Rostov across
the Caucasus mountains to Tiflis. Baku was to be a
second objective. The advance met its first serious check
on the Terek. He then tried to cross this river by a
manoeuvre farther to the east and succeeded. But after
this he was held up again in the very difficult country
beyond the Terek, which was not only precipitous, but
densely wooded. The brake imposed by this frontal
resistance was increased by the exposure of his left flank,
in the Steppes between Stalingrad and the Caspian.

"The Russians brought reserves round from the
southern Caucasus and also from Siberia. These developed
a menace to my flank here, which was so widely stretched
that the Russian cavalry could always penetrate my out-
posts whenever they chose. This flank concentration of
theirs was helped by the railway that the Russians built
across the Steppes, from Astrakhan southward. It was
roughly laid, straight over the level plain without any
foundation. Efforts to deal w r ith the menace by wrecking
the railway proved useless, for as soon as any section of
the railway was destroyed a fresh set of rails was quickly
laid down, and joined up. My patrols reached the shores
of the Caspian, but that advance carried us nowhere, for
my forces in this quarter were striking against an intangible
foe. As time passed and the Russian strength grew in that
area the flanking menace became increasingly serious. 53

Kleist went on trying to reach his objective until
November — by repeated surprise attacks at different points.
After failing to get through from Mozdok he made a
turning movement from Nalchik on his western flank and
succeeded in reaching Ordzhonikidze, in combination
with a converging stroke from Prokhladnaya. He traced
this multiple manoeuvre for me on the map, describing it,
with professional satisfaction, as "a very elegant battle 35 .
For, it he had at last been given a measure of air support.

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Staling? ad 213

But then bad weather held him up, and after a short
interval the Russians counter-attacked. "In this counter-
attack a Rumanian division, which I reckoned as a good
one, suffered a sudden collapse and threw my plan out of
joint. After that, a stalemate set in."

The other generals confirmed Kleist's evidence on the
causes of the failure, especially the shortage of petrol — the
armoured divisions were sometimes at a standstill for weeks
on end, waiting for fresh supplies. Owing to this shortage
the petrol lorries themselves were immobilized and petrol
was brought forward on camels — an ironical revival of the
traditional "ship of the desert 55 . Blumentritt furnished a
supplementary point in saying that the chance of over-
coming the resistance in the mountains was diminished
because most of the Germans' expert mountain troops,
instead of being used to support Kleist, had been em-
ployed to help the 17th Army's advance along the Black
Sea coast towards Batum. "That coastal advance was
less important than von Kleist's thrust, and it was a mistake
to put so much effort into it. When it was checked at
Tuapse, and reinforcements were demanded, some of us
demurred* The argument went on raging. We used to
say, to those who pressed the need of the coastal advance —
'Yes, children, but the oil is over there 5 — pointing to
Baku. But the clamour for the reinforcement of the
Tuapse operations prevailed, with the consequent splitting
of our efforts in the Caucasus, until it was too late. 95

The divergence of effort that took place in the Caucasus
area was repeated, on a greater scale, in the splitting of the
forces between the Caucasus and Stalingrad. But on this
question, too, Blumentritt differed from the prevailing
view. "It was absurd to attempt to capture the Caucasus
and Stalingrad simultaneously in face of strong resistance.
My own preference, which I expressed at the time, was to
concentrate first on taking Stalingrad. I felt that capturing
the oil was less important than destroying the Russian
forces. Although it was not possible to contradict economic

214

The Other Side of the Hill

experts who asserted that it was essential to obtain the
oil, if we were to continue the war, events disproved their
contention. For we managed to carry on the war until
1945 without ever securing the Caucasus oil."

DEFEAT AT STALINGRAD

The supreme irony of the 1942 campaign was that
Stalingrad could have been taken quite early if it had
been considered of prime importance. Kleist's account
revealed this — "The 4th Panzer Army was advancing on
that line, on my left. It could have taken Stalingrad with-
out a fight, at the end of July, but was diverted south to help
me in crossing the Don. I did not need its aid, and it
merely congested the roads I was using. When it turned
north again, a fortnight later, the Russians had gathered
just sufficient forces at Stalingrad to check it."

Never again did the prospect look so bright for the
Germans as in the second half of July, The rapid sweep
of the two panzer armies had not only hustled the Russians
out of successive positions but created a state of confusion
favourable to further exploitation. That accounted for the
ease with which the German armoured forces were able to
gain crossings over the Lower Don. There was hardly
anything to stop them at that moment from driving where
they wished — south-eastward to the Caucasus or north-
eastward to the Volga. Most of the Russian forces were
still to the west of the Lower Don, outstripped in their
retreat by the pace of the panzers.

When the 4th Panzer Army missed the chance of taking
Stalingrad with a rush, through its temporary diversion
south-eastward, the situation began to change. The
Russians had time to rally and collect forces for the defence
of Stalingrad. The Germans, after their first check, had
to wait until the bulk of Paulus's 6th Army had fought its
way forward to the Don, mopped up the Russian forces
that were cornered in the bend of the river, and were
ready to join in a converging attack on Stalingrad. But

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 215

its arrival on the scene was retarded not only because it
was a foot-marching force but because its pushing power
dwindled, as division after division was dropped to guard
the continually extending flank along the Middle Don,

By the time that the more deliberate bid for Stalingrad
began, in the second half of August, the Russians had
collected more reserves there. Check followed check
It was easier for the Russians to reinforce Stalingrad than
the Caucasus, because it was nearer their mam front
Hitler became exasperated at these repeated checks. The
name of the place — "the City of Stalin'* — was a challenge
He drew off forces from his main line, and everywhere else,
in the effort to overcome it — and exhausted his army in the
effort.

The three months 5 struggle became a battle of battering-
ram tactics on the Germans 9 side. The more closely they
converged on the city, the narrower became their scope
for tactical manoeuvre, as a lever in loosening resistance.
At the same time, the narrowing of the front made it
easier for the defender to switch his local reserves to any
threatened point on the defensive arc. The more deeply
the Germans penetrated into the densely built-up area of
the city, the slower their progress became. In the last
stages of the siege the front line was barely half a mile
from the west bank of the Volga, but by then the strength
of their efforts was fading, as a result of very heavy losses.
Each step forward cost more and gained less.

The inherent difficulties of street fighting, in face of
stubborn opponents, tended to outweigh the handicaps
which the defence suffered in this case. The most serious
of these was the fact that reinforcements and supplies had
to come across the Volga by ferries and barges, under
shell-fire. This limited the scale of the forces that the
Russians could use, and maintain, on the west bank for
the defence of the city. In consequence the defenders
were often hard-pressed. The strain on them was the more
severe because the higher command, with cool strategic

2x6

The Other Side of the Hill

calculation, reinforced the direct defence as sparingly as
possible — preferring to concentrate most of its gathering
reserves on the flanks, with a view to a counter-offensive.
In the later stages, only on two occasions did it divert to
Stalingrad itself a division from the armies that it was
assembling for the counter-offensive. The margin by
which the gallant defenders of Stalingrad held on was
narrow, but it sufficed.

The story of the prolonged battle for Stalingrad has
been graphically related from the Russian side. On the
German side, detail is lacking because most of the executive
commanders, as well as their troops, fell into the Russians'
hands. So far as it is known, it appears to have been a
rather dull process of battering at blocks of the city, with
diminishing resources. The hopes of the attackers faded
long before the initiative was wrested from them — but they
were forced to continue trying under Hitler's unrelaxing
demands for renewed efforts.

More historical interest lies in the evidence as to the
way that the push for Stalingrad turned into a trap for
the armies engaged. The collapse of the flanks was fore-
shadowed long before it actually occurred. Emphasizing
this fact Blumentritt said : "The danger to the long stretched
flank of our advance developed gradually, but it became
clear early enough for anyone to perceive it who was not
wilfully blind. Dining August the Russians by degrees
increased their strength on the other side of the Don, from
Voronezh south-eastward. A number of short and sharp
attacks on their part explored the weaknesses of the German
defence along the Don. These exploratory attacks showed
them that the Second Hungarian Army was holding the
sector south of Voronezh, and the Eighth Italian Army
was holding the sector beyond that. The risk became
worse after September, when the Rumanians took over the
more south-easterly sector as far as the Don bend, west of
Stalingrad. There was only a slight German stiffening in
this long 'Allied* front-

Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad 217

"Haider had sent me on a flying visit to the Italian
sector, as an alarming report had come that the Russians
had penetrated it and made a large breach. On investi-
gating it, however, I found the attack had been made by
only one Russian battalion, but an entire Italian division
had bolted. I took immediate steps to close the gap,
filling it with an Alpine division and part of the 6th German
division.

"I speni ten days in that sector and after returning
made a written report to the effect that it would not be
safe to hold such a long defensive flank during the winter.
The railheads were as much as 200 kilometres behind
the front, and the bare nature of the country meant that
there was little timber available for constructing defences.
Such German divisions as were available were holding
frontages of 50 to 60 kilometres. There were no proper
trenches or fixed positions.

"General Haider endorsed this report and urged that
our offensive should be halted, in view of the increasing
resistance that it was meeting, and the increasing signs of
danger to the long-stretched flank. But Hitler would not
listen. During September the tension between the Fuhrer
and Haider increased, and their arguments became
sharper. To see the Fuhrer discussing plans with Haider
was an illuminating experience. The Fuhrer used to
move his hands in big sweeps over the map — Tush here;
push there 9 . It was all vague and regardless of practical
difficulties. There was no doubt he would have liked to
remove the whole General Staff, if he could, by a similar
sweep. He felt that they were half-hearted about his ideas.

"Finally, General Haider made it clear that he refused
to take the responsibility of continuing the advance with
winter approaching. He was dismissed, at the end of
September, and replaced by General Zeitzler — who was
then Chief of Staff to Field- Marshal von Rundstedt in the
West. I was sent to the West to take Zeitzler's place.

"Arriving fresh on the scene, and being newly appointed

2l8

The Other Side of the Hill

to such a high position, Zcitzler did not at first worry the
Fiihrer by constant objections in the way that General
Haider had done. Thus Hitler pursued his aims unchecked,
except by the Russians, and our armies were committed
more deeply. Before long, Zeitzler became gloomy about
the prospect and argued with the Fiihrer that his intention
of maintaining our armies forward near Stalingrad through-
out the winter was impossible. When the outcome proved
the truth of his warnings, the Fuhrer became increasingly
hostile to Zeitzler. He did not dismiss him, but he kept
him at arm's length."

Summing up the situation Blumentritt said: "There
would have been no risk of panic in withdrawing this time,
for the Geiman troops were now properly equipped for
winter fighting, and had got over the fear of the unknown
that had frightened them the year before. But they were
not strong enough to hold on where they were, and the
Russian strength was growing week by week.

"Hitler, however, would not budge. His 'instinct' had
proved right the year before, and he was sure that it would
be justified again. So he insisted on c no withdrawal 9 .
The result was that when the Russians launched their
winter counter-offensive his army at Stalingrad was cut
off, and forced to surrender. We were already too
weakened to bear such a loss. The scales of the war had
turned against Germany. 95

CHAPTER XV

AFTER STALINGRAD

A question that I put to many generals was: "Do you
think that Germany could have avoided defeat after
Stalingrad?" Rundstedt's reply was: "I think so, if the
commanders in the field had been allowed a free hand in
withdrawing when and where they thought fit, instead of
being compelled to hold on too long, as repeatedly hap-
pened everywhere. 55 While Rundstedt himself was not on
the Eastern front after 1941, his position gave him more
detachment of view. Moreover, the fact that he never
took an optimistic view throughout, while having unique
experience of high command on both fronts, gives a par-
ticular value to his opinion on the broad issue. When
putting the same question to the generals who stayed in
the East, I found them much more definite. All felt that
Russia's offensive power could have been worn down by
elastic defence — if they had only been allowed to practise
it* Some gave striking examples.

Kleist cited his own experience in conducting the
retreat from the Caucasus after Paulus's armies had been
trapped at Stalingrad. He was promoted to field-
marshal for his achievement in conducting that retreat
without serious loss, and it would seem to have been better
earned than many who have gained their baton for offensive
successes, as is the normal rule. For it is difficult to think
of any retreat in history that has extricated an army from
such a dangerous position under such extraordinary
difficulties — with the handicap of distance multiplied by
winter, and then again by the pressure of superior forces
pressing down on his flank and rear.

Relating the story of that retreat Kleist said: "Although
our offensive in the Caucasus had reached its abortive

219

220

The Other Side of the Hill

end in November, 1942, when stalemate set in, Hitler
insisted on our staying in that exposed forward position,
deep m the mountains. At the beginning of January a
serious danger to my rear flank developed from an attack
which the Russians delivered from Elista westwards past
the southern end of Lake Manych. This was more serious
than the Russian counter-attacks on my forward position,
near Mozdok, But the greatest danger of all came from
the Russian advance from Stalingrad, down the Don
towards Rostov, far in my rear.

"When the Russians were only 70 kilometres from
Rostov, and my armies were 650 kilometres east of Rostov,
Hitler sent me an order that I was not to withdraw under
any circumstances. That looked like a sentence of doom.
On the next day, however, I received a fresh order — to
retreat, and bring away everything with me in the way
of equipment. That would have been difficult enough in
any case, but became much more so in the depths of the
Russian winter.

"The protection of my flank from Elista back to the
Don had originally been entrusted to the Rumanian Army
Group under Marshal Antonescu. Antonescu himself did
not arrive on the scene, thank God! Instead, the sector
was placed under Manstein, whose 'Army Group South 5
included part of the Rumanian forces. With Manstein ? s
help, we succeeded in withdrawing through the Rostov
bottleneck before the Russians could cut us off. Even
so, Manstein was so hard pressed that I had to send some
of my own divisions to help him in holding off the Russians
who were pushing down the Don towards Rostov. The
most dangerous time of the retreat was the last half of
January. 55

Kleist emphasized how the course of this retreat,
which had appeared hardly possible to achieve, showed
the power of elastic defence. After his forces had got
safely back to the Dnieper, they were able to launch a
counter-offensive that turned the tables on the Russian

After Stalingrad

221

advance westward from Stalingrad and the Don. Thi
riposte recaptured Kharkov and restored the whole
situation on the southern front. A long lull followed,
which lasted until after mid-summer 1943.

That breathing space enabled the Germans to con-
solidate a firm position in the East, and to build up their
strength afresh — not to its former level, but sufficient to
provide a good prospect of holding the Russians at bay.
But Hitler refused to listen to any advice in favour of
changing to a defensive strategy. It was he, not the
Russians, who took the offensive initiative in the summer.
Although his effort was on a more limited scale and
frontage than ever, he threw into it all the resources he
had — employing seventeen armoured divisions in a con-
verging attack on the Russians 9 Kursk salient. Talking
of this offensive, Kleist said that he had little hope of any
good resulting from it, but Kluge and Manstein wno were
put in charge of the pincers stroke seemed to be quite
optimistic beforehand. "If it had beet launched she
weeks earlier it might have been a great success — though
we had no longer the resources to make it decisive. But in
the interval the Russians got wind of the preparations.
They laid deep minefields across their front, while with-
drawing their main forces farther to the real*, so that
comparatively few were left in the bag that our high
command had hoped to enclose/ 5

When this last German offensive had been brought to
a halt, the Russians launched theirs — as a counter-offensive.
They now had ample resources to maintain the momentum,
whereas the Germans in this last gamble had squandered
the strength that might still have enabled them to impose
a prolonged series of checks, and even pioduce a stalemate.
Almost all the mobile reserves were exhausted. Thus the
Russian advance rolled on during the autumn and winter
with only short halts — caused more by out-running its
own supplies than by the Germans' counter-thrusts. The
whole southern front was in a state of flux.

222

The Other Side of the Hill

But on the northern front, where the German forces
had been allowed to remain on the defensive, the Russian
attacks repeatedly broke down in face of the tenacious
and well-knit resistance. I had a striking account of this
period from Heinrici, who then commanded the 4th Army
on the sector from Rogachev to Orsha, astride the great
highway from Moscow to Minsk- Mentioning that he had
been re-reading what I had written about the trends of
modern warfare, he said: "I want to tell you how strongly
I agree, from experience, with your conclusions as to the
superiority of defence over attack in the tactical field.
The problem turns, as you remark, on the ratio of space
to force, I think it may interest you to have some
illustrative examples from my experience.

"After the evacuation of Smolensk, the Russians
advanced to within twenty kilometres of Orsha, where the
troops of the 4th Army were able to check them, after
occupying a hastily-prepared position that consisted of
only one trench line. That autumn we there had to meet
a series of strong Russian offensives, beginning in October
and continuing until December. There were five suc-
cessive offensives, I had ten divisions in my army to hold
a sector that was 150 kilometres wide as the crow flies,
but actually about 200 kilometres allowing for the irregu-
larity of the front. The 4th Army was without any reserves,
and much weakened by the losses it had suffered. But its
artillery was intact — that was a vital asset.

"The main objective of the Russians was the great rail
centre of Orsha — in order to cut the lateral railway from
Leningrad to Kiev. With this aim they concentrated the
weight of their assault on a frontage of 20 kilometres astride
the main highway. In their first offensive they employed
20-22 divisions; in the second 30 divisions; and in the next
three about 36 divisions apiece. Part of them were the
original ones, but most of them were fresh,

"To meet this assault I used 3^ divisions to hold the
20 kilometres frontage where the attack came, leaving 6|

After Stalingrad

223

to hold the remainder of my very wide front. Every
attack was checked. These five successive battles each
lasted five or six days, but the crisis usually came about the
third or fourth day, after which the attack began to peter
out. The Russians did not try any large armoured drive
— because no considerable gap was made in the defences.
The attacks were supported by up to fifty infantry tanks,
but these were always checked

"The Russians usually made about three tries a day —
the first about 9 a.m., after heavy artillery preparations;
the second between 10 and 11; and the third between
2 and 3 in the afternoon. It was almost like clockwork!
There was no question of the Russian troops failing to
advance, until they were stopped by our fire — for they were
driven forward under the compulsion of officers and com-
missars, marching in rear, and ready to turn their pistols
on anyone who shirked. The Russian infantry were badly
trained, but they attacked vigorously.

"In my opinion, there were three main factors that
contributed to the success of the defence. First, I formed
narrow divisional sectors, with a high ratio of force to
space, on the actual frontage of the Russian assault.
Secondly, I managed to form a very powerful artillery
grouping, of 380 guns, to cover the threatened sector.
This was controlled by a single commander, at Army
Headquarters, and was able to concentrate its fire on any
required point of that 20 kilometre frontage. The Russian
offensives were supported by up to a thousand guns, but
their fire was not so concentrated. Thirdly, the losses of
the German divisions engaged — which had to be reckoned
as the equivalent of about one battalion per division in
each day of battle — were compensated by a system of
drawing battalions from the divisions on other parts of
the Army front. I always tried to have three fresh
battalions — one for each of the divisions holding the battle
front — ready behind this before the attack started- The
other battalion of the regiment from which it was drawn

224

The Other Side of the Hill

would follow, together with the regimental staff, and in
this way I would get complete fresh regiments incorporated
in the front, and then complete fresh divisions. The
temporary mixing of divisions was inevitable, and part
of the price of the defensive success, but I always tried to
restore their integrity as soon as possible/ 5

In May, 1944 Heinrici was given command of the
1st Panzer Army together with the 1st Hungarian Army
on the Carpathian front, and with these forces conducted
the retreat to Silesia early m 1945 after the German front
had collapsed in the north. In March, 1945, he was given
command of the Army Group that faced the Russians'
final push for Berlin, With tins he fought the battle of the
Oder and the battle of Berlin.

In this later stage, he said, he had further developed
the defensive methods which he had already described.
"When the Russians were found to be concentrating for
an attack, I withdiew my troops from the first line under
cover of night, to the second line — usually about 2 kilo-
metres behind. The result was that the Russian blow hit
the air, and its further attack did not have the same
impetus. Of course, a necessary condition of success was
to discover the actual intended day of the assault, which I
sought to do by using patrols to secure prisoners. After
the Russian attack had been broken, I continued to hold
the second line as my new forward position, while on the
sectors that had not been attacked the troops moved forward
again to re-occupy the first line. This system worked very
well in the battle of the Oder — the only drawback was
our scanty strength, after so much had been wasted need-
lessly by the rigid defence of positions impossible to hold.

"I never suffered defeat during three years of defensive
battles when I could base my plan on such methods — and
I was proud that I never had to call on the Higher
Command to spare me any of its reserves. I found self-
propelled guns were of the greatest value in applying
these defensive tactics*

After Stalingrad

225

"In the light of my experience, I consider that your
conclusion that the attacker needs a three to one superiority
is under the mark, rather than over it. I would say that,
for success, the attacker needs six to one or seven to one
against a well-knit defence that has a reasonable frontage
to cover. There were times when my troops held their
own against odds of 12 to 1 or even 18 to 1.

"The German defeat in the East was, in my opimon,
due to one main reason — that our troops were compelled
to cover immense spaces without the flexibility, in the
command, that would have enabled them to concentrate
on holding decisive points. Thus they lost the initiative
permanently. I doubt whether we could have worn down
the Russians by pure defence, but might well have been
able to turn the balance by a more mobile kind of warfare,
and by shortening our front so as to release forces that
could be used for effective counter-strokes.

"But the army commanders were never consulted
about the plan or method of defence. Guderian, when
Chief of the General Staff in the last year, had no influence
on Hitler. His predecessor, Zeitzler, had only a very
slight influence. Earlier still, Haider's advice had been
largely disregarded.

"My first experience after taking over command of the
4th Army m 1942, opened my eyes. I withdrew a small
detachment from an awkward position it was holding —
whereupon I received a warning, conveyed through
General von Kluge, then the commander of the Army
Group, that if I did anything of the sort again the least
that would happen to me would be a court-martial.

"Hitler always tried to make us fight for every
yard, threatening to court -martial anyone who didn't. No
withdrawal was officially permitted without his approval
— even a small-scale withdrawal. This principle was so
hammered into the army that it was a common saying
that battalion commanders were afraid c to move a sentry
from the window to the door 5 . These rigid methods

H

226

The Other Side of the Hill

cramped us at every turn. Time after time, forces stayed
in impossible positions until they were surrounded and
captured. But some of us ventured to evade his orders so
far as we could/'

Such evasion was only possible in a local and limited
way. Tippelskirch, who succeeded Heinnci in command of
the 4th Army, bore witness to the value of elastic defence,
but also to the disastrous consequences of being unable to
practise it to an adequate extent. "At Mogilev in March,
1 944, I was commanding the 1 2th Corps — which consisted
of three divisions. In the offensive the Russians then
launched, they used ten divisions in the assault on the
first day, and by the sixth day had used twenty divisions.
Yet they only captured the first line, and were brought to a
halt before the second. In the lull that followed I prepared
a counter-stroke, delivered it by moonlight, and recovered
all the ground that had been lost — with comparatively few
casualties. 5 '

Tippelskirch then went on to relate what happened
in the Russians 5 summer offensive in 1944. He took over
command of the 4th Army three weeks before it opened.
The army commanders on that front begged for permission
to withdraw to the line of the Beresina — a long step back
that would have taken the stmg out of the Russian blow.
But their proposals were rejected* Tippelskiich never-
theless made a short step back on his sector to the line of
the Dnieper, and that sufficed to keep his front intact.
But the fronts of both the armies on his right and left were
ruptured, and a general collapse followed. The retreat
did not stop until the Vistula had been reached, near
Warsaw.

"It would have been much wiser strategy to withdraw
i the whole front in time. The Russians always needed a
long pause for preparation after any German withdrawal,
and they always lost disproportionately when attacking.
A series of withdrawals by adequately large steps would
have worn down the Russian strength, besides creating

After Stalingrad

227

opportunities for counter-strokes at a time when the
German forces were still strong enough to make them
effective.

"Hitler had been justified in his 1941 veto on any
withdrawal, but his great mistake was to repeat it in 1942
and later, when conditions were different. For after the
first year the German Army was well equipped for winter
fighting, and felt quite able to hold its own with the Russians
under these conditions. Thus a strategic withdrawal
would not have shaken its morale. Our troops were
quite capable of carrying out such a manoeuvre in winter.
Besides economizing their own strength, it would have
enabled them to stage a powerful come-back.

"The root cau&e of Germany's defeat was the way that
her forces were wasted in fruitless efforts, and above all
in fruitless resistance at the wrong time and place. That
was due to Hitler. There was no strategy in our campaign."

General Dittmar contributed some interesting points to
the discussion, from his wider and more detached point of
view. As a military commentator he was amazingly
objective in his broadcast commentaries during the war —
more so perhaps than any other military critic anywhere.
This was the more notable because he had to expound the
situation under restrictions, and dangers, far worse than
any Allied commentator had to fear. When I asked him
how he was able to speak so candidly on many occasions,
he told me that he owed this latitude to Fritsche, the
head of radio propaganda, who alone saw his broadcasts
before they were delivered. He had the feeling that
Fritsche had reached an underlying disillusionment with
regard to the Nazi regime, and was glad to give scope to
someone who would express what he secretly felt himself.
Naturally there were many protests, though Fritsche did
his best to shield Dittmar. "I always felt that I was
walking a tight-rope with a noose round my neck."

When I asked Dittmar whether he thought that if the
Germans had adopted a strategy of elastic defence they

228

The Other Side of the Hill

could have worn down the Russians, he replied: "I believe
we could, and the advantages of elastic defence were clear,
but our military chiefs could not apply it properly because
of Hitler's objections. The General Staff were not allowed
to order the construction of lines in rear, or even to discuss
plans in case of being driven back. They were forbidden
to make any preparatory plans for a withdrawal. In
1 943 5 however, they managed to do a little preparatory
work on the quiet, by circulating instructions in discreetly
worded leaflets These leaflets were distributed among
the various armies, but without any imprint to show that
they emanated from the General Staff. 95

I asked Dittmar whether any strategic withdrawal was
attempted on the German side, prior to the launching of
the great Russian offensive in July, 1943, or again before
that of January, 1945- He replied: "No. Each was a
case of an absolute break-through, owing to the strategy
that Hitler imposed. Some of the commanders of the
lower foimations were shrewd enough to evade his rule
that every place was to be held at all costs, and carried out
short withdrawals on their own, but others clung on in
strict obedience to orders, and as a result their troops were
cut off and captured. The disaster in each case was due
to the fundamental error of a rigidly defensive strategy.
That disaster was all the worse in the case of the Russian
offensive from the Vistula m January, 1945, because the
reserves that had been held ready to meet the threat
were taken away at the critical moment and dispatched
to the relief of Budapest. 55 They comprised three of the
best-equipped armoured divisions available.

"The policy of clinging on at all costs in particular
places repeatedly changed the campaign for the worse.
The attempt to cement one threatened breach in the general
front repeatedly caused fresh breaches. In the end that
proved fatal."

CHAPTER XVI

THE RED ARMY

The German generals 5 impressions of the Red Army were
interesting, and often illuminating. The best appreciation
in a concise form came from Kleisl : "The men were first-
rate fighters from the start, and we owed our success simply
to superior training. They became first-rate soldiers with
experience. They fought most toughly, had amazing
endurance, and could carry on without most of the things
other armies regarded as necessities. The Staff were
quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became
highly efficient/ 9

Some of the other German generals disagreed, and said
that the Russian infantry in general remained rather poor,
tactically and technically, though the tank forces were
formidable. I noted, however, that the more critical
opinions came from generals who had been on the northern
half of the front — which suggests that the more skilled
part of the Red Army operated in the south. On the
other hand, the guerrillas seem to have been more active
behind the German front in the north, and by 1944 had
forced the Germans there to abandon the use of all except
a few of the trunk roads as supply routes. Tippelskirch,
whose 4th Army was cut off on the northern Dnieper by
the Russian summer offensive that year, told me that he
extricated it by making a detour southwards towards the
Pripet Marshes, after the main line of retreat to Minsk
had been blocked, moving by way of roads which had long
been abandoned because of guerrilla interference. "I
found every single bridge on the route had been broken,
and had to repair them in the course of my retreat."

Talking of his four years 5 experience of the Northern
front, he remarked: "Our infantry lost their fear of the

229

230 The Other Side of the Hill

Russian infantry in 1941, but they remained fearful of
being taken prisoner — and sent to Siberia or worse. This
fear helped to stiffen their resistance, but it had an insidious
effect as time went on, particularly when they were
compelled by Hitler's order to remain in isolated forward
positions where they were bound eventually to be cut off,"

I asked Rundstedt what he considered were the strong
and weak points of the Red Army, as he found it in 1941.
His reply was: "The Russian heavy tanks were a surprise
in quality and reliability from the outset. But the Russians
proved to have less artillery than had been expected, and
their air force did not offer serious opposition in that
first campaign."

Talking more specifically of the Russian weapons
Kleist said: "Their equipment was very good even in
1941, especially the tanks. Their artillery was excellent,
and also most of the infantry weapons— their rifles were
more modern than ours, and had a more rapid rate of
fire. Their T.34 tank was the finest in the world. 5 * In
my talks with Manteuffel, he emphasized that the Russians
maintained their advantage in tank design and that in the
"Stalin" tank, which appeared in 1944, they had what he
considered the best tank that was seen in battle, anywhere,
up to the end of the war. British experts have criticized
the Russian tanks for lacking the refinements, and gadgets,
desirable in various operational respects — especially for
wireless control. But the German tank experts considered
that the British and Americans tended to sacrifice too
much in the way of power and performance for these
refinements.

On the equipment side Kleist said that the Russians 5
weakest period had been in 1942. They had not been
able to make up their 1941 losses, and throughout the
year were very short of artillery in particular. "They
had to use mortars, brought up on lorries, to compensate
their lack of artillery. 55 But from 1943 on their equip-
ment position became better and better. While the

The Red Army

231

inpouring flow of Allied supplies was a big factor, especially
in motor transport, the increasing production of the new
Russian factories in the East, out of reach, accounted for
even more* The tanks employed were almost entirely of
their own manufacture.

A rather surprising feature of the campaign in the East
was that the Russians did not make any effective use of
airborne forces, although they had led the world in the
development of this new arm — which had played a promi-
nent part in their Army Manoeuvres in pre-war years. I
discussed this question with Student, who replied: "I
often wondered why the Russians never used their para-
chute troops The reason, I imagine, may have been that
their training was insufficient — due to lack of practice in
navigation as well as in dropping. All they did in this
way was to drop agents and small parties for sabotage
behind our front. 55

Coming to the question of leadership I asked Rundstedt
which were the best of the Russian generals in his experi-
ence. He replied: "None were any good in 1941. Of
Budenny, who commanded the armies facing me, a cap-
tured Russian officer aptly remarked — c He is a man with
a very large moustache, but a very small brain/ But in
later years there is no doubt of the improvement in their
generalship. Zhukoy was very good. It is interesting to
recall that he first studied strategy in Germany under
General von Seeckt — this was about 1921-23."

Dittmar, who in his position as the leading military
commentator was best placed to gather the consensus of
opinion among the German generals, said that Zhukov
was regarded as outstanding. Koniev was good, a clever
tactician, but not quite on the same level. "As the war
went on, the Russians developed an increasingly high
standard of leadership from top to bottom. One of their
greatest assets was their officers' readiness to learn, and
the way they studied their job." He added that the
Russians could afford to make mistakes, because of their

232 The Other Side of the Hill

immense superiority of strength, in a way that the Germans
could not.

This verdict on the Russian generals was questioned
by some of their German opponents, especially those who
had been on the Northern front. Broadly speaking, the
run of opinion seemed to be that the top and bottom of
the Russian ladder of command became the strongest
sections, while the middle piece was shaky* The top rungs
were filled by men who had proved themselves so able
that they were allowed to exercise their own judgment,
and could safely insist on doing things in their own way.
The bottom rungs were filled by junior officers who,
within their limited sphere, tended to develop a good
tactical sense, because the incompetent soon became
casualties in a field that was ruled by the hard realities
of the enemy's bullets and shells. But the intermediate
commanders, even more than most armies, were con-
cerned with other factors. Their superiors 5 orders and
judgments were more to be feared than the enemy.

In this connection one of the German army commanders
on the northern front made a significant comment: "It
was usually safe to encourage the Russians to attack, so
long as the defence was elastically designed. The Russians
were always very bull-headed in their offensive methods,
repeating their attacks again and again. This was due to
the way their leaders lived m fear of being considered
lacking m determination if they broke off their attack."

As regards the general characteristics of the Russian
soldier, Dittmar gave me an illuminating sidelight when
I asked him what he considered was the Russians' chief
asset. "I would put first, what might be called the soulless
indifference of the troops — it was something more than
fatalism. They were not quite so insensitive when things
went badly for them, but normally it was difficult to make
any impression on them in the way that would happen
with troops of other nations. During my period of
command on the Finnish front there was only one instance

The Red Army

233

where Russian troops actually surrendered to my own.
While that extraordinary stolidity made the Russians very
difficult to conquer it was also their chief weakness in a
military sense — because in the earlier campaigns it often
led to them being encircled."

Dittmar added: "On Hitler's specific orders, an attempt
was later made m the German Army to inculcate the same
mental attitude that prevailed m the Red Army. We
tried to copy the Russians in this respect, while the Russians
copied us, more successfully, in tactics. The Russians
could afford to tram their troops in this attitude because
losses mattered little to them, and the troops were
accustomed to do implicitly what they were told. 3 9

Blumentiitt, who was fond of discoursing philosophically
and historically on all these subjects, gave me his impressions
at greater length, starting with his experience in the First
World War.

"In 1 9 14-18, as a lieutenant, I fought for the first two
years against the Russians, after a brief contact with the
French and Belgians at Namur in August, 1914. In our
very first aitack on the Russian front, we quickly realized
that here we were meeting essentially different soldiers
from the French and Belgian — hardly visible, entrenched
with consummate skill, and resolute! We suffered
considerable losses.

"In those days it was the Russian Imperial Army.
Hard, but good-natured on the whole, they had the habit
of setting fire on military principle to taverns and villages, in
East Prussia when they were forced to withdraw, just as
they always did thereafter m their own country. When the
red glow from the burning villages lit up the horizon at
evening, we knew that the Russians were leaving.
Curiously, the population did not seem to complain.
That was the Russian way, and had been so for centuries.

"When I referred to the bulk of the Russian Army as
good-natured, I am speaking of their European troops.
The much harder Asiatic troops, the Siberian corps, were

234

The Other Side of the Hill

cruel in their behaviour. So, also, were the Cossacks.
Eastern Germany had plenty to suffer on this score in
1914.

"Even in 19 14-18 the greater hardness of war condi-
tions in the East had its effect on our own troops. Men
preferred to be sent to the Western rather than the Eastern
front. In the West it was a war of material and mass-
artillery — Verdun, the Somme, and so on. These factors
were paramount, and very gruelling to endure, but at
least we were dealing with Western adversaries. In the
East there was not so much shell-fire, but the fighting was
more dogged, as the human type was much harder. Night
fighting, hand-to-hand fighting, fighting in the forests,
were particularly fostered by the Russians. In that war
there was a saying current among German soldiers: 'In
the East the gallant Army is fighting; in the West the
Fire Brigade is standing by. 5

"It was in this war, however, that we first learnt to
realize what 'Russia* really means. The opening battle in
June, 1 94 1, revealed to us for the first time the new Soviet
Army. Our casualties were up to fifty per cent. The
Ogpu and a women's battalion defended the old citadel at
Brest-Litovsk for a week, fighting to the last, in spite of
bombardment with our heaviest guns and from the air.
Our troops soon learnt to know what fighting the Russians
meant. The Fuhrer and most of our highest chiefs didn't
know. That caused a lot of trouble

"The Red Army of 1941-45 was far harder than the
Czar's Army, for they were fighting fanatically for an idea.
That increased their doggedness, and in turn made our
own troops hard, for in the East the maxim held good —
'You or P. Discipline in the Red Army was far more
rigorous than in the Czar's Army. These are examples of
the sort of order that we used to intercept — and they
were blindly obeyed. 'Why do you fail to attack, I
order you for the last time to take Strylenko otherwise I
fear for your health.' 'Why is your regiment not in the

The Red Army

235

initial position for attack? Engage at once unless you
want to lose your head. 9 In such ways we were brought to
realize the inexorable character of our opponents. We
had no idea in 1941 that within a few years it would be
much the same with us.

"Wherever Russians have appeared in the history of
war, the fight was hard, ruthless, and involved heavy
losses. Where the Russian makes a stand or defends
himself, he is hard to defeat, and it costs a lot of bloodshed.
As a child of nature he works with the simplest expedients.
As all have to obey blindly, and the Slav- Asiatic character
only understands the absolute, disobedience is non-
existent. The Russian commanders can make incredible
demands on their men in every way — and there is no
murmuring, no complaint.

"The East and the West are two worlds, and they
cannot understand each other. Russia is a dumb question
mark on the Sphinx. The Russians can keep their mouths
shut, and their minds are closed to us."

Blumentritt's reflections touched on a point that
played a part almost as great as morale. For all the
generals emphasized that the Russians' greatest asset was
the way they could do without normal supplies, Man-
teuffel, who led many tank raids deep behind their front,
gave the most vivid picture — "The advance of a Russian
Army is something that Westerners can't imagine. Behind
the tank spearheads rolls on a vast horde, largely mounted
on horses. The soldier carries a sack on his back, with dry
crusts of bread and raw vegetables collected on the march
from the fields and villages. The horses eat the straw
from the house roofs — they get very little else. The
Russians are accustomed to carry on for as long as three
weeks in this primitive way, when advancing. You
can't stop them, like an ordinary army, by cutting their
communications, for you rarely find any supply columns
to strike. 59

CHAPTER XVII

PARALYSIS IN NORMANDY

For Britain and the United States the landing in Normandy
was the supreme venture. The story of it has been
abundantly told from their points of view. It is more
illuminating to follow the course of the invasion from
"the other side of the hill 5 '. During the first month, the
opposing Commander-in-Chief was Field- Marshal von
Rundstedt, who had been in command of the Western
theatre since early in 1942. He gave me his account.
At the start of the second month Rundstedt was replaced
by Field- Marshal von Kluge, who held the post until the
collapse came. He is dead — after the collapse he swallowed
a dose of poison in despair, a nd fear of Hitler. But General
Blumentntt was Chief of Staff to both throughout this
crucial campaign, and I had a very detailed account
from him of events during both periods.

Under Rundstedt and Kluge in turn, the battle to check
the invasion was conducted by Field-Marshal Rommel
commanding Army Group "B", which stretched from
Brittany to Holland. Rommel, too, is dead. But I was
able to gain light on his part in the Normandy campaign
from members of his staff — and get a check on each of
the higher commanders 5 accounts from other generals
who were on the scene.

Seeing the battle through the opponent's eyes is the
most dramatic way of seeing it. It is different in one
important respect from "looking at it through the opposite
end of the telescope 5 \ For instead of being minimized,
the picture is magnified — with startling vividness.

Looking at the invasion problem from the English
shore, it appeared tremendously formidable. Looking at

236

Paralysis in Normandy 237

it from the French shore, as the enemy saw it, one could
better appreciate the very different feelings of those who
faced the threat of invasion by Powers which held the
command of the sea, and of the air. "I had over 3,000
miles of coastline to cover/ 3 Rundstedt told me, "from the
Italian frontier in the south to the German froniier in
the north, and only 60 divisions with which to defend it.
Most of them were low-grade divisions, and some of them
were skeletons. 3 '

The figure of 60 would not "go" into 3,000 miles on
any strategic calculation. It spelt fifty miles per division,
even without allowing for the need of reserves behind.
That was an impossible proposition. In the 1914-18 war
it used to be considered that 3 miles per division was the
safety limit against any strong attack. The power of
modern defence had increased since then at least double,
perhaps treble — even so, the number of divisions available
was far too small to cover the whole frontage with any
degree of security.

The chances thus depended on guessing correctly
where the Allies were likely to make their landing.
Unlikely sections of the coastline had to be left almost
defenceless in order to have any appreciable cover for the
more probable stretches. Even then, these could only be
held thinly if reserves were to be kept back for counter-
attack at the actual points of landing within the sector —
when these were clearly known.

Rundstedt and Blumentritt emphasized to me how
much more difficult their problem was made by Hitler's
readiness to imagine that the invasion might come any-
where on the circumference of occupied Europe, and his
inclination to scout the shipping factors.

PRELUDE

I asked the Field- Marshal whether he had expected an
Allied invasion of the West at any time prior to when it
actually came. He replied: "I was surprised that you did

238

The Other Side of the Hill

not attempt an invasion in 1941 while our armies were
advancing deep into Russia. But at that time I was myself
on the Eastern front, and out of touch with the situation
in the West. When I came there, and knew the situation
better, I did not expect an early invasion, for I realized
that your resources were not sufficient* 3 3 Rundstedt's
reference to his 1941 view would appear to bear out earlier
reports that he then got on Hitler's nerves by his warnings
about leaving the German rear exposed — a risk which
Hitler sought to cover by sending Rundstedt to take charge
in the West. Rundstedt's sphere of responsibility stretched
from the Dutch-German frontier to the Franco-Italian
frontier.

In answer to a further question, the Field-Marshal said
he did not imagine that the landing at Dieppe, in August,
1942, portended an actual invasion. He thought it was
merely an experimental attack, to test the coastal defences,
When I questioned Blumentritt on the same point he gave
a somewhat different answer — "I was not in the West
at the time, but I heard a lot about the landing after my
arrival, at the end of September, to succeed General
Zeitzler as Chief of Staff there. The German Command
was not sure whether it was merely a raid, or whether it
might have been followed up with larger reinforcements if
it had been more successful at the outset." It would
seem that both Zeitzler and Keitel took a serious view
of it*

Continuing his account, Rundstedt said: "I expected
an invasion in 1943, once we had occupied the whole of
France. For I thought you would take early advantage
of this extensive stretching of the German forces in the
West."

Blumentritt amplified this point: "After the Allied
landings in French North Africa — in November, 1942 —
the Fuhrer's order for us to advance into the unoccupied
part of France was prompted by his conviction that the
Allies would go on from Africa to invade southern France.

Paralysis in Normandy

239

It was reckoned that they would land on ihe Mediter-
ranean coast, and that the Vichy Government would not
oppose them. The occupation took place without any
great friction, and the only casualties were caused by
partisans — whose activities were already becoming uncom-
fortable. Field- Marshal von Rundstedt himself went on
alone ahead of his troops in order to arrange at Vichy
that the occupation should be carried out peacefully, so as
to avoid useless losses to both sides. He succeeded in that
purpose. 55

1943 — "the year of uncertainty"

"After the fall of Tunis in May/ 3 Blumentritt said,
"Hitler became increasingly anxious about the possibility
of a landing in the south of France. In fact, that year
Hitler was constantly on the jump — at one moment he
expected an invasion in Norway, at another moment in
Holland, then near the Somme, or Normandy and Brittany,
in Portugal, in Spain, in the Adriatic. His eyes were
hopping all around the map.

"He was particularly concerned about the possibility
of a pincer-type invasion, with simultaneous landings in
the south of France and the Bay of Biscay. He also feared
a stroke to capture the Balearic Islands, followed by a
landing at Barcelona and an advance from there north-
ward into France. He was so impressed with the risks
of an Allied invasion of Spain that he ordered strong
German forces to be sent to the Pyrenees to meet it. At
the same time he insisted that the German forces must be
careful to observe the strictest neutrality, and avoid any
offence to Spain.

"We soldiers, however, did not share some of his
apprehensions. We thought it was unlikely that the British
High Command would attempt a landing in the Bay of
Biscay as it was outside the range of air support from
England. We also discounted the Spanish possibilities,
for several reasons — we doubted whether the Allies would

240

The Other Side of the Hill

risk incurring Spain's hostility, and in any case it was un-
favourable country for large-scale operations, the com-
munications being bad, and the Pyrenees forming a barrier
beyond. Moreover, we were on friendly terms with the
Spanish generals along the Pyrenean frontier, and while they
let us know clearly that they would resist any German in-
vasion, they were helpful in providing us with information. 9 '

Blumentntt, however, went on to say that while the
generals discounted some of the threats that worried Hitler,
they thought a landing would come somewhere. "This
year showed every sign of being the one for the expected
invasion. Rumours grew stronger throughout 1943 that
an invasion was coming. They reached us largely from
foreign diplomatic sources — from the Rumanian, Hun-
garian, and Japanese military attaches, as well as from
Vichy quarters."

It would seem that rumour was more effective than
planned deception in playing on the mind of the enemy
command. In one of my talks with Rundstedt, I asked
him whether he thought that a cross-Channel invasion
was coming in September that year — at that time we made
an elaborate feint, moving large forces down to the south
coast of England, and making an appearance of embarking
them. He replied, with a smile: "The movements you
made at that time were too obvious — it was evident that
they were a bluff/ 3

That too apparent piece of stage-play tended to relieve
the anxieties of the German Command, by its indication
that the Allies were putting off the attempt. Since autumn
gales were about due, it meant that the German garrisons
of France might count upon another winter's respite
before the storm broke upon them. It was a partial relief
after a long period of strained alertness,

"In brief, 1943 might be summed up as 'the year of
uncertainty and insecurity',' 5 remarked Blumentritt. "Its
difficulties were increased because the Resistance move-
ment in France had by then become very formidable, and

Paralysis in Normandy

241

was causing us many casualties, as well as serious strain.
It had not amounted to much in 1942. It was then divided
into three distinct groups — Communists, Gaulhsts and
Giraudists. Fortunately for us, these three groups were
antagonistic to one another, and often brought us informa-
tion about one another's activities. But from 1943 onwards
they became united — with Britain directing their operations
and supplying them with arms by air. 35

CHANGING THE GUARD

During 1943 various alterations were made in the
defence scheme to meet invasion, under the handicap of
limited resources. For France had been used as a con-
valescent home where divisions exhausted in the Eastern
campaign could recuperate and reorganize. Describing
the steps, Blumentritt said: ' 'Up to 1943 there had been
fifty to sixty divisions in France which were repeatedly
being replaced by badly-damaged divisions from the
Russian front. This continual interchange was detrimental
to a proper system of defence on the coast. So permanent
coast-defence divisions were formed, with a specialized
organization adapted to their particular sectors. This
system had the advantage of ensuring that they were well
acquainted with the sector they had to guard, and it also
enabled the most economic use of the limited equipment
available in the West. But it had inevitable weaknesses.
The officers and men were mostly of the older classes, and
their armament was on a lower scale than in the active
divisions. It included a large proportion of captured
French, Polish, and Yugo-Slav weapons, which fired
differing kinds of ammunition — so that supplies were
more liable to run out, at awkward moments, than in the
case of standard weapons. Most of these divisions had
only two infantry regiments, with two field batteries
comprising 24 pieces in all, and one medium battery of
12 pieces. As the artillery was horse-drawn it had little
mobility.

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The Other Side of the Hill

"Besides these coast-defence divisions there was the
coastal artillery. But this, whether naval or military,
came under the Naval Gommand — which was always
inclined to disagree with the Army Command."

A fresh complication arose at the end of the year with
RommePs entry on the scene. He had previously been for
a short time in command of the German forces that occu-
pied Northern Italy, but in November he was appointed
by Hitler to inspect and improve the coast defences from
Denmark to the Spanish frontier. After dealing with
those in Denmark he moved to France just before Christmas
— which brought him into Rundstedt's sphere. He
worked under special instructions from Hitler, yet without
any clear definition about his relationship to Rundstedt.
Controversy naturally developed, and the more inevitably
because their ideas differed.

Blumentritt's comment was: 5 'Soon, the armies did not
know whether they were under the command of Rundstedt
or Rommel, as the latter wanted his ideas on coast defence
to be put into practice everywhere. To solve the problem,
Rundstedt suggested that Rommel should take over execu-
tive charge of the most important sector of the front along
the Channel, from the Dutch-German border to the Loire,
while the Southern front from the Loire to the Alps
would be entrusted to Blaskowitz — both being under
Rundstedt as supreme commander. Under RommePs
Army Group "B" would be placed the troops in Holland;
the 15th Army, holding from there to the Seine; and the
7th Army, from the Seme to the Loire. Blaskowitz's Army
Group "G" comprised the 1st Army, covering the Bay of
Biscay and the Pyrenees, and the 19th Army, covering the
Mediterranean coast. 59

According to RommePs staff, the proposal came from
him — "as the only way of putting his ideas into execution
quickly". In any case the arrangement was sanctioned,
about a month after his arrival. It went some way to ease
the situation, although the difference of views between

Paralysis in Normandy

243

Rundstedt and Rommel was not compatible with a real
solution.

Speaking to me of Rommel, Rundstedt said — "He was
a brave man, and a very capable commander in small
operations, but not really qualified for high command/ 5
But he had no complaint of Rommel's loyalty. "When I
gave an order Rommel obeyed it without making any
difficulty. 55 On the other hand, it would appear that
Rundstedt was almost too scrupulous in refraining from
interference in what he regarded as his subordinate's
proper sphere of responsibility. Hence he hesitated to
overrule Rommel on matters where his own view was
basically different, and where RornmeFs decisions were
bound to have a far-reaching effect on his own steps.

Here I would remark that the more I saw of Rundstedt
the better impression he made. That was due to indirect
as well as direct evidence. His seniority might have partly
explained the high respect, but not the deep affection he
inspired among those who shared his captivity. He has a
rather orthodox mind, not only in the operational sphdre,
but it is an able and sensitive mind, backed by a character
that makes him outstanding. He is dignified without being
arrogant, and essentially aristocratic in outlook — giving
that term its best sense. He has an austere appearance
that is offset by a pleasant smile and a nice gleam of
humour. This frequently comes out. Walking back with
him on one occasion to his cramped little room, after
passing through the heavily barbed-wire gate into the
inner compound, we came to the front door. I motioned
him to go in first. He replied to this gesture, with a smile :
"Oh, no — this is my house 55

WHERE?

When 1944 came it was clear that the mam invasion
would be launched from England, because of the scale
of the American forces which were being transported there.
But it was more difficult to determine where the landings

244

The Other Side of the Hill

would be made in France. "Very little reliable news came
out of England/ 5 Blumentritt told me. "All that side of
the Intelligence was directed by O.K.W. under Hitler,
not by us — and was carried out by a special branch of the
S.D. We were dependent on them for our information,

"They gave us reports of where, broadly, the British
and American forces respectively were assembled in
southern England — there were a small number of German
agents in England, who reported by wiieless transmitting
sets what they observed. But they found out very little
beyond that. We were so weak in the air that recon-
naissance over England was very limited. Towards D-day,
however, night-flying 'planes reported large movements of
transport towards the south-west coast — which they could
follow because the vehicles had their headlights on. 95
(Presumably these were American troops, as the western
half of Southern England was occupied by them,) "We
also intercepted a wireless message from the British Fleet
which gave us an indication that something important was
about to take place in the Channel.

"Another hint came from the increased activity of the
^Resistance* in France. We captured several hundred
wireless transmitters, and were able to discover the bearing
of the code phrases used in communicating with England.
The messages were veiled, but the broad significance was
evident.

"But nothing we learnt gave us a definite clue where the
invasion was actually coming. We had to depend on our
own judgment in that vital respect. 5 '

Blumentritt then told me: "Our Naval Staff always
insisted that the Allies would land near a big port. They
anticipated an attack on Le Havre — not only because of its
value as a port, but because it was the base for our midget
submarines. We soldiers did not agree with their view.
We doubted whether the Allies would make a direct
attack on such a well-fortified place. Moreover, we had
inlormation about a big exercise carried out in southern

Paralysis in Normandy

245

England, where the troops had been disembarked on a
flat and open coastline.

"From this we deduced that the Allies would not try
to attack a port at the outset. But we had no idea, nor
any report, that they were developing artificial harbours —
the Mulberries. We thought you were probably intending
to lay your ships side by side, to form a bridge over which
stores could be unloaded and carried ashore to the beaches/ 5

Rundstedt said frankly: "I thought the invasion would
come across the narrower part of the Channel, between
Le Havre and Calais — rather than between Caen and Cher-
bourg. I expected the landing to take place on either
side of the estuary of the Somme. I thought the first
landing might take place on the west side, between Le
Treport and Le Havre, followed by a further landing
between the Somme and Calais "

I asked Rundstedt his reasons for tins calculation. He
replied: "The Somme-Calais area seemed to us so much
better, strategically, from your point of view — because it
was so much closer to Germany. It was the quickest route
to the Rhine. I reckoned you could get there in four
days. 55

His reasoning suggested that his calculation was
governed by a preconceived view, based on the assumption
that the Allies would take what was theoretically the best
line, regardless of the practical difficulties. I remarked
to him that, for the same reasons, it was likely to be the
most strongly defended sector — surely a good reason why
the Allies were likely to avoid it.

He admitted the point but answered: "The strength of
the defences was absurdly overrated. The 6 Atlantic Wall 5
was an illusion, conjured up by propaganda — to deceive
the German people as well as the Allies. It used to make
me angry to read the stories about its impregnable defences.
It was nonsense to describe it as a 'wall 5 . Hitler himself
never came to visit it, and see what it really was. For that
matter the only time he came to the Channel coast in the

246

The Other Side of the Hill

whole war was back in 1940 when he paid a visit on one
occasion to Gap Gris Nez." I remarked: "And looked
across at the English coast, like Napoleon? 59 Rundstedt
nodded, with an ironical smile.

Rundstedt went on to say that another reason for his
anticipation that the invasion would come in the Somme-
Calais area was that we should be forced to attack the
area where V-weapons were located at the earliest possible
moment, in order to save London from destruction. He
was told that the effect of these weapons would be much
greater than it was in reality. Hitler built excessive hopes
on them, and that affected strategic calculations*

It was Hitler, however, who guessed that the Allied
landings would come in Normandy. Blumentritt revealed
this, "At the end of March O.K.W. issued instructions
which showed that Hitler expected an invasion of Nor-
mandy. From that time onward we received repeated
warnings about it, starting with the words — 'The Ftihrer
fears . . .' I don't know what led him to that conclusion.
But as a result the 91st Air-landing Division with some
tank squadrons was moved down there, and posted in
reserve behind the Cherbourg Peninsula — near Carentan."

Members of Rommel's staff had told me that he likewise
anticipated that our landings would take place in Nor-
mandy, in contrast to Rundstedt's view. I asked Rundstedt
and Blumentritt about this, and they said it was correct.
Rommel came round to that view increasingly in the spring.
They did not know how far it was his own judgement, or
influenced by Hitler's repeated warnings — "Watch
Normandy".

It would seem that Hitler's much derided c intuition"
was nearer the mark than the calculations of the ablest
professional soldiers. They were unduly influenced by
their tendency to go by what was the proper course in
orthodox strategic theory — or by a conviction that the
Allied planners were sure to do the conventional thing.
The value of doing the "unexpected" was overlooked.

Paralysis in Normandy

247

In this connection, Rundstedt made a significant dis-
closure in answer to one of my questions* "If the Allies
had landed in western France, near the Loire, they could
have succeeded very easily — both in establishing a large
enough bridgehead, and then driving inland. I could not
have moved a single division there to stop them/' Blumen-
tritt added: "Such a landing would have met practically
no opposition. There weie only three divisions covering
300 miles of coast south of the Loire, and two of them
were training divisions composed of raw recruits. A
company commander on that coast had to cycle all day
in covering his company sector. We regarded the Loire
area as too far from England for air support, and thus
assumed it was unlikely the Allied Command would
attempt to land there — knowing how much they were
inclined to count on ensuring maximum air cover."

On the same reasoning the German Command, except
Rommel, thought that a landing in Normandy was less
likely than where the Channel was narrower, and air
support easier. Rundstedt said, too: "We thought that
any landing in Normandy would be limited to an attempt
to capture Cherbourg. The American landing near here
was thus less unexpected than the British landing round
Caen. 55

THE GERMAN DISPOSITIONS

In June, 1944, there were (to be exact) 59 German
divisions in the West — eight of these being in Holland and
Belgium. More than half the total were coast-defence or
training divisions. Of the 27 field divisions, only 10 were
armoured — three of these were in the south, and one
near Antwerp.

Along the 200 mile stretch of the Normandy coast,
west of the Seine, stood six divisions (four of them merely
coast-defence). Three of these were in the Cherbourg
Peninsula, two held the forty-mile stretch between there
and Caen — from the Vire to the Orne — and one was

248 The Other Side of the Hill

between the Orne and the Seine. Blumentritt commented :
"The dispositions would more truly be described as
'coast-protection* rather than as 'defence 5 ! As we did not
anticipate that any landing would be made on the west
side of the Cherbourg Peninsula, that sector was held
very lightly — we even put Russian units there/ 5

There was one armoured division in the forward area,
for counter-attack. This was the 21st Panzer Division.
"There were prolonged arguments/ 5 Blumentritt said, "as
to where the 21st Panzer Division should be placed.
Field-Marshal von Rundstedt would have preferred it to
be south of St. Lo, behind the Cherbourg Peninsula.
But Rommel chose to put it nearer the coast and on the
other flank, close to Caen. This meant that it was too
near the coast to be really available as a reserve for the
sector as a whole. 55

Nevertheless, the presence of that division near Caen
proved an important factor. But for it, the British might
have captured Caen on the first day of the landing.
Rommel begged in vain for a second armoured division to
be at hand near the mouth of the Vire — where the
Americans landed.

Here we are brought to the great controversy that
vitally affected the German plans to meet the invasion.
Rundstedt felt that, with forces so limited and a coastline
so long, it was not possible to prevent the Allies achieving
a landing. He relied, therefore, on a powerful counter-
offensive to throw them out — after they had committed
themselves, but before they were well established.

Rommel, on the other hand, felt that the only chance
lay in defeating the invaders on the coast, before they were
properly ashore. "The first twenty-four hours will be
decisive, 55 he often said to his Staff. Blumentritt, though
of the opposite school, explained Rommel's reasons to me
most fairly: "Rommel had found in Africa that the tanks
were apt to be too far back for delivering a counter-attack
at the critscal moment. He also felt that if the panzer

Paralysis in Normandy

249

reserves were kept far back inland, as the Commander-in-
Chief preferred, their move-up would be interrupted by
the Allied air force.' 5 From Rommel's own Staff I learnt
that he was greatly influenced by the memory of the way
he had been nailed down for days on end in Africa by
an air force that was not nearly so strong as what he now
had to face.

But neither Rundstedl's nor RommePs plan prevailed-
Each was prevented from doing what he thought best.

"Before the Allied invasion/ 5 Rundstedt said, "I had
wanted to evacuate the whole of southern France up to
the Loire, and bring back the forces there to form a strong
mass of manoeuvre with which I could strike back at the
Allies. This would have provided ten or twelve infantry
divisions and three or four armoured divisions to fight a
mobile battle. But Hitler would not listen to such an
idea — though it was the only way in which I could hope
to foim a proper reserve. All the newspaper talk about
'Rundstedt's Central Army' was sheer nonsense — that
Army did not exist. Worse still, I was not even allowed
a free hand with the handful of armoured divisions that
were available in France. I could not move one of them
without Hitler's permission."

But Rommel was also narrowly restricted in applying
his different idea. That was not really due to Rundstedt
but to lack of reserves. He was allowed to place his
divisions where he wished. As Rundstedt said to me —
"While I did not like them being so near the coast, it
would not have been right for me to interfere with the
commander on the spot in such matters of detail — it was
only Hitler who interfered in that way." But Rommel
had only three armoured divisions for his whole front,
from the Loire to the Scheldt — one for the Eastern, one
for the Central and one for the Western sector. These had
not nearly the number of tanks that a British or American
armoured division possessed. It was a very light punch
with which to counter a powerful invasion.

250 The Other Side of the Hill

The chances were further diminished by earlier neglect
to develop the coast defences. From Rommel's staff I
heard of the feverish efforts he made in the Spring of 1 944
to hasten the construction of under-water obstacles, bomb-
proof bunkers, and mine-fields along the Normandy coast
— where, he correctly judged, the invasion would come.
For example, less than two million mines had been laid
along the whole north coast of France in the three years
before he arrived on the scene. In the few months before
D-day the number was trebled — but he was aiming at over
fifty million mines. It was fortunate for the invaders
that there was so much more to do than could be achieved
in the short time available.

Rundstedt's explanation to me was: "The lack of
labour troops and material was the main handicap in
developing the defences. Most of the men of the Todt
labour force, who had been previously available in France,
had been drawn off to Germany to repair air raid damage
there. At the same time, the coast defence divisions were
too widely extended — often over a forty-mile stretch — to
carry out the necessary work themselves. Beyond this,
there was not enough material for the job — owing to the
constant interference of the Allied Air Forces, which
checked both the manufacture and the movement of the
necessary material."

But this does not cover the earlier neglect, in 1 942 and
1 943* of which Rommel complained. A deeper explanation
may be that Rundstedt, a masterly exponent of mobile
offensive warfare, had little belief in the value of static
defences, and so gave too little attention to their con-
struction. That is the view of RommePs staff, and is in
accord with the type of counter-offensive plan on which
Rundstedt relied. It was a very natural attitude for the
man who had manoeuvred the French out of the Maginot
Line.

The measures to meet the Allied invasion "fell between
two stools 9 * — as the result of the conflict of opinion between

Paralysis in Normandy 251

Rundstedt's and Rommel's ideas, multiplied by Hitler's
tight hand on the reserves. It had more effect in opening
the way into France than anything the Allies did to achieve
surprise.

THE LANDING

"The coming of the invasion/ 5 Blumentritt remarked,
"could be recognized by many signs. Increasing disorder
in the interior became a serious threat, and caused us
considerable loss — through ambushes and raids. There
were many derailments of trains that were carrying sup-
plies and reinforcements to the front. Beyond this was
the planned destruction by air bombing of the railways
in France and Western Germany — especially of the bridges
across the Sornme, the Seine and the Loire. All these were
pointers "

Rundstedt emphasized: "Although we had no definite
report of the date of the invasion that did not matter, as
we had been expecting it anytime from March onward."
I asked whether the storm that postponed the launching
twenty-four hours, and nearly compelled its cancellation,
had not lulled the defenders into a sense of security at the
critical moment. Blumentritt replied: "No, it didn't have
that effect — because we thought the Allies were sure to
have the kind of vessels that would not be affected by
heavy seas. So we were always on tenter-hooks, and just
as ready at one time as another/'

Rundstedt went on: "The one real surprise was the
time of day at which the landing was made — because our
Naval Staff had told us that the Allied forces would only
land at high water. A further effect of your choice of low
tide, for the landing, was that the leading troops were
protected from fire to a considerable extent by the rocks.

"The scale of the invading forces was not a surprise — in
fact, we had imagined that they would be larger, because
we had received exaggerated reports of the number of
American divisions present in England. But that over-

252

The Other Side of the Hill

estimate had an indirect effect of important consequence,
by making us the more inclined to expect a second landing,
in the Calais area. 55

Blumentritt related to me the story of D-day, from the
point of view of the German Headquarters in the West —
which was located at St. Germain, just west of Paris.
(RommeFs headquarters was at La Roche Guyon, midway
between Paris and Rouen, but, as at Alamein, he was off
' the scene when the blow fell, being on his way to see
Hitler.)

"About 10 p.m. on June 5th we intercepted messages
between the French Resistance movement and England
from which it was deduced that the invaders were coming.
Our 15th Army east of the Seine at once issued the 6 Alarm 5 ,
though for some reason the 7th Army in Normandy
delayed doing so until 4am. 1 That was unfortunate.
Soon after midnight news came that Allied parachute
troops had begun dropping.

"Time was vital. The nearest available part of the
general reserve was the 1st S.S. Panzer Corps, which lay
north-west of Paris. But we could not move it without per-
mission from Hitler 5 s headquarters. As early as 4 a.m.
Field- Marshal von Rundstedt telephoned them, and asked
for the release of this Corps — to strengthen RommeFs
punch. But Jodl, speaking for Hitler, refused to do so.
He doubted whether the landings in Normandy were
more than a feint, and was sure that another landing was
coming east of the Seine. The 'battle 3 of argument went
on all day until 4 p.m., when this Corps was at last released
for our use.

"Then further difficulties interfered with its move. The
Corps artillery had been kept on the east bank of the Seine
— and the Allied Air Forces had destroyed the bridges.
The Field- Marshal and I had seen some of them being
smashed. The artillery thus had to make a long circuit

1 According to 7th Army records, however, the alarm there was
issued at 1.30 a.m.

Paralysis in Nowiandy

253

southward by way of Pans before they could get across the
Seine, and was repeatedly bombed on the march, which
caused more delays. As a result two days passed before
this reserve was on the scene, ready to strike/ 5

By that time the Allied forces were well established
ashore, and the chances of an early counter-stroke had
faded. The armoured divisions became absorbed in the
fight piecemeal, in the effort to check the invaders from
spreading farther inland, instead of being used to drive
them back into the sea.

I asked Rundstedt whether he had hopes of defeating
the invasion at any stage after the landing* He replied :
"Not after the first few days. The Allied Air Forces
paialysed all movement by day, and made it very difficult
even at night. They had smashed the bridges over the
Loire as well as over the Seine, shutting off the whole
area. These factors greatly delayed the concentration of
reserves there — they took three or four times longei to
reach the front than we had reckoned."

Rundstedt added: "Besides the interference of the Air
Forces, the fire of your battleships was a main factor in
hampering our counter-stroke. This was a big surprise,
both in its range and effect." Blumentritt remarked that
army officers who interrogated him after the war did not
seem to have realized what a serious effect this naval
bombardment had.

But there was still another cause of delay. Rundstedt
and Blumentritt said that after about a fortnight they came
to the conclusion that the expected second landing east
of the Seine was not coming, but Hitler's headquarters
were still convinced it was, and were reluctant to let them
move forces westward to Normandy from the Calais area.
Nor were they allowed to reshuffle their forces in Nor-
mandy as they wished. "In desperation, Field-Marshal
von Rundstedt begged Hitler to come to France for a talk.
He and Rommel together went to meet Hitler at Soissons,
and tried to make him understand the situation. Although

254

The Other Side of the Hill

Caen and St, Lo, the two pivots of the Normandy position,
were still in our hands, it was obvious they could not be
held much longer. The two Field- Marshals were now in
full agreement as to the only step that might save the
situation short of a big retreat — which they knew Hitler
would not permit* They wanted to withdraw from Caen,
leave the infantry to hold the line of the Orne, and
pull out the armoured divisions to refit and reorganize.
Their plan was to use the latter for a powerful counter*
stroke against the Americans 5 flank in the Cherbourg
Peninsula.

"But Hitler insisted that there must be no withdrawal —
4 You must stay where you are. 9 He would not even agree
to allow us any more freedom than before in moving the
forces as we thought best.

"The Field-Marshal and I had come to realize more
and more clearly, since the second week, that we could
not drive the invading forces back into the sea. But Hitler
still believed it was possible ! As he would not modify his
orders, the troops had to continue clinging on to their
cracking line. There was no plan any longer. We were
merely trying, without hope, to comply with Hitler's
order that the line Caen-Avranches must be held at all
costs."

While referring sympathetically to the sufferings of the
troops, Blumentritt remarked: "They did not stand
artillery fire as well as our troops had done in the last war.
The German infantry of this war were not as good as in
1914-18. The rank and file had too many ideas of their
own — they were not so disciplined, and obedient. The
quality of the army had suffered from its too rapid
expansion, which did not allow time for a thorough
disciplinary training."

The meeting with Hitler was followed by Rundstedt's
removal from command — for the time being. "Field-
Marshal von Rundstedt had flatly said that he could not
carry on unless he had a free hand. In view of this, and

Paralysis in Normandy

255

of the pessimistic tone of his reports on the situation,
Hitler decided to find a new commander. He wrote the
Field- Marshal a letter, which was quite pleasantly worded,
saying that he had come to the conclusion that, in the
circumstances, it was best to make a change."

That decision of Hitler's was influenced by another
piece of plain speaking on Rundstedt's part, according to
Blumentritt. Keitel had rung him up to ask about the
situation, and after hearing Rundstedt's gloomy report,
had plaintively asked: "What shall we do? 5 ' Rundstedt
pungently replied: "End the war! What else can you
do?"

COLLAPSE UNDER BACK- AND -FRO NT STRAIN

Field-Marshal von Kluge happened to be visiting
Hitler's headquarters at that moment. He had been on
the sick list for nine months recovering from the injuries
sustained in a bad air crash in Russia, but Hitler had sent
for him at the beginning of July in view of the precarious
situation on the Eastern front* Hitler's idea was to send
him back there to replace Busch, as commander of the
Central Army Group, which was cracking under the
strain of the Russian summer offensive that had just
opened. According to Blumentritt, Kluge was actually
with Hitler, when Keitel came in and told Hitler what
Rundstedt had said on the telephone. Thereupon Hitler
at once decided that Kluge must go to take charge in
the West instead of in the East (where General Model
was now promoted to replace Busch). While the decision
was taken on the spur of the moment, it had long been in
Hitler's mind that Kluge should be Rundstedt's deputy
if the need arose.

"Field- Marshal von Kluge was a robust, aggressive type
of soldier," Blumentritt remarked. "He arrived at our
headquarters at St. Germain in July 6th to take up his
new appointment as Commander-in-Chief in the West.
At the start he was very cheerful and confident — like all

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Fatalysis in Jfowiandy 257

newly-appointed commanded s. Indeed, he was almost gay
about the prospects.

"In our first talk he reproached me because we had
forwarded, and endorsed, Rommel's report on the gravity
of the situation in France. He said such a pessimistic
report ought not to have been sent to the Fiihrer but
should have been modified by us before it was forwarded.
Field- Marshal von Rundstedt was still at St. Germain at
the moment — he stayed there for three days after Field-
Marshal von Kluge arrived. When I told him what
Field- Marshal von Kluge had said, he was rather shocked
and declared emphatically: 'It was proper that such an
important document should be forwarded without any
alteration by a superior headquarters. 5

"While Field- Marshal von Kluge clearly thought at first
that the dangers of the situation had been exaggerated, his
view soon changed. For he was quick to visit the front,
as was his habit. While there he saw the Commander of
the 7th Army, Hausser, the Commander of the 5th Panzer
Army, Eberbach, and then the various corps commanders
— including the 1st and 2nd S.S. Corps. All of them
pointed out to him the seriousness of the situation. Within
a few days he became very sober and quiet. Hitler did
not like the changing tone of his reports.

"On the 17th Rommel was badly injured when his
car crashed, after being attacked on the road by Allied
'planes. Hitler then instructed Field-Marshal von Kluge
to take over charge of Army Group C B 5 for the moment,
as well as being Commander-in-Chief."

Then, three days later, on July 20th, came the attempt
to kill Hitler at his headquarters in East Prussia. The
conspirators 5 bomb missed its chief target, but it had terrific
repercussions on the battle in the West at the critical
moment there.

"Field- Marshal von Kluge was at the front that day
and I was not able to get into touch with him until the
evening. By that time he had already had the messages

1

258

The Other Side of the Hill

about the attempt — first that it had succeeded, and then
that Hitler was still alive. The Field-Marshal told me that,
more than a year before, some of the leading officers
who were in the plot had approached him, and that he
had received them twice, but at the second meeting he
had told them that he did not want to be mixed up with
the plot- He knew, however, that it was continuing.
The Field-Marshal had not said anything to me about it
before, and I had not been aware of the plot,

"When the Gestapo investigated the conspiracy, in the
days that followed, they found documents in which Field-
Marshal von Kluge's name was mentioned, so he came
under grave suspicion. Then another incident made
things look worse. Shortly before General Patton's break
out from Normandy, while the decisive battle at Avranches
was in progress, Field-Marshal von Kluge was out of
touch with his headquarters for more than twelve hours.
The reason was that he had gone up to the front, and there
been trapped in a heavy artillery bombardment. At the
same time his wireless tender was destroyed by bombing,
so that he could not communicate. He himself had to
stay under cover for several hours before he could get out
and start on the long drive back to his headquarters.
Meantime, we had been suffering 'bombardment' from
the rear. For the Field- Marshal's prolonged 'absence'
excited Hitler's suspicion immediately, in view of the
documents that had been found. A telegram came from
Hitler peremptorily stating 'Field-Marshal von Kluge is
at once to extricate himself from the battle area around
Avranches and conduct the battle of Normandy from the
tactical headquarters of the 5th Panzer Army 5 . This was
back near Falaise.

"The reason for this order, as I heard subsequently,
was that Hitler suspected that the Field- Marshal's purpose
in going right up to the front, was to get in touch with the
Allies and negotiate a surrender. The Field-Marshal's
eventual return did not calm Hitler. From this date

Paralysis in Normandy

259

onward the orders which he sent him were worded in a
brusque and even insulting language. Field-Marshal von
Kluge became very worried. He feared that he would be
arrested at any moment — and at the same time realized
more and more that he could not prove his loyalty by any
battlefield success.

"All this had a very bad effect on any chance that
remained of preventing the Allies from breaking out. In
the days of crisis Field-Marshal von Kluge gave only part
of his attention to what was happening at the front* He
was looking back over his shoulder anxiously — towards
Hitler's headquarters,

"He was not the only general who was in that state of
worry for conspiracy in the plot against Hitler. Fear per-
meated and paralysed the higher commands in the weeks
and months that followed. The influence on the generals
of July 20th is a subject that would form a book in itself."

After General Patton's break-out from Normandy, and
the collapse of the front in the West, Field- Marshal Model
suddenly arrived on August 1 7th as the new Commander-
in-Chief. "His arrival was the first news of the change that
Field-Marshal von Kluge received — this sudden arrival
of a successor had become the customary manner of dis-
missal at this time and had already happened in the case
of the commanders of the 19th and 15th Armies. At that
moment Field- Marshal von Kluge was at Laroche-Guyon,
the headquarters of Army Group C B\ He stayed on there
for twenty-four hours putting Field- Marshal Model in
the picture.

"I went over there from St. Germain to say good-bye
to him, and saw him alone. As I went in he was sitting
at his table with a map in front of him. He kept tapping
it at the point marked 'Avranches 9 — where Patton had
broken through — and said to me: 'That is where I lose
my reputation as a soldier. 5 I tried to console him, but
with little effect. He walked up and down the room
ruminating gloomily. He showed me the letter from the

26o

The Other Side of the Hill

Fiihrer, that Field- Marshal Model had brought him. It
was written in quite polite terms — the Fiihrer saying that
he felt the strain of the battle was too much for the Field-
Marshal and that a change was desirable. But the last
sentence of the letter had an ominous note — 'Field- Marshal
von Kluge is to state to which part of Germany he is
going, 5 The Field- Marshal said to me: 6 1 have written
a letter to the Fiihrer in which I have explained to him
clearly the military position, and also other matters' — but
he did not show me this letter, 351

"Field-Marshal von Kluge left for home next day. On
the evening of the day after his departure I had a telephone
call from Metz to say that he had had a heart attack, and
had died. Two days later came a medical report stating
that his death was due to a cerebral haemorrhage. Then
came word that he was to have a State Funeral, and that
Field- Marshal von Rundstedt had been instructed by the

1 The letter was found by the Allies in the captuied German
Archives After acknowledging the order for his replacement, and
remarking that the obvious reason for it was the failure to close the
gap at Avranches, it went on to say — "When you receive these lines
• . . I shall be no more. I cannot bear the reproach that I have sealed
the fate of the West through faulty measures, and I have no means
of defending myself. I draw a conclusion from that and am dispatching
myself where already thousands of my comrades are I have never
feared death. Life has no more meaning for me, and I also figure on
the list of war criminals who are to be delivered up. 9 * The letter then
went on to a long and detailed exposition of the practical impossi-
bility of averting the collapse at Avranches, and a mild rebuke to
Hitler for not attending to the warnings he had been given both by
Rommel and Kluge himself as to the critical position

"Our appreciations were not dictated by pessimism but by sober
knowledge of the facts. I do not know if Field-Marshal Model, who
has been proved in every sphere, will still master the situation. From
my heart I hope so. Should it not be so, however, and your cherished
new weapons not succeed, then, my Fiihrer, make up your mind to end
the war. The German people have borne such untold suffering that
it is time to put an end to this fnghtfulness. There must be ways to
attain this end, and above all to prevent the Reich from falling under
the Bolshevist heel." The letter ended with a final tribute to Hitler's
greatness and affirmation of Kluge's loyalty even in death.

Paralysis in Normandy

261

Fiihrer to represent him in laying a wreath and delivering
the Funeral Oration. Then came a sudden order that
there was to be no State Funeral. I then heard that
Field-Marshal von Kluge had taken poison, and that this
had been confirmed by a post-mortem. Like other generals
who had been on the Eastern front, he had carried poison
capsules in case of being captured by the Russians — though
many did not take them even when they were captured.
He had swallowed one of these capsules in the car and was
dead before he arrived in Metz. My opinion is that he
committed suicide, not because of his dismissal, but because
he believed he would be arrested by the Gestapo as soon
as he arrived home/ 5

While Kluge committed suicide of his own accord,
Rommel was compelled to swallow a similar dose, just
over a month later, while he was still convalescing from
his accident. Two fellow-generals visited him, under
orders from Hitler, and took him out for a drive and there
confronted him with Hitler's decision that he must commit
suicide or be brought to trial — with the certainty of a
degrading execution. He had been more definitely
implicated in the plot. A realization of the hopelessness
of the situation in the West had brought him into revolt
at an earlier stage. I was told by his staff that he had
little confidence in the prospect even before the Allies
landed and thereafter became increasingly critical of
Hitler's lack of a sense of reality.

After the Allies had succeeded in establishing their
bridgehead in Normandy he said to one of them: "All is
over. It would be much better for us to end the war now,
and live as a British dominion, than to be ruined by
continuing such a hopeless struggle." Realizing that
Hitler was the main obstacle to peace Rommel openly said
that the only thing was to do away with him and then
approach the Allies. That was a remarkable change of
attitude in Hitler's favourite general. It cost Rommel his
life, but it was too late to save Germany.

262

The Other Side of the Hill

Talking of the general breakdown which followed
Patton's break-out 'from the Normandy bridgehead,
Blumentritt made another significant revelation. "Hitler
and his staff at O.K.W. had been deluded, in postponing
a withdrawal so long, by their belief that our forces would
have time to get back and occupy new lines in rear, if
the need arose. They counted on the British advance
being deliberate, and on the Americans being clumsy.
But Petain, who was an old acquaintance of Field- Marshal
Rundstedt's, had several times warned him not to under-
rate the speed with which the Americans could move, once
they had gained experience. The event proved it. The
lines in rear which O.K.W. had reckoned on holding were
successively outflanked by Patton's dash before they were
even occupied. 55

After following the course of the decisive break-through
as the German High Command saw it, it is worth while to
supplement it by a short account of how it appeared, and
felt, to the fighting commanders on the spot.

A graphic impression of the American break-through at
Avranches as it looked from the German side was given
me by General Elfeldt who commanded the 84th Corps,
holding that sector, at the foot of the Cherbourg Peninsula.
He was only sent there to take over charge just as the
decisive offensive was opening. Until then he had been
commanding the 47th Division, which held the Calais-
Boulogne sector. "It was on the 28th July, so far as I
remember, that orders came for me to go at once to
Field- Marshal von Kluge's headquarters. On arrival he
told me that I was to take over command of the 84th
Corps from General von Choltitz. He said he did not
agree with the defence policy of the latter, but did not say
in what respect. The Corps, he told me, comprised the
remnants of seven divisions. He also said that the 11 6th

Paralysis in Normandy 263

Panzer Division was to counter-attack westward to relieve
the pressure, and would be under my command. After
spending the night with the Field-Marshal I drove in the
morning to Le Mans and on to the tactical headquarters
of the 7th Army, which was then 10 to 15 kilometres east
of Avranches. From there I was directed to my own corps
headquarters. I do not remember exactly where it was,
as it was hidden in the trees, away from any village.
Everything was confused, and the Allied air force dominated
the area. On the following day I went round my troops.
They were very weak and there was no continuous front.
Some of the divisions had only about three hundred
infantry left, and the artillery was much depleted.

"The first order I gave was that all the troops south
of the River La See, near Avranches, were to defend the
south bank, while the troops from the east were to hang on
where they were until the 11 6th Panzer division arrived
that night; they were then to join in its counter-attack.
But the 1 1 6th did not arrive, as it was diverted to another
danger point while on the way. On the morning of the
31st American tanks drove towards Brescy, on the River
See, 15 kilometres east of Avranches. At that moment my
headquarters was north of Brescy, and was nearly cut off
by this flank thrust. My headquarters personnel were in
the fighting line all day. Luckily the Americans were not
very vigorous in their thrust here.

"In the next two days I was reinforced by two new
divisions which were nearly up to strength, as well as by
the 1 1 6th Panzer Division. I formed the remnants of the
other seven divisions into a single one. My orders were
to stop a further break-through between Brescy and Vire,
and to delay the expected American thrust south-eastwards
from Avranches, as a powerful counter-thrust was to be
made by a panzer corps, under General von Funk. This
was subsequently reinforced, to provide a counter-stroke of
bigger scale, by all the tanks that could be made available
from Eberbach's 5th Panzer Army. 59

264 The Other Side of the Hill

Elfeldt went on to describe at length the even more
precarious situation that developed, after the armoured
stroke had failed to reach Avranches, and his left flank
was increasingly outflanked. He wheeled back gradually
to the eastward, and the difficulties of the withdrawal
were the greater because the armoured forces retired
through his front, creating confusion. Fortunately the
American pressure on his front and immediate flanks was
not too dangerous — Patton's 3rd Army was moving on a
wider circuit. "The American troops, of the 1st Army,
on my front were not tactically at all clever. They failed
to seize opportunities — in particular they missed several
chances of cutting off the whole of my corps. The Allied
air force was the most serious danger.

"By the time we had got back to the Orne the whole
front had become much narrower than before, so my corps
headquarters had become superfluous and was temporarily
withdrawn from the line. But the following morning
the Canadians broke through southwards to Falaise and I
was at once ordered to form a front to check them. The
available troops were very scanty and we had no commu-
nications. The Canadian artillery fired all day into my
headquarters, but fortunately did no damage at all although
they fired about a thousand shells. These fell all round the
small house in which I was, but no one was hurt. During
the day I was able to re-form a continuous line, but beyond
my right flank I could see the British tanks driving down
the other side of the River Dives towards Trim. Thus our
line of retreat was blocked.

"The next day I was ordered to break out north-
eastward, behind the backs of these armoured forces. It
was soon clear that this was not possible, as the British
were now there in strength. So I proposed to the army
commander, General Hausser, that my troops should be
placed at the disposal of General Meindl, who was com-
manding the parachute forces, to help the latter to break
out near St. Lambert, jo ^-eastward. It seemed to me

Paralysis in Normandy

265

that one strong thrust might have a better chance than a
number of small ones. Meindl succeeded in breaking out,
but when I reached St. Lambert myself next morning the
gap was again closed. I tried an attack with all I had left
— a couple of tanks and two hundred men. It started well
but then ran into part of the 1st Polish Armoured Division.
After a two-hours' fight our ammunition began to run
out. Then the troops which were following behind me
surrendered, thus leaving me with a handful of men at the
cut-off tip of the wedge. So we had to surrender in turn.
The commander of this Polish division was a fine-looking
man and a gentleman. He gave me his last cigarette.
His division itself was in an awkward situation and had
run out of water — the forces of the two sides were
extraordinarily intermingled. 55

I took the opportunity of asldng Elfeldt what he
thought about the German soldier in this war compared
with the previous war. His views differed in some respects
from those of Blumentritt {see page 254). "The infantry
were quite as good as in 1914-18, and the artillery much
better. Weapons had improved, and so had tactics. But
there were other factors. In the last two years of the first
war, the morale of the troops became affected by the
spread of Socialistic ideas that were pacifist in trend. In
this war, National Socialism had the opposite effect — it
fortified their morale. 55

"How did discipline compare in the two wars? 55
"That is more difficult to answer. National Socialism
made the troops more fanatical — which was both good
and bad for discipline. But relations between officers and
men were better than in 1 914-18, and that helped dis-
cipline. The improved relationship was due partly to the
new conception of discipline that was inculcated in the
Reichswehr, based on the experience of 19 14-18, and partly

1*

266

The Other Side of the Hill

to the subsequent influence of National Socialism in
diminishing the gulf between officers and men. The
ordinary soldiers showed more initiative, and used their
heads better in this war than they did in the last — especially
when fighting on their own or in small parties." On this
score Elfeldt's opinion corresponded with the judgement
of British commanders, who often remarked how the
German soldiers excelled their opponents when operating
alone or in pairs — a verdict that was in surprising contrast
to the experience of 1914-18, as well as to the continuing
popular view that the Germans were no good as indivi-
dualists. Since National Socialism made so strong an
appeal to the herd instinct, the natural assumption was
that the generation which grew up under it would show
less, not more, individual intiative on the battlefield than
their fathers. I asked Elfeldt if he could suggest an
explanation. He said that he himself was puzzled, but
added, "I think it may have been due to the kind of scout
training these young soldiers had received in the 'Hitler
Youth' organization. 53

The question how the German soldier of the two wars
compared came up again, a few days later, in a discussion
with Heinrici, Rohricht, and Bechtolsheim. Heinricf s
view was that the German Army was better trained in
the first war, but he did not consider that the discipline
had been better. Rohricht and Bechtolsheim agreed, and
the former added: "The Army needed a long interval
between the Polish and the Western campaigns to develop
its training — especially the training of the non-commis-
sioned officers. As head of the Training Department of the
General Staff, I was in close touch with this question. But
morale, and discipline, were better in the later part of this
war than in the later part of the first war. Between 19 16
and 191 8 the soldiers 5 morale was gradually undermined
by the infiltration of Socialistic ideas, and the suggestion
that they were fighting the Emperor's war, whereas this
time they had and kept such extraordinary confidence in

Paralysis in Normandy

267

Hitler that they remained confident of victory in face of
all the facts/ 5

Heinrici and Bechtolsheim endorsed this statement of
Rdhricht 5 s, who went on to say: "Nevertheless the morale
of the Army was gradually weakened by the effects of
overstrain, and by the tendency of the S.S. to grab the
best men. On the Eastern Front the divisions never got
a rest, and that became a debilating factor "

In reply to a further question about the effect of
National Socialism on the Army, Rohricht said: "It had a
mixed effect. It created difficulties for us, and weakened
our control, but it fostered an ardent patriotic spirit in
the soldiers, which went deeper than the spirit of 19 14 —
for this time there was no enthusiasm for war such as
there had been then. That spirit had greater endurance
under reverses." Heinrici agreed with Rohricht, while
emphasizing that faith in a personality counted for more
than the system. "The troops 5 tremendous confidence in
Hitler was the dominant factor, whether one liked it or
not. 55

What did the German generals think of their Western
opponents? They were diffident in expressing an opinion
on this matter, but I gathered a few impressions in the
course of our talks. In a reference to the Allied com-
manders, Rundstedt said: "Montgomery and Patton were
the two best that I met. Field-Marshal Montgomery was
very systematic. 55 He added: "That is all right if you
have sufficient forces, and sufficient time. 55 Blumentritt
made a similar comment. After paying tribute to the
speed of Patton 5 s drive, he added: "Field-Marshal Mont-
gomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse.
He moved like this 55 — Blumentritt took a series of very
deliberate and short steps, putting his foot down heavily
each time.

Giving his impression of the different qualities of the

268

The Other Side of the Hill

British and American troops, Blumentritt said: "The
Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of
mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery
fire they usually fell back — even after they had made a
successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had
got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-
four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them.
To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy
losses. I had many opportunities to observe this interesting
difference in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of
my corps faced the British, and the left half the American/'

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ANTI-HITLER PLOT-
AS SEEN FROM H.Q,. IN THE WEST

The story of the 20th July Plot has been told from many
angles, but not from that which has the closest bearing
on the military issue. A fairly clear picture has emerged
about what happened after the bomb exploded at Hitler's
headquarters in East Prussia, and failed to kill him; also
about the course of events in Berlin, and how the con-
spirators there failed to seize their momentary opportunity.
To complete the picture it is important to trace what
happened on that fateful day at German Headquarters
in the West. I had a long account of this, and the
subsequent reactions, from General Blumentritt which is
worth giving in full — not only for its direct evidence, but
for the atmosphere it conveys.

blumentritt's account

During the early months of 1944 there were many
visitors to Supreme Headquarters, Western Front, at
St. Germain, and long discussions of the war-situation.
A matter that was often mooted was whether the field-
marshals should jointly approach Hitler and urge him to
make peace.

One day, about the end of March, Field-Marshal
Rommel came to St. Germain accompanied by his Chief
of Staff, General Speidel. Just before they left, Speidel
said he wanted to have a word with me in private. When
we had withdrawn, Speidel told me that he was speaking
on RommePs behalf and then said: "The time has come
when we must tell the Fiihrer that we cannot continue

269

270 The Other Side of the Hill

the wax." It was agreed that we should broach the
matter to Field-Marshal Rundstedt, and this was done.
We found that he was of the same opinion. A telegram
was then sent to O.K.W., asking the Fuhrer to come to
St. Germain "in view of the serious situation in France".
But no reply was received.

General Speidel came to see me again about the matter,
and in the course of our conversations told me that there
were a number of people in Germany who were intending
to tackle Hitler. He mentioned the names of Field-Marshal
von Witzleben, General Beck, General Hoeppner, and
Dr. Goerdeler. He also said that Field-Marshal Rommel
had given him a few days leave to go to Stuttgart to
discuss the matter with others there— both Speidel and
Rommel came from the state of Wurtemburg, and had
long known Goerdeler. But in these conversations Speidel
never indicated that the assassination of Hitler was
contemplated.

Nothing further developed before Field-Marshal von
Kluge arrived to replace Field-Marshal von Rundstedt
as Commander-in-Chief in the West — following the latter's
heated telephone talk with Field-Marshal Keitel, in which
he had insisted that the war ought to be brought to an
end. I would add a little more about this change. Hitler
knew that Field-Marshal von Rundstedt was much
respected by the Army, and by the enemy. Allied propa-
ganda broadcasts often suggested that the views of the
Field-Marshal and his staff differed from those of Hitler.
It was notable, too, our headquarters was never subjected
to air attack. Nor was the Field-Marshal ever threatened
by the French Resistance Movement— presumably, because
it was known that he had always been in favour of good
treatment for the French. All these things were brought
to Hitlers notice, of course, in reports from his own
agents. While he treated the Field-Marshal with respect
— more respect than he showed other soldiers — he kept
him under careful watch. Then, the Field-Marshal's

The Anti-Hitler Plot — as seen from H.Q. in the West 271

emphatic advice about seeking peace provided Hitler with
a suitable ground for replacing him.

Field-Marshal von Kluge arrived at St. Germain, to
take over, on July 6th. On the 17th Field-Marshal
Rommel was knocked out. Thereupon von Kluge moved
to Rommel's headquarters at La Roche-Guyon, to conduct
the battle from there, leaving me in charge at St. Germain.

JULY 20TH

The first news of the attempt on Hitler's life reached
me about 3 p.m. — from Colonel Finck, the Deputy Chief
of Staff, who had been transferred from the Eastern front
about six weeks earlier. Colonel Finck came into my
room and said: "General, the Fuhrer is dead. A Gestapo
mutiny has taken place in Berlin." I was very surprised,
and asked how he had heard. Finck replied that it had
come from General von Stulpnagel, the Military Governor
of Paris, on the telephone.

I tried to get hold of Field-Marshal von Kluge on the
telephone, at La Roche-Guyon, but was told that he was
visiting the front. I then told Speidel in very guarded
terms — as we were talking over the telephone — that there
were serious developments, and that I would drive over
myself to tell him what had happened. I left St. Germain
about 4 p.m. and arrived at La Roche-Guyon about
5.30 p.m.

Field-Marshal von Kluge had just returned there.
When I went into his room I saw that he had in front of
him an extract from the German Radio to the effect that
an attempt had been made on the life of the Fuhrer, but
that it had failed. Von Kluge told me that he had
previously had two telephone messages from Germany,
but without any indication of the sender's identity, which
said: "The Fuhrer is dead and you must make a decision."
Von Kluge went on to say that, about a year before,
Witzleben, Beck and others had come to his home to
sound him about an approach to the Fiihrer and how it

272

The Other Side of the Hill

should be conducted. He also said that he had made
notes of these discussions.

While we were talking a telephone message from St.
Germain was brought in. It said that an anonymous
telegram had arrived there stating that Hitler was dead.
Kluge was puzzled as to which of the statements were
true, and wondered whether the Radio was merely putting
out a false report. After some further discussion I put
a telephone call in to General Warlimont, Jodl's deputy,
at O.K.W. It was a long time before the call came
through. Then the reply was merely that Warlimont
was not available, as he was engaged with KeiteL

So von Kluge and I put our heads together, and dis-
cussed whom we could try next. We telephoned the Chief
of the S.S. in Paris. He replied that he did not know
anything beyond the radio announcement. We then tele-
phoned General Stieff — the Chief of the Organization
Department — at O.K.H. I knew Stieff well, but had no
idea that he was in the inner circle of the conspiracy, as
later emerged. Stieff at once asked: "Where did you get
the news that the Fuhrer was dead ? 5 5 He added: "The
Fiihrer is quite well, and in good spirits" — and then rang
off. We felt very uneasy about this telephone call after-
wards, realizing how suspicious it must have appeared in
the circumstances.

Stieff's answer and manner were so curious as to
suggest a likely explanation, and I remarked to von Kluge :
"This is an attempt that failed. 55 Von Kluge then said to
me that, if it had succeeded, his first step would have been
to order the discharge of the V i 5 s against England to be
stopped, and that his second step would have been to
get in touch with the Allied Commanders.

Von Kluge then instructed me to telephone General von
Stulpnagel, and tell him to come to La Roche-Guyon, I
was also to summon Field- Marshal Sperrle, commanding
the Luftwaffe in the West.

General von Stulpnagel arrived first, about 7.30 p.m.,

The Anti-Hitler Plot — as seen from H.Q* in the West 273

accompanied by Lieut-Colonel Hoffacker. They sat round
a table with the Field- Marshal, Speidel and I — all the circle
are dead now, except Speidel and I. Von Stulpnagel began
by saying: 4 5 May Lieut-Colonel Hoffacker explain matters. 5 '
It soon became clear that Hoffacker knew all about the
attempt, and was the link between von Stulpnagel and
von Witzleben. He traced how the plot had developed
from an intended petition into a putsch — as it was realized
that Hitler would not listen to argument, and that the
Allies would not listen to any peace offer from Hitler. He
told how von Stauffenberg had organized the actual
attempt, and gave us the details.

When he had finished, von Kluge, with obvious dis-
appointment remarked: "Well, gentlemen, the attempt
has failed. Everything is over. 55 Von Stulpnagel then
exclaimed: "Field-Marshal, I thought you were acquainted
with the plans. Something must be done." Von Kluge
replied: "Nothing more can be done. The Fuhrer is
still alive. 55 I noticed that von Stulpnagel had begun to
look very uncomfortable. He got up and walked out on
the verandah. When he returned, he said very little.

Then Field-Marshal Sperrle arrived — and only stayed
a few minutes. He refused von Kluge 5 s invitation to
remain for dinner. I felt that Sperrle did not want to
get drawn into the discussion, or be a witness of anything
that transpired.

The rest of us now went in to dinner. Von Kluge
seemed very vivacious and unworried in manner, whereas
von Stulpnagel was taciturn. After a while he turned
to von Kluge and said: "May I speak to you privately
again. 55 Von Kluge agreed — and said to me, "You come
too. 55 We went into a small room. Here von Stulpnagel
told me that he had taken "the first precautions 55 before
leaving Paris. Von Kluge exclaimed: "Heavens! What
have you been doing? 55 "I gave orders for all the S.S. in
Paris to be arrested 55 — by this he meant not the Waffen
S.S., but the S.D., or Security Service.

274

The Other Side of the Hill

Von Kluge exclaimed: "But you can't do that without
my orders." Von Stulpnagel replied : "I tried to telephone
you this afternoon but you were away from your H.Q.,
so I had to act on my own" Von Kluge remarked:
"Well, that's your responsibility." After that, they didn't
go back to finish their dinner.

Von Kluge then told me to telephone to von Stulp-
nagePs Chief of Staff in Paris and ask whether steps had
actually been taken to arrest the S.S. This was Colonel von
Linstow — who is also dead. 1 He told me that steps had
been taken, adding "And nothing can stop them." Von
Kluge then said to von Stulpnagel: "Look here, the best
thing you can do is to change into civilian clothes and
go into hiding." He told von Stulpnagel to release all the
arrested S.S. at once.

After von Stulpnagel had gone, I said to von Kluge:
"We ought to do something to help him." Von Kluge
pondered my suggestion and then told me to drive after
von Stulpnagel, and advise him to disappear somewhere
in Paris for a few days. Strictly, of course, von Kluge
should have placed him under arrest.

I drove to St. Germain first. On arrival there my staff
brought me fresh telegrams which had come while I had
been away. One was from Field-Marshal Keitel; it said
that all reports of the Fiihrer's death were false, and all
orders sent on that assumption were to be ignored. Another
was from General Fromm, saying that Himmler had just
taken over command of the home forces from him —
Hitler no longer trusted any of the generals in Germany.
A third was from Himmler — simply saying that he had
taken over command of the home forces. While I was
reading the telegrams a telephone call came from Admiral
Krancke, the Naval C-in-C in the West — the Field-Marshal
had not thought of calling him to the conference — to ask
if I would drive into Paris to see him.

1 Blumentritt*s narrative was' punctuated with repetitions of "tot"
(dead.)

The Anti-Hitler Plot — as seen from H.Q,. in the West 275

About an hour after midnight I set off for Paris, where
I found all the Naval H.Q,. staff assembled. Admiral
Krancke showed me a long telegram he had received from
Field- Marshal von Witzleben, saying that the Fuhrer was
dead, and that a new government was being formed,
under himself for the time being. Thereupon Krancke
had telephoned O.K.W. and by chance had been put
through to Admiral Doenitz, who said that it was untrue.

I then went on to the H.Q. of the Security Police,
They were just coming back from prison. The first
officers I saw wanted to know what had happened and
why they had been arrested without any reason. Their
attitude was very decent, and they showed a willingness to
help in hushing things up. I asked where Obergruppen-
fiihrer Oberg, the Chief of the Security Police, was at the
moment. I was told that he was at an hotel, along with
von Stulpnagel.

I went on there, about 2 a.m., and found what was
almost like a party in progress — including Abetz, the
Ambassador in Paris. Oberg took me aside into another
room, and told me that he had no idea what was behind
the situation, but that we must agree as to what ought to
be done next. I must ,say that, throughout, Oberg
behaved very decently, and tried to smooth things over
for the sake of the Army. He suggested that the regiment
that had carried out the arrests should be confined to
barracks, and that the men should be told that it had been
merely an exercise. But von Stulpnagel considered that
it was impossible to prevent a leakage. I then conveyed
von Kluge's advice to von Stulpnagel — that he should dis-
appear. But when I got back to St. Germain I found
that a message had already come from O.K.W. saying
that he was to proceed to Berlin at once, to render a report.

Later in the day von Stulpnagel set off for Berlin by
car, by way of Verdun and Metz. He was accompanied
by one man besides the driver, as an escort in case they
met French partisans. Just before Verdun was reached,

276

The Other Side of the Hill

he ordered the car to stop, and said that as they were just
coming to the partisan area it would be a good thing
for them to get out and fire their pistols at a tree, to make
sure they were in working order. After that they drove
on, but he stopped the car again when they came to the
old Verdun battlefields — where he had fought in the
previous war — and said that he would like to show them
round* After going a short way he said to them: "You
stop here, Pm going on alone to look at a point I know 93
They suggested they ought to accompany him in case of
meeting partisans, but he said it was not necessary. Shortly
afterwards they heard a shot. They ran forward and
found him floating m a canal. He had shot himself after
getting into the water — so that he would drown if the
first shot did not succeed. But his attempt at suicide
had not succeeded. The two men fished him out and
took him to hospital. He had shot one eye out, and the
other eye was so badly damaged that it had to be
removed.

I heard these details subsequently from Oberg, who,
feeling that von Stulpnagel was probably mixed up m the
attempt on Hitler, had driven to Verdun to see von
Stulpnagel in hospital, still in the hope that he might be
able to keep things quiet. Von Stulpnagel, however, had
refused to say anything, Oberg told me. After about a
fortnight in hospital, von Stulpnagel was removed to
Berlin on orders from there. He was brought to trial,
condemned and hanged.

Meanwhile there was something like a panic in Paris
among the Staff— as to who were suspect. Oberg received
a string of telegrams to arrest various people — first,
Hoffacker, then Finck; and in all about thirty or forty
people, both soldiers and civilians. A few days later
Oberg telephoned me to come and see him, and told
me that Hoffacker had mentioned von Kluge's name in
his preliminary interrogation. Oberg said that he could
not believe that von Kluge was implicated.

The Anti-Hitler Plot — as seen from H.Q,. in the West 277

I accompanied Oberg when he went to see von Kluge
and make a report. Von Kluge told Oberg: "Garry out
these interrogations as your sense of duty tells you." Oberg
remarked to me that he did not like the task, but as it
could not be avoided he wanted to conduct the interroga-
tions in a gentlemanly way. So it was arranged that,
as an assurance, one of the officers of my staff should be
present during them. Here it is worth mentioning that
neither Speidel nor I had breathed a word to anyone
about the conference on the evening of July 20th.

Soon after this, von Kluge visited Rommel in hospital
in Paris* On his return he told me that Rommel had
expressed surprise that there had been an attempt to kill
Hitler, as distinct from putting pressure on him to sue for
peace.

In the days that followed I noticed that von Kluge
began to look more and more worried. He often talked
about himself and his own affairs. On one occasion he
remarked, sombrely: "Events will take their course." Then
Field-Marshal Model suddenly arrived to replace him.
On his way home, as I have already related, von Kluge
was found dead in the car, having swallowed a poison
capsule*

Apart from the conversation we had on the evening
of July 20th, von Kluge never said anything to me
about a plot to tackle or overthrow Hitler. I had left
von Kluge's staff in January, 1942, and had no close
relations with him again until July, 1944- Colonel von
Tresckow was 1 a 1 to von Kluge, and may have been taken
more into his confidence — but he is dead.

I was in Schleswig with General Dempsey after the
capitulation in May, 1945, and saw very clearly that even
then the civil population was divided in their view of
Hitler. One half was shocked that the German generals
had taken part in the attempt to overthrow Hitler, and
felt bitterly towards them in consequence — the same

1 Head of the Operations branch.

278

The Other Side of the Hill

feeling was manifested in the Army itself. The other
half complained that the generals had not turned out
Hitler before.

THE AFTERMATH

After taking over command in the West, Field- Marshal
Model stayed at the H.Q. of Army Group "B 5 \ Telephoning
me from there a day or two later, he said that he had just
received a disconcerting message from the Fiihrer's H.Q,.
"All they can talk about and think about is the 20th July,
and now they want to take Speidel away, as a suspect. 5 '
He had emphatically told Keitel that he could not spare
the Chief of Staff at Army Group H.Q. when the situation
was so critical. As a result, Speidel was left there until
the first week of September. He was then relieved, and
came to see me, telling me that he had been ordered to
return home. On arrival there he was arrested by the
Gestapo.

After General Speidel had gone, a telegram came
which said that I was to be relieved by General Westphal,
and was to report to the Fuhrer's H.Q. on the 13th
September. I felt somewhat depressed! On setting off,
I went first to see Field-Marshal von Rundstedt at Coblenz,
where he had just established his H.Q. on being recalled
to take supreme command in the West. Field- Marshal
von Rundstedt was very annoyed to hear that I was being
taken away from my post just as he had returned to
command. He at once protested to O.K.W, and asked
that he might retain me as his Chief of Staff. But the
answer came back that the request could not be granted.
The reason given was that I had repeatedly expressed a
desire for a fighting command. This did not sound very
convincing in the circumstances,

I left Coblenz on the 9th September, and took the
opportunity to visit my family — at Marburg— in case of
what might happen. I spent Sunday, the 10th, at home,
I felt a quiver every time the telephone rang or the sound

The Anti-Hitler Plot — as seen from H. Q. in the West 2 79

of a car was heard approaching the house — and went to
the window to look out.

On the nth I took the train for Berlin. The train
was held up by an air raid at Kassel, so I telephoned from
there to say that I was delayed, and would thus miss the
special courier train that ran nightly from Berlin to East
Prussia. Continuing in the train to Berlin I had to get
out at Potsdam, because of bomb damage on the line.
Just as I got out of the train I suddenly heard a voice in
the dark saying: " Where is General Blumentritt?" I felt
another quiver. After I had answered, an officer came
up to me, accompanied by a soldier who was carrying a
tommy gun. The officer addressed me politely, and said
he had orders to escort me to a hotel in Berlin — the Adlon.
On arrival there, the hall porter told me there was a sealed
envelope awaiting me. I opened it — all that it contained
was my ticket to Angerburg in East Prussia. That was
rather an anti-climax. But it brought only a temporary
sense of relief. I still had to wait and wonder what was
in store for me at the Fuhrer ? s H.Q,.

The following night I caught the special train thence,
arriving at Angerburg on the morning of the 13th, I was
met by Field- Marshal KeitePs adjutant, who took me to
Keitel's special train; here I had breakfast and left my
baggage. I was told that the Fuhrer was too tired to
receive me, but that I could attend the daily conference
at mid-day if I liked. I decided to do so.

In front of the house where the conference was held I
found a group of generals. I went up to them and
reported to General Guderian, who had become Chief of
the General Staff. I noticed that he did not attempt to
shake hands, while Keitel and others stood aloof. Guderian
said to me, in a loud voice: "I wonder you dare to come
here after what has happened in the West. 5 ' I showed
him the telegram ordering me to report. Then an S.S.
officer arrived and said that, after all, the Fuhrer had
decided to attend the daily conference. A few minutes

a8o

The Other Side of the Hill

later we saw Hitler walking through the forest, with tired
and slow steps, accompanied by an escort of five or six
men.

Guderian turned to me and said, grimly: "Now you
can report yourself to the Fuhrer. 55 But to my surprise
Hitler greeted me in a pleasant manner, saying: "You've
been having a very hard time in the West. I know the
Allied air forces are on top and what it means. I'd like
to have a talk with you after the conference/ 5

When the conference ended Guderian said to me:
"Gome and have a talk with me about the Eastern front."
I replied: "It doesn't interest me in the least at the
moment. 55 I then had ten minutes talk with Hitler,
alone, and he was again very nice.

When I came out, the other generals were all waiting,
and at once asked me: "What did the Fuhrer say to
you? 55 I replied: "He was veiy pleasant. 55 Thereupon,
they all became very pleasant, and Keitel invited me to
have tea with him. I replied that I would like to get
away that evening and go home, adding: "It's two years
since I spent a leave with my wife and children. 35 At
that, Keitel said: "I don 5 t think it is possible/ 5 I said:
"But the Fuhrer told me I could go on leave, and was then
to report to Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, who would
give me command of an army corps in the West. 55 Keitel
told me to wait half-an-hour. After seeing the Fuhrer,
he came back and told me I could go.

During our conversation, this time, Keitel spoke of
von Kluge, and remarked that they had documentary
evidence about his treasonable activities. Keitel said that
they had intercepted a wireless message from some Allied
H.Q,., which asked to be put in touch with von Kluge.
Keitel added: "And that's why he was missing so long that
day near Avranches. 55 Protesting that this suspicion was
unjust, I related how von Kluge had been forced to take
cover, and how he had been unable to get in touch with
his own H.Q,. for hours, because his wireless tender had

The Anti-Hitlei Plot — as seen from H.Q. in the West 281

been knocked out. But it was obvious that Keitel did not
believe this explanation.

I also paid a call on Jodl before leaving. Jodl said to
me, without shaking hands: "That seems to be a bad show
of yours in the West 5 ' I retorted: "It might be well for
you to come yourself and have a look at the situation."
Jodl was surprised to hear that I was going on leave that
evening.

After that I went back to Keitel's train to pick up my
baggage. An orderly there gave me a bottle of claret to
take away, remarking at the same time: "Where you had
breakfast this morning you were sitting in the same seat
where Colonel Stieff last sat." I felt that I had had a
lucky escape. Even after I reached my home at Marburg
I still jumped when the telephone rang. I did not begin
to feel at ease until I got back to the front, and took
over command of my new corps. An underlying anxiety
continued.

From then on to the end of the war many of us felt
that we were under a cloud of suspicion. In March, 1945,
when I was commanding the army in Holland, I received
a telegram from O.K.W. telling me to report at once the
whereabouts of my family. That sounded ominous — as if
they might be taken as hostages. I looked at the map
and saw that the American forces were approaching
Marburg — being already less than sixty miles away. So
I didn't send an answer to this telegram! I felt that my
family would be safer with the Americans.

From the night of July 20th onwards the German
generals often used to discuss among themselves whether
they should get in touch with the Allies — as von Kluge
had thought of doing that evening, when he thought
Hitler was dead. The reasons that checked them from
doing so were:

282

The Other Side of the Hill

(1) Their oath of loyalty to the Ftthrer. (They now
argue: "We gave our oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer.
If he is dead that is cancelled/ 5 So most of them
want to believe that he is dead).

(2) The people in Germany had not realized the truth
of the situation, and would not understand any
action the generals took towards making peace,

(3) The troops on the East front would reproach the
West front for letting them down.

(4) The fear of going down to history as traitors to
their country.

CHAPTER XIX

HITLER'S LAST GAMBLE —
THE SECOND ARDENNES STROKE

In the dark, foggy morning of December i6, 1944, the
German Army struck in the Ardennes. The blow came
as a shock to the Allies, for some of their highest com-
manders had been confidently saying that the Germans
would never be capable of another offensive. It soon
became a greater shock, for the blow burst through the
American front in the Ardennes and threatened to sever
the Allied armies. Alarm spread behind the front, and
was worse still in the Allied capitals. It was like a night-
mare. Fears were voiced that the Germans might reach
the Channel coast, and produce a second Dunkirk.

It was Hitler's last big gamble — and the rashest of all.

Everything looked very different from the German end
of the telescope. The offensive was not only a long-odds
chance, but an incredible muddle. The Allies spoke of it
as the "Rundstedt offensive". That title acts on Rundstedt
like the proverbial red rag, for his feelings about the plan
were, and remain, very bitter. In reality he had nothing
to do with it except in the most nominal way. Having
failed to dissuade Hitler from attempting it, and feeling
that it was a hopeless venture, he stood back throughout
and left Field-Marshal Model to run it.

The decision was entirely Hitler's own, and so was the
strategic plan. It would have been a brilliant brain-wave
he had still possessed the forces and resources to give it a
fair chance of success in the end. That it gained a startling
initial success was largely due to tactics suggested by the
young General von Manteuffel — an army commander at
forty-seven — who persuaded Hitler to adopt them. Hitler

283

284 The Other Side of the Hill

would never listen to the arguments of the older generals,
whom he distrusted, but he had a very different attitude
towards newer men and ideas. He regarded Manteuffel
as one of his discoveries. He loved revolutionary ideas.

The surprise achieved at the start also owed much to the
extreme secrecy in which the design had been hidden.
But this was carried so far that it became more hindrance
than help. It caused many of the muddles which forfeited
such chance as the attack gained* But long after the plan
had miscarried, Hitler insisted on pursuing the attack.
He forbade any timely withdrawal, If the Allies had moved
quicker, his armies might have been trapped. Even as it
was they were badly hammered. The losses they suffered
were fatal to the prospects of the continued defence of
Germany.

It is instructive to follow the course of events through
the eyes of some of the chief German commanders con-
cerned. At the top came Rundstedt, who had been
restored to his old place as Commander-in-Chief in the
West early in Septembei — when the Allies were approach-
ing the Rhine, and Hitler needed a symbol that would
rally the confidence of his shattered armies Under
Rundstedt came Model, who was not a great strategist,
but who had a ruthless energy in scraping up reserves
from a bare cupboard, and was one of the few generals
who dared to argue with Hitler. Model committed suicide
at the end of the war. Under Model came the two Panzer
Army commanders, Sepp Dietrich and Manteuffel. Sepp
Dietrich was an S.S. leader, formerly a rolling stone
in various business jobs, who had caught Hitler's fancy by
his aggressive spirit. Rundstedt regarded him as respon-
sible for fumbling the crucial part of the offensive. Man-
teuffel was a professional soldier of the younger school,
and an aristocrat. A man of quiet dignity, similar to
Rundstedt's, he was also a dynamic exponent of new
methods. Within a year he had risen from command of a
panzer division to command of an Army. Besides being

Hitler's Last Gamble 285

the designer of the tactics of the Ardennes offensive, it was
his thrust that proved by far the most threatening feature.
For these reasons I give the story largely in his words,
checked and supplemented by evidence gathered from
other sources,

Manteuffel is keenly professional enough to enjoy
"fighting his battles over again 95 , in discussion, while
philosophical enough not to dwell disproportionately on
how things went wrong He has a pleasant vein of humour,
too. It survived the hard conditions of the camp where
the generals were then confined, as well as the strain of
anxiety which all of them felt about the fate of their
families, and whether they would ever see them again.
That cheerless camp deep in a remote mountain valley was
depressing enough, even without the barbed wire, to
induce claustrophobia Visiting it on one of the dreariest
of mid-winter days, I remarked to Manteuffel that Grizedale
was not a pleasing place at such a time of the year, but
that it would be better in summer. He replied, with a
smile: "Oh, it might be worse. I expect we shall be
spending next winter on a barren island, or else in a ship
anchored in mid- Atlantic."

THE PLAN

"The plan for the Ardennes offensive," Manteuffel
told me, "was drawn up completely by OJK.W. and sent
to us as a cut and dried Tuhrer order 5 . The object defined
was to achieve a decisive victory in the West by throwing
in two panzer armies — the 6th under Dietrich, and the
5th under me* The 6th was to strike north-east, cross the
Meuse between Li^ge and Huy, and drive for Antwerp.
It had the main role, and main strength. My army was
to advance along a more curving line, cross the Meuse
between Namur and Dinant, and push towards Brussels —
to cover the flank. On the third or fourth day the 15th
Army, using the specially reinforced 12th S.S. Corps under
General Blumentritt, was to make a converging thrust

286

The Other Side of the Hill

from the north-east towards the Meuse at Maastricht — to
assist the 6th Panzer Army's drive on Antwerp, The
Fiihrer's idea was that the Ardennes offensive would by then
have drawn off a large part of the reserves to the help of
the Americans, so that this secondary stroke, although
lighter, should have a chance of success.

"The aim of the whole offensive was, by cutting off
the British Army from its bases of supply, to force it to
evacuate the Continent* 5 9

Hitler imagined that if he produced this second Dunkirk,
Britain would virtually drop out of the war, and he would
have breathing space to hold up the Russians and produce
a stalemate in the East.

Rundstedt told me: "When I received this plan early
in November I was staggered. Hitler had not troubled to
consult me about its possibilities. It was obvious to me
that the available forces were far too small for such an
extremely ambitious plan. Model took the same view of
it as I did. In fact, no soldier believed that the aim of
reaching Antwerp was really practicable. But I knew
by now it was useless to protest to Hitler about the possibility
of anything. After consultation with Model and Man-
teuffel I felt that the only hope was to wean Hitler from
this fantastic aim by putting forward an alternative
proposal that might appeal to him, and would be more
practicable. This was for a limited offensive with the
aim of pinching off the Allies' salient around Aachen."

Manteuffel gave me a fuller account of their discussion
and conclusions. "We were agreed in our objections to the
plan. In the first place the strategic dispositions were
faulty, and there would be grave risk to the flanks unless
these were buttressed* Beyond that, the ammunition
supplies were not sufficient for such extensive aims. Beyond
that again, the Allies' air superiority would be too great a
handicap in attempting such aims. Moreover, we knew
that strong Allied reinforcements were available back in
France, and also in England. I myself stressed the point

Hitler's Last Gamble

287

that we must expect intervention from the airborne
divisions that were ready in England. I also emphasized
how the good network of roads beyond the Meuse would
facilitate the Allies 5 counter-moves.

"We drafted a report to O.K.W. emphasizing that the
forces were not adequate to deliver an offensive on the
lines laid down. At the same time we suggested a modified
plan. In this, the 15th Army, with a strong right flank,
would deliver an attack north of Aachen, towards
Maastricht. The 6th Panzer Army would attack south
of Aachen, and cut in behind that place with the eventual
objective of establishing a bridgehead over the Meuse in
the Li6ge area. The main aim here was to fix the Allies'
attention. The 5th Panzer Army would strike from the
Eifel through the Ardennes towards Namur, with the
aim of gaining a bridgehead there. The armies would then
turn inward and roll up the Allied position along the
Meuse If opposition seemed to be collapsing, they could
exploit their success by an advance towards Antwerp, but
otherwise they could limit their risks. 35

The most that they really hoped 3 Manteuffel said, was
to pinch out the American forces that had pushed beyond
Aachen as far as the River Roer. But he would have
preferred to wait until the Allies started a fresh offensive,
and keep all the German armoured forces in hand for the
delivery of a concentrated counter-stroke. Rundstedt was
of the same opinion, as Blumentritt independently con-
firmed — "The Field- Marshal was really against any further
offensive on our part. His idea was to defend the Roer
and hold all the armoured divisions in readiness behind that
line, as a powerful reserve for counter-attack against a
break-through. He wanted to pursue a defensive strategy. 35

Since Hitler rejected such an idea, the only hope seemed
to lie in subtly inducing him to modify his offensive design
to a form that would offer a chance of moderate success
without involving too heavy risks.

Manteuffel explained that the scope and direction of

288

The Other Side of the Hill

the thrusts suggested was close enough to Hitler's design
as to appear not so very different. In putting forward the
alternative plan, they tried to increase its appeal by
suggesting that, if opposition seemed to be collapsing,
they could then exploit the success towards Antwerp.
"On November 4, so far as I remember, this alternative
plan was sent to O.K.W. for submission to Hitler. It was
emphasized that we could not be ready to launch the attack
before December 10 — Hitler had originally fixed the date
as December 1."

Manteuffel went on: "Hitler rejected this more
moderate plan, and insisted on the original pattern. Mean-
while, knowing that he usually kept us waiting for an
answer we had begun our own planning — but only on
the narrower basis of our own proposals. All the divisions
of my own 5th Panzer Army were assembled, but kept
widely spaced, between Trier and Krefcld — so that spies
and the civil population should have no inkling of what
was intended. The troops were told that they were being
got ready to meet the coming Allied attack on Cologne.
Only a very limited number of staff officers were informed
of the actual plan. 5 *

The 6th Panzer Army was assembled still farther back,
in the area between Hanover and the Weser. Its divisions
had been drawn out of the line to recuperate and be re-
equipped. Curiously, Sepp Dietrich was not informed of
the task that was intended for him nor consulted about the
plan he would have to carry out, until much closer to the
event. Most of the divisional commanders had only a
few days 5 notice. In the case of ManteuffeFs Army, the
move down to the starting line was made in three nights.

THE FLAWS

This strategic camouflage helped surprise, but a heavy
price was paid for the extreme internal secrecy. Com-
manders who were informed so late had too little time to
study their problem, reconnoitre the ground, and make

Hitlers Last Gamble

their preparations. As a result many things were over-
looked, and numerous hitches occurred when the attack
began. Hitler had worked out the plan at his head-
quarters in detail, with Jodl, and seemed to think that this
would suffice for its fulfilment. He paid no attention to
local conditions or to the individual problems of his
executants. He was equally optimistic about the needs
of the forces engaged.

Rundstedt remarked: "There were no adequate rein-
forcements, no supplies of ammunition, and although the
number of armoured divisions was high, their strength in
tanks was low — it was largely paper strength/' (Man*
teuffel said that the actual number of tanks in the two
panzer armies was about 800 — which puts a different
complexion on the Allied statement, based on the number
of divisions, that this was the most powerful concentration
of tanks ever seen in the war.)

The worst deficiency of all was in petrol. Manteuffel
said: "Jodl had assured us there would be sufficient petrol
to develop our full strength and carry our drive through.
This assurance proved completely mistaken. Part of the
trouble was that O.K.W. worked on a mathematical and
stereotyped calculation of the amount of petrol required
to move a division for a hundred kilometres. My experi-
ence in Russia had taught me that double this scale was
really needed under battlefield conditions. Jodl didn't
understand this.

"Taking account of the extra difficulties likely to be
met in a winter battle in such difficult country as the
Ardennes, I told Hitler personally that five times the
standard scale of petrol supply ought to be provided.
Actually, when the offensive was launched, only one and
a half times the standard scale had been provided. Worse
still, much of it was kept too far back, in large lorry columns
on the east bank of the Rhine. Once the foggy weather
cleared, and the Allied air forces came into action, its
forwarding was badly interrupted. 55

J

2 go

The Other Side of the Hill

The troops, ignorant of all these underlying weaknesses,
kept a remarkable trust in Hitler and his assurances of
victory, Rundstedt said: "The morale of the troops
taking part was astonishingly high at the start of the
offensive. They really believed victory was possible —
unlike the higher commanders, who knew the facts/'

NEW TACTICS

At the start, the chances were improved by two factors.
The first was the thinness of the American defences in the
Ardennes sector. The Germans had good information
about this, and knew that only four divisions covered the
75-mile stretch of front. It was Hitler's keen sense of the
value of the unexpected which led him to exploit this
weakness, and its indication that the Allied High Command
was unprepared — despite the lesson of 1940 — for a large-
scale German offensive in such difficult country.

The second favourable factor lay in the tactics that
were adopted. These were not part of the original plan.
Manteuffel told me: "When I saw Hitler's orders for the
offensive I was astonished to find that these even laid down
the method and timing of the attack. The artillery was
to open fire at 7.30 a.m., and the infantry assault was to be
launched at 1 1 a.m. Between these hours the Luftwaffe
was to bomb headquarters and communications. The
armoured divisions were not to strike until the break-
through had been achieved by the infantry mass. The
artillery was spread over the whole front of attack.

"This seemed to me foolish in several respects, so I
immediately worked out a different method, and explained
it to Model. Model agreed with it, but remarked sar-
castically: c You'd better argue it out with the Fuhrer.'
I replied: 'All right, I'll do that if you'll come with me.'
So on December 2, the two of us went to see Hitler in
Berlin.

"I began by saying : 'None of us knows what the weather
will be on the day of the attack — are you sure the Luftwaffe

Hitler's Last Gamble

291

can fulfil its part in face of the Allied air superiority?' I
reminded Hitler of two occasions in the Vosges earlier
where it had proved quite impossible for the armoured
divisions to move in daylight. Then I went on: 'All our
artillery will do at 7.30 is to wake the Americans — and
they will then have three and a half hours to organize their
counter-measures before our assault comes.' I pointed out
also, that the mass of the German infantry was not so
good as it had been, and was hardly capable of making
such a deep penetration as was required, especially in such
difficult country. For the American defences consisted of
a chain of forward defence posts, with their main line of
resistance well behind — and that would be harder to
pierce.

"I proposed to Hitler a number of changes. The first
was that the assault should be made at 5.30 a.m , under
cover of darkness. Of course this would limit the targets
for the artillery, but would enable it to concentrate on a
number of key targets — such as batteries, ammunition
dumps, and headquarters — that had been definitely
located.

"Secondly, I proposed to form one 'storm battalion 9
from each infantry division, composed of the most expert
officers and men. (I picked the officers myself.) These
fi storm battalions' were to advance in the dark at 5.30,
without any covering artillery fire, and penetrate between
the Americans' forward defence posts. They would avoid
fighting if possible until they had penetrated deep.

"Searchlights, provided by the flak units, were to light
the way for the storm troops' advance by projecting their
beams on the clouds, to reflect downwards. I had been
much impressed by a demonstration of this kind which I
had seen shortly beforehand, and felt that it would be the
key to a quick penetration before daylight." (Curiously,
Manteufiel did not seem aware that the British had already
developed such "artificial moonlight". And although he
spoke to me of the impression made on him by a little

The Other Side of the Hill

book of mine, The Future of Infantry > which appeared in
1932, he had forgotten that this new development was one
of the principal suggestions in that book.)

Resuming his account, Manteuffel said: "After setting
forth my alternative proposals to Hitler, I argued that it
was not possible to carry out the offensive in any other
way if we were to have a reasonable chance of success* I
emphasized : * At 4 p.m. it will be dark. So you will only
have five hours, after the assault at 1 1 a.m., in which to
achieve the break-through. It is very doubtful if you can
do it in the time. If you adopt my idea, you will gain a
further five and a half hours for the purpose. Then when
darkness comes I can launch the tanks. They will advance
during the night, pass through our infantry, and by dawn
the next day they will be able to launch their own attack
on the main position, along a cleared approach. 3 '

According to Manteuffel, Hitler accepted these sag-
gestions without a murmur. That was significant. It
would seem that he was willing to listen to suggestions
that were made to him by a few generals in whom he had
faith — Model was another — but he had an instinctive
distrust of most of the senior generals, while his reliance
on his own immediate staff was mingled with a realization
that they lacked experience of battle conditions.

"Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont had never been in the
war. At the same time their lack of fighting experience
tended to make them underrate practical difficulties, and
encourage Hitler to believe that things could be done
that were quite impossible. Hitler would listen to soldiers
who had fighting experience, and practical ideas."

What these tactical changes did to improve the prospects
of the offensive was offset, however, by a reduction of the
strength that was to be put into it. For the executive
commanders soon had damping news that part of the forces
promised them would not be available — owing to the
menacing pressure of the Russian attacks in the East.
The result was that Blumentritt's converging attack on

Hitler's Last Gamble 293

Maastricht had to be abandoned, so leaving the Allies
free to bring down reserves from the north. Moreover,
the 7th Army, which was to advance as flank cover to the
other wing of the offensive, was left with only a few divisions
— and without any tanks. Manteuffel was the more
dismayed to hear this, because he had told Hitler, on the
2nd, that in his view the Americans would launch their
main counter-stroke from the Sedan area towards Bastogne.
"I pointed out the way that so many of the roads converged
on Bastogne."

Yet the ambitious aims of the offensive were not
modified. Curiously, too. Hitler and Jodl did not seem
to realize the effect on the momentum of the advance.
"The time of reaching the Meuse was not discussed in any
detail, 53 Manteuffel told me. "I imagined that Hitler must
realize that a rapid advance would not be possible under
winter conditions, and these limitations, but from what I
have heard since it is clear that Hitler thought the advance
could go much quicker than it did. The Meuse could not
possibly have been reached on the second or third day — as
Jodl expected. He and Keitel tended to encourage Hitler's
optimistic illusions."

Rundstedt receded into the background after Hitler's
rejection of the "smaller" plan, leaving Model and Man-
teuffel, who had more chance of influencing Hitler, to
fight for the technical changes in the plan that were all
Hitler would consider. Blumentritt bitterly remarked:
' 'The Commander-in-Chief in the West was not, in fact,
consulted any more. He was expected to carry out the
offensive in a mechanical way in accordance with the
Fuhrer's operation orders — which regulated the smallest
details — without being able to interfere in any way him-
self." Rundstedt took only a nominal part in the final
conference, held on December 12 th in his headquarters at
Ziegenberg, near Bad Nauheim. Hitler was present, and
controlled the proceedings.

294

The Other Side of the Hill

THE MISSING CARD

As the start of one of my talks with ManteufFel I raised
a question about the use of the airborne forces. I said
that in travelling over a large part of the Ardennes before
the war I had been struck by the fact that its possibilities
for tank movement were greater than was generally
supposed, especially by the conventionally-minded French
high command. At the same time there was an obvious
difficulty in the way that the roads descended into steep
valleys at the river crossings, and these might form tough
obstacles if stoutly defended. It had seemed to me that
the offensive answer to this defensive problem was to drop
airborne forces on these strategic defiles, and seize them
ahead of the tank advance. That was why in my com-
mentary when the Ardennes offensive opened I had assumed
that the Germans were using their airborne troops in this
way. But it now appeared that they did not do so. Could
he, Manteuffel, tell me something about this.

ManteuffePs reply was: "I entirely agree with your
definition of the nature and problem of the Ardennes, and
I think it would have been an excellent idea to use para-
chute forces in the way you suggest. It might have
unlocked the door. But I don't remember it being mooted
when the plan was being discussed, and in any case the
available parachute forces were very scanty. Our parachute
forces were hampered by a shortage of transport aircraft,
above all, but also by a lack of men at the time when this
offensive was launched. The dangerous situation on the
Eastern front had led Hitler to use them as ordinary
infantry, to cement breaches. Other divisions had been
drawn away to Italy and absorbed in the battle there.
The result of all these factors was that only about nine
hundred parachutists were available for the Ardennes
offensive, and they were used on the front of the 6th Panzer
Army."

Manteuffel went on to talk of the neglect to make any

Hitler's Last Gamble

295

effective use of Germany's parachute forces after the capture
of Crete in 1941 — how they had been earmarked for a
stroke against Malta or Gibraltar which never came off;
how Student had wanted to use them in Russia, and had
been thwarted by Hitler's preference for keeping them
in reserve for some special coup; and how, in the end,
they had been frittered away in the r61e of ordinary ground
troops instead of being employed in their own proper
role. He concluded by saying: "In my view, there could
be nothing better than a combination of panzer and
parachute troops."

On this subject Thoma told me, earlier: "Guderian
always worked well with Student, who trained the para-
chute forces, but Goering blocked proposals for combined
action with the panzer forces He always wanted to keep
up the strength of the Luftwaffe, and was therefore niggardly
with such air transport as he had to provide for the para-
chute forces. 5 '

From General Student I got details of how the parachute
troops were employed in the Ardennes offensive. When
the German front in France collapsed and the Allies dashed
forward into Belgium, at the beginning of September, he
was sent to form a fresh front in southern Holland. For
this purpose he was given command of a scratch force
that was imposingly named the 1st Parachute Army. It
consisted of a number of depleted infantry divisions
supplemented by a sprinkling of parachute units that
were then in course of training under him. After the new
front had been established, and the Allied advance checked,
the German forces in Holland were constituted as Army
Group € H', comprising the 1st Parachute Army and the
still more newly created 25th Army. Student was given
command of this army group in addition to his other
function of Commander-in-Chief of the Parachute Forces.

On December 8th he was told of the intended offensive
in the Ardennes and instructed to collect what he could
in the way of trained parachutists in order to furnish one

296

The Other Side of the Hill

strong battalion. That was barely a week before the
offensive was launched. The battalion comprised about
iooo men under Colonel von der Heydte, and it was
sent to the sector of Sepp Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army.
On getting in touch with the Luftwaffe command, von
der Heydte found that more than half the crews of the
aircraft allotted had no experience of parachute operations,
and that necessary equipment was lacking. It was not
until the 13th that he managed to see Sepp Dietrich, who
said that he did not want to use parachute troops for fear
that they might give the enemy a warning, but that
Hitler had insisted.

The task eventually assigned to the parachute troops
was, not to seize one of the awkward defiles ahead of the
panzer advance, but to land on Mont Rigi near the
Malmedy-Eupen-Verviers crossroads, and create a flank
block to delay Allied reinforcements from the north. Von
der Heydte was ordered, despite his protests, to make
the drop at night instead of at dawn, to avoid putting the
enemy on the alert. But on the evening before the
attack the promised transport did not arrive to take the
companies to the airfields, and the drop was postponed
until the next night — when the ground attack had already
started. Then, only a third of the aircraft managed to
reach the correct dropping zone, and the strong wind
dragged the parachutes so that many of the troops were
killed or injured in landing on the wooded and snow-
covered heights. By this time the roads were filled with
American columns streaming south, and as von der Heydte
had only been able to collect a couple of hundred men he
could not gain the cross-roads and establish a blocking
position. For several days he harassed the roads with
small raiding parties, and then, as there was no sign of
Sepp Dietrich's forces arriving to relieve him, he tried to
push eastward to meet them, but was captured on the
way.

"This was our last parachute operation, 5 ' said Student.

Hitler's Last Gamble

297

"On D-day we had had 150,000 parachute troops, and
six organized divisions. Of the total 50,000 were trained,
and the rest under training. We were not able to complete
their training as they were constantly committed to ground
fighting, and by the time they were needed for the Ardennes
offensive, five months later, only a handful were available
— because they had been used up as infantry instead of
being kept for their proper r6ie."

THE BLOW

The blow that gave the Allies their biggest shock since
1942 had no such weight behind it as they pictured at the
time. That is now clear from the German order of battle,
though Manteuffel did not emphasize it — he gave his
account with marked restraint, and is the type of man who
dislikes to offer excuses, however justifiable.

The offensive was launched on December 16th along a
seventy-mile stretch between Monschau (south of Aachen)
and Echternach (just north-west of Trier) . But the 7th
Army's attack on the southern sector did not really count,
as it could only employ four infantry divisions. The
intended main punch was delivered on a narrow front, of
barely fifteen miles, by Sepp Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army,
which was composed of the 1st and 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps,
supplemented by the 67th Corps (of infantry). Although
it had more armoured divisions than the 5th Panzer Army
it was a light-weight for its purpose.

Sepp Dietrich's right-hand punch was blocked early by
the Americans' tough defence of Monschau. His left-
hand punch burst through and, by-passing Malmedy,
gained a crossing over the Ambleve beyond Stavelot on
the 1 8th — after a thirty-mile advance from the starting
line. But it was checked in this narrow defile, and then
cornered by an American counter-move. Fresh efforts
failed, in face of the Americans' rising strength as reserves
were hurried to the scene, and the 6th Panzer Army's
attack fizzled out.

298

The Other Side of the Hill

ManteufFel's 5th Panzer Army attacked on a broader
front, of some thirty miles. He sketched out for me its
dispositions and course. The 66th Corps (of infantry)
was on his right wing, facing in the direction of St, Vith.
"It was purposely put there because the obstacles were
greater, and the chances of rapid progress less, than
farther south." The 58th Panzer Corps was in the centre,
between Prum and Waxweiler. The 47th Panzer Corps
was on the left, between Waxweiler and Bitburg, facing the
direction of Bastogne At the start these two corps included
only three armoured divisions, and despite recent reinforce-
ment the latter only had a strength of between sixty to a
hundred tanks each — one third to a half of their normal
establishment. Sepp Dietrich's armoured divisions were
not much stronger in tanks.

On ManteufFePs front the offensive had a good start.
"My storm battalions infiltrated rapidly into the American
front — like rain-drops. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the
tanks advanced, and pressed forward in the dark with the
help of 'artificial moonlight'. By that time bridges had
been built over the Our river. Crossing these about mid-
night, the armoured divisions reached the American main
position, at 8 a.m., then called for artillery support, and
quickly broke through.

"But Bastogne then proved a very awkward obstacle.
Part of the trouble was due to the way that the 7th Army
had been reduced in strength, for its task was to block the
roads running up from the south to Bastogne." After
crossing the Our at Dasburg, the 47th Panzer Corps had to
get through another awkward defile at Clervaux on the
Woltz, These obstacles, combined with winter conditions,
caused delay. "Resistance tended to melt whenever the
tanks arrived in force, but the difficulties of movement
offset the slightness of the resistance in this early stage.
When they approached Bastogne resistance increased."

On the 1 8th, the Germans came close to Bastogne —
after an advance of nearly thirty miles from their starting

Hitlers Last Gamble

299

line. But during the night before, General Eisenhower
had placed the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, then
near Rheims, at General Bradley's disposal. The 82nd
was sent to stiffen the northern sector, while the 101st was
rushed up by road to Bastogne. Meanwhile part of the
10th U.S. Armoured Division had arrived at Bastogne
just in time to help a battered regiment of the 28th Division
in checking the Germans 5 initial threat. When the 101st
Airborne Division arrived on the night of the 18th, the
defence of this vital road-centre was cemented. During
the next two days thrusts were made against it, from front
and flanks, but all were foiled.

On the 20th Manteuffel decided that no more time
must be lost in trying to clear away this obstacle. "I went
forward myself with the Panzer Lehr Division, led it
round Bastogne, and pushed on to St. Hubert on the 21st.
The 2nd Panzer Division pushed round the north side of
Bastogne. To cover these by-passing advances I masked
Bastogne, using the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to sur-
round the town, with the help of a panzer grenadier
regiment from the Panzer Lehr Division. The 58th
Panzer Corps meanwhile pressed on through Houffalize
and Laroche, after momentarily swinging north to threaten
the flank of the resistance that was holding up the 66th
Corps near St. Vith, and help it forward.

"Even so, the masking of Bastogne entailed a weakening
of my strength for the forward drive, and thus diminished
the chances of this reaching the Meuse at Dinant. More-
over, the 7th Army was still back on the Wiltz, which it
had not been able to cross. The 5th Parachute Division,
on its right, came through my sector and pushed forward
close to one of the roads running south from Bastogne, but
was not across it."

The situation was now less favourable, and potentially
more dangerous than Manteuffel realized. For Allied
reserves were gathering on all sides in a strength much
exceeding that which the Germans had put into the

300

The Other Side of the Hill

offensive, Field-Marshal Montgomery had taken over
temporary charge of all the forces on the north flank of
the breach, and the 30th British Corps had been brought
down to the Meuse, as a support to the 1st American
Army. On the south flank of the breach two corps of
General Patton's 3rd American Army had swung north-
ward, and on the 22nd one of them launched a strong
attack up the road from Arlon to Bastogne. Although its
advance was slow, its menacing pressure caused an
increasing subtraction from the forces that ManteufFel
could spare for his own advance.

The days of opportunity had passed. ManteufFePs
swerving thrust towards the Meuse caused alarm at Allied
Headquarters, but it was too late to be really serious.
According to plan, Bastogne was to have been gained on
the second day, whereas it was not reached until the third,
and not by-passed until the sixth day. A "small finger 5 >
of the 2nd Panzer Division came within a few miles of
Dinant on the 24th, but that was the utmost limit of
progress, and the finger was soon cut off.

Mud, and fuel shortage had been important brakes on
the advance — owing to lack of petrol only half the artillery
could be brought into action. That deficiency was not
compensated by air support. While the foggy weather of
the opening days had favoured the German infiltration by
keeping the Allied air forces on the ground, this cloak of
obscurity disappeared on the 23rd, and the scanty resources
of the Luftwaffe proved incapable of shielding the ground
forces from a terrible pummelling. That multiplied the
toll for time lost. But Hitler was also paying forfeit for the
decision that had led him to place his main strength on the
northern wing, with the 6th Panzer Army, where room for
manoeuvre was much more cramped.

In the first week, the offensive had fallen far short of
what was hoped, and the quickened progress at the start
of the second week was illusory — for it only amounted to a
deeper intrusion between the main road-centres, which the

Hitler's Last Gamble

301

Americans were now more firmly holding. On Christmas
Eve, Manteuffel got through on the telephone direct to
Hitler's headquarters, to represent the realities of the
situation and to make a proposal. Speaking to Jodl, he
emphasized that time was running short, that Bastogne
was causing a lot of trouble, that the 7th Army was not
far enough forward to cover his flank, and that he expected
a massive Allied counter-stroke very soon, driving up the
roads from the south. "Let me know this evening what
the Fiihrer wants. The question is whether I shall use
all my strength to overcome Bastogne, or continue masking
it with small forces and throw my weight towards the
Meuse.

"I then pointed out that the most we could hope to do
was to reach the Meuse — and gave my reasons. First,
because of the delay at Bastogne. Second, because the
7th Army was too weak to bar all roads from the south.
Third, because after eight days of battle the Allies were sure
to be on the Meuse in strength, and it would not be possible
to force a crossing in face of strong opposition. Fourth,
because the 6th Panzer Army had not penetrated far, and
was already held up on the line Monschau-Stavelot
Fifth, it was clear that we should have to fight a battle
this side of the Meuse. For I had picked up wireless
messages from the Allied Traffic Control at Huy, which
was sending regular reports of the passage of reinforcements
across the bridge there — we were able to decipher the
code. 95

After that, Manteuffel made his own proposals— for a
circular stroke northward on the near side of the Meuse,
to trap the Allied forces that were east of the river, and
sweep the bend clear. This would establish the German
forces in a stronger position, which they might hope to
hold. "With this aim, I urged that the whole of my army,
reinforced by the O.K.W. reserves and by the 6th Panzer
Army's reserves, should be concentrated south of the
Ourthe, around Laroche, and then wheel round in a circuit

302

The Other Side of the Hill

past Marche towards Li6ge. I said: 6 Give me these
resex^ves, and I will take Bastogne, reach the Meuse, and
swing north, so helping the 6th Panzer Army to advance. 5
I finished by emphasizing these points — I must have a
reply that night; the O.K.W. reserves must have sufficient
petrol; I would need air support. Up till then I had only
seen the enemy's aircraft !

"During the night Major Johannmeier, the Fixhrer's
adjutant, visited me and after discussion telephoned Jodl.
At the end I came to the telephone myself, but Jodl said
that the Fiihrer had not yet made a decision. All he could
do for the moment was to place at my disposal one
additional armoured division.

"It was not until the 26th that the rest of the reserves
were given to me — and then they could not be moved.
They were at a standstill for lack of petrol — stranded over
a stretch of a hundred miles — just when they were needed/ 5
(The irony of this situation was that on the 19th the
Germans had come within about a quarter of a mile of a
huge petrol dump at Andrimont, near Stavelot, con-
taining 2,500,000 gallons. It was a hundred times larger
than the largest of the dumps they actually captured.)

I asked ManteufFel whether he felt that real success
would have been possible as late as December 24th — even
if he had been given the reserves immediately, and they
had been provided with petrol. He replied: "I think a
limited success would still have been possible — up to the
Meuse, and perhaps the capture of bridgeheads beyond
it." In further discussion, however, he admitted that
such a belated attainment of the Meuse would have brought
more disadvantage than advantage in the long run.

"We had hardly begun this new push before the Allied
counter-offensive developed. I telephoned Jodl and asked
him to tell the Fiihrer that I was going to withdraw my
advanced forces out of the nose of the salient we had made
— to the line Laroche-Bastogne. But Hitler forbade this
step back. So instead of withdrawing in time, we were

Hitlers Last Gamble

303

driven back bit by bit under pressure of the Allied attacks,
suffering needlessly heavy losses. On January 5th the
situation was so serious that I feared Montgomery would
cut off both our Armies, Although we managed to avoid
this danger, a large part of them were sacrificed. Our
losses were much heavier in this later stage than they had
been earlier, owing to Hitler's policy of 'no withdrawal 9 .
It spelt bankruptcy, because w r e could not afford such
losses.' 9

AFTERMATH

Manteuffel summed up the last stage of the war in two
sentences: "After the Ardennes failure, Hitler started a
'corporal's war 5 . There were no big plans — only a
multitude of piecemeal fights. 95

He went on: "When I saw the Ardennes offensive was
blocked I wanted to cany out a general withdrawal — first to
our starting line, and then to the Rhine, but Hitler would
not hear of it. He chose to sacrifice the bulk of his main
forces in a hopeless struggle on the West bank of the
Rhine. 99

Rundstedt endorsed this verdict. But he also made it
clear that, although the German Army's leading exponent
of offensive warfare, he had never seen any point in this
offensive. "Each step forward in the Ardennes offensive
prolonged our flanks more dangerously deep, making
them more susceptible to Allied counter-strokes. 99 Rund-
stedt traced the effect, on the map, as he talked. "I
wanted to stop the offensive at an early stage, when it was
plain that it could not attain its aim, but Hitler furiously
insisted that it must go on. It was Stalingrad No. 2."

The Ardennes offensive carried to the extreme of
absurdity the military belief that "attack is the best
defence 99 . It proved the "worst defence 99 — wrecking
Germany's chances of any further serious resistance. From
that time on, the main concern of most of the German
commanders seems to have been, not whether they could

304

The Other Side of the Hill

stop the Allies 5 advance, but why the Allies did not advance
faster and finish the war quicker.

They were tied to their posts by Hitler's policy, and
Himmler's police, but they were praying for release.
Throughout the last nine months of the war they spent
much of their time discussing ways and means of getting
in touch with the Allies to arrange a surrender.

All to whom I talked dwelt on the effect of the Allies
"unconditional surrender 55 policy in prolonging the war.
They told me that but for this they and their troops — the
factor that was more important — would have been ready
to surrender sooner, separately or collectively. "Black-
listening 55 to the Allies 5 radio service was widespread.
But the Allied propaganda never said anything positive
about the peace conditions m the way of encouraging
them to give up the struggle. Its silence on the subject was
so marked that it tended to confirm what Nazi propaganda
told them as to the dire fate in store for them if they sur-
rendered. So it greatly helped the Nazis to keep the
German troops and people to continue fighting — long after
they weie ready to give up.

CHAPTER XX

HITLER—
AS A YOUNG GENERAL SAW HIM

In the course of one of my talks with MaixteufFel about the
Ardennes offensive he gave me a military character-
sketch of Hitler that differed markedly from the impression
of him that the older generals conveyed. It is worth
reproducing because it goes further to explain the sources
of both his power and his failure.

The way in which ManteufFel attracted Hitler's notice
is also illuminating. In August, 1943* he had been given
command of the 7th Armoured Division — which Rommel
had led in 1940. It was in Manstein's Army Group.
That autumn the Russians surged over the Dnieper and
captured Kiev, then rolled on rapidly west towards the
Polish frontier. Manstein had no formed reserve left to
meet this fresh crisis, but charged ManteufFel with the
task of collecting such odd units as he could find for an
improvised counter-stroke. ManteufFel broke in behind
the rear of the advancing Russians, ejected them from
Zhitomir junction by a night attack, and drove on north
to recapture Korosten. By dividing his meagre forces
into a number of small mobile groups ManteufFel created
an impression out of proportion to his strength, and the
sudden riposte brought the Russian advance to a halt.

After that, ManteufFel further developed this method
of penetrating raids that cut in between the Russian
columns and struck at them from the rear. "It was handi-
capped by the Russians 5 lack of dependence on a normal
system of supply — I never met any supply columns on
these 'interior 5 raids — but I caught staff and signal centres
besides striking bodies of troops in the back. These

305

306 The Other Side of the Hill

penetrating raids proved very effective in spreading con-
fusion. Of course, for operations of this kind an armoured
division must be self-contained for supplies, carrying with
it what it needs, so as to be free from dependence on
communications during the whole course of the operation."
(It is evident that Manteuffel practised what General
(then Brigadier) Hobart demonstrated with the ist Tank
Brigade in the Salisbury Plain area in i934~35 — though
without convincing the British General Staff that such a
form of strategy was practicable.)

Hitler was delighted with the new method, and eager
to hear more about it. So he sent an invitation for Man-
teuffel and the commander of his tank regiment, Colonel
Schultz, to spend Christmas at his headquarters near
Angerburg, in East Prussia. After congratulating Man-
teuffel, Hitler said: "As a Christmas present, I'll give you
fifty tanks."

Early in 1944 Manteuffel was given command of a
specially reinforced division, the "Gross-Deutschland",
and with this he was sent to diffeient sectors to check a
break-through or to release forces that had been trapped
by the Russian tide of advance. In September, after he
had cut a way through to the German forces that were
hemmed in on the Baltic coast round Riga, he was given
a big jump in promotion — to command the 5th Panzer
Army, in the West.

Throughout 1 944, Manteuffel saw more of Hitler than
almost any other commander did, as Hitler frequently
summoned him to his headquarters to discuss these emer-
gency missions and to consult him on armoured warfare
problems. This close contact enabled Manteuffel to get
under the surface that terrified or mesmerized other
generals.

"Hitler had a magnetic, and indeed hypnotic per-
sonality. This had a very marked effect on people who
went to see him with the intention of putting forward their
views on any matter. They would begin to argue their

Hitler — as a Toung General Saw Him 307

point, but would gradually find themselves succumbing to
his personality, and in the end would often agree to the
opposite of what they intended. For my part, having
come to know Hitler well in the last stages of the war*
I had learned how to keep him to the point, and maintain
my own argument. I did not feel afraid of Hitler, as so
many were. He often called me to his headquarters for
consultation, after that Ghristmastide I had spent at his
headquarters by invitation, following the successful stroke
at Zhitomir that had attracted his attention.

"Hitler had read a lot of military literature, and was
also fond of listening to military lectures. In this way,
coupled with his personal experience of the last war as an
ordinary soldier, he had gained a very good knowledge of
the lower level of warfare — the properties of the different
weapons; the effect of ground and weather; the mentality
and morale of troops. He was particularly good in gauging
how the troops felt. I found that I was hardly ever in
disagreement with his view when discussing such matters.
On the other hand he had no idea of the higher strategical
and tactical combinations. He had a good grasp of how a
single division moved and fought, but he did not understand
how armies operated."

Manteuffel then went on to talk of how the "hedgehog"
system of defence had developed, and how Hitler was led
to carry it too far. "When our troops were being forced
back by the Russian attacks, they were attracted, as by
magnets, towards the defended localities that had been
prepared in rear. Falling back on these, they found it
natural to rally there, and put up a stubborn resistance.
Hitler was quick to see the value of such localities, and the
importance of maintaining them. But he overlooked the
need of giving the sector commanders reasonable latitude
to modify their dispositions, and to withdraw if necessary.
He insisted on having the question submitted to him in
every case. Too often, before he had made up his mind,
the Russians had broken through the over-strained defence.

308

The Othet Side of the Hill

"He had a real flair for strategy and tactics, especially
for surprise moves, but he lacked a sufficient foundation
of technical knowledge to apply it properly. Moreover,
he had a tendency to intoxicate himself with figures and
quantities. When one was discussing a problem with him,
he would repeatedly pick up the telephone, ask to be put
through to some departmental chief, and ask him — 'How
many so and so have we got V Then he would turn to the
man who was arguing with him, quote the number, and
say : 'There you are 5 — as if that settled the problem. He
was too ready to accept paper figures, without asking if
the numbers stated were available in reality. It was
always the same whatever the subject might be — tanks,
aircraft, rifles, shovels.

"Generally, he would ring up Speer or Buhle — who was
in charge of factories. Buhle always kept a little note-
book beside him, with all the figures ready for which
Hitler was likely to ask, and would answer pat. But even
if the numbers had actually been produced, a large part
of them were still in the factories, and not with the troops.
In much the same way, Goering said he would provide
ten divisions of ground troops from the Luftwaffe at short
notice, for the Russian front — forgetting that the officers
had been trained only for air operations, and would need
a lengthy fresh training before they would be fit for land
operations/*

I remarked to Manteuffel that the more I heard about
the German side of the war the more the impression had
grown that, on the one hand, Hitler had a natural flair
for strategy and tactics of an original land, while the
German General Staff on the other hand were very
competent but without much originality. I felt that,
from the way many of the generals had talked, Hitler's
misunderstanding of technical factors so jarred them that
they tended to discount the possible value of his ideas,
while he was angered by their orthodoxy and lack of
receptivity. In this way, it seemed to me, that a tug-of-war

Hitler — as a Toung General Saw Htm 309

had developed, instead of a good working combination.
Manteuffel said that he agreed completely with that
definition of the situation. It summed up the trouble on
the military side. "I said much the same thing to Hitler
myself when I spent Christmas with him in 1943, when
discussing the difference of outlook between the tank
leaders and those who had grown up with the older arms*
The more senior generals could not get into the mind of
the fighting troops under the new conditions of warfare."

CONCLUSION

Surveying the record of German leadership in the war,
and the course of operations, what are the conclusions
that emerge? An utter failure on the plane of war policy,
or grand strategy, is seen to be accompanied by a remark-
able, though uneven, run of performance in strategy and
tactics. The explanation is also of a dual nature. The
older professional leaders trained under the General Staff
system tended to prove highly efficient, but lacking in
genius — save in the sense of "an infinite capacity for
taking pains". Their immense ability carried its own limi-
tation. They tended to conduct war more in the manner of
chess than as an art, unlike the old masters of war. They
were inclined to frown on fellow-professionals who had
novel ideas, and were more contemptuous when such ideas
came from amateurs. Most of them, also, were limited in
understanding of any factors outside the military field.

Hitler was quicker to spot the value of new ideas, new
weapons, and new talent. He recognized the potentialities
of mobile armoured forces sooner than the General Staff
did, and the way he backed Guderian, Germany's leading
exponent of this new instrument, proved the most decisive
factor in the opening victories. Hitler had the flair that
is characteristic of genius, though accompanied by liability
to make elementary mistakes, both in calculation and
action. The younger soldiers he picked out and pushed
on were often akin to him in these respects — especially
Rommel, the most favoured military "upstart". Such men
had an instinct for the unexpected and a greater sense of
its incalculable value in paralysing opponents. They
brought back into warfare, in a new guise, the classical
ruses and stratagems which the established military
teachers of the last half-century had declared out of date

310

Conclusion

and impossible to apply in modern operations. By Hitler's
success in demonstrating the fallacy of orthodoxy he
gained an advantage over the military hierarchy which
he was quicker to exploit than to consolidate.

Sometimes the intuitive amateurs were justified by
events; sometimes the mathematically calculating pro-
fessionals — the latter more, naturally, in the long run.
But the jealousy between them, and the way it aggravated
inevitable clashes of opinion, proved more fatal to Germany
than the actual errors of either side. For that, the primary
responsibility lay with the established hierarchy, as it
always does. The result may have been inevitable, for the
sphere of war is not one that teaches wisdom to its priests,
or the quality of reconciling contrary views. In view of
Hitler's policy and his temperament, he would have been
very difficult to restrain in any circumstances; but the
attitude of the professionals and the frequency with which
his insight proved more correct than theirs made him
uncontrollable. But neither side was conscious of its own
limitations.

The German generals of this war were the best-
finished product of their profession — anywhere. They
could have been better if their outlook had been wider
and their understanding deeper. But if they had become
philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers.

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INDEX

Abbeville, 54, 135, 137

Africa, North, 54 et seq , 162 et seq.

Airborne forces, 105, 123-6, 158 et

seq., 231, 294-7
Air power, 55, 102, 106, 123, 128,

130, 133, 150, 153, 167, 172,

184-5, 211, 230, 249 et seq., 263,

300

Aisne, the, 135, 146 et seq.
Alaraem, Montgomery takes over,

55, and Rommel legend, 56,

defeat due to Hitler, 162;

Rommel at, 170, Thoma at,

171, the battle of, 172
Alba, Duke of, 152
Albert Canal, 124, 125, 126, 128
Alexander, Field-Marshal Sir

Harold, 55
Altmarh, The, 44

Anti-aircraft defence, 94, 117, 134,
211

Antonescu, Marshal, 220
Antweip, 84, 127, 157, 247, 285 et
seq.

Ardennes, advance through the, in
1940, 64, 101, 118 et seq , 127-8,
131 et seq ; 1944 counter-offen-
sive, 69, 77, 83, 85, 283 et seq

Armoured forces, 20, 22-3, 30-2,
46, 48-9, 64^-5, 67, 70-1, 75, 76,
80, 96 et seq., 119, 123, 127, 138,
140, 144, 163, 174-5, 177, 187,
230, 249, 289, 295, 298, 305-6

Armoured mobile infantry, 104, 108

Army, American, Elfeldt on, 264;
Blumentritt on, 268

Army, British, Rundstedt and
Blumentritt on, 267-8

Army, French, its doctrine, 21;
is poorly armed, 134; Blumen-
tritt on, 150, 151

Army, German, its behaviour, 29;
the effect of disarmament on,
31, 32 ; new weapons and tactics
tried in Spam, 34; is expanded,
75, 79, 80, 9^96, relaxes, 151;
is not modern enough, 175;
compared with World War I,
254, 265-267

Army, Italian, 163

Army, Red, 183, 223, 229 et seq.
Arras, 137, 138

Artillery, 105, 108-9, 133, 223, 224,

230, 241, 264, 291
Atlantic Wall, the, 245
Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir

Claude, 55
Avranches, 74, 258 et seq , 280

Badoglio, Marshal, 163

Bastogne, 293, 298 et seq.

Bechtolsheim, General von, on in-
vasion of Belgium, 126-130; on
invasion of France, 147, 149-150;
on German soldiers, 266-7

Beck, General, opposes Hitler, 13,
32, 39, 271; is dismissed, 40, 80

Belgium, allied armies lured into,
46, invasion of, 124 et seq

Beresma, the, 226

Berlin, 186, 224, 269, 275, 279

Biscay, Bay of, 139, 242

Black Sea, the, 64, 72, 189 et seq ,
211, 213

Blaskowitz, General, 242

Blomberg, Field-Marshal von, as
War Minister, 12, 27, 32, 92, 93;
his marriage and dismissal, 13,
35, SO, 94; his personality, 28;
his influence on the Army, 29, 30;
his subservience to Hitler, 34

Blumentritt, General, on Manstem,
73; on invasion of France, 114,
117, 118, 121, 123, 130, 131, 138,
141, 142, 148, 150-152; on in-
vasion of England plan, 160,
161; on invasion of Russia, 180,
184, 187 et seq ; on Normandy
invasion, 237 et seq ; on Rom-
mel, 242, 248, on Kluge, 255,
260; on British and American
troops, 268; on Anti-Hitler Plot,
269 et seq ; and Ardennes counter-
offensive, 285, 287, 292, 293

Bock, Field-Marshal von, and in-
vasion of Russia, 49, 74, 177,
183, et seq ; and invasion of

314

Index

3 J 5

France, 118, 123, 146; and in-
vasion of England plan, 157;
sick, 199, shelved, 205

Bradley, General Omar, 299

Brauchitsch, Field-Marshal von,
becomes head of the Army, 13,
36-38, warns Hitler, 39-41; and
invasion of Poland, 42, 43; and
invasion of Russia, 47-50, 180,
182, 189, 192, 202, is dismissed,
15, 50, 72; and Haider, 62, 63;
and invasion of France, 114-116,
and invasion of England plan,
157-8; mentioned, 99, 166

Brest-Litovsk, 186, 234

Breunmg, Admiral, 158

Brmkmann, Admiral, 158

Britain, and Munich, 40; and
Poland, 40-42, and Finland,
43; attacks the Alttnark, 44,
and Greece, 175, 176, 178; and
Normandy landing, 236

Broad, Lieut-Gen Sir Charles, 97

Brussels, 121 et seg

Budapest, 69, 70, 228

Budenny, Marshal, 64, 183, 231

Busch, General von, 157, 205, 255

Caen, 59, 247, 249, 254, 262
Caucasus, the, 49, 63, 65, 72, 170,
190, 191, 192, 197 et seg , 210,
212, 213 et seg ,219
Caulamcourt, General de, 194
Cherbourg, 59, 245 et seq. 9 254, 262
Churchill, Winston, his broadcasts
and Hitler, 43, 44, replaces
Auchinleck, 55, and peace pro-
posals, 158
Ciano, Count, 153
Clausewitz, Karl von, 203
Cossack, the, 44
Coulondre, 41

Crete, capture of, 162, 167-169

Crimea, the, 63, 72, 191

Cross - country movement, 104,

174-5, 187
Cruwell, General, 169
Cyprus, 162, 169
Czecho-Slovakia, 14, 40

Danzig, 40

D-day, 244, 250-253, 297
Defensive-offensive tactics, 30, 46,

58, 63, 73, 107, 122, 209, 220-1,

248, 287

Defensive, strength of, 24, 49, 198

201-2, 215, 219 et seq., 237
Dempsey, General Sir Miles, 277
Devon, 157

Dieppe landing, 65, 169, 238

Dietl, General, 52

Dietrich, General Sepp, 83-85, 284,

288, 296-7
Disarmament of Germany, effect

of, 31-2

Dittmar, General, on Hitler, 50,
51, 77, 227-8, on Russian
soldiers, 232-3

Doenitz, Admiral, 275

Dunkirk, escape from, 46, 47, 112,
129, 139 et seq., 154, 158, 159

Eben Emael, fort, 125, 126
Eberbach, General, 257, 263
Eden, Anthony, 176
Egypt, 162

Eisenhower, General, 299
Elfeldt, General, on Avranches

break through, 262-265; on

German soldiers, 265-6; on U.S.

soldiers, 264
Engel, Admiral, 158
England, invasion plans for, 71,

152 et seq.; is preserved from

invasion, 111-113

Falaise, 258, 264

Falkenhorst, General von, 44

Finland, 43, 45

Foch, Marshal, 10

France, invasion of, 14, 17, 19, 24,
29, 100, 101, 111 et seq.; and
Munich, 40; and aid to Finland,
43

Franco, General, 34, 98, 99, 162,
166

French Resistance Movement,
240-1, 244, 252, 270

Fntsch, General von, Himmler's
trap for, 13, 35, 36, becomes
Chief of Army Command, 32, 92,
93, 94; his diplomacy, 33, his
caution, 34, his dismissal, 36, 70;
and Brauchitsch, 38, 39

Fntsche, Hans, 227

Fromm, General, 116, 117, 274

Fuller, Major-Gen J F C, 97

Funk, General von, 203

Index

316

Gamelin, General, 127, 134, 138,
144

Gaulle, General de, 97, 136
Gestapo, the, 29, 61
Gibraltar, 162, 166, 167, 295
Giraud, General, 136
Goebbels, Dr. Paul Joseph, 75, 192
Goerdeler, Dr. Carl Fnednch, 94,
270

Goering, Reichsmarshal Hermann,
as Commander-in-Chief of Air
Force, 36, 37, 105, 117, 295; and
invasion of England plans, 155,
156, 160, 161; and capture of
Crete, 167, 168; and Russian
invasion, 308
Gort, Field-Marshal Viscount, 139
Graziani, Marshal, 163, 166
Greece, invasion of, 175-178
Guderian, General, and armoured
warfare, 30, 96, 101, 310; and
Russian invasion, 64, 67-9, 184,
188, 189, 199, 225, is dismissed,
70, and French invasion, 101,
130, 133, 136 et seq , 147, 148;
and Blumentritt, 279, 280, and
Student, 295
Gumgand, Major-Gen. Sir Francis
de, 176

Hague, the, 125
Haig, Field-Marshal, Earl, 10
Haider, General, disagrees with
Hitler, 13-15, 40, and the in-
vasion of Poland, 42-3, 203-7,
217, 225, and the invasion of
Russia, 47, 48, 177, 180, 182,
and Hitler, 51, 72, 166; and
Brauchitsch, 62, 63, dismissal of,
64; and the invasion of France,
115, 116, 118, and Dunkirk, 139,
and the invasion of England
plans, 156
Hammerstem, Geneial von, 27-32,

89, 91, 92
Haushofer, Professor, 53
Hausser, General, 257-264
Heimrici, General, on invasion of
France, 149; on invasion of
Russia, 186, 222 et seq , his
command in Russia, 200; on
German soldiers, 266-7

Heydte, Colonel von der, 296
Heye, General von, 27, 29

Himmler, Hemnch, and the Roehm
purge, 12, 33; traps Blomberg
and Fntsch, 12, 13, 34 et seq,
80, and Manstem's removal, 73;
commands home foices, 274, 304

Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von, in
last war, 10; his manner, 19;
appoints Hitler as Chancellor, 27,
appoints Fntsch Chief of Army
Command, 32; Rundstedt com-
pared to, 78, and Schleicher,
90-92

Hitler, Adolf, as strategist, 9-11,
121-2, 310, assumes supreme
command, 13, 15, 36-7 ; conquers
Czechoslovakia and Poland, 14,
42; orders invasion of France,
14-15, 114, 116, 123; and Fntsch,
13, 36, becomes Chancellor, 27,
91; and Blomberg, 27, 35; his
anti-Bolshevist obsession, 34,
appoints Brauchitsch head of
Army, 38; breaks Munich agree-
ment, 40, arranges pact with
Russia, 41 ; and victory m Poland,
42; invades Norway, 43-6, and
invasion of Russia, 15, 47-50,
63, 170, 174 et seq ; a mystic,
51, picks Rommel and Dietl as
heroes, 52, 310, gives ultimatum
to Rommel, 61; and Normandy
invasion, 60, 237-9, 246, 249,
254, and assassination attempt,
257 et seq, 269 et seq.; and
Zeitzler, 65-7, and Guderian,
69-70, 310, and Manstem, 71-3,
120, and Kluge, 74-5, 255, 258-9,
260, and Model, 75-7, and Rund-
stedt, 77-82, 254-5; his last
fling, 83-5; rise to power, 87 et
seq.; and armoured forces, 103-4;
and Dunkirk, 112, 139-140; his
bid for peace, 113, 115 153;
plot to overthrow him, 117; his
interventions, 134-8, 140; his
admiration of British Empire,
141-3; and invasion of England
plans, 152, 154-6, 160; and N
Africa, 165-6; and Crete, 167-8;
and Malta, 169-170; and Thoma,
171; his decision on Rommel,
261; his last gamble, 283 et seq.;
and Manteuffel, 305-6, Man-
teuffel on, 306-9

Hobart, Major-Gen. Sir Percy, 97,
306

Hoeppner, General, and invasion of
Belgium, 126, 127, and invasion

Index

of France, 147; and Moscow
offensive, 193; and Hitler, 270

Hoffacker, Lt Colonel, 273, 276

Holland, 46, 116, 123 et seq

Hoth, General, 131, 193

Hungary, 70

Intelligence, German, incorrect-
ness of their leports, 155, 158,
160, 184, 187, and Russia, 204,
and Normandy invasion, 244

Italy, 41

Japan, 162
Jassy, 107

Jodl, General, his attitude to Hitler,
65, 66, 292, and Russia, 182;
and Normandy invasion, 252,
and Aidennes offensive, 289, 293,
301, 302, and Blumentntt, 281

3^7

Krancke, Admiral, 274-5
Kuchler, General von, 124
Kursk, 73, 191, 208, 210, 221

Laon, 136

Leeb, Field-Marshal von, and in-
vasion of France, 118, 148; and
invasion of Russia, 183, 203-206

Lenmgiad, 66, 72, 193, 200, 205,
222

Leopold, King, 129
List, Field-Marshal von, 99, 132,
205

Lossberg, General von, 70
Ludendorff, General, 10, 19, 78
Luftwaffe, and Poland, 24; forma-
tion of, 94; as Hitler's instru-
ment, 96; and Battle over
Britain, 24, 112, 156; and
Goenng, 36, 105, 117, 295, 296;
and France, 24, 123, 128, 133,
150; and Crete, 168, and Russia,
200, 201

Keitel, Field-Marshal, succeeds
Blomberg, 13, 36, 37; and Nor-
mandy invasion, 255, 270; and
anti-Hitler plot, 272, 274, 278;
and Blumentntt, 279, 280, 281;
and Ardennes offensive, 293;
mentioned, 41, 65, 66, 94, 292

Kharkov, 63, 72, 209, 210, 221

Kiev, 49, 50, 64, 102, 185, 188, 189,
190, 193, 222

Kleist, Field Marshal von, and in-
vasion of Russia, 64, 65; his
account of invasion of Russia,
177, 180-185, 189 et $eq., 208 et
seq* f 219, 220, 221; and invasion
of France, 101, 130, 132, 147-
149; his account of invasion of
France, 133 et seq. ; his impression
of Red Army, 229. 230

Kluge, Field-Marshal von, replaces
Rundstedt, 60; in Russia, 73,
189, 194, 195-6, 198, 199, 205,
221, 225; m France, 128, 146,
in Normandy, 74, 236, 255, 257-
260, 262; is dismissed, 75: suicide,
75, 236, 260, 261; and Hitler, 83,
258-260, 270 et seq ; his last
letter, 260

Koniev, Marshal, 98, 231

Maastricht, 124 et seq > 130,
286-7, 292

Maginot Line, Hitler's strategy for*
9; and invasion of France, 118,
122, 146, 148, 149, 250

Malta, 162, 169, 170, 295

Manstem, Field-Marshal von, and
invasion of Poland, 42; his
ability, 70, his plan for defeat
of France, 71, 119, 120, 123;
and Russian invasion, 72, 191,
220, 221, 305; is discarded, 73

Manteuffel, General von, and Ar-
dennes offensive, 83-85, 283 et
seq ; and invasion of Russia,
305; on Model, 76, 77, on
armoured warfare, 105- 109;
on Russian tanks, 230; on
Russian Army, 235; on Hitler,
306 et seq

Mareth, Battle of, 56

Martel, Lieut.-General Sir Giffard
Le Q , 138

Mediterranean, the, 55, 148, 162
et seq , 239, 242

Mem Kampf t 142

Middle East, the 162, 170

Minsk, 183, 186, 187, 229

Model, Field - Marshal, replaces
Kluge, 75, 277-8; his ability, 76;

Index

Quisling, Vidkun, 43-5, 96

318

Model, Field-Marshal {continued)
and Hitler, 77, 292; and 'Rund-
stedt offensive', 83-4; and in-
vasion of Russia, 255; and
Normandy invasion, 259, 260;
and Ardennes offensive, 283, 286,
290, 293

Montgomery, Field - Marshal Sir
Bernard, takes over Eighth
Army, 55; victories in Africa,
56, 162, 172, and Thoma, 173;
Rundstedt and Blumentritt on,
267, and Ardennes offensive,
300, 303

Moonlight, artificial, 291-2, 298

Moscow, 15, 49, 63, 66, 72, 74,
174 et seq., 197 et seq

Mulberries, the, 245

Munich, 40

Mussolini, Benito, his desire for
war, 153, 154; and N. Africa,
163, 165

Napoleon I, The Emperor, 9, 10,
19, 47, 49, 96, 157, 174, 180, 193,
197-8, 202, 246

Normandy invasion, 58-60, 74, 75,
236 et seq.

Norway, invasion of, 43-6

Nuremberg trials, 43, 112, 110

Oberg, General, 275-277
O'Connor, General Sir Richard,

163, 165
Oder, the river, 70, 186, 224

Papen, Franz von, 79, 89, 90
Patton, General George, inspired by
Sherman's methods, 30; in Nor-
mandy invasion, 74; Blumentritt
and Rundstedt on, 258, 259, 262,
264, 300

Paulus, Field-Marshal von, 66, 214,
219

P6tain, Marshal, 151, 262

Plot of July 20th, against Hitler,

61, 75, 77, 258, 261, 269 et seq
Poland, is conquered, 14, 40-43,

71, 113; and Luftwaffe, 24
Pripet Marshes, the, 68, 183, 185.

186, 229

Raeder, Admiral, 44, 45, 152, 153

Reichenau, Field-Marshal von, and
new British tank ideas, 30; and
mvasion of France, 127-129, 146,
147, 149 ; and invasion of England
plan, 157; and invasion of Russia,
185, 205; mentioned, 27, 32, 42

Retchswehr, the, 19-21, 28, 32,
87 et seq , 265

Remhardt, General, 133, 137, 139

Rhine, the river, 124, 130, 149,
158, 245, 284, 289, 313

Richthofen, General, 130, 133, 167

Roehm, Captain, 12, 33, 93

Rohncht, General, on Himmler's
trap for Fritsch, 36, his descrip-
tion of Schleicher and Hammer-
stem, 88; on the rise of Hitler,
89 et seq ; on invasion of France,
115-7, 120-1, 135; on the Ger-
man soldier, 266-7

Rommel, Field-Marshal, his rise to
fame, 52, 53; m North Africa,
54-57, 166, 170-172; and French
invasion, 146; and Normandy
invasion, 58-61, 71, 74, 236
242 et seq , his accident and
cfeath, 61, 257, mentioned, 75,
305, 310, and anti-Hitler plot,
269-271, 277

Roosevelt, FianUni, 44

Rotterdam, 123, 124

Ruhr, the, 116, 123

Rumania, 69

Rundstedt, Field-Marshal von,
represents senior generals, 11,
36; on Sudetenland conference,
40; and invasion of Poland, 42,
71; on Hitler, 44; Montgomery
on, 56; and Normandy invasion,
58-60, 74, 236, 239 et seq , 262,
270, and invasion of France, 71,
117-9, 128-9, 132-3, 142, 144;
and Ardennes offensive, 77, 283,
et seq , is restored to command,
78, 80, 82, his development of
army, 79-80; his retirement, 80,
81; his ability, 81-2, and
'Rundstedt offensive', 83-4, 283;
mentioned, 112, 114, 160; his
account of invasion of France,
122-3, 134, 137-9, 146; his
account of invasion of England
plan, 156-7; his account of in-

Index

vasion of Russia, 176, 179,
184-5, 189-193, 198, 219; and
Russia, 180, 183, 186, 203-4;
on Red Army, 230-1; his
account of Normandy invasion,
237-8, 240, 245-7, 249-251,
253-5, his character, 243; and
Hitler, 270, and Blumentritt,
278 u his account of Ardennes
offensive, 286, 289-290, 303
Russia, and Hitler, 9 et $eg , 41 ;
war with Finland, 43; invasion
of, 15, 47-51, 63 et seq , 174 et
seq , 305

St. Nazaire raid, 169
Schacht, Dr Hjalmar, 95
Schleicher, General von, 79, 88 et
seq.

Schheffen, Field-Marshal, Count

von, 17, 203
Sea power, 43, 47, 55, 72, 154 et

seq., 163, 168, 170, 202, 253
Sevastopol, 72, 191
Sedan, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 292

et seq

Seeckt, General Hans von, his
effect on Second World War, 17,
19-22, 32, his part m First War,
18; his book, TJioughts of a
Soldter, quoted, 22-26, is suc-
ceeded by Heye, 27; and unity,
95; and Zhukov, 231

Sherman, General, 30

Sicily, 169

Siewert, General, on invasion of
France, 114, 115, 134, 135; on
invasion of England plans, 157,
158

Simovich, General, 178
Smolensk, 188, 207
Sodenstern, General von, 120, 141,
161

Space, influence of, 48, 130, 151,

166, 174, 197, 222-3, 237
Spam, 165, 239

Spanish Civil War, Nazi inter-
vention m, 34, 9S, 99

Speer, Albert, 308

Speidel, General, and Anti-Hitler
Plot, 269-271, 277, 278

Sperrle, Field-Marshal, 133, 272,
273

S.S. the, 29, 36, 93, 100, 267, 273
Stalm, Josef, 182, 188, 207

Stalingrad, 197 et seq , 216-218

Stauffenberg, Count von, 273

Steiff, Colonel, 272, 281

Strasser, Gregor, 90, 91

Strauss, General von, 157

Student, General, on invasion of
Holland, 124-5; on invasion of
Belgium, 125-6; on invasion of
England plans, 158-160, on
threat to Gibraltar, 166-7; on
capture of Crete, 167-8; on
Malta, 169-170, on Russian
parachute troops, 231; on para-
chute troops m Ardennes offen-
sive, 295-6

Stulpnagel, General von, 271 et
seq

Sudetenland, 39, 40, 80

Suez Canal, 162, 169, 170

Supply, influence of, 55, 64-5, 102,
131, 163, 171, 173, 180, 191,
198, 204, 209, 211 et seq., 221,
229, 235, 286, 289, 300, 302,
305; by air, 102, 106, 200-1,
211, 241

Tank Corps, the Royal, 30

Thoma, General von, and armoured
forces, 30, on rise of * Panzers*,
96-7; on armoured warfare m
Spam, 98-9, 173, on invasion
ot Poland, 99; on invasion of
France, 100, 139, on Guderian,
101; on Hitler, 102-3, his
reasons for success of armoured
forces, 102, on invasion of
Russia, 103, 105; his capture
at Alamem, 105, 162, on the
threat to Middle East, 170; on
North Africa, 170-3, on Mont-
gomery, 173, on Goering, 295

Tippelskirch, General von, his
account of Russian invasion,
198, 200, 226, 227, 229, 230

Tobruk, 170, 172

Tunis, 239

" Unconditional surrender "

Policy, 304
United States of America, enters

war, 82, 162; and invasion of

Normandy, 236, 243, et seq.;

break through at Avranches,

320

Index

United States of America (continued)
262-4; Blumentritt's opinion of,
267-8

Urals, the, 204, 209

Versailles Treaty, 18, 87, 96
Vichy Government, the, 239, 240
Voronezh, 190, 191, 200, 210, 216
Voss, Admiral, 44, 158
V-weapons, 246, 272
Vyasma, 49, 193, 198

Wietersheim, General von, 137,
147-8

Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry

Maitland, 175
Witzleben, Field-Marshal von, 270*-

275

Wood, Major-General John S», 30

Youth, Hitler, movement, 266
Yugo-Slavia, 178

Warumont, General, 272, 292
Warsaw, 42, 53, 101, 226
Wavell, Field-Marshal Sir Archibald,

57, 163
Weichs, General von, 135
Weygand, General, 144, 151
Weygand Line, the, 147

Zeitzler, General, replaces Haider,
64, 217; is promoted, 65, dis-
agrees with Hitler, 66, 218; is
discharged, 67; his influence on
Hitler, 225; and Dieppe landing,
238

Zhukov, Marshal, 196, 231